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LABOR RELATIONS LAW
I. REPRESENTATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY
A. Elections
1. The Coercive Effect of Pro-union Supervision in Union Elections:
ITT Lighting Fixtures, Division of ITT Corp. v. NLRB'
The National Labor Relations Board (the Board), which is charged with the respon-
sibility of overseeing union elections,' has stated that its function is one of ensuring that
"employees have the opportunity to cast their ballots for or against a labor organization in
an atmosphere conducive to the sober and informed exercise of the franchise, free not
only from the interference, restraint, or coercion violative of the Act, but also from other
elements which prevent or impede a reasoned choice."' One way in which employees' free
choice may be threatened is by a supervisor's participation in the union election.' The
Board has noted that when a supervisor encourages employees to support the union
during an election a two-fold threat exists: (1) the supervisor's pro-union stance may lead
the employees to believe that the employer supports the union, and (2) employees might
be coerced into supporting the union out of fear of retaliation by the pro-union super-
visor.' Accordingly, if it can be shown that the supervisor's conduct tended to have a
coercive effect on the employees' free choice, the election will be declared invalid. 6 Where
the supervisor has not threatened the employees with retaliation, the Board will look at
two factors to determine whether the supervisor's actions had a coercive effect: (1) the
degree of supervisory authority, and (2) the extent, nature, and openness of the pro-
union activity.'
In determining the authority possessed by the supervisor, the courts, as well as the
Board, have focused on the supervisor's ability to affect adversely the employees' work
conditions.s Yet the definition of "supervisor" found in the National Labor Relations Act
includes the ability to reward as well as to retaliate.' Nevertheless, because most cases arise
* By David P. Curtin, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE Law REVIEW.
712 F.2d 40, 114 L.R.R.M. 2067 (2d Cir. 1983).
' 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982).
3 Sewell Manufacturing Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 70, 50 L.R.R.M. 1532, 1534 (1962).
▪ Catholic Medical Ctr. of Brooklyn v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 20, 22, 104 L.R.R.M. 2186, 2187.88 (2d
Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Handy Hardware Wholesale, Inc., 542 F.2d 935, 938, 93 L.R.R.M. 2881, 2883
(5th Cir. 1976).
5 Turner's Express, Inc., 189 N.L.R.B. 106, 107, 76 L.R.R.M. 1562, 1563 (1971).
• Catholic Medical Ctr. of Brooklyn v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 20, 22, 104 L.R.R.M. 2186, 2187 (2d Cir.
1980); NLRB v. Alamo Express, Inc., 430 F.2d 1032, 1035, 74 L.R.R.M. 1562, 1563 (5th Cir. 1971).
• ITT Lighting Fixtures, Division of ITT Corporation, 658 F.2d 934, 937, 108 L.R.R.M. 2281,
2283 (2d Cir. 1981).
• See NLRB v. Handy Hardware Wholesale, Inc., 542 F.2d 935, 938, 93 L.R.R.M. 2881, 2883
(5th Cir. 1976); Delchamps, Inc., 210 N.L.R.B. 179, 180, 86 L.R.R.M. 1166, 1167(1974); Flint Motor
Inn Company, 194 N.L.R.B. 733, 734, 79 L.R.R.M. 1040, 1041-42 (1971).
9 Section 2(1 1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1982), states: "The
term 'supervisor' means any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees . .
. or effectively recommend such actions . . ."
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from supervisors' punishment of employees,'" the judicial emphasis has naturally been on
supervisors' retaliatory powers.
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
realigned the focus of determinations about whether the pro-union activities of a super-
visor have affected the outcome of a union election by requiring the Board to consider the
supervisor's ability to reward employees as well as punish them." In ITT Lighting Fixtures,
Division of ITT Corp. v. NLRB," the Second Circuit held that pro-union activity during a
union election by workers who possessed the authority to affect favorably the working
conditions of fellow employees, constituted coercion sufficient to warrant vacating the
results of the election As a result, courts called upon to measure the degree of coercion
in a union election will now examine the participants' ability to make any significant
change, beneficial as well as detrimental, in other employees' working conditions.
ITT Lighting Fixtures concerned a company's challenge of a union election on the
grounds that some of the participants were supervisors within the meaning of the
National Labor Relations Act (the Act).'" An election had been held in which the UAW
had been chosen as the exclusive bargaining representative of ITT's employees.' 5 The
company challenged the election, charging that the public, "pervasive," pro-union ac-
tivities of a group of fifty-one supervisors ("the groupleaders") had tainted the election.'"
Following an evidentiary hearing, the Hearing Officer agreed that the groupleaders were
all supervisors but held that they were "minor" supervisors who lacked sufficient coercive
authority to affect the election .' 7 The Regional Director, upon review of the findings of
the Hearing Officer, sustained the company's challenges to eleven of the group but found
the evidence inconclusive as to the others.'" Nevertheless, the Director held that determin-
ing the status of the remaining groupleaders was unnecessary because their votes would
not have changed the outcome of the election.'" Moreover, he concluded that the Hearing
Officer had been correct in holding that the groupleaders were "minor" supervisors and
could not.affect the employment status of the other employees.'"
In reviewing the Regional Director's decision, the Board limited the scope of its
review to the issue of whether the remaining groupleaders were supervisors." The Board
found four more groupleaders to be supervisors but agreed with the Regional Director
that the votes of the groupleaders would not have altered the election results." Accord-
"'See NLRB v. Handy Hardware Wholesale, Inc., 542 F.2d 935 , 938, 93 L.R.R.M. 2881, 2883
(5th Cir. 1976); Delchamps, Inc., 210 N.L.R.B. 179, 180, 86 L.R.R.M. 1166, 1167(1974); Flint Motor
Inn Company, 194 N.L.R.B. 733, 734, 79 L.R.R.M. 1040, 1041-42 (1971).
" ITT Lighting Fixtures, Division of ITT Corporation v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 40, 44, 114 L.R.R.M.
2067, 2070 (2d Cir. 1983).
712 F.2d 40, 114 L.R.R.M, 2067 (2d Cir. 1983).
13 Id. at 45, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2071..
' 4 Id. at 41, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2068.
Id. at 42, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2068-69.
" Id. at 42, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2069.
' 7 Id.
'9 Id.
19 Id. Of the 364 ballots cast, 175 were for the union, 153 were against the union, and thirty-four
were challenged and not counted (of which thirty-one were cast by the groupleaders). Id.
" Id.
21 Id.
Id.
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ingly, the Board certified the election. 33
 The company subsequently refused to bargain
with the UAW, and the Board issued an order to compel it to do so."
The company then petitioned the court of appeals for review of the Board's order. 33
Upon review of the administrative proceedings, the court concluded that these proceed-
ings had missed the crucial issue to be decided in the case: whether the employees' free
choice in the election had been diminished by the pro-union activities of the grouplead-
ers.23
 Emphasizing the coercive potential of the groupleaders' union support," the court
noted that neither the Board nor the Regional Director had explained by what criteria
they had distinguished "major" from "minor" supervisors.'" The court, therefore, re-
manded the case to the Board for a finding of whether the groupleaders' activities tended
to have a coercive effect on the employees in a way that would have impaired free
choice.'
On remand the Board issued a Supplemental Decision and Order that concluded
that "[Ole type of day-to-day supervisory authority possessed by these groupleaders
simply did not afford the opportunity for effective retaliation against anti-union employ-
ees . . ."3° Based on this finding, the Board affirmed its earlier decision that the
groupleaders' activities did not sufficiently affect the other employees' freedom of choice
to warrant setting aside the election. 3 ' ITT Lighting Fixtures, once again, petitioned the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to set aside the Board's order. 32
The Second Circuit granted ITT's petition and set aside the election. 33 In so holding,
the court criticized the Board's assessment of the groupleaders' coercive authority solely
according to their ability to affect the other employees' working conditions adversely.' The
court reasoned that supervisory authority consists of the power to reward in addition to
the power to retaliate. 3' The court noted that this power to reward, that is, the power to
give one employee an advantage over another, could have a coercive effect equal to the
effect of the power to punish. 33
 Accordingly, the court stated that the Board should also
consider the supervisor's ability to grant or recommend transfer, favorable work assign-
ments, and overtime assignments. 37
 Moreover, the court found that both statutory au-
thority33 and the Board's prior decisions39
 support the inclusion of the power to reward in
the criteria for determining supervisor status.
" Id.
" Id. The Board found that ITT had violated sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5) and (1) (1982). 712 F.2d at 42, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2069.
.5
	 Lighting Fixtures, 712 F.2d at 42, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2069. This earlier decision is reported at
658 F.2d 934, 108 L.R.R.M. 2281 (2d Cir. 1981).
" ITT Lighting Fixtures, 712 F.2d at 42, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2069. See ITT Lighting Fixtures,
Division of ITT Corporation, 658 F.2d 934, 940, 108 L.R.R.M. 2281, 2284 (2d Cir. 1981).
" ITT Lighting Fixtures, 712 F.2d at 42.43, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2069.
"" Id. at 43, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2069.
" Id, at 43, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2070.
39 Id. (quoting the Board's decision, 265 N.L.R.B. 188, 112 L.R.R.M. 1136 (1982)).
" Id.
32 Id. at 41, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2068.
a' Id. at 45, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2071.
34 Id. at 44, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2070.
25 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
39 Id. (citing section 2(11) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1982)).
39 Id. (citing Delchamps, Inc., 210 N.L.R.B. 179, 86 L.R.R.M. 1166 (1974) and Flint Motor Inn
Company, 194 N.L.R.B. 733, 79 L.R.R.M. 1040 (1971)).
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Turning to the facts of the case, the court found that fifty-one employees could
possibly have been influenced by the groupleaders' activities" — enough to reverse the
outcome of the election." The court noted that three of the groupleaders, together
supervising thirty-one employees, possessed a significant degree of authority to reward
subordinates'''. and that they had encouraged those subordinates to support the union."
In addition, the court found that another groupleader, who was in charge of twenty
employees, had the authority to choose workers for overtime." According to the court,
the Board had recognized that she exerted a measure of authority but had dismissed the
impact of that authority because it was subject to the approval of her supervisor." The
court disagreed, noting that the statutory definition of "supervisor" required only that she
be able to exercise independent judgment in making her recommendations." The court
ruled that she had this ability and further noted that her supervisor generally approved
her recommendations after only a cursory investigation." Taken together, the court
determined that these four groupleaders exercised enough authority over fifty-one em-
ployees to change the result of the election.'" In light of the groupleaders' power to
reward and punish their subordinates, the court found that the election could not be
characterized as having been held in an atmosphere free from coercive influences.'"
Having given the Board two opportunities to demonstrate the validity of the election, the
court concluded that the proper action was to vacate the Board's order and set aside the
election.5°
The Second Circuit's decision in ITT Lighting Fixtures is not a departure from prior
law. Instead, the decision is a re-emphasis of the aspect of reward in considering a
supervisor's influence. As the court noted, previous cases had included the power to
reward in their determination of the supervisory power.'" Moreover, the statutory defini-
tion of "supervisor" includes a specific reference to the power to reward." Yet both the
case law and the statute mention the supervisor's beneficient authority only in conjunction
with the ability to affect other employees adversely.'" The court in ITT Lighting Fixtures,
however, separates these powers and emphasizes that the power to retaliate is not a
necessary element of supervisory authority." Instead, an individual can be found to be a
supervisor solely on the basis of the ability to reward other 5 5
4° Id. at 45, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2071.
" Id. The court noted that the groupleaders' votes would not have affected the election results
and, rather, regarded the proper issue as whether their union activity, combined with their authority,
could have affected enough other votes to influence the election. Id. at 44, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2071.
42 Id. at 44, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2071.
43 Id.
" Id,
45 Id.
" Id. at 45, 119 L.R,R.M. at 2071.
" Id.
" Id.
" Id.
5° Id.
51 See NLRB v. Handy Hardware Wholesale, Inc., 542 F.2d 935, 938, 93 L.R.R.M. 2881, 2883
(5th Cir. 1976); Delchamps, Inc., 210 N.L.R.B. 179, 180, 86 L.R.R.M. 1166, 1167 (1974); Flint Motor
Inn Company, 194 N.L.R.B. 733, 734, 79 L.R.R.M. 1040, 1041-42 (1971).
52 See section 2(11) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1982).
'3
 See, e.g., NLRA section 2(11) ("layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward . . ."); and
Delchamps, Inc., 210 N.L.R.B. 179, 180, 86 L.R.R.M. 1166, 1167 ("the meat department managers ..
. possess the authority to
	 . reprimand, discipline, and recommend pay raises . . .").
" 177' Lighting Fixtures, 712 F.2d at 44, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2070.
u Id.
at 44-45, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2071.
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Apart from having substantial support from the statute and case law, the ITT Lighting
Fixtures approach. to defining supervisory authority is especially meaningful within the
context of a union election. To validate a union election, a court should be certain that the
election was held in an atmosphere free from any coercive influences that would taint the
results. An employee can be coerced as much by a promise of reward as by a threat of
retaliation. Accordingly, to measure the degree of coercion in a union election, ITT
Lighting Fixtures requires a court to examine the participants' ability to affect any sig-
nificant alteration in other employees' terms of employment — whether the alteration is
to the benefit or detriment of the employees.
2. *Exacerbation of Racial Tensions During Pre-Representation Election Period:
NLRB v. Eurodrive, Inc.'
Section 9(c)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) provides that the
authority to conduct representation elections for purposes of collective bargaining rests
with the National Labor Relations Board (Board). 2 A party objecting to the validity of an
election on grounds of improper pre-election conduct bears the burden of proving by
specific evidence that the election was unfair." Pursuant to Board rules and regulations,
where the objecting party in a case involving a consent election' files exceptions to the
election which raise substantial and material factual issues, the Board may order a
hearing." The evidence presented by the objecting party must present a prima facie case
for setting aside the election." The United States Supreme Court has noted that Congress
has granted the Board a wide degree of discretion in establishing the requisite procedures
and safeguards necessary to insure the fair and free choice by employees of bargaining
representatives.' Section 10(e) of the Act limits judicial review to determining whether
o By Cynthia Terzakis, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 724 F.2d 556, 115 L.R.R.M. 2361 (6th Cir. 1984).
o 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1982).
• Harlan #4 Coal Co. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 117, 120, 85 L.R.R.M. 2312, 2314 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 416 U.S..986, 86 L.R.R.M. 2156 (1974) (company did not sustain burden where substantial
evidence supported Board's findings). Accord, NLRB v. Basic Wire Products, Inc., 516 F.2d 261, 263,
89 L.R.R.M. 2257, 2258 (6th Cir. 1975).
o Under the Board's rules and regulations, two types of consent arrangements may be entered
into to informally resolve representation disputes. 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.62(a), (b) (1983). In the first, a
consent election agreement, upon the filing of a petition and with the consent of the Regional
Director of the Board, the employer, any individual, or any labor organization representing a
substantial number of employees involved may agree to an election waiving a hearing on all matters.
29 C.F.R. § 102.62(a). Under the consent election agreement, the parties agree to be bound by the
rulings and determinations made by the appropriate regional director. Id. His conclusions have the
same force and effect as if issued by the Board. Id.
In the second, the parties may enter into a stipulation for certification agreement which waives
only the right to a hearing before the election. 29 C.F.R. § 102.62(b). In the stipulation for
certification agreement, the Board, not the Regional Director, makes the final determination of
disputes under an appeal procedure. Id. In Eurodrive, the parties entered into a Stipulation for
Certification Upon Consent Election, thereby affording them Board review. Eurodrive, 724 F.2d at
557, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2361. For objection procedures see infra note 32.
o 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(e)( I) (1983). See, e.g., NLRB v. Tennessee Packers, Inc., Frosty Morn
Division, 379 F.2d 172, 177-78, 65 L.R.R.M. 2619, 2622 (6th Cir. 1967).
• See, e.g., NLRB v. Silverman's Men's Wear, Inc., 656 F.2d 53, 55, 107 L.R.R.M. 3273, 3274 (3d
Cir. 1981); Anchor Inns, Inc. v. NLRB, 644 F.2d 292, 296, 106 L.R.R.M. 2860, 2863 (3d Cir. 1981).
7
 NLRB v. A. J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330, 19 L.R.R.M. 2128, 2131 (1946) (Board properly
refused to accept employer's post-election challenge to eligibility of voter who participated in consent
election).
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there is substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support the Board's findings.'
Although the Board in conducting representation elections strives to achieve "labora-
tory" conditions as nearly ideal as possible to enable employees to express their uninhi-
bited desires,' courts have recognized that "clinical asepsis" in union organization efforts
is not a practical or attainable goal. 1° Consequently, the Board and the reviewing courts
have allowed some degree of propagandizing." Generally, the Board considers exaggera-
tion, inaccuracies, half-truths and name calling to be legitimate propaganda." Although
the Board recognizes that some appeal to prejudice is inevitable, campaign propaganda
which seeks to overemphasize and exacerbate racial feelings may be deemed grounds for
setting aside an election."
In Sewell Manufacturing Company," the Board adopted a standard for determining the
acceptability of racially related election propaganda. According to that standard, the
Board will not set an election aside where a party limits itself to truthfully setting forth
another party's position on racial matters and does not deliberately seek to exacerbate
racial feelings.' The Board declared in Sewell that the burden of establishing that a racial
8 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982). Courts recognize that in reviewing the Board's conclusions, they
may not consider the issues involved de novo and cannot choose between conflicting inferences, even
if they would have arrived at a different result. See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 488, 27 L.R.R.M. 2373, 2378 (1951); NLRB v. Tennessee Packers, Inc., Frosty Morn Division,
379 F.2d 172, 180, 65 L.R.R.M. 2619, 2624 (fith Cir. 1967) (substantial evidence supported Board's
finding that employer's adoption and clarification of work rules conferred benefits and was not
merely a routine decision).
9 General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127, 21 L.R.R.M. 1337, 1341 (1948) (interrogation of
employees by foreman concerning union involvement destroyed laboratory conditions). Accord,
Sewell Manufacturing Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 70, 50 L.R.R.M. 1532, 1534 (1962).
15 NLRB v. Sumter Plywood Corp., 535 F.2d 917, 920, 92 L.R.R.M. 3508, 3510-11 (5th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1082, 94 L.R.R.M. 2643 (1977) (racial orientation of campaign which
appealed to ethnic pride and unity did not warrant refusal to certify union).
" Id. See also EDM of Texas, 245 N.L.R.B. 934, 936, 102 L.R.R.M. 1405, 1405-06 (1979);
Hollywood Ceramics Co., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 224 n.6, 51 L.R.R.M. 1600, 1601 n.6 (1962).
EDM of Texas, 245 N.L.R.B. 934, 936, 102 L.R.R.M. 1405, 1405-06 (1979) (fact that director
of manufacturing did not intentionally utter deprecatory anti-union remarks not a defense to section
8(a)(1) violation) (citing Hollywood Ceramics Co., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 224 n.6, 51 L.R.R.M, 1600,
1601 n.6 (1962)). Accord, Baker Canning Co. v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 574, 576, 87 L.R.R.M. 3142, 3143
(7th Cir. 1974).
18 Sewell Manufacturing Co., Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 71, 50 L.R.R.M. 1532, 1534 (1962) (second
election warranted because racial comments not germane to any legitimate issue of election and
served only to exacerbate racial tensions).
" 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 50 L.R.R.M. 1532 (1962). In Sewell, two weeks before the election the
employer mailed to employees a picture of a black man and a white woman dancing. Id. at 66, 50
L.R.R.M. at 1532. The picture had a bold face caption indicating the union's endorsement of racial
integration and equality. Id. The employer also sent its employees a reproduction of a newspaper
article and accompanying photo of a white union leader dancing with a black woman. Id. at 66-67, 50
L.R.R.M. at 1532. The company president enclosed a letter setting forth reasons why he would vote
against the union if permitted to do so. Id. at 67, 50 L.R.R.M. at 1532. Included among his reasons
was his objection to paying assessments to a union to promote political Objectives such as the NAACP
and the Congress of Racial Equality. Id.
The Board in Sewell recognized that some racial statements are to be tolerated because they are
true and because they pertain to matters, such as the union's position on racial integration, which
employees are entitled to know. Id. at 71, 50 L.R.R.M. at 1534. Finding that the conduct in the case
was not germane to any legitimate issue and only served to exacerbate racial tensions, the Board in
Sewell directed that a second election be held. Id. at 72, 50 L.R.R.M. at 1535.
18 Id. at 71-72, 50 L.R.R.M. at 1535.
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message is truthful and germane rests with the party making the statement." Where there
is doubt as to whether the total conduct of the party falls within permissible bounds, the
doubt will be resolved against him."
During the Survey year, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in NLRB v. Eurodrive, Inc.
denied enforcement of a Board order requiring the company to bargain with the union."
The court found that the undisputed facts were sufficient to establish that a union
organizer had engaged in a subtle, but deliberate, attempt to exacerbate existing racial
tension.' Such conduct, the court held, was likely to have affected appreciably the
employees' decision to vote for or against union representation." Although the distinc-
tion between permissible and impermissible racial statements has never been an easy line
to draw, 2 ' courts evaluate the context in which the statements were made" and the total
conduct of the party involved. 23 NLRB v. Eurodrive, Inc. indicates that the threshold level
of tolerability may be lower where parties have knowledge of pre-existing racial tension in
the work environment.
The dispute in Eurodrive involved statements made by a Teamster organizer at two
pre-election meetings held for employees," Eight days prior to the election, the organizer
suggested that the union was necessary to safeguard the rights of white employees who,
unlike black employees, were not covered by equal protection laws." In support of his
contention, the union organizer referred to the recent dismissal of a white employee who
was discharged for racially harassing the company's only black employee." Claiming that
this incident exemplified the "white's need for protection," the organizer promised that
the union could and would obtain the discharged employee's reinstatement with back
pay." During the employee meeting, the organizer singled out the black employee and
stated that were he to sign a statement provided by the union, the discharged employee's
reinstatement would be assured." At a second meeting held on the eve of the election, the
union organizer repeated his promise to obtain the reinstatement of the discharged
employee. 29
Subsequently, in the Board-conducted election, the union received fifteen of the
twenty-eight ballots cast," The company, claiming that the union's appeal to the racial
" Id. at 72, 50 L.R.R.M. at 1535.
" Id.
" NLRB v. Eurodrive, Inc., 724 F.2d 556, 560, 115 L.R.R.M. 2361, 2364 (6th Cir. 1984).
" Id.
20 Id.
See,e.g., Bancroft Manufacturing Co., Inc., 210 N.L.R.B. 1007, 1007, 86 L.R.R.M. 1376, 1378
(1974) (statement, "If blacks did not stay together as a group and the Union lost the election all the
blacks would be fired," constituted neither appeal to racial prejudice nor attempt to inflame racial
hatred and, therefore, did not warrant setting aside election).
22 See, e.g., NLRB v. General Telephone Directory Co., 602 F.2d 912, 915, 102 L.R.R.M. 2487,
2488 (9th Cir. 1979) (prior to determining whether an employer's pre-election statements are
protected, a court will consider the context in which they were made).
23 See, e.g., Sewell Manufacturing Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 71, 50 L.R.R.M. 1532, 1534 (1962).
24
 NLRB v. Eurodrive, Inc., 724 F.2d at 557, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2362.
Id.
26 Id. Despite repeated warnings from the employer, the harassing employee continued to make
racial slurs, jokes, and insults. Id. Eurodrive consequently fired the harassing employee. Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
3° Id. at 557, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2361.
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prejudice of the electorate interfered with the employees' ability to make a reasoned
choice in the election,' requested that either the election be set aside or a hearing be
held.32
 After investigating the company's allegations, the Regional Director of the Board
recommended that the employer's objections be dismissed." Adopting the Regional
Director's recommendations, the .Board certified the union as the bargaining representa-
tive and denied the employer's subsequent motion for reconsideration." The company,
however, refused to bargain with the newly elected union." The union then filed an
unfair labor practice charge with the Board."
The Board held that because the union had been certified as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees, the employer had an obligation to bargain with the
union.37
 The Board rejected the employer's challenge to the validity of the union's
certification, finding that it was an attempt to relitigate issues raised and determined in
the underlying representation case." In view of the employer's failure to present any
newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence or any special circumstances which
would warrant the reconsideration of the decision made in the representation proceed-
ing, the Board granted the union's motion for summary judgment." The Board deter-
mined that the employer's refusal to bargain with the union constituted an unfair labor
31 Id. at 557 n.1, 557-58, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2361 n.1, 2362.
33
 Id. at 557, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2361. The company initially raised four objections to the election,
but only appealed the Board's decision with respect to the racial issue. Id, at n.1.
The Board's rules and regulations provide that any party may file objections and present
evidence to the Regional Director with regard to the conduct of the election or to conduct affecting
the results of the election, stating the reasons for the objections. 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(a) (1983). If
timely objections are filed, the Regional Director conducts an investigation of the objections or
challenges to the election. 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(c)(1) (1983). If a stipulation for certification agreement
has been entered into, as in Eurodrive,see supra note 4, the Regional Director presents to the parties a
report on the objections, including his recommendations. 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(c)(2) (1983). The
parties may file exceptions to the report and supporting documents with the Board in Washington.
Id. An opposing party may then file an answering brief and supporting documents with the Board in
Washington. Id,
If the Board determines that the exceptions to the report do not raise substantial and material
issues with respect to the conduct or results of the election, the Board may decide the election upon
the record or may make other disposition of the case. 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(f). If, however, it appears to
the Board that the exceptions do raise substantial and material factual issues, it may direct the
Regional Director or other Board agent to serve a notice of hearing on the parties concerning the
exceptions. Id.
If the Board denies the request for review, the denial serves as an affirmance of the Regional
Director's action and also precludes relitigation of any issues in any related subsequent unfair labor
practice proceeding. 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.67(f), 102.69(f) (1983). Where review is granted, the Board
will consider the entire record in light of the grounds relied upon for review. 29 G.F.R. § 102.67(g)
(1983).
33
	 v. Eurodrive, Inc., 724 F.2d at 557, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2361.
" Eurodrive, Inc., 260 N.L.R.B. 1466, 1467, 109 L.R.R.M. 1344, 1344 (1982).
35
 NLRB v. Eurodrive, Inc., 724 F.2c1 at 557, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2362.
3.3 Id.
37
 Eurodrive, Inc., 260 N.L.R.B. 1466, 1467, 109 L.R.R.M. 1344, 1344 (1982).
35
 Id. The Board referred to Pittsburg Plate Glass Co, v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 162, 8 L.R.R.M.
425, 431 (1941), where the Court held that a company or union desiring to relitigate an issue
presented in a prior representation proceeding must indicate in some way that the evidence they
wish to offer is more than cumulative. Id. Absent such a showing, a single trial of the issue suffices. Id.
See, e.g., Rules and Regulations of the Board, 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.67(f) and 102.69(c) (1983).
ss Eurodrive, Inc., 260 N.L.R.B. at 1467, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1344.
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practice in violation of Sections 8(a)(1) and (5)." Accordingly, the Board ordered the
employer to cease its unfair labor practice and commence collective bargaining with the
union."
On appeal by the employer, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied enforcement
of the Board's bargaining order," Citing with approval the principle enunciated by the
Board in Sewell Manufacturing Company, Inc. , 43 the court maintained that an election will be
set aside when the objecting party demonstrates that pre-election conduct is an attempt to
exacerbate racial feelings through a deliberate appeal to racial prejudice." Applying the
principle set forth in Sewell and subsequent case law," the Sixth Circuit stated that an
effective appeal to racial prejudice is material" and prima facie warrants setting aside an
election. 47 Accordingly the court maintained that the union organizer's pre-election
statements must be analyzed in terms of the atmosphere of racial tension that existed at
the time the statements were made."
In analyzing the pre-election atmosphere in Eurodrive, the court noted that racial
tensions existed among employees prior to the election." The court accepted the Board's
conclusion that the racial tension did not result from the union's pre-election conduct."
The Sixth Circuit, however, stressed that the determination of whether pre-election
" Id. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer —
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 7." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act states: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer — (5) to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of
section 9(a)." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
The rights of employees are detailed in Section 7 of the Act which reads in relevant part:
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ... ." 29 U.S.C. §
157 (1982).
41 Eurodrive, Inc., 260 N.L.R.B. at 1467, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1344.
42 NLRB v. Eurodrive, Inc., 724 F.2d 556, 560, 115 L.R.R.M. 2361, 2364 (6th Cir. 1984).
43 See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
" NLRB v. Eurodrive, Inc., 724 F.2d at 558, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2362 (quoting Sewell Manufactur-
ing Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 71, 50 L.R.R.M. 1532, 1534 (1962)).
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Katz, 701 F.2d 703, 705, 112 L.R.R.M. 3024, 3026 (7th Cir. 1983)
(company's allegation that pre-election racial and religious slurs were made at union organizational
meeting established prima facie case for setting aside election); NLRB v. Silverman's Men's Wear,
Inc., 656 F.2d 53, 58, 107 L.R.R.M. 3273, 3276 (3d Cir. 1981) (court stated that principle to be
applied from Sewell is that effective appeal to racial prejudice prima facie warrants setting aside
election).
" NLRB v. Eurodrive, Inc., 724 F.2d at 559, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2363 (citing Sewell Manufacturing
Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 71, 50 L.R.R.M. 1532, 1534 (1962)).
NLRB v. Eurodrive, Inc., 724 F.2d at 558, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2363 (quoting NLRB v. Silver-
man's Men's Wear, Inc., 656 F.2d 53, 58, 107 L.R.R.M. 3273, 3276 (3d Cir. 1981)). In Silverman, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals evaluated a union secretary-treasurer's characterization of the
company vice-president as a "stingy Jew." 656 F.2d at 57, 107 L.R.R.M. at 3276. The court in
Silverman indicated that knowledge of the vice-president's religion was not relevant to the employees'
right to make an informed choice for or against unionism, and condemned use of remarks which
serve no purpose except to exploit religious prejudices. Id. at 58, 107 L.R.R.M. at 3276.
" NLRB v. Eurodrive, Inc., 724 F.2d at 559, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2363.
" Id. at n.5.
'° Id.
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conduct had an impact on employee free choice does not necessarily depend on who was
initially responsible for the racial tension." Deliberate attempts to exacerbate existing
racial tensions prior to an election, the Eurodrive court asserted, render a party equally
culpable as a party who creates the tension in the first instance."
In examining the union organizer's statements of the "white's need for protection" in
light of existing racial tensions, the court determined that the statements by themselves,
without further reference to the incident culminating in the white employee's discharge,
would not have been sufficient to establish an intent to aggravate racial feelings. 53
 The
court noted, however, that the union organizer did not simply inform employees of the
benefits that would accrue under employment laws or as a result of unionization."
Instead, he explicitly referred to the racially-related discharge, singled out the black
employee, and promised that if the harassed individual cooperated, the union could
obtain the discharged white employee's reinstatement with back pay. 55 The Eurodrive
court characterized the racial statements as "tangentially related" to legitimate campaign
issues." The court maintained, however, that both the context of the remarks and the
total conduct involved placed undue emphasis on a racial issue which the union organizer
"must have known" would exacerbate an already tense environment. 57 Finding that the
deliberate appeal to racial prejudice raised a substantial and material issue which inter-
fered with the employees' free choice," the Eurodrive court held that the Board abused its
discretion in denying the employer's request for a rehearing."
The Eurodrive court, therefore, proceeded to determine the appropriate disposition
of the case. The court recognized that the normal procedure for a review of a substantial
and material question of fact is to remand to the Board for a hearing." The court
asserted, however, that a remand in this case would serve no useful purpose, since the
evidence was undisputed that the pre-election statements were made in an existing
atmosphere of racial tension. 5 ' Consequently, the court stated that the only remaining
task was to determine the likely impact of the statements upon the electorate.' Pointing to
the relatively small size of the proposed bargaining unit and the improbability that any
employee would be unaware of the racial incident s3 the court found that the statements
were likely to have an appreciable impact on the employees' free choice in the election."
5 ' Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 559, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2363.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 559, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2363-64.
55 Id. at 559, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2364.
" Id.
58 Id.
58 Id.
" Id.
"' Id. at 560 nn.6 & 7, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2364 nn.6 & 7.
52
 Id. at 560, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2364 (quoting NLRB v. Gorbea, Perez & Morrell, S. en C., 328
F.2d 679, 680, 55 L.R.R.M. 2586, (1st Cir. 1964)) (an inducement is material if objectively it is
unlikely to have an appreciable effect). See also NLRB v. Katz, 701 F.2d 703, 707, 112 L.R.R.M. 3024,
3028 (7th Cir. 1983) (pre-election racial and religious slurs made by a priest at union organizational
meeting could have impaired employees' freedom of choice in election); Advertisers Manufacturing
Co. v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 544, 546-47, 110 L.R.R.M. 2355, 2357 (7th Cir. 1982) (Board did not abuse its
discretion in finding that union secretary-treasurer's characterization of company president as "liar"
did not impair employee free choice in election).
52 NLRB v. Eurodrive, Inc., 724 F.2d at 560, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2364.
64 Id.
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Moreover, the court noted that the effectiveness of the statements was multiplied by the
already existing racial tension resulting from the harassing conduct and ultimate dis-
charge of the offender."
In addition, the court considered the timing of the statements. Because the state-
ments were made twice within the eight day period preceding the election," the court
found that the employer did not have sufficient opportunity to respond."' The court
stated, however, that even had the company been able to respond, it might only have
further intensified the existing heated atmosphere." Concluding that the undisputed
facts were sufficient to establish that the union organizer engaged in a "subtle but
deliberate attempt" to exacerbate existing racial tension," and that this attempt was likely
to have an appreciable impact on the electorate," the Sixth Circuit denied enforcement of
the Board's bargaining order."
The Eurodrive case is significant for its furtherance of the general Board policy with
respect to the conduct of representation elections and for its vehement condemnation of
intentional appeals to racial prejudice in an emotionally charged working environment.
Eurodrive exemplifies the efforts of courts to monitor the election process in order to
avoid the undesirable result of workers being persuaded to vote for or against a union on
the basis of invidious prejudices they might have against individuals of another back-
ground.'" Consistent with existing case law," Eurodrive demonstrates that messages
sought to be conveyed during the pre-election period can legitimately be accomplished
without appeals directed solely towards the racial prejudice of the electorate. 74
Moreover, the Eurodrive decision remains within the bounds of the general Board
policy of encouraging "laboratory" conditions as nearly ideal as possible for the conduct
of representation elections." While some degree of interference is inevitable in union
organizational efforts," the primary concern in the election process is to ensure that
employees are free from any interference, restraint or coercion which would prevent or
impede a reasoned choice." In view of this standard, the court in Eurodrive determined
that the subtle, but deliberate attempt by the union organizer to aggravate existing racial
tension was likely to have had considerable effect on the employees' decision to vote for or
against union representation.'" Since the court found that the pre-election conduct
destroyed the laboratory conditions by impeding employee free choice, its decision to
deny enforcement of the Board's bargaining order" furthers the policy of the Act.
" Id.
66 Id.
87 Id .
" Id.
ea Id.
" Id.
1 ' Id.
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Sumter Plywood Corp., 535 F.2d 917, 924-25, 92 L.R.R.M. 3508, 3514 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1092, 94 L.R.R.M. 2643 (1974) (racial orientation of campaign which
appealed to ethnic pride and unity did not warrant refusal to certify union).
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Silverman's Men's Wear, Inc., 656 F.2d 53, 107 L.R.R.M. 3273 (3d Cir.
1981) discussed supra note 47.
" NLRB v. Eurodrive, Inc., 724 F.2d at 560, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2364.
" See, e.g., General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R,B. 124, 127, 21 L.R.R.M. 1337, 1341 (1948).
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Sumter Plywood Corp., 535 F.2d at 920, 92 L.R.R.M. at 3510-11.
77 Sewell Manufacturing Co., 138 N.L.R,B. at 70, 50 L.R.R.M. at 1539.
" NLRB v. Eurodrive, Inc., 724 F.2d at 560, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2364.
" Id.
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Finally, the Eurodrive case establishes the relevance of the statement maker's knowl-
edge of existing racial tensions. The court declared in Eurodrive that interference with the
employees' ability to make a well reasoned choice does not depend solely upon the
creation of the racial tension, but may result as well from the deliberate attempt to
exacerbate an existing problem.' The court in Eurodrive explicitly stated that the chal-
lenged remarks in themselves were insufficient to establish any particular intent to
intensify racial animosity. 81 At several points, however, the court indicated that it was the
statement maker's knowledge of the previous racial incident and his "deliberate" attempt
to exploit the situation to the union's advantage which rendered the conduct objectiona-
ble." Moreover, regardless of whether the union organizer had knowledge of the effect
of his statements, the court found that his awareness of the underlying racial animosity
was sufficient to render him liable for the outcome of his conduct."
As a result of NLRB v. Eurodrive, Inc., parties involved in a representation election
must exercise greater caution in using racially related statements when they are aware of
existing racial tensions. The case demonstrates a lowering of the threshold requirement
defining the boundary between permissible and impermissible conduct, at least in a
working environment that is already racially charged. Remarks which by themselves
might not warrant setting aside an election, may, when coupled with knowledge of
underlying racial tension, cross the fine line of acceptability and render the election
invalid.
3. *Provision of Alcoholic Beverages During Polling Hours for Representation Election:
NLRB v. Labor Services, Inc.'
Section 9(c)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) vests the National Labor
Relations Board (Board) with the power to conduct representation elections for purposes
of collective bargaining. 2 Where the Board finds that a question concerning representa-
tion exists, it must then 'direct a secret ballot election of the employees and certify the
results of the election. 3 In monitoring the conduct of the election process, the Board
insists that "laboratory conditions as nearly ideal as possible"' be provided to insure
employee free choices Where the requisite laboratory conditions are not present, as when
" Id. at 559 n.5, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2363 n.5.
"' Id. at 559, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2363.
" The court specifically adverted to the statement maker's knowledge of the existing racial
tensions on at least two specific occasions. See supra notes 26-28, 48-52, 57.
33 NLRB v. Eurodrive, Inc., 724 F.2d at 560, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2364.
* By Cynthia Terzakis, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 721 F.2d 13, 114 L.R.R.M. 3259 (1st Cir. 1983).
2
 29 U.S.C. § 159(0(1) (1982).
3 Id. Valid certification of a union is a prerequisite to an obligation to bargain with the elected
union. NLRB v. Silverman's Men's Wear, Inc., 656 F.2d 53, 54 n.2, 107 L.R.R.M. 3273, 3274 n.2 (3d
Cir. 1981) (citing Pittsburg Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 8 L.R.R.M. 425 (1941)). An
employer who refuses to bargain collectively with a union which has been certified as the exclusive
bargaining representative of its employees commits an unfair labor practice. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)
(1982).
• General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127, 21 L.R.R.M. 1337, 1341 (1948) (questioning by
foreman as to possible resignation from union and interrogation as to whether employees signed
union authorization cards destroyed laboratory conditions).
• Id. at 126, 21 L.R.R.M. at 1340. Accord, Rattan Art Gallery, Ltd., 260 N.L.R.B. 255, 256, 109
L.R.R.M. 1149, 1150 (1982) (laboratory conditions not present because Board's translation of its
Notice of Election into Ilocano language confusing and incomplete).
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pre-election conduct interferes with an employee's ability to make a reasoned choice for
or against union representation, the Board must set aside the election and conduct a new
one.'
In exercising its powers under the Act, the Board has broad, but not unlimited
discretion.' Courts generally accord great deference to the determinations of the Board,
setting aside its findings only for an abuse of discretion in determining that the election
was fairly or not fairly conducted.' Where the Board's determination, however, is reason-
able and is supported by substantial evidence, it normally will be sustained on review. 9
The party challenging the validity of the election proceedings bears a "heavy burden" of
demonstrating that the Board has abused its discretion.°
The provision of refreshments and alcoholic beverages to employees during the
election process has been the subject of litigation concerning possible election interfer-
ence with employees' free choice." The Board has held that the supplying of meals or
alcoholic beverages at a pre-election event does not necessarily destroy employee free
choice.° Absent the existence of an element of coercion, the Board views such activity as
permissible electioneering.' 3 In an illustrative case, the Board in Lach-Simkins Dental
Laboratories, Inc." found that a union-sponsored luncheon, consisting of sandwiches and
soft drinks, which took place in the same building as the polls before and during polling
hours did not interfere with the conduct or the results of the election. 15 In so finding, the
6 General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. at 127, 21 L.R.R.M. at 1341.
NLRB v. Klingler Electric Corp., 656 F.2d 76, 85, 107 L.R.R.M. 3011, 3018 (5th Cir. 1981)
(Board did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside election where Board agent allowed a
bitter, but brief confrontation between a pro-union employee and a company observer); Fall River
Savings Bank v. NLRB, 649 F.2d 50, 53, 107 L.R.R.M. 2653, 2655 (1st Cir. 1981) (Board, which has
"wide degree of discretion," held justified in determining that relatively limited power of managers
involved, as well as absence of threatening conduct, not sufficient to set aside election on grounds of
coercion); New England Lumber Division of Diamond International Corp. v. NLRB, 646 F.2d 1, 3,
107 L.R.R.M. 2165, 2166-67 (1st Cir. 1981) (Board held not to have abused "broad discretion" in
finding that individual presence as an observer of union official did not warrant setting aside
election); NLRB v. Gulf States Canners, Inc„ 634 F.2d 215, 216, 106 L.R.R.M. 2270, 2271 (5th Cir.
1981) (Board did not abuse discretion in refusing to set aside election since objecting party failed to
show that the misconduct involved interference with employees' exercise of free choice to extent that
materially affected the results of the election).
Collins and Aikman Corp. v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 722, 726, 729.30, 66 L.R.R.M. 2280, 2282-83,
2285 (4th Cir. 1967) (Board abused discretion in holding that union conduct in paying employee
excessive amount to be union observer was not likely to influence unduly and mislead the electorate
when casting its votes in a very close election).
9 See supra note 7.
'° See supra note 7.
" See, e.g., Movsovitz & Son, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. 444, 78 L.R.R.M. 1656 (1971) (alleged promise
to purchase beer and whiskey for employees after union won election would not be sufficient basis
for overturning election); Jacqueline Cochran, Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. 837, 71 L.R.R.M. 1395 (1969)
(pre-election Christmas party held by union where food and alcoholic beverages were provided free
of charge held not objectionable conduct); Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 86, 43 L.R.R.M.
1391 (1959) (union-supplied beer and soft drinks at pre-election meeting held not objectionable).
" Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 123 N.L.R.B. at 87-88, 43 L.R.R.M. at 1391-92 (beer and soft drinks
supplied by union at pre-election meeting not objectionable). Accord, Zeller Corp., 115 N.L.R.B. 762,
765, 37 L.R.R.M. 1399, 1400 (1956) (serving of drinks and dinner as part of pre-election activities not
im prop.tr).
13 See supra note 12.
'1 ,186 N.L.R.B. 671, 75 L.R.R.M. 1385 (1970).
" ' Id.
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Board declined to make any sweeping prohibition against the provision of food and
beverages during polling hours.' In Lach-Simkins the Board expressly stated that it would
consider each situation on its own merits.' 7
During the Survey year, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in NLRB v. Labor Services,
Inc." denied enforcement of a Board determination which found that a union represen-
tative who purchased free alcoholic beverages for at least two-thirds of the electorate
before, during, and after the election had not improperly influenced the election results. 19
The court stated that the Board's considerations neither withstood analysis nor reflected
the exercise of any special expertise. 2° Moreover, the First Circuit in denying enforcement
noted that serious implications existed in the case which rendered it different in kind
from existing precedent. 2 ' The court was careful, however, to state that its decision should
not be interpreted as detracting from the general principle of judicial deference to Board
determinations in election proceedings." Consequently, after the Labor Services case,
unions or employers who wish to furnish employees with alcoholic beverages during the
time the polls are open may meet with judicial resistance, unless they can adequately
demonstrate that employee free choice is no more impaired by the provision of alcoholic
beverages than it would be by the furnishing of sandwiches and soft drinks.
The election in question in Labor Services was held between 5:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. at
a Howard Johnson Motor Lodge." At approximately 4:15 ; .m. the union's business
manager and two other men entered the bar of the motor lodge. 24
 Shortly thereafter, the
union business manager greeted five or six other employees of the company when they
entered the bar and told them their drinks would go on his tab." The union business
manager then instructed the bartender not to accept any money from the men involved."
When some of the men who had finished their drinks appeared to be leaving, the union
representative loudly stated that there was still time for another drink before the men had
to vote.' Once again he told them that their drinks would go on his tab." After finishing
their additional drinks, the five or six men started to leave and were told by the business
manager, "fcl]on't forget how to vote." 2° The men returned a few minutes later and
continued to drink on the union agent's tab. 3° Eventually twelve to fifteen employees were
furnished drinks compliments of the union business manager. 3 '
The election resulted in a final vote of thirteen for the union and five against. 32 The
16
	at 672, 75 L.R.R.M. n'. 1385.
' 7 Id.
" 721 F.2d 13, 114 L.R.R.M. 3259 (1st Cir. 1983).
1 ° Id. at 14-15, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3260-61.
'° Id. at 17, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3263.
21 1,1.
" Id.
23 Id. at 14, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3260. The court indicated there were slightly different versions of
the incidents in question but used the factual version given by the employer's witnesses since that
version was accepted by the Regional Director and the Board. Id.
24 Id.
23 Id.
2t1 Id.
22 Id. at 14-15, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3260.
a Id. at 15, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3260.
29 Id.
33 Id.
51 Id.
92 Id. at 14, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3260.
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employer filed objections to the election alleging that the conduct of the business manager
affected the election results." The Regional Director of the Board overruled the employ-
er's objections." In concluding that the union business manager's conduct in furnishing
alcoholic beverages during polling hours did not warrant setting aside the election, the
Regional Director made five findings. 35
 First, he determined that there was no indication
that the union business manager induced the employees in advance to come to the bar or
to vole for the union to get a free drink." Second, the Regional Director found no
evidence of coercive statements." Third, he declared that there was no evidence that any
employee was inebriated." Fourth, he found that the value of the drinks was not
sufficient to interfere with the employees' free choice. 3° Finally, he noted that the incident
occurred outside of the polling area.°
The Board adopted without elaboration the Regional Director's findingsl' and cer-
tified the union as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the employees. 42
When the employer refused to bargain with the union in an attempt to challenge the
validity of the union certification, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging
violations of Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. 43 The Board determined that all the issues
raised by the employer were or could have been litigated in the prior representation
proceedings arethat the employer did not offer any newly discovered evidence." The
Board, therefore, granted the union's motion for summary judgment. 45 In granting the
33 Id. The Board's rules and regulations provide that any party may file objections with, and
present evidence to, the Regional Director regarding the conduct of the election or conduct affecting
the results of the election and state the reasons for the objections. 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(a) (1983). If
timely objections are filed, the Regional Director conducts an investigation of the objections or
challenges. 29 C.F.R, § 102.69(c)(1) (1983). If a stipulation for certification agreement has been
entered into, the Regional Director presents to the parties a report on the objections, including his
recommendations. 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(c)(2) (1983). The parties have ten days from the issuance of
the report to file exceptions to the report and supporting documents with the Board in Washington.
Id. An opposing party may file an answering brief and supporting documents with the Board in
Washington. Id.
If the Board determines that the exceptions to the report do not raise substantial and material
issues with respect to the conduct or result of the election, the Board may decide the election upon
the record or make other disposition of the case. 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(1) (1983). lf, however, it appears
to the Board that the exceptions do raise substantial and material factual issues, it may direct the
Regional Director or other Board agent to serve a notice of hearing on the parties concerning the
exceptions before a hearing officer. Id.
If the Board denies the request for review, the denial serves as an affirmance of the Regional
Director's action and also precludes relitigation of any such issues in any related subsequent unfair
labor practice proceeding. 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.67(f), 102.69(f) (1983). Where review is granted, the
Board will consider the entire record in light of the grounds relied upon for review. 29 C.F.R. §
102.67(g) (1983).
34
 NLRB v. Labor Services, Inc., 721 F.2d at 14, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3260.
33
 Id. at 15, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3261.
33 Id.
37 Id.
33 Id.
33 Id.
" Id.
4 ' Labor Services, Inc., 265 N.L.R,B. 463, 111  L.R.R.M. 1650 (1982).
42
 The Board's Decision and Certification were issued on January 7, 1982. 259 N.L.R.B. 959,
109 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1982).
43 Labor Services, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. at 463-64, 1 1 1 L.R.R.M. at 1650-51. See supra note 3.
44 Id. at 463, Ill L.R.R.M. at 1650-51.
" Id. at 463, l l l L.R.R.M. at 1651.
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motion, the Board determined that the employer had violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of
the Act by refusing to bargain with the union as the exclusive representative of its
employees in the appropriate unit.'"
Finding no rational guidance in the Regional Director's conclusions to justify the
Board's reliance on his determinations, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit re-
manded the case to the Board for further proceedings. 47 Moreover, the court denied
enforcement of the bargaining order due to the grave policy implications for future
elections." The court reasoned that by permitting the union to supply unlimited free
drinks to voters before, during, and after the election, a similar privilege would have td be
accorded the employer." The First Circuit feared that such a "bibulous competition"
would result in an "atavistic return" to voter inducement techniques through the dis-
criminating distribution of alcohol."'
The court in Labor Services rejected the findings of the Regional Director on several
grounds. 51 The court maintained that the absence of advance inducement or coercive
statements cannot realistically make a difference in a case where the union manager
supplied two-thirds of the electorate with alcoholic beverages. 52 Stressing that the effect of
the union agent's activities, not his motives, must be evaluated," the court concluded that
the union business manager's conduct in buying drinks and reminding employees how to
vote could not be justified merely by showing that he did not previously advertise the
provision of free alcoholic beverages for the electorate." Similarly, the court asserted that
the absence of coercive statements is immaterial where the union's method of inducing
electorate support involved friendly influence as opposed to intimidation."
The court also found unpersuasive the Regional Director's reliance on his findings of
the absence of inebriation." The court stated that the Board's standard in evaluating
conduct in representation elections is whether the activities involved reasonably tended to
interfere with the employees' freedom of choice in the election." Interference with
employee free choice, the court reasoned, does not result merely from inebriation but
may exist in other forms, including "induced fellowship."" Similarly, the court rejected
the finding that the value of the drinks provided was insufficient to affect the free choice
of the electorate." The court maintained that the reality and appearance of impropriety
" Id. at 464. 111 L.R.R.M. at 1650-51.
" NLRB v. Labor Services, Inc., 721 F.2d at 15, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3261.
49 Id.
49 Id.
"I Id.
" Id. at 16-17, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3261-62.
52
 Id. at 16, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3261.
s3 Id. (citing Cross Baking Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 1346, 1348, 78 L.R.R.M. 3059, 3060 (1st Cir.
1971)). In Cross Baking, the principal in-plant union advocate assaulted employees who refused to
support the union. 453 F.2d at 1348, 78 L.R.R.M. at 3059. The court held that in determining
whether certification was improper, it must not focus on whether the advocate was a paid union
agent, but rather whether the incident in fact produced an atmosphere of fear and coercion
preventing a fair election. Id.
54 NLRB v. Labor Services, Inc., 721 F.2d at 16, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3261.
55 Id.
58 Id. at 16, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3261-62.
57 Id., 114 L.R.R.M. at 3262 (citing Weyerhaeuser Co., 247 N.L.R.B. 978, 978 n.2, 103 L.R.R.M.
1271, 1272 n.2 (1980)) (Board stated proper standard is whether conduct reasonably tends to
interfere with employee freedom of choice in election).
NLRB v. Labor Services, Inc., 721 F.2d at 16, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3262.
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of supplying complimentary alcoholic beverages is not contingent upon the expenditure
of a specified dollar amount." In support of its position, the court stated that neither state
statutes which proscribe the furnishing of alcoholic beverages nor Board precedent make
such distinctions." The court did note that the Board has found unobjectionable the
giving of money in return for services rendered or in furtherance of the election process
provided the receipt of these items is not contingent on voter support in the election.°
These precedents were inapplicable in the First Circuit's opinion, however, because it
found no suggestion of any service rendered or any assistance given to the election
process which would justify the free provision of alcoholic beverages.°
The court also found unconvincing the final finding of the Regional Director which
condoned the business agent's conduct since the incident occurred outside rather than
inside the polling area." Since by definition, provision of drinks outside the polling place
does not occur in the polling area, the court maintained that the significance of this
determination was more "descriptive" than "exculpatory."" In so finding, however, the
court recognized the tension between the Board's objective of providing an employee with
a voting environment as free from interference as possible" and the practical considera-
tion of evaluating the actual facts in light of "realistic standards" of conduct. 67 The court
distinguished Boston Insulated Wire and Cable Cornpany 68 in which union pamphleteering
was permitted outside glass-paneled doors ten feet from the polling place. 69 The court
reasoned that the effects of pamphleteering dissipate once the employees enter the
building to vote, whereas the psychological and physical effects of rounds of drinks in an
adjacent bar linger and enter the polling area. 76
Following its rejection of all five of the Regional Director's findings as unsubstan-
tiated, the First Circuit noted that there was no precedent concerning the furnishing of
free liquor during an election!' The court indicated that the cases dealing with the
provision of free alcoholic beverages all involved pre-election promises which were to
have a post-election effect." In the court's opinion, Laeh -Sitnkins Dental Laboratories, Inc.,
involving a complimentary lunch of sandwiches and soft drinks provided by the union in
the polling building before and during the polling hours" was perhaps the closest
precedent." The Labor Services court noted that in determining that the luncheon did not
66 Id.
61 Id.
6' Id. at n.4.
63 Id. at 16, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3262.
6' Id. at 17, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3262.
66 Id,
66 Id. (citing Milchem, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 362, 69 L.R.R.M. 1395 (1968)) (Board held "the final
minutes before an employee casts his vote shall be his own, as free from interference as possible.").
" NLRB v. Labor Services, Inc., 721 F.2d at 17, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3262 (citing Liberal Market,
Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1481, 1482, 34 L.R.R.M. 1270, 1271 (1954)) (Board held that an election must be
appraised "realistically and practically . . . and not . . . against theoretically ideal, but nevertheless
artificial standards.").
"" 259 N.L.R.B. 1118, 111  L.R.R.M. 1423 (1982), enforced, 703 F.2d 876, 113 L.R.R.M. 2241 (5th
Cir. 1983).
" NLRB v. Labor Services, Inc., 721 F.2d at 17, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3262.
" Id.
7' Id.
72 Id, at n.6, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3262-63 n.6. See supra note 12 for examples of cases cited.
n 186 N.L.R.B. 671, 75 L.R.R.M. 1385 (1970). See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
" NLRB v. Labor Services, Inc., 721 F.2d at 17, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3263.
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interfere with the election, the Board in Lach -Simkins had relied on the fact that the
luncheon was not held too close to the polling place and the value of the sandwiches and
soft drinks were relatively insignificant. 75 The First Circuit in Labor Services, however,
cautioned that reliance on the Lach -Simkins case without discussion or analysis is inappro-
priate, since it equates the likely effects of "a tuna on rye and Pepsi with a double
scotch." 7B Since the Board affirmed the Regional Director's findings without further
elaboration," the court concluded that the considerations urged by the Board in Labor
Services lacked an adequate analytical foundation and failed to demonstrate any special
expertise of the Board warranting judicial deference./8
 The court, therefore, remanded
the case to the Board for further proceedings and elaboration."' Moreover, the court
acknowledged that the Board on remand may determine that substantial and material
questions of tact created by non-employer witnesses may warrant resolution by a hearing
and may be subject to significant change."
The dissent in Labor Services maintained that this case poses the exact type of "minor,
detailed, interstitial question of labor election policy" that Congress intended the Board
and not the courts to resolve.s' Since the Board had not violated the terms of its enabling
act" or disregarded its own agency rules, the dissent was unable to find that the Board
had abused its discretion and exceeded its statutory authority." The dissent determined,
therefore, that the Board had applied its policies in this area consistently,s4 having
maintained in prior decisions that the provision of alcoholic beverages is permissible
activity." Moreover, contrary to the opinion of the majority, the dissent did not perceive
an obvious difference between the provision of "lunch and soft drinks" as in the Loch-
Simkins case and "no lunch but one or two hard drinks" as in the instant case."
The dissent further maintained that in view of the Board's expertise in labor rela-
tions, the difficulties in policing strict rules prohibiting the purchase of alcoholic bever-
ages by employees for one another, and the tendency to use such drink-buying activity as
74 Id. The election in Lack-Simkins was conducted in a room at the top of a twenty-six foot high
stairway, whereas the luncheon was held in a room in the basement of the building. 186 N.L.R.B.
671, 75 L.R.R.M. 1385 (1970).
T4' NLRB v. Labor Services, Inc., 721 F.2d at 17, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3263.
" Id. at 14, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3261,
74 Id. at 17, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3263.
T" Id. at 18, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3263.
" Id. at 17-18, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3263.
• Id. at 18, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3263 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
82
 NLRB v. Labor Services, Inc., 721 F.2d at 18, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3263 (citing 29 U.S.C. §
I59(c)(1)) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
43 NLRB v. Labor Services, Inc., 721 F.2d at 18, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3263 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
" Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
▪ Id., 114 L.R.R.M. at 3264 (citing Jacqueline Cochran, Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. 837, 839 n.1, 71
L.R.R.M. 1395, 1396 n.1 (1969)) (union pry-election Christmas party where food and alcohol served
found not objectionable); Peachtree City Warehouse, Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 1031, 1039-40, 62 L.R.R.M.
1169, 1169-70 (1966) (union conducted pre-election meeting where refreshments consisting of hot
dogs, sandwiches, potato chips and soft drinks served, while employer held barbecue with dancing on
the eve of election where alcoholic refreshments also available); Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 123
N.L.R.B. 86, 87-88, 43 L.R.R.M. 1391, 1391-92 (1959) (pre-election union meeting where beer and
soft drinks provided not objectionable); Albion Malleable Iron Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 225, 226-27, 32
L.R.R.M. 1084, 1084-85 (1953) (employer who purchased alcoholic drinks and made false promises
prior to the election held not to have influenced voters in choice of bargaining representative);
Cooper's Inc., 94 N.L.R.B. 1554, 1556, 28 L.R.R.M. 1212 (1951) (drinking which occurred after
union meeting but prior to the date of the election held not to constitute undue influence).
" NLRB v. Labor Services, Inc., 721 F.2d at 18, 114 L.R.R.M, at 3264 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
December 1984]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
	
141
an excuse to delay or prevent certification, the Board's decision was not unreasonable."
Moreover, the dissent asserted that the Board's decision did not run contrary to public
policy." Neither the Commonwealth of Massachusetts nor federal policy prohibit political
committees from spending money on intoxicating liquors for delegates." Consequently,
the dissent contended that the court should observe the division of tasks between adminis-
trative agencies and the courts and should leave the regulation of election day conduct to
the Board."
Labor Services raises significant issues concerning the role of the courts in reviewing
the Board's evaluation of election proceedings. First, the case questions the practical
aspect of furnishing alcoholic beverages to employees during polling hours and the
subsequent impact on the election results. Second, it further demonstrates the role of
judicial review in ensuring that agency findings are supported by substantial evidence and
are not arbitrarily made. Although the First Circuit declined to enforce the order in view
of insufficient analysis in the Regional Director's conclusions," the court itself stressed
that the specific outcome of this case should not be interpreted as an erosion of the
principle of judicial deference to Board discretion in representation election proceed-
ings. 92 The court, troubled by substantial and material questions of fact, 93 acknowledged
that the version of facts upon which its decision rested could be subject to change on
remand." The court sought to reaffirm that although deference to the expertise of the
Board is a common practice, it is by no means absolute." To warrant judicial deference,
however, the court noted that the Board must set forth the reason for its determinations
in sufficient detail to satisfy the court that the decision is reasonable, based on substantial
evidence and does not constitute an abuse of discretion."
In the Labor Services case, the court rejected the Board's decision not because no
justification for the Board's decision existed, but rather because the Board failed to
elaborate adequately the basis upon which it rested its conclusions." The First Circuit's
opinion in Labor Services repeatedly pointed to the potential interference with employee
free choice which :night result from the effects of alcohol consumption and "induced
fellowship" during the time the polls are open." The Board, however, either failed to
consider the impact of alcohol on employee free choice at or around the time the
employee casts his ballot, or it did not view this fact as having any substantial bearing upon
the outcome of the election. Whatever the reason for the omission of this issue in its
determination, the Board did not communicate these factors to the court. The omission
was material in the First Circuit's opinion, since as a reviewing court, it was responsible for
evaluating whether the Board's decision had an adequate basis in law. As the First Circuit
indicated, the Board's mere reliance on Lach -Simhins without discussion, thereby equating
87 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
" Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
8° Id. at 18.19, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3264 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 19, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3264 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
ut See supra notes 20-21, 77-78 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
" NLRB v. Labor Services, Inc., 721 F.2d at 17-18, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3263.
m See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
B8 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
97 NLRB v. Labor Services, Inc., 721 F.2d at 15, 114 L.R.R.M. at 3261.
" See supra notes 53-59, 66-70, 75-76 and accompanying text.
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the effects of a luncheon with non-alcoholic beverages to those of a gathering with
alcoholic beverages consumed over a (wo-hour period, was simply an insufficient basis
upon which to grant deference."
After rejecting the Board's analytical approach, the court emphasized that it did not
consider furnishing the missing analytical foundation to be in its province. The dissent
contended that the difference between "lunch and sofa drinks" and "no lunch but one or
two hard drinks" appeared to be more "obvious" to his brethren than it was to him.'" The
dissent expressed concern that the result in the case will make future line-drawing a
formidable task. 101
 Such distinctions, in the dissent's view, should be left to the determina-
tion of the Board, thereby preserving the division of tasks between administrative agen-
cies and the courts.'" Precisely for this reason, however, the court did not undertake to
supply the requisite analysis to support the Board's decision, but rather remanded the
case to the Board for further proceedings.'" The court in Labor Services alluded to the
potential lingering effects of alcohol consumption on employees who are in the process of
casting their ballots.m In so doing, the court indicated that a distinction exists between
this situation and one in which alcoholic beverages are furnished at a pre-election event.
In the latter case, the intoxicating effects of alcoholic consumption, if any, will have had
ample time to dissipate, whereas in the former case, they might impair the employees'
ability to think clearly when casting their ballots for or against unionization. Since
interference with employee free choice destroys the laboratory conditions mandated by
the standard used in testing the validity of representation elections, the distinction
between pre-election consumption and concurrent consumption is significant. Such elec-
tion interference is likely, therefore, to justify a policy discrepancy in future cases so that
alcoholic beverages can be served at pre-election campaign events but not during polling
hours.
In conclusion, as a result of NLRB v. Labor Services, Inc., the division of tasks between
the Board and the appeals courts remains intact. Primary responsibility for determining
that the stringent laboratory conditions standard has been met in the conduct of rep-
resentation elections rests with the Board. To be entitled to deference in its determina-
tion, however, the Board's findings must be reasonable and able to withstand analysis.
Absent an adequate basis for determining i he effects of particular activities — such as the
furnishing of alcoholic beverages — which transpire during the time the polls are open,
the Board's findings with respect 16 such activities may not survive judicial scrutiny.
4. *The Right of an Employer to an NLRB Investigatory Hearing Regarding
Intimidation by Employees in a Representation Election:
NLRB v. Monark Boat Co.'
Under section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) an employer must
bargain with the union selected by a majority of his employees to be their representative." --
99 See supra notes 76.78 and accompanying text.
'" See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
101 NLRB v. Labor Services, Inc., 721 F.2d at 19, 114 L.R.R.M, at 3264 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
1" See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
'°3 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
'°' See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
* By Lloyd E. Selbst, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 713 F.2d 355, 113 L.R.R.M. 3749 (8th Cir. 1983).
2
 Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) ,
 (1982), provides: "It
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A representation election, to be valid, must be the expression of the unfettered desires of
the work force. 3 The Act authorizes the National Labor Relations Board (Board) to
investigate allegations that the outcome of an election has been influenced by intimidation
of employees or by other election misconduct prohibited by the Act.' In addition, the Act
requires the Board to set aside any vote which the Board determines, on the basis of its
investigation, has been affected by election misconduct. 5
The Board has broad discretion to decide whether it will hold hearings as part of its
inquiry into allegations that the fairness of an election was destroyed by proscribed
activities.° Further, the Board generally has the discretion to decide the procedures that
will be followed in any hearing that it does grant.' In some instances, however, the Board's
freedom to deny a hearing is limited by Board rules or by court decisions.° For example,
when either the union or the employer alleges that the outcome of an election has been
affected by acts which generated an atmosphere of intimidation and fear among the work
force, Board rules require that the Board grant the petitioner the opportunity to prove
his allegations through an adversarial investigatory hearing.° Board rules, affirmed by the
circuit courts, traditionally condition the grant of such a hearing on establishment of a
prima facie case of election coercion. '° A prima facie case, according to the Board and the
circuit courts, is established when the petitioner has alleged and offered to prove inci-
dents which would allow the determiner of facts reasonably to conclude that a significant
number of employees did not vote freely because of intimidation." If the Board deter-
mines that a prima facie case of election coercion has not been made, and consequently
refuses to grant an investigatory hearing, the petitioner can request that the circuit court
order the Board to hold a hearing. Courts, however, will find that the Board has abused
its discretion by not according the petitioner the opportunity to prove his charges at an
investigatory hearing only where the petitioner has made a sufficient preliminary showing
of a tainted election. 13
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of § 9(a)." Id. Section 9(a) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982), provides: "Representatives designated or selected for
the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit ... Id.
• Methodist Home y. NLRB, 596 F.2d 1173, 1183, 101 L.R.R.M. 2139, 2146 (4th Cir. 1979);
NLRB v. Southern Paper Box Co., 473 F.2d 208, 209, 82 L.R.R.M. 2482, 2484 (8th Cir. 1973).
• NLRB v, Griffith Oldsmobile, Inc., 455 F.2d 867, 869, 79 L.R.R.M. 2650, 2651-52 (8th Cir.
1972).
See supra note 3.
• See supra note 4. See also Melrose-Wakefield Hospital Ass'n v. NLRB, 615 F.2d 563, 566-67,
570-71, 103 L.R.R.M. 2711, 2713, 2716-17 (1st Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Campbell Products, 623 F.2d
876, 879, 104 L.R.R.M. 2967, 2970 (3d Cir. 1980).
• See cases cited supra, note 6.
• Bauer Welding and Metal Fabricators v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 314, 316, 110 L.R.R.M. 2270, 2272
(8th Cir. 1982).
• Id.; NLRB v. Southern Paper Box Company, 473 F.2d 208, 211, 82 L.R.R.M. 2482, 2485 (8th
Cir. 1973); see also Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc. v. NLRB, 324 F.2d 857, 858, 54 L.R.R.M. 2659,
2670 (5th Cir. 1963).
t° See cases cited supra note 9.
" See cases cited supra note 9.
12 29	 §§ 158(a)(5), 160(f) (1982). See, e.g., Bauer Welding and Metal Fabricators v. NLRB,
676 F.2d 314, 316, 110 L.R.R.M. 2270, 2272 (8th Cir. 1982); Zeigler's Refuse Collectors, Inc. v.
NLRB, 639 F.2d 1000, 1008, 106 L.R.R.M. 2331, 2339 (3d Cir. 1981).
13 NLRB v. Griffith Oldsmobile, Inc., 455 F.2d 867, 869, 79 L.R.R.M. 2650, 2652 (8th Cir.
1972).
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The Board has long taken the position that allegations by an employer of election
misconduct involving only actions of rank and file employees who hold no union office
will rarely establish a prima facie case of election coercion.' 4 In cases establishing this
position, the Board 'has reasoned that threats made by mere union sympathizers are far
less intimidating to workers than threats made by union officials.' 5 The Board has,
therefore, held that an employer must make a much stronger showing of coercion to
establish a prima facie case when his charges implicate mere union sympathizers than he
would have to make if the charges implicated union officials.'° Accordingly, the Board has
rarely granted an investigatory hearing based solely on an employer's allegations of
intimidation by pro-union workers.' 7
The Board's position, distinguishing between allegations of union and nonunion
coercion in deciding whether to grant an employer a hearing on its claim of election
coercion, has generally been upheld by reviewing circuit courts." Finding that the Board's
distinction between coercion that originates from union as opposed to nonunion person-
nel is reasonable, these circuit courts have deferred to the Board's discretionary power in
granting an election coercion hearing.'" In NLRB v. Griffith Oldsmobile, Inc. ,2° for example,
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a Board ruling that an employer's allegations
of threats by pro-union employees were not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of an
atmosphere of coercion. The court found that the employer's petition did not allege that a
sufficient number of workers had been influenced by the threats to actually affect the
outcome of the election.''- ' The court held that the employer must offer to prove that the
alleged threats either originated with the union or actually intimidated a significant
number of named employees to establish a prima facie case of a tainted election. 22 The
court stated, however, that it would have been proper for the Board to find that the
employer established a prima facie case on the facts presented lithe employer had alleged
that union officers had made the threats. 23 The court followed this reasoning in Bauer
" NLRB v. ARA Services, 717 F.2d 57, 66, 114 L.R.R.M. 2377, 2383 (3d Cir. 1983) (en bane)
("[T]he Board, with judicial concurrence, has always accorded less weight to conduct which is
attributable to neither the Union nor the employer. Threats of fellow employees are deemed to be
less coercive than those of agents of a union or an employer who may have the wherewithal to
effectuate them."). See also Zeigler's Refuse Collectors, Inc. v. NLRB, 639 F.2d 1000, 1006.07, 106
L.R.R.M. 2331, 2336-37 (3d Cir. 1981); Manning, Maxwell & Moore v. NLRB, 324 F.2d 857, 858, 54
L.R.R.M. 2659, 2660 (5th Cir. 1963) (appellate courts cited Board rulings).
15
 NLRB v. ARA Services, 717 F.2d 57, 66, 114 L.R.R.M. 2377, 2383 (3d Cir. 1983) (en bane).
le Id.
77 Id.
Tuf-Flex Glass v. NLRB, 715 F.2d 291, 296, 114 L.R.R.M, 2226, 2231 (7th Cir. 1983); NLRB
v. Advanced Systems, Inc., 681 F.2d 570, 575, 110 L.R.R.M. 2418, 2422 (9th Cir. 1982); ATR Wire
and Cable Co. v. NLRB, 671 F.2d 188, 190, 109 L.R.R.M. 2808, 2809-10 (6th Cir. 1982); NLRB v.
Campbell Products, 623 F.2d 876, 879, 104 L.R.R.M. 2967, 2970 (3d Cir. 1980); Melrose-Wakefield
Hospital Ass'n v. NLRB, 615 F.2d 563, 568, 571 n.6, 103 L.R.R.M. 2711, 2714, 2717 n.6 (1st Cir.
1980). A number of circuits, however, have criticized Board decisions for giving the union-nonunion
distinction excessive significance. See, e.g., Zeigler's Refuse Collectors, Inc. v. NLRB, 639 F.2d 1000,
1006-09, 106 L.R.R.M. 2331, 2336-39 (3d Cir. 1981); Cross Baking Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 1346,
1348, 78 L.R. R.M. 3059, 3059 (1st Cir. 1971) ("It does not follow that fear would be less effective if it
had an unofficial origin. Indeed, we can visualize situations where it might be more effective.").
18 See cases cited supra note 18.
455 F.2d 867, 79 L.R.R.M. 2650 (8th Cir. 1972).
21 Id. at 871, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2653.
" Id.
23 Id.
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Welding and Metal Fabricators v. NLRB.' In that case, the Eighth Circuit ruled that the
Board had reasonably found that the allegation of a single threat made by a union
representative established a prima facie case that an intimidating atmosphere existed
during an election."
During the Survey year, in NLRB v. Monark Boat Co., 36 the Eighth Circuit abandoned
its position in Griffith Oldsmobile. In so doing the Eighth Circuit became the first federal
circuit court to reject the validity of the union-nonunion distinction for determining
whether an employer has made a prima facie case of election coercion. 27 In Monark, the
court ruled that the Board must now use the same test to determine whether an employer
has established a prima facie case of an unfair election, irrespective of whether union
officials or mere union sympathizers took the actions that provided the basis of the
employer's complaint." The Eighth Circuit's new test, to be applied when threats origi-
nate with union as well as nonunion personnel, is whether the act or acts alleged, even if
relatively unimportant and nonthreatening in themselves, might have made a significant
number of employees fearful of voting against the union."
The dispute in Monark arose after the Board determined that the United Brother-
hood of Carpenters and Joiners, AFL-CIO (UBC) had won a Board sponsored election."
Charging that employee supporters of' the UBC had created an atmosphere of intimida-
tion and fear which tainted the election, the Monark Boat Company refused to bargain
with the union. 31 The Regional Director of' the Board refused Monark's request for an
investigatory hearing on the election. 32 Monark appealed to the Board, which upheld the
Regional Director's decision." The Board then petitioned the circuit court to enforce its
bargaining order, 34 and Monark countered with charges that the election was unfair and
requested the court to order the Board to hold a hearing on election coercion."
Monark claimed that union supporters created a coercive atmosphere by a series of
intimidating iricidents." First, Monark alleged that several union sympathizers threat-
ened co-workers with violence and property damage if' they did not support the union. 37
Second, the company charged that pro-union workers vandalized company property in
an attempt to intimidate workers." Finally, Monark claimed that an employee's dog was
poisoned in reprisal for the employee's refusal to campaign for the union."
24 676 F.2d 314, 110 L.R.R.M. 2270 (8th Cir. 1982).
" Id. at 318-19, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2274-75.
" 713 F.2d 355, 113 L.R.R.M. 3749 (8th Cir. 1983).
r Id. at 360, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3753.
2" Id.
29 Id.
" Id. at 356, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3750.
31 Id.
' Id.
3' Id.
34 Id.
as
 Id.
" Id. at 357, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3571.
" Id. Monark alleged that: (1) on four occasions pro-union employees stated that if the union
were elected and subsequently called a strike, employees crossing the picket line would be assaulted
or have their cars damaged; (2) a union supporter told a co-worker that "people that don't join the
union won't be here very long;" and (3) as employees were lining up to vote, an employee wearing a
union T-shirt said to another employee "Just do what 1 told you ...." The second employee joined
the line to vote. Id.
3" Id.
39 Id. at 358, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3752.
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The court found that although no single incident was sufficiently threatening to raise
a reasonable inference that a significant part of the work force was intimidated, the acts,
taken together, did reach that level." An investigatory hearing by the Board was, there-
fore, necessary to determine the extent of the coercion." The court stressed that even acts
which appear to be relatively unimportant when considered in isolation, could, in the
totality of circumstances, lead to the conclusion that a significant number of employees
may have been fearful of voting against the union." As few as two minor incidents, the
court asserted, could be sufficient to establish the prima facie case of a tainted election."
Although the court observed that in the instant case fully half of the explicit and
implied threats did not directly relate to the election" and that the employees who were
threatened denied they had been frightened by the threats," the court ruled that the
employer's allegations, if true, established a substantial possibility that the work force was
intimidated," The court found the verbal threats, the vandalism, and the poisoning of the
dog were significant incidents that might, when considered together, have intimidated a
number of employees." Observing that there had been an unusually large number of
abstentions from the voting — more than enough to affect the outcome" -- the court
reasoned that sufficient evidence existed to create an inference of coercion." Thus, the
court declared, since a preliminary showing of a tainted election required no more than
allegations of incidents and facts which suggest that there was a substantial degree of
intimidation among the work force, the employer had met his burden and a hearing was
in order. 5 °
The court noted that union supporters rather than union officers allegedly commit-
ted the coercive acts." Moreover, the court observed that employees possibly may not be
as intimidated by a threat made by a co-worker as they would be by an ominous statement
made by a union agent."' In the court's view, however, the pivotal question was whether
the incidents alleged could have spawned fear among the employees, not whether union
officers took part in the incidents. 53 Noting that although a threat made by a union officer
might be more suggestive of coercion than a threat made by an employee, the court
nonetheless found that the latter could still be intimidating." In the instant case, the court
stated, the employer offered to prove the kind of acts which may have produced the
atmosphere of fear and reprisal that the employer alleged existed during the election. 55
Therefore, the court ruled, Monark had a right to an investigatory hearing despite the
apparent lack of union participation. 5°
4° Id.
41 Id.
" Id. at 359, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3752.
" Id.
" Id. at 358, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3752.
45 Id. at 359, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3752.
46 Id.
'7 Id. at 358, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3752.
' id. at 359, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3752.
" Id. The court here appears to have inferred coercion from the high number of abstentions.
" Id,
51 Id. at 359, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3753.
52 Id.
" Id.
" Id.
55 Id.
" Id.
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The Eighth Circuit in Monark lowered the threshold showing required of an em-
ployer to demonstrate the likelihood that the alleged acts of union sympathizers had
influenced an election to the level that the Eighth Circuit traditionally required for an
employer to show that alleged acts of intimidation committed by union agents influenced
an election." Prior to Monark, the Eighth Circuit had upheld the Board view, and
demanded a greater showing that the alleged acts were coercive when they were commit-
ted by union supporters rather than by union officers." In NLRB v. Griffith Oldsmobile,
Inc., for example, the Eighth Circuit required that an employer offer to prove that the
alleged threats either originated with the union or actually intimidated a significant
number of named employees to establish a prima facie case of a tainted election." In
Monark, by contrast, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the employer had established a
prima facie case of election interference because of the coercive acts of certain employees,
who acted independently of the union, even though all the threatened workers named in
the employer's petition denied that they had been intimidated by the threats."
Monark is significant in that prior to its decision in that case the Eighth Circuit had
permitted a far lower threshold showing of intimidating conduct when the union partici-
pated in at least some of the threats made."' Thus in Bauer Welding and Metal Fabricators v.
NLRB , I12 a single instance of a physical threat to an employee by co-workers, when taken
together with a possibly intimidating letter sent by the union to plant supervisors, was
held to be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of fear among a substantial number of
workers." Similarly, in NLRB v. Payless Cashway Lumber Store of South St. Paul, Inc.," a
single threat made by a union representative to an employee was determined to establish a
prima facie case that an intimidating atmosphere existed during the election."
The Eighth Circuit will apparently no longer uphold the Board's distinction between
coercion originating with union as opposed to nonunion personnel in evaluating whether
an employer has established a prima facie case of election misconduct. Under Monark,
threats, even when they are not made by union agents, need not directly relate to the
election and need not be explicit."' Instead, threats need only raise an inference that,
when considered together, may have made a substantial number of employees fearful of
voting against the union." No employee need testify that his vote was influenced by the
misconduct." For a prima facie case, the significant impact of the alleged threats on the
work force can be inferred from a comparatively large number of abstentions from the
voting.'" The Eighth Circuit in Monark, therefore, seems to reduce the distinction between
misconduct by union agents and misconduct by union supporters to the point of having
See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
'" See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
" NLRB v. Griffith Oldsmobile, Inc., 455 F.2d 867, 871, 79 L.R.R.M. 2650, 2653 (8th Cir.
1973).
" Monark, 713 F.2d at 359, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3752.
61 See supra notes 20-25.
82 Bauer Welding and Metal Fabricators v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 314, 110 L.R.R.M. 2270 (8th Cir.
1982).
63 Id. at 318-19, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2273-74.
" 508 F.2d 24, 88 L.R.R.M. 2067 (8th Cir. 1974).
65 Id. at 28, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2070.
Monark, 713 F.2d at 358, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3752.
6T Id.
68 Id .
"3 Id.
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little practical importance in determining whether the employer has presented a prima
facie case of a tainted election."
Although the Eighth Circuit had noted in a number of earlier opinions that the test
of whether an employer has made out a prima facie case of election intimidation should
be the same irrespective of whether union agents or union supporters were the source of
the threats," Monark is the first case where the court required the Board to apply the same
test." Monark appears to be a productive turning point for the Eighth Circuit. Logically,
little basis exists for the Board's presumption that a threat by a union agent is inherently
more intimidating than a threat by a co-worker and is therefore stronger evidence that
the pro-union side created an atmosphere of coercion. The cases on election misconduct
amply demonstrate that employees can be extremely fearful of the vengeance of co-
workers who expect them to support a union." Indeed, intimidating acts by co-workers
might seem more threatening than intimidating acts by union representatives since
employees acting independently are not subject to the restraining influence that an
organization can provide." Rather than applying questionable presumptions about what
sort of conduct employees find intimidating, courts should approach each case individ-
ually and determine the probable impact of threats based solely on the evidence and
allegations before it as the Monark court did."
In Monark the Eighth Circuit has reversed its own previous position and has become
the first circuit to refuse to uphold the Board's union-nonunion distinction." In so doing,
the Eighth Circuit has taken a logical step since little empirical evidence supporting the
Board's presumption seems to exist." The Monark decision indicates that the pivotal
question in determining whether an employer has established a prima facie case of
election intimidation is not whether union officers were involved in the alleged incidents
but whether it is plausible that the alleged incidents, taken together, could have caused
fear among enough workers to have affected the outcome of the election."
B. Organizational Activity
1. *Employer Restrictions on Union Buttons: Burger King Corp. v. NLRB'
The right of employees to wear union buttons or other union insignia while at work
has been well-established since its recognition by the Supreme Court in 1945 in Republic
Aviation Corp. v. NLRB . 2 In that opinion, the Supreme Court indicated that in the absence
7' Id. at 359, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3752.
7 ' See cases cited supra notes 20 and 24.
7y
	
713 F.2d at 355-60, 113 L.R.R.M at 3749-53.
" See, e.g., Zeigler's Refuse Collectors, Inc. v. NLRB, 639 F.2d 1000, 1009, 106 L.R.R.M. 2331,
2338 (3d Cir. 1981) (employees found to be fearful of threats of violence made by a co-worker);
NLRB v. Southern Paper Box Company, 473 F.2d 208, 210-11, 82 L.R.R.M. 2482, 2483 (8th Cir.
1971) (threats of assault by co-workers held to be coercive).
Cross Baking Company v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 1346, 1348, 78 L.R.R.M. 3059, 3060 (1st Cir.
1971).
Monark, 713 F.2d at 355-60, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3749-53.
" See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
7" See supra notes 40-56 and accompanying text.
41 By Ronald T. Gerwatowski, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE Law REVIEW.
725 F.2d 1053, 115 L.R.R.M. 2387 (6th Cir. 1984).
2 324 U.S. 793, 802 n.7, 16 L.R.R.M. 620, 624 n.7 (1945)(quoting with approval the Board's
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of "special circumstances," such as an employer's need for production and discipline, an
employer violates section 8(a)(1) 3 of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) when he
prohibits an employee from wearing a union button or other similar insignia while on the
job.' The Supreme Court also indicated that in determining whether or not an employer's
ban on button wearing or any other form of communication is violative of the Act, courts
should balance the employees' right to self-organize against the employer's right to
maintain discipline.' As a result, in the cases where an employer's ban on union buttons
has been at issue, the courts have traditionally examined the facts of each case, and
determined whether the employer's asserted interest outweighs the employees' conflicting
interest in self-organization before determining whether or not a "special circumstance" is
present.' "Special circumstances" have since been found to exist in cases where the
employer has asserted an interest in such areas as safety,' impact on hospital patients,'
prevention of customer alienation,' and avoidance of discord and violence among per-
sonnel during a heated organization campaign.'°
Another special consideration that has been raised as a justification for an employer's
ban on union buttons has been the employer's interest in a uniform public image among
its employees who have regular contact with the public." The employer's interest in a
uniform public image, however, like other asserted employer interests, has not given rise
to an automatic finding of special circumstances. 12 In cases where the public image
decision, 51 N.L.R.B. 1186, 1187-88 (1943)). See C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPINC. LABOR LAW 96
(1983)[hereinafter cited as C. Moms]; Derenshinsky, The Solicitation and Distribution Rules of the
NLRB, 40 U. Cm. L. REV. 417, 444 (1971).
a Section 8(a)(1) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title." 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982)[hereinafter cited as "section 7") provides: "Employees shall have the right
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . ." Id.
See Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 803-04 n.10, 16 L.R.R.M. at 625 n.10.
See id. at 797-98, 16 L.R.R.M. at 622. See also Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483,
491-92, 98 L.R.R.M. 2727, 2730 (1978).
6 See, e.g., Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 79, 81-82, 112 L.R.R.M. 3099,
3101-02 (4th Cir. 1983); Davison-Paxon Co. v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 364, 372, 80 L.R.R.M, 2673, 2679
(5th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Floridan Hotel of Tampa, Inc., 318 F.2d 545, 547, 53 L.R.R.M. 2420, 2422
(2d Cir. 1963); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. NLRB, 230 F.2d 357, 358, 37 L.R.R.M. 2619, 2620 (7th Cir.
1956).
7 See, e.g., Andrews Wire Corp., 189 N.L.R.B. 108, 109, 76 L.R.R.M. 1568, 1570 (1971)(holding
that the employee could enforce a ban on union insignia where such insignia was attached to safety
hats and impaired employee safety).
See, e.g., George J. London Memorial Hospital, 238 N.L.R.B. 704, 708, 99 L.R.R.M. 1680,
1680 (1978)(stating that a rule prohibiting buttons only in the patient area of the hospital would have
been presumptively invalid).
6 See, e.g., Davison-Paxon Co. v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 364, 370, 80 L.R.R.M. 2673, 2678 (5th Cir.
1972)(holding that an employer's ban on buttons was justified where the company was concerned
that controversial buttons, worn in the selling area of the store, would antagonize customers).
' 6 See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. NLRB, 230 F.2d 357, 359; 37 L.R.R.M. 2619, 2620 (7th
Cir. 1956)(holding that union "scab" buttons could be banned in order to avoid disruptions of
employee harmony).
" See,e.g., NLRB v. Harrah's Club, 337 F.2d 177, 180, 57 L.R.R.M. 2198, 2200 (10th Cir. 1964).
15 Compare Pay'n Save Corp. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 697, 701, 106 L.R.R.M. 3040, 3043 (9th Cir.
1981)(holding that the public image justification did not constitute a "special circumstance") with
NLRB v. Harrah's Club, 337 F.2d 177, 180, 57 L.R.R.M. 2198, 2200 (10th Cir. 1964)(holding that an
employer's interest in a uniform public image justified a ban on union buttons).
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justification has been at issue, a balancing test of conflicting employer and employee
interests has also been employed." In one case, for example, the employees failed to
assert any organizational purpose for button wearing." As a result, the court found that
the employer's interest in a uniform public image was a sufficient special circumstance to
justify a ban on union buttons." In another case, however, a different result was reached
where the employees had been engaged in an organizing campaign!' In that case, the
court stated that the employer's interest in employee appearance did not outweigh the
interest of employees in self-organization. 0 As a result, the court rejected the employer's
contention that his interest in a uniform public image constituted a special circumstance!'
In the area of employer bans on union buttons, therefore, it has been the general rule that
each case should be determined by weighing the relevant facts on the record, and
reaching an accommodation of the conflicting interests of employers and employees.
During the Survey year, the Sixth Circuit, in Burger King Corp. v. NLRB, I9 faced the
issue of whether an employer's rule against the wearing of union buttons by employees
was in violation of the Act." The Sixth Circuit held that "special circumstances" exist
where an employer enforces a nondiscriminatory and consistent rule that requires em-
ployees to wear authorized uniforms when in contact with the public.21 The case is
significant in that the court found the employer's interest in a uniform public image
sufficient to justify a ban on union buttons, even though the employees at the time were
engaged in an organizational campaign.22
InBurger King, employees were required to wear identical uniforms as a matter of the
fast food restaurant's written policy." The policy additionally stated that only company-
owned buttons and name tags would be permitted on the employees' uniforms." On the
morning of May 28, 1981, a union organizer and a number of off-duty Burger King
employees took over a Burger King restaurant as a part of a union organizing drive."
The "takeover," which had been joined by some of the employees on duty, resulted in a
confusing "melee" in the middle of the restaurant. 26 One and a half hours after the
takeover and melee had subsided, a supervisor arrived at the restaurant and approached
Cynthia Williams, one of the employees on . cluty who had joined the takeover, and asked
1 ' See, e.g., Pay'n Save Corp. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 697, 701 n.10, 106 L.R.R.M. 3040, 3043 n.10
(9th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Harrah's Club, 337 F.2d 177, 180, 57 L.R.R.M. 2198, 2200 (10th Cir. 1964).
14 NLRB v. Harrah's Club, 337 F.2d 177, 179, 57 L.R.R.M. 2198, 2200 (10th Cir. 1964).
Id. at 180, 57 L.R.R.M. at 2200-01.
Pay'n Save Corp. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 697, 699, 106 L.R.R.M. 3040, 3041-42 (9th Cir. 1981).
' 7 Id. at 701 n.10, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3043 n.10.
10 See id. The court also determined that the rule against wearing union buttons in the case
before it had been applied disparately, and therefore violated section 8(a)(1) on that basis. Id. at 701,
106 L.R.R.M. at 3043.
" 725 F.2d 1053, 115 L.R.R.M. 2387 (6th Cir. 1984).
20 Id. at 1054-55, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2387-88.
" Id. at 1055, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2388.
22 See id. at 1054, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2387.
e Id.
" Id.
23
 Id. at 1054, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2387.
20
 Id. The circuit court did not describe the "takeover" in any detail. The court merely stated in
part: "On Thursday morning, May 28, 1981, at about 11:30 a.m., a number of off-duty employees
accompanied by a union organizer entered restaurant 768 and took over the restaurant." Id.
Nor did the court describe the "melee" in detail. The court merely referred to it as a "melee
[that] ensu[edi as a result of the takeover of the restaurant . . ." Id.
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her about the cause of the employees' anger, 27 During the conversation, the supervisor
also asked Williams what a union could do for her." At that point, the conversation was
terminated. 29 In a subsequent conversation, however, the supervisor noticed that Williams
was wearing a union button and asked her if she knew that wearing buttons was against
company policy." Williams thereupon removed her union button. 31 Another employee
who was working at a drive-in window that served the public overheard this conversation
and also removed the union button that she was wearing."
Charges were subsequently filed with the Board," The first charge related to whether
the initial conversation that took place between the supervisor and Williams was coer-
cive. 34 The second charge concerned the validity of the employer's rule prohibiting
employees from wearing buttons while on duty." In regard to the first charge, the
administrative law judge held that the conversation between the supervisor and Williams
was coercive, and therefore violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act." The judge dismissed the
charge relating to the wearing of buttons.37 On consideration of the administrative law
judge's decisions, the Board sustained the ruling on the first charge, but reversed the
dismissal of the second charge, holding that the rule prohibiting button wearing also
violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act." Subsequently, the Board sought enforcement of its
decision in the Sixth Circuit. 39
In its very brief opinion, the Sixth Circuit initially examined the record and rejected
the Board's determination that the conversation between the supervisor and the em-
ployee was coercive. 49 According to the court, a simple inquiry did not, by itself, constitute
coercion." The court next considered the validity of the employer's prohibition of union
buttons as it applied to the employee who had direct contact with the public.' The court
noted that the restaurant's prohibition on buttons had been, on rare occasions, inconsis-
tently applied, but agreed with the administrative law judge's conclusion that these "rare
departures from the norm" were insufficient to establish a company practice of deviating
from the general prohibition. 43 The court then alluded to the business justification for the
employer's general ban on buttons, stressing that the restaurant chain established much
of its national recognition from its "uniform public image."" The court concluded that
"special circumstances" justified the employer's rule, and refused to enforce the Board's
ST Id.
" Id.
" Id.
311 Id.
3 ' Id.
" Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
33 Id. at 1054-55, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2387 - 88.
" Id. at 1055, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2388.
" Id.
" Id.
" See id.
4.3 Id.
" Id.
" Id.
" Id. If the employer had banned only the union buttons, while consistently allowing buttons to
be worn, the employer's rule could have been held unlawful on that basis alone. See C. MORRIS, supra
note 1, at 97.
44 Burger King, 725 F',2d at 1055, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2388.
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order insofar as it applied to employees who had contact with the public." According to
the court, when an employer has a nondiscriminatory and consistent policy that requires
its employees who meet with the public to wear authorized uniforms, "a 'special circum-
stance' exists as a matter of law which justifies the banning of union buttons.""
Circuit Judge Merritt wrote an opinion that concurred in the majority's finding that
the conversation between the supervisor and the employee was not coercive, but dissented
on the issue of the rule regarding union buttons. 47 According to Judge Merritt, there was
"ample case law" supporting the Board's finding of a section 8(a)(1) violation with respect
to the ban on union buttons." Judge Merritt recognized the "special circumstances"
requirement regarding employer prohibitions on union buttons," but concluded that the
public image justification was only "arguably present" in the case before the court."
According to Judge Merritt, the buttons in Burger King were not only "innocuous and
unprovocative," but there was also no evidence that the buttons could possibly damage the
employer's public image. 5 ' In addition, Judge Merritt asserted that the employer's jus-
tification was insufficient because employees who had no contact with the public had been
prohibited from wearing buttons." Finally, Judge Merritt asserted that the decision in
Burger King could not be distinguished "on any meaningful ground" from previous
decisions that have rejected the public image justification for employer bans on union
buttons." Accordingly, Judge Merritt concluded that the employer had violated the Act
by banning the union buttons."
The dissent's assertion that the employer's ban on union buttons in Burger King had
violated the Act has merit. 55
 Although the enforcement of a rule prohibiting button
wearing in some circumstances may be an entirely reasonable exercise of the employer's
business judgment," the determination of the reasonableness of such a rule has always
been made on the basis of a balancing of the interests of the employer and employees."
The balancing of interests has consisted of weighing the employer's right to discipline his
or her employees against the employees' right to engage in concerted activity for the
purpose of self-organization. 58
 In those situations where employee solidarity may be a
'5 Id.
" Id.
47 Id. at 1056, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2389 . (Merritt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Another opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, was written by Circuit Judge Engel. Id. at
1055-56, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2388-89 (Engel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Engel,
however, dissented on the issue of the alleged coercive conversation, and concurred on the issue of
the ban on buttons. Id.
" Id. at 1056, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2389 (Merritt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
'" Id.
50
 Id.
" Id.
SP Id .
" Id.
s4
" See id.
See NLRB v. Harrah's Club, 337 F.2d 177, 180, 57 L.R.R.M. 2198, 2200-01 (10th Cir. 1964).
" See notes 3 - 5 and accompanying text. For a case that struck the balance on the same issue in
favor of the employees' right to organize, see Pay'n Save v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 697, 701 n.10, 106
L.R.R.M. 3040, 3043 n.10 (9th Cir. 1981).
se See Republic Aviation Corp, v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 797-98, 16 L.R.R.M. 620, 622 (1945). See
also C. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 96-97.
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necessary prerequisite to a union's organizing efforts, the mere wearing of a union button
may be an important element in securing that solidarity. In such circumstances, the
employees' wearing of union buttons is an activity with an organizational purpose that
should not be interfered with unless an employer can show a more pressing justification
that outweighs that employee right." On the other hand, if an employee is unable to
justify his or her wearing of a union button as an important element in the exercise of
employee section 7 rights, then an employer's ban on union buttons for the purposes of
projecting a uniform public image may be upheld as a reasonable exercise of business
judgment."
Under the facts of the Burger King case, there is a strong argument that the wearing
of the union buttons during the highly confrontational organizing efforts of the union
was a valid exercise of the employees' right to self-organize." The Burger King court,
however, concluded that the important interest of Burger King Corporation in maintain-
ing its uniform public image was a special circumstance that justified a ban on union
buttons. 62 In ruling as it did, the court failed to mention in its opinion that the employees
had an equally compelling interest in self-organization. 63 Because there was an organiza-
tional campaign in progress at the time of the controversy," the employees' interest in
wearing union buttons as a part of their organizing drive could arguably have outweighed
the employer's interest in employee appearance. 65 The court, however, did not acknowl-
edge such an employee interest. Instead, the court chose to declare, "as a matter of law,"
that the uniform public image justification constitutes a special circumstance."
After the Burger King decision, employees who wear authorized uniforms while
meeting regularly with the public would be taking a risk in wearing a union button against
company policy. Even where employees are engaging in a union organizing campaign,
the protected interest in self-organization may not be enough to outweigh the employer's
interest in projecting a uniform image to the public. As a result, the Burger King decision
may have the effect of eliminating the right of uniformed employees who have contact
with the public to wear union buttons.
Burger King establishes the principle that an employer may ban union buttons where
that ban is in connection with a consistent, nondiscriminatory policy requiring employees
who meet regularly with the public to wear authorized uniforms." The rule in Burger
King is one that is easy to apply and facilitates prediction of the outcome of labor law suits
relating to employer prohibitions on the wearing of union buttons. The rule has the
potential, however, of infringing upon uniformed employees' rights to self-organize and,
as a consequence, defeating the purposes of the Act.
se
	
U.S.C. § 157 (1982), quoted supra note 2.
" See NLRB v. Harrah's Club, 337 F.2d 177, 180, 57 L.R.R.M. 2198, 2200 (10th Cir. 1964).
"t See Burger King, 725 F.2d at 1054, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2587.
62 Id. at 1055, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2588.
" See id.
" See id. at 1054, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2587.
" See, e.g., Pay'n Save Corp. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 697, 701 n.10, 106 L.R.R.M. 3040, 3043 n.10
(9th Cir. 1981)(where the court, in a case involving a similar dispute, found that the employee
interest in self-organization outweighed the employer's interest).
" 725 F.2d at 1054, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2388.
62 Id. at 1055, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2388.
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2. *Interrogation of Employees by Employers During Union Organizing Periods:
Ajax Tool Works Inc. v. NLRB'
During the initial stages of union organizing within a plant, the employer has a
natural curiosity about the progress of the union activity among his employees.' This
curiosity is a legitimate interest if' the employer is confronted with a union claim of
majority status. 3 The organizing employees, on the other hand, have a right to be
protected from any employer activity tending to interfere with, restrain, or coerce em-
ployees in the exercise of their rights to form a union.' Because employer knowledge of
union activity has often led to reprisals, even the most innocuous employer questioning
may be suspect 5 and may tend to inhibit employees in the exercise of their right to
organize.' Consequently, the National Labor Relations Board (Board) originally took the
position that for an employer to interrogate employees concerning any aspect of union
activity was a per se unfair labor practice.'
In 1954, the Board reversed its per se position on interrogation, and, in Blue Flash
Express, Inc.,' held that interrogations are only unlawful when "under all the circumstances
the interrogation reasonably tends to restrain or interfere with the employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed by the [National Labor Relations] Act."' In evaluating the
circumstances, the Board considered whether the employees gave false answers, whether
the employer communicated the purpose of the questioning, whether the employees were
assured that no reprisals would take place, and whether a background of employer
hostility existed.ffi The Board listed five additional factors to be considered in evaluating
* By Andrea Petersen, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
713 F.2d 1307, 113 L.R.R.M. 3762 (7th Cir. 1983).
• See Address by Howard Kleeb, "Employer Rights and Their Limitations During Union
Organizational Campaigns," (January 29, 1964), reprinted in 55 L.R.R.M. 114, 115 (1968), under the
title of Taft-Hartley Rules During Union Organizing Campaigns [hereinafter cited as Address by Howard
Kleebl.
• Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1062, 65 L.R.R.M. 1385, 1386 (1967).
▪ 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
• Address by Howard Kleeb, supra note 2, at 115.
• Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. at 1063, 65 L.R.R.M. at 1386.
7 In re Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1359, 24 L.R.R.M. 1575, 1575 (1949).
The Board held that "section 8(a)(1) of the Act is violated when an employer interrogates his
employees concerning any aspect of union activity." Id. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). 'This section
provides in relevant part: "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer — (I) to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title
" Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 591, 592, 34 L.R.R.M. 1385, 1386 (1954). The Board
noted that numerous courts had explicitly or by implication condemned the rationale of Standard-
Coosa-Thatcher Co. Id. See, e.g., NLRB v. England Bros., Inc., 201 F.2d 395, 398, 31 L.R.R.M. 2319,
2322 (1st Cir. 1954) (citing Sax v. NLRB, 171 F.2d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 1948)) (the England Bros. court
held that "mere words of inquiry" were not sufficient to constitute "coercion" absent a finding of an
illegal anti-union attitude or background on the part of the employer); Jacksonville Paper v. NLRB,
137 F.2d 148, 152, 12 L.R.R.M. 812, 816 (5th Cir. 1943). In Jacksonville Paper, the court held that the
employer "is not precluded by the Act from inquiring or being informed as to the progress of the
efforts at unionization. He has a right to inquire if the Union was organized or if it has 'washed up'
..." provided he does not do so threateningly or coercively.
• Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B, 591, 593, 34 L.R.R.M. 1385, 1386 (1954) (emphasis in
the original).
io Id.
December 1984)	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 155
the legality of an interrogation: the time, the place, the personnel involved, the informa-
tion sought, and the employer's conceded preference."
In cases of isolated employer questioning of employees concerning union activity, the
Board generally continues to use the approach of evaluating all the circumstances
adopted in Blue Flash." While the Board has not developed a clear set of rules, it generally
has found, barring de minimus situations, that employee interrogations are illegal absent
a showing by the employer that a valid purpose in determining union strength existed,
that such purpose was communicated to the employees, and that the employees were
assured no reprisals would result's The courts, on the other hand, have often used the
less stringent standard developed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Bourne v.
NLRB. 14 According to the Bourne court, the five relevant inquiries are: (1) whether there is
a history of employer hostility and discrimination; (2) what the interrogator wanted to
know; (3) who the interrogator was; (4) where the interrogation took place; and (5)
whether the reply was truthful. 15
During the Survey year, in Ajax Tool Works v. NLRB,"' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered what constituted unlawful interrogation
under section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act),' 7 and what factors
qualified someone for the title of supervisor under the terms of section 2(11) of the Act.'"
After first determining that an employee who was put in charge of the night shift fit the
statutory definition of supervisor,'" the court concluded that this employee, together with
an admitted supervisor, had violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act by repeatedly questioning
small, informal groups of employees about their union activities.'" In reaching this
' 2 C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 102 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as C. MORRIS].
The Board, in response to the courts' impatience with the vagueness of the Blue Flash standard,
developed a more precise standard that could he applied in cases where the employer was presented
with a union claim of majority status and wanted to poll the employees to test the legitimacy of the
claim. Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. at 1062, 65 L.R.R.M. at 1386. The Struksnes test stated by
the Board is:
Absent unusual circumstances, the polling of employees by an employer will be violative
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act unless the following safeguards are observed: (1) the
purpose of the poll is to determine the truth of a union's claim of majority, (2) this
purpose is communicated to the employees, (3) assurances against reprisals are given,
(4) the employees are polled by secret ballot, and (5) the employer has not engaged in
unfair labor practices or otherwise created a coercive atmosphere.
Id.
Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections under the National Labor
Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 107 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Bak].
" 332 F.2d 47, 48, 56 L.R.R.M. 2241, 2243 (2d Cir. 1964). See Bok,supra note 13, at 107 n.197.
" 332 F.2d at 48, 56 L.R.R.M. at 2243.
" 713 F.2d 1307, 113 L.R.R.M. 3762 (7th Cir. 1983).
17 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1982). The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in
the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or
effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
Id.
Ajax, 713 F.2d at 1309, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3763. Because section 8(a)(1) of the Act only applies
against employers, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982), the court had to decide who was a supervisor and
therefore acting as an agent of the employer before the court could reach the issue of whether the
employee interrogations constituted violations of section 8(a)(1).
2° Ajax, 713 F.2d at 1309, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3763.
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decision, the court expressed its concern that the Bourne factors may be too lenient."'
Consequently, the court expanded the Bourne test. In Ajax, the appeals court combined
the five Bourne factors with two of the elements of the Board's test and then added one
element of its own. In combining the two existing tests, the court attempted to effect a
compromise between the courts' standard and the Board's stricter standard. The result,
however, may well be that by adding more factors, the court has only added more
loopholes for the employer.
Ajax Tool Works, Inc., a chisel manufacturer, had two shifts in both the machine
shop and the forge shop. 22 David Shea, foreman of the forge shop, and Joe ,Capriotte,
foreman of the machine shop, were in charge of the day shift." Peter Piotrowski was the
single "leadman" on the night shift for the two departments." During the night shift,
Piotrowski set up the machines, made adjustments in setting as needed, attempted to
repair broken machines, and reassigned workers when necessary. 25 When not involved in
those duties, Piotrowski sat at his desk and read." He also disciplined workers and made
recommendations about personnel, though he did not have the authority to hire or fire
employees on his own initiative."'
During April and May of 1980, an employee, Luis Diaz; began to organize the Ajax
employees on behalf of the United Auto Workers (UAW)." Ajax was a small company of
about 100 employees, and the word of the organizing activity spread rapidly among the
workforce and aroused the attention of management." On one occasion when Diaz and
several other co-workers were having coffee in the company cafeteria, Piotrowski ap-
proached them and asked: "What is happening? Are you forming the union?"" Diaz
denied the existence of any union activity and maintained that the employees were
discussing baseball.' Seven similar incidents involving Piotrowski and Shea were reported
within the next two weeks." In addition, it was reported that Shea read a notice of a union
meeting posted on the bulletin board and said to several employees standing around at
the time: "That is garbage. If you want to go, go. But that won't help you." 33
Based on these facts, the UAW filed charges against Ajax claiming that the interroga-
tions constituted an unfair labor practice. At the ensuing administrative hearing, the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found, first, that Piotrowski was a supervisor within the
meaning of the Act and, second, that the interrogations by Piotrowski and Shea were
violative of section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 54 The Board upheld the findings of the ALI and
21 Id. at 1314, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3767. Although the court does not cite to Bourne, the five factors
used by the Ajax court are the same as the factors listed in Bourne. See supra note 15 and accompany-
ing text,
" Id.
" Id.
24 Id.
" Id. at 1310, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3764.
26 Id.
" Id.
" Id. at 1313, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3766.
39 Id.
3° Id.
a' Id.
3-'
33 Id.
51 Id. at 1311, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3763.
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Ajax petitioned the court for review." The Board cross-appealed for enforcement of its
order."
In determining the status of Piotrowski, the appeals court stated that it was well
established that the presence of any one of the indicia of supervisory status referred to in
section 2(11) of the Act" is sufficient to render an employee a statutory supervisor as long
as the individual in question has the authority to exercise independent judgment." The
court found that even if Piotrowski were only implementing orders when he made his
initial assignments of employees, he was acting on his own when he reassigned workers
who had finished their jobs or whose machines had broken down. Accordingly, the court
noted that Piotrowski acted with managerial judgment as to the best interests of the
employer. 3" The court reasoned that Piotrowski's exercise of managerial judgment was a
sufficient basis for a finding of supervisory status. 4° Nonetheless, the court went on to
point out that the record was replete with other indicia of Piotrowski's supervisory status:
first, he was responsible for maintaining discipline; second, he effectively recommended
that an employee be discharged; third, he was responsible for locking up at night; fourth,
he did not do the same work as the other workers but sat and read when he was not
engaged in supervisory duties; and finally, the court noted, if Piotrowski, who was the
highest ranking employee on the night shift, was not the supervisor, then the night shift,
which was comprised of thirty men, would have been without a supervisor. 4 ' The court
agreed with the Board that these facts suggested a finding of supervisory status even
though they were not necessarily determinative.''
After deciding the supervisory issue, the court considered the legality of Piotrowski's
and Shea's practices. The court started from the premise that interrogations are only
violative of section 8(a)(1) when the questions asked, viewed from the perspective of the
employee, "could reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate the employee with respect to
union activities." 43 The court then listed five factors relevant to determining whether the
employer's conduct reasonably could have tended to intimidate or induce fear of reprisals
in the employees: (1) the existence of employer anti-union animus; (2) the questioner's
status in the company hierarchy; (3) the nature of the information sought; (4) the place
where the information was sought and the method by which the information was sought;
and (5) the truthfulness of the reply.'" These five factors were a modification of the Bourne
factors used by other circuit courts." The court also noted that it was obliged to consider
all relevant circumstances and included two of the factors relied upon by the Board:
whether the employer offered a legitiniate explanation for the questions, and whether the
employer gave assurances that no reprisals would follow the employee's response."
The court acknowledged that the enunciated test was not foolproof." According to
33 Id. at 1309, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3763.
Id. at 1315, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3768.
" See supra note 18.
" Ajax, 713 F.2d at 1312, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3764.
3" Id.
4a
 Id.
41 Id.
'' Id. at 1313, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3766.
Id. (quoting NLRB v. Rich's Precision Foundry, Inc., 667 F.2d 613, 109 L.R.R.M. 2143, (7th
Cir. 1981)).
" Id.
" See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
" Ajax, 713 F.2d at 1313, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3766. See also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
47 Ajax, 713 F.2d at 1313, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3766.
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the court, all seven factors could weigh in favor of the employer, even though the
challenged interrogations were in fact intimidating to employees and did actually inter-
fere with their protected rights." To avoid such a result, the Ajax court introduced an
eighth factor to be weighed: the number of employee interrogations." Suggesting that
seemingly harmless inquiries could become coercive if repeated often enough," the Ajax
court found that the point at which repeated questioning became intimidating could be
determined by measuring the size of the workforce and the number of people who
witnessed each incident. 34The court concluded that because the Ajax workforce consisted
of 100 employees and several employees overheard each incident of questioning, it was
reasonable to infer that seven incidents were sufficient to intimidate the whole work-
force." According to the court, the Ajax supervisors not only interrogated certain em-
ployees repeatedly, but they always did so in the presence of other employees, thereby
ensuring that the rest of the workforce was aware of management's repeated and pointed
questioning."
Having thus decided that the repetitious nature of the employer's interrogations was
a factor to be considered in this case, the court went on to apply the first seven factors to
the Ajax facts." While the court found no evidence of a history of anti-union animus on
the part of Ajax," it nevertheless concluded that the questions were coercive." The court
also found that the lack of explanation for the supervisor's interest," combined with the
absence of any assurances that no reprisals would be given,'" contributed to the coercive
impact of the questioning. Next, the court noted that the untruthfulness of the responses
indicated a fear of reprisal.'" Finally, although the court found that the time and place of
the inquiries were not intimidating,'" it concluded that because the employees perceived
Shea and Piotrowski as agents of management, the coercive and intimidating nature of
their questioning was significantly enhanced." In sum, the court found that the Board
was justified in finding that the Ajax method of interrogation violated the law."
An analysis of the Ajax opinion reveals the court's concern that, under current law,
employers are permitted to use methods of interrogation that intimidate employees who
are in the process of organizing a union." The court acknowledged the argument made
by Professor Derek Bok" that even if the Bourne factors used by the courts to measure the
legality of employer interrogation "cut in favor of the employer," intimidation of the
" Id.
" Id. The Ajax court cited to Peerless of America Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108, 1114, 83
L.R.R.M. 3000, 3004-05 (7th Cir. 1973) for this eighth factor. In Peerless , the court looked only to the
number of inquiries and did not consider the Bourne factors at all. Id.
51' Ajax, 713 F.2d at 1313, I 13 L.R.R.M. at 3766.
" Id. at 1314, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3767.
Id.
'3 Id.
' 4 Id. at 1314, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3767-68.
" Id. at 1314, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3767.
" Id.
Id. at 1314-15, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3767-68.
54 Id.
' 9 Id. at 1315, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3768.
" Id.
6 ' Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 1315, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3767.
" See Bok, supra note 13, at 107.
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employees may still occur." Bok argued that the Board's Blue Flash standard" for legal
interrogation more effectively restrained employers from engaging in unfair labor prac-
tices."' Even though the Blue Flash evaluation of all the circumstances did not result in
clear rules, it did, according to Bok, assure that employer interrogation was illegal absent
a showing from employers that they had a valid purpose for obtaining information
concerning union strength, that they communicated this purpose to the employees, and
that they gave assurances that no reprisals would follow." Thus, while Bok acknowledged
that the courts' standard protected employers who might inadvertently commit an unfair
labor practice, he questioned whether such added protection was worth the cost of
allowing employees to be coerced by inquiries permissible under the Bourne approach."
I In the Ajax decision, the court appeared to he answering Bok" by offering a com-
promise standard for measuring the legality of isolated instances of employer interroga-
tion. In Ajax, the court first applied the five factors of the Bourne test."' The court
emphasized that these factors were not exclusive and included two of the Board factors in
its evaluation of the situation presented in Ajax." If, after the application of these seven
factors, the employer's questions did not amount to a violation of the Act, the court
suggested that one more factor — an evaluation of the repetitious nature of the inquiries
— then should be applied."
By the use of this eight-factor test, the court appears to be suggesting that the
addition of the repetitiousness factor should both protect the employer from inadver-
tently committing an unfair labor practice, and protect the employee from being intimi-
dated by seemingly innocuous inquiries. The court's compromise standard, however, is
confusing for two reasons. First, the court did not indicate what weight should be given to
each factor. Second, the repetitiousness part of the test itself is confusing.
In applying the first seven factors, the court in Ajax found that five factors weighed
against the employer."' Nonetheless, the court suggested that the incidents of questioning
did not amount to a violation . 75 The court also did not give dispositive weight to the factor
relating to communicating a legitimate purpose for questioning, or to the factor relating
to assurances against reprisals that the Board has given in other cases." Thus, ascertain-
ing what weight the court gave each factor is difficult, because even though the majority
of the first seven factors weighed against the employer, the court indicated that the
employer would not have been found to be in violation of the Act. Only when the court
considered the repetitious nature of the inquiries did the scale tip decisively in favor of
the employee.
In addition to the difficulty in predicting how each of the eight factors in the Ajax test
will be weighted by the courts, it is also difficult to understand exactly how the repetiti-
ousness test will be applied. According to the court, questions that are innocuous when
65 Id. at 109.
e See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
"7
	 supra note 13, at 110.
" Id. at 107.
" Id. at 110.
" Ajax, 713 F.2d at 1314 n.5, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3767 n.5.
" Id. at 1314, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3767-68. See also supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
" Id. See also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
" Id.
" See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
" Ajax. 713 F.2d at 1314, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3767.
78 See Bok, supra note 13, at 107.
160	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 26:121
viewed as isolated incidents can become coercive if repeated too often." The Ajax court
concluded that the point at which repeated questioning becomes intimidating can he
determined by evaluating the size of the workforce, the number of incidents, and the
number of people who witness each incident. 78
 The court's reasoning implies that the
larger the workforce, the greater the number of innocuous questions the employer is
permitted to ask. In Ajax, however, the court did not consider that most of the reported
incidents which formed the basis of the union's claim involved Luis Diaz, the primary
organizer.'" Even if the Ajax workforce numbered 1,000 employees, seven incidents of
innocuous questioning may have intimidated Diaz. Interrogation that intimidates one
employee is sufficient to constitute an unfair labor practice. 8° Given these problems it is
unclear exactly how courts will measure the coercive effect of repeated incidents of
questioning.
The Ajax Tool Works decision was an attempt to consolidate the confusing list of
factors that the courts apply in determining the legality of employer interrogations. The
Ajax court may have been motivated by a desire to prevent employers from using legal
means of interrogation to restrain employees in the exercise of their rights to organize.
Future litigation, however, will be necessary to determine the effect — if any — that this
eight factor test may have on the analysis of employer interrogation cases.
3. *The NLRB and No Solicitation Rules — A Return to Pre - 1981 Policy: Our Way, Inc.'
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act' (the Act) provides employees with the
rights to self-organize, form labor unions, and bargain collectively.' Section 8(a) of the Act
makes it an unlawful labor practice for an employer to interfere with those rights.' These
provisions have furnished the grounds for challenges to the validity of rules, promulgated
by employers, which are designed to prohibit employee solicitation on work premises.' In
1943, the National Labor Relations Board (Board) held, in Peyton Packing Co., 6 that rules
n Ajax, 713 F.2d at 1314, 113 L.R.R.M, at 3767.
" Id.
71.1 Id.
NO NLRB v. Cladding Keystone Corp., 535 F.2d 129, 130, 76 L.R.R.M. 2099, 2101-02 (2d Cir.
1970).
* By Kenneth Lamb, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW ReviEw•
' 268 N.L.R.B. No. 61, 115 L.R.R.M. 1009 (1983).
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
3 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
▪ 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3) (1982). Section 8 provides that:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer — -
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7 . . . ;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization ...
Id.
• See, e.g., Our Way, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 61, 63, 115 L.R.R.M. 1009, 1009 (1983); T.R.W.
Bearings, 257 N.L.R.B. 442, 442, 107 L.R.R.M. 1481, 1481 (1981); Essex International, Inc., 211
N.L.R.B. 749, 749, 86 L.R.R.M. 1411, 1412 (1974); Stoddard-Quirk Mfg., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 615, 51
L.R.R.M. 1110, 1111 (1962); Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 828, 12 L.R.R.M. 183, 183 (1943).
49 N.L.R.B. 828, 12 L.R.R.M. 183 (1943).
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prohibiting solicitation during working time were presumptively valid because "working
time is for work."' By contrast, non-working time such as lunch and break periods is,
according to the Board, an employee's own time.' Thus, the Board determined that rules
prohibiting solicitation on the employee's own time were presumptively invalid, even if
applied only to work premises.9 The Supreme Court subsequently upheld these conclu-
sions in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,' ° stating that any rules prohibiting solicitation
outside of working time were unreasonable impediments to the right to self-organization,
even when those rules prohibit solicitation only on work premises."
In the years following Republic Aviation, the Board further developed these principles
by distinguishing between two types of no-solicitation rules: those prohibiting solicitation
during "working time" and those prohibiting solicitation during "working hours." 12 In
Essex International, Inc., 13 the Board held that rules prohibiting solicitation during working
time are presumptively valid under Peyton Packing because "working time" refers to that
time when actual job duties are performed." Similarly, under Republic Aviation rules
prohibiting solicitation during working hours are presumptively invalid because "working
hours" refers to the whole period from the beginning to the end of an employee's
workshift.'' This period includes non-working time such as lunch and break periods
during which an employee may solicit or be solicited because his own time is involved."
This distinction between "working hours" and "working time" was abandoned by the
Board, however, in 1981. In T.R.W. Bearings," the Board held that prohibitions against
solicitation during "working time" as well as prohibitions against solicitation during
"working hours" are presumptively invalid." The Board reasoned that there was no
meaningful distinction between the phrases "working hours" and "working time." 9 Both
phrases are ambiguous, according to the Board, so that employees might erroneously
interpret either one to mean that they could not solicit during parts of the work day, such
as break periods, that are their own time." The Board thus concluded that both terms
unlawfully interfered with the employee's exercise of organizational rights under section
7 of the Act. 21 The Board did not, however, create an irrebuttable presumption. Accord-
ing to the Board, any rule prohibiting solicitation during either "working hours" or
"working time" could be rendered lawful by the inclusion of an explanation that the
restriction on organizational activity did not apply to those periods of the day when
employees are not performing their work tasks."
T Id. at 843, 12 L.R.R.M. at 183.
Id.
9 Id. Such rules are discriminatory absent proof of special circumstances furnished by the
employer that the rules are necessary to preserve discipline or maintain production. Id. at 843-44, 12
L.R.R.M. at 183.
"' 324 U.S. 793, 16 L.R.R.M. 620 (1945).
" 324 U.S. at 803 n.10 (citing Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843-44, 12 L.R.R.M. 183,
183 (1943)).
"2 See, e.g., Campbell Soup Company, 159 N.L.R.B. 74, 81-82, 62 L.R.R.M. 1352, 1352 (1966).
13 211 N.L.R.B. 749, 86 L.R.R.M. 1411 (1974).
" Id.
15 Id.
'a Id.
17 257 N.L.R.B. 442, 107 L.R.R.M. 1481 (1981).
' 9 Id. at 443, 107 L.R.R.M. at 1482.
IB Id.
20 Id.
" Id.
22 Id.
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From 1981 until 1983, the principles enunciated in T.R.W. Bearings governed the
validity of no-solicitation rules. During the Survey year, however, in Our Way, Ine. 23 the
Board abruptly overruled T.R.W. Bearings and held that an employer's rules prohibiting
solicitation during working time were facially valid. 2' In Our Way, Inc., the International
Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers challenged the validity of the work rules and em-
ployee handbook of the employer, Our Way, as violating section 8(a) of the Act." Work
rule number seven prohibited solicitation during the working time of the soliciting
employee or the working time of the employee being solicited. 26 The handbook stated
that solicitation for any cause was prohibited during working time." Applying the princi-
ples of T.R.W. Bearings, the administrative law judge held that both work rule seven and
the employee handbook were facially invalid. 28 On appeal, the Board rejected the ad-
ministrative law judge's conclusions, overruled T.R.W. Bearings, and held that Our Way's
rules were facially valid."
The Board began its analysis by reiterating the basic principle that rules prohibiting
solicitation during non-working times are presumptively invalid, while those prohibiting
solicitation during actual working times are presumptively valid." According to the
Board, the distinction is based on the fact that non-working time involves an employee's
own tinne_while actual working time is the employer's time and is meant for work only. 3 '
The Board noted that from 1943 until 1981, the period between Peyton and T.R.W.
Bearings, it had respected this distinction consistently by holding that rules prohibiting
solicitation during "working time" were presumptively lawful." Likewise, according to the
Board, the further distinction drawn in Essex International, Inc. between "working hours"
and "working time" was consistent with the basic principle of allowing solicitation on the
employee's own time." "Working hours" rules are presumptively invalid, the Board
stated, because such rules imply that an employee's own time during the work day may
not be used for solicitation.34
 On the other hand, the Board pointed out that, in Essex,
"working time" rules were held to be presumptively valid because such rules implied that
23 268 N.L.R.B. No. 61, 115 L.R.R.M. 1009 (1983).
Id. at 5, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1010.
25
 268 N.L.R.B. No. 61, appendix at 2 (1983).
26
 Id. at 3, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1009. Work rule seven provided that: "In order to make our
company a better place to work, the following are Prohibited. 7 Soliciting, collecting or selling for
any purpose during the working time of the soliciting employee or the working time of the employee
being solicited." Id.
" Id. The handbook provided that:
SOL1CITATIONIDISTRIBUTION — - In order to prevent disruption in the operation
of the plant, interference with work and inconvenience to other employees, solicitation
for any cause, or distribution of literature of any kind, during working time, is not
permitted. Neither may an employee who is not on working time, such as an employee
who is on lunch or on break, solicit an employee who is on working time for any cause
or distribute literature of any kind to that person. Whether on working time or not, no
employee may distribute literature of any kind in any working areas of the plant.
Id.
26 Id. at 2, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1009.
29 Id. at 4-5, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1010.
3° Id. at 3-4, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1009-10.
3 ' Id.
32 Id. at 3, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1009.
33 Id. at 3-4, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1009-10.
1 Id.
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solicitation was prohibited only during those times when the employee was supposed to be
working." According to the Board, Our Way's rules satisfied the standard enunciated in
Essex . 36
The Board then considered the practical impact on employers of its T.R.W. Bearings
decision." Prior to T.R.W. Bearings, according to the Board, the distinction drawn in Essex
between rules prohibiting solicitation during "working hours" and those prohibiting
solicitation during "working time" had been understood by both,unions and employers."
The Board noted that employers had relied on the Essex principles when drafting rules,
and unions had relied on Essex when explaining organizational rights to their members. 39
Describing T.R.W. Bearings as an unnecessary departure from an otherwise settled area of
the law, the Board overruled it to the extent that it conflicted with Essex.4°
The Board also took note of criticisms by both management and unions of the
inconsistencies in the Board's opinions." According to the Board, its return to Essex will
have no ill effects on existing no-solicitation rules because any rules written to comport
with T.R.W. Bearings would also be valid under Essex." The Board concluded that its
reversal of T.R.W. Bearings is simply a return to the principle that no-solicitation rules
need only indicate that employees may solicit on their own time to he valid under section 7
of the Act.43
One member of the Board dissented from those parts of the majority opinion
overruling T.R.W. Bearings." According to the dissent, the majority was correct in stating
that employees may engage in solicitation during the work day only when they are not
supposed to be performing their work duties.° The dissent, however, rejected the
3' Id. at 4, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1010.
36 Id. The Board added that Our Way's no-solicitation rules also complied with those standards
laid out in Stoddard-Quirk Mfg., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 51 L.R.R.M. 1110 (1962). Our Way, 268 N.L.R.B.
No. 61 at 4, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1010. In Stoddard- Quirk, the Board drew a distinction between oral and
written solicitation and employed a balancing test weighing the respective interests of employer and
employee. 138 N.L.R.B. at 616-21, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1111-14. As regards written solicitation, the Board
held that the employer's interest in cleanliness in work areas outweighed the necessity of employees
having access to those areas to distribute written materials. /d. at 620, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1113. The
Board added, however, that the employer's interest was not substantial enough to outweigh the
employee's need to solicit in other employer-owned areas, such as company parking lots, because
employee intrusion on employer rights was minimal and the employees' need for access to these
areas was great. Id. Thus, the Board held that employees may solicit with written materials only in
nonworking areas of the premises on nonworking time. Id. at 621, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1113.
As regards oral solicitation, the Board in Stoddard-Quilk found that because of the absence of the
littering problems that accompanied written solicitation, the employer's interest in keeping oral
solicitation out of working areas was minimal. Id. at 620, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1113. Accordingly, the
Board held that the only allowable restriction on oral solicitation was that it he on nonworking time.
Id. at 621, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1113.
" 268 N.L.R.B. No. 61 at 4, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1010.
" Id.
" Id.
" Id. at•5, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1010.
41 Id.
42 Id.
" Id. Although, the Our Way Board reversed the administrative law judge's holding that the
no-solicitation rules were facially invalid, it agreed with the judge's finding that Our Way's rules had
been unlawfully applied in practice. Id. at 5-6, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1010,
" 268 N.L.R.B. No. 61 at 7, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1012 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
45 Id.
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majority's conclusion that Our Way's no-solicitation rules, as published, were valid."
Those rules, according to the dissent, were so broad and ambiguous as to mislead
employees into concluding that they could not solicit on their own time. 47
 Such a conclu-
sion, the dissent stated, unlawfully restricted employees' full exercise of their section 7
rights."
The dissent first focused on the reasoning in T.R.W. Bearings, that both "working
time" and "working hours" were inherently ambiguous phrases subject to misconstruction
by employees." In neither the present case nor in Essex, the dissent stated, had the Board
offered a convincing explanation of how employees would be able to distinguish between
the phrases "working hours" and "working time." 5° Absent such an explanation, the
dissenting member concluded that he would adhere to the rule of T.R.W. Bearings in
order to ensure the protection of employee interests under section 7 of the Act. 5 '
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's contention that from 1943 until 1981,
the period between Peyton and T.R.W. Bearings, the Board had held that no-solicitation
rules containing the phrase "working time" were presumptively lawful." According to the
dissenting member, from at least 1966 through 1974, the Board had held such rules to he
presumptively unlawful." To support this contention, the dissent cited Campbell Soup," a
1966 decision by the Board. According to the dissent, in Campbell Soup the Board had
found two challenged no-solicitation rules to be unlawful: one expressed in terms of
"working time," the other in terms of "working hours." 55
 Thus, the dissent concluded that
from 1966, when Campbell Soup was rendered, until 1974, when Essex International was
decided, rules containing both phrases.were presumptively unlawful. 5°
The Board's reversal of the principles enunciated in T.R.W. Bearings is unfortunate
because it fundamentally misconstrues the purpose of section 7 of the Act. The United
States Supreme Court has stated that analyses under the Act should balance the compet-
ing interests of the employer and employee.57
 The employer has an interest in maintain-
ing discipline on the work premises, and employees have the undisputed right to self-
organization." A proper balancing of these interests had been reached in T.R.W. Bearings.
In that case, the Board held that the ambiguity of the phrases "working time" and
"working hours," without more explanation, would render no-solicitation rules contain-
ing those phrases presumptively invalid because they were likely to be misconstrued by
employees, to the employees' disadvantage." The Board did not abandon the interests of
46 Id.
47 Id. at 7 - 8, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1012 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting),
" Id.
49 Id. at 11, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1013, (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
5° Id. at 11-12, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1013 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
5 ' Id. at 12, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1013 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
52 Id. at 8, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1012 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
55 Id. at 9, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1013 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting). The dissenting member
cited and analyzed Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 12 L.R.R.M. 183 (1943), Campbell Soup
Co., 159 N.L.R.B. 74, 62 L.R.R.M. 1352 (1966), and Avon Convalescent Center, 200 N.L.R.B. 702,
82 L.R.R.M. 1233 (1972) to support his contention. 268 N.L.R.B. at 8-11, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1012-13
(Zimmerman, Member, dissenting),
" 159 N.L.R.B. 74, 62 L.R.R.M. 1352 (1966).
268 N.L.R.B. No. 61 at 10, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1013 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
56 Id.
" Republic Aviation Corp., 324 U.S. 793, 797-98, 16 L.R.R.M. 620, 622 (1944).
58 Id.
s°
	
N.L.R.B. 442, 443, 107 L.R.R.M. 1481, 1482 (1981).
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the employers in T.R.W. Bearings, however, because it 'allowed no-solicitation rules to
include the phrases as long as they were accompanied by an explanation that non-working
portions of the day were not included within the prohibitions.° Thus, both the employer's
interest in self-discipline on the work premises and the interest of employees in self-
organization were protected.
In stark contrast to T.R.W. Bearings, the Board's decision in Our Way, Inc. does not
appropriately balance the interests of employers and employees. The use of the phrase
"working time" by employers is now presumptively lawful, even without an accompanying
explanation." This retreat by the Board will allow employers to draft ambiguous rules
that do not clearly indicate when an employee has the right to solicit or be solicited. As a
result some employees will erroneously conclude that they cannot solicit during certain
periods of the day when, in fact, they are guaranteed that right under the Act. Thus, the
Board's decision in Our Way, Inc. contravenes the underlying purpose of section 7 of the
Act, and miscontrues the proper balance of the employer's interest in discipline on the
work premises and the right of employees to self-organize."
The Board in Our Way, Inc. has thus reversed its position concerning the presump-
tions which are to be applied to no-solicitation rules promulgated by employers. In the
future, a prohibition against solicitation during "working time" will no longer create a
presumption of invalidity. Rather, such rules will be presumed valid.° Rules prohibiting
solicitation during "working hours" will continue to be presumed invalid." The Board's
decision to overrule T.R.W. Bearings defeats the principle underlying the Act, that em-
ployers' and employees' interests be balanced.
4. *The Necessity of Showing Coercive Effects of an Employer's Conduct Before
Corporate-Wide Access Can Be Ordered: Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB'
Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) 2 empowers the NatiOnal
Labor Relations Board (Board) to remedy unfair labor practices by taking "such affirma-
tive action . . . as will effectuate the policies of [thej Act." 3 Board remedies ordinarily
consist of orders to cease and desist from the proscribed conduct or to compensate the
aggrieved party for losses incurred as a result of the unfair labor practice. 4 In some cases,
such as where the unfair labor practice is committed by a persistent violator, the Board
may conclude that an extraordinary remedy is necessary to correct the violation. 5 Because
" Id.
" 268 N.L.R.B. No. 61 at 5, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1010.
" See Republic Aviation Corp., 324 U.S. 793, 797-98, 16 L.R.R.M. 620, 622 (1944).
Our Way, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 61 at 5, 115 L.R.R.M. 1009, 1010 (1983).
" Id. at 3-4, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1009-10.
* By Scott A. Faust, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 713 F.2d 823, 113 L.R.R.M. 3625 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
2 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
• Id.
▪ See United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 646 F.2d 016, 618; 106 L.R.R.M. 2573, 2574
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
5 Id. at 630, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2583. For cases in which courts and the Board have expanded
remedial measures beyond the actual locations at which unfair labor practices were found, see J.P.
Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 322, 327, 104 L.R.R.M. 2573, 2577 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
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the Board's powers are remedial and not punitive, however, its orders must be designed
to remedy the effects of the violation at hand.' The Board may not justify an order solely
on the ground that it will deter future violations of the Act or punish past unrelated
actions.'
One type of extraordinary remedy which the Board may impose is an order requir-
ing an employer to afford a union access to its work sites. 8 The most common form of
access granted to a union is a grant of access to bulletin boards at the plant. 9 Another form
would be a grant of access to the plant itself.° While the Board seems to be increasingly
willing to order access to an employer's work sites as a remedial measure, the develop-
ment of this remedy has not been marked by any consistent standard or theory."
In United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB , w the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held that the Board had broad authority to order corporate-wide
access as a remedial measure.' 3 The court acknowledged that the imposition of remedies
U.S. 1077 (1981); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 881, 882, 103 L.R.R.M. 2221, 2222 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 918 (1980); Gerry's Cash Markets, Inc. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d 1021, 1025,
101 L.R.R.M. 3116, 3119 (1st Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Jack La Lanne Management Corp., 539 F.2d 292,
295, 92 L.R.R.M. 3601, 3603 (2d Cir. 1976); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 1017, 1021.22, 70
L.R.R.M. 2104, 2107 (4th Cir. 1968); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 292, 304, 65 L.R.R.M.
2829, 2835 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B.
1547, 1551, 98 L.R.R.M. 1437, 1438 (1978); Alberts, Inc., 213 N.L.R.B. 686, 698.99, 87 L.R.R.M.
1682, 1684 (1974), enforced, NLRB v. Alberts, Inc., 543 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
See Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 11-12, 7 L.R.R.M. 287, 291 (1940); Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235-36, 3 L.R.R.M. 646, 681 (1938); Decaturville
Sportswear Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 886, 889, 70 L.R.R.M. 2472, 2474 (6th Cir. 1969).
7 See Bell & Howell Co. v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 136, 147 n.36, 100 L.R.R.M. 2192, 2198 n.36 (D.C.
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942 (1979).
See United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 646 F.2d 616, 631, 106 L.R.R.M. 2573, 2583
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
9 See Koval Press, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 1261, 1265, 101 L.R.R.M. 1086, 1087 (1979), enforced,
NLRB v. Koval Press, Inc., 622 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1980). Access to bulletin boards is perhaps the least
intrusive form of access to company property, yet such access provides the union with an important
means by which to communicate with employees. United Steelworkers, 646 F.2d at 631-32, 106
L.R.R.M. at 2593. That communication is often essential to offset effects caused by the unlawful
conduct of an employer. See, e.g., John Singer, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 88, 90, 80 L.R.R.M. 1340, 1341
(1972).
1 ° See, e.g., Decaturville Sportswear Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 886, 889, 70 L.R.R.M. 2472, 2472
(6th Cir. 1969). "As with access to bulletin boards, the general theory behind the use of this remedial
tool is that greater communication between the union and employees is needed to dissipate the
effects of fear and oppression that have been created by serious or repeated employer unfair labor
practices." United Steelworkers, 646 F.2d at 633, 106 L.R.R.M. 2573, 2585.
" United Steelworkers, 646 F.2d at 631, 106 L.R.R.M. 2573, at 2584.
13 646 F.2d 616, 106 L.R.R.M. 2573 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
13 Id. at 638, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2591. The court stated that such a remedial order did not conflict
with the well-established rule of NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 L.R.R.M. 2001,
2007 (1956), that an employer may deny a union access to company property during an organizing
campaign, unless the union meets a heavy burden of showing that no other reasonable means of
communicating its organizational message to the employees exist. United Steelworkers, 646 F.2d at 637,
106 L.R.R.M. at 2589. The court in United Steelworker., stated that the principles of Babcock, which
protect the employer's private property rights, did not apply to remedial access orders because access
as a remedial measure may be necessary to offset coercive effects caused by an employer's unlawful
conduct. Id. at 638, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2590. The employer should not be allowed to benefit from his
unlawful conduct by invoking the talisman of private property rights. Id. at 639, 106 L.R.R.M. at
2590. If, however, such coercive effects do not exist, the above reasoning fails, and the Babcock rule
applies. Id.
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is a matter of special administrative competence and that the Board's remedies must stand
unless the order is shown to be a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which
can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act." The court stated that when
determining the effects of the current violation to be remedied, the Board may consider
the violator's history of recalcitrance, 15 In the court's view, an extensive history of unlaw-
ful conduct alone, however, would not justify extraordinary relief.' 6 The United Steelwor-
kers court found that history deserves consideration only insofar as it exacerbates the •
effects of the violation at hand.' 7 Unless such effects exist and extraordinary relief is
necessary to cure them, the Board's extraordinary order will be punitive, not remedial,
and therefore not enforceable under the policies of the Act.J' As a result, under the rule
of United Steelworkers, before the Board may impose an access remedy, it must cite
evidence that the violation at issue produced coercive effects at the plant to which access is
ordered, and that access is necessary, not merely useful, to undo these effects."'
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia re-emphasized its requirement that the Board substantiate decisions to grant an
extraordinary access remedy. In Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB,' the court applied the
principles of United Steelworkers'' and, in so doing, clarified the burden which the Board
must bear in order to justify extraordinary remedies. The court elaborated on the factors
that the Board should consider in its determination of whether to grant an extraordinary
remedy. Those factors, as originally set forth in United Steelworkers, are: 1) the seriousness
of the violation at issue; 2) the knowledge of the violation at other plants; 3) the distance
between plants; 4) the existence of organizing activity at other plants; and 5) the effect of
the passage of time between violations. 22 The court also stated that an employer's exten-
sive history of unlawful conduct could not, by itself, justify extraordinary relief." After
Florida Steel, the Board will have a clearer idea of what factors to consider in determining
the necessity of granting extraordinary relief, and it will have to make certain that specific
coercive effects arising from an unfair labor practice exist before granting corporate-wide
relief.
The petitioner in Florida Steel, Florida Steel Corp. (FSC), by its own admission, is "an
enterprise waging a tough, prolonged campaign" against the United Steelworkers
Union. 24 The union has conducted organizational activity at only four of FSC's twenty-two
locations:2s At each location, the company's campaign against the union has included the
commission of unfair labor-practices:26 In seventeen separate cases, the Board has found
" United Steelworkers, 646 F.2d at 629, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2583 (citing Virginia Electric & Power Co.
v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540, 12 L.R.R.M. 739, 744 (1943)).
13 United Steelworkers, 646 F.2d at 630, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2584.
16 Id. at 639 n.45, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2591 n.45.
' 7 Id.
at 638, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2590.
19 Id.
20 713 F.2d 823, 113 L.R.R.M. 3625 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
21 646 F.2d 616, 106 L.R.R.M. 2573 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying
text.
22 713 F.2d at 830, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3630.
23 Id. at 829, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3630.
24 United Steelworkers, 646 F.2d at 621, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2576.
25 Id.
" 713 F.2d at 825 n.1, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3627 n.l. The history of FSC-Union relations has not
been totally one-sided. Id. The Fifth Circuit in a related proceeding found that the Union has waged
an aggressive campaign for many years by filing as many charges as possible against FSC. Florida
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multiple violations of the Act by FSC. 27
In 1979, the Board found that FSC had committed unfair labor practices in violation
of Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act 28
 by unilaterally changing the pay rates of two
employees in the bargairiing unit represented by the union at FSC's Indiantown, Florida
plant without first bargaining with the union about the issue." The Board neither alleged
nor found any anti-union animus." The Board stated, however, that FSC's "pattern of
unlawful conduct" had evidenced a "rejection of the principles of collective bargaining,"
of which its most recent violation was only a continuance. 3' In light of this history, the
Board concluded that the usual cease-and-desist and affirmative remedial orders for
violations of this type would not adequately remedy the violations in this case." The
Board, therefore, provided for the issuance of a corporate-wide cease-and-desist order;
corporate-wide posting of a Board notice ; 33
 the mailing and reading of the notice to all of
FSC's employees; and publication of the notice in all appropriate publications." In
addition, the Board's order required FSC to afford the union access to any of FSC's plants
if, within two years of the order, the Board conducted an election at the plant, or if FSC
gave a speech concerning union representation to employees convened for such a pur-
pose."
FSC appealed the Board's order to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia." The court remanded to the Board for further findings. 37
 On remand, the
Board amended its order to require that FSC afford the union access only to FSC's two
other Florida plants at which the union had begun organizing activity, Tampa and
Jacksonville." FSC again brought an appeal, seeking review of the Board's order to
provide corporate-wide notification and access to its Tampa and Jacksonville plants." The
Board filed a cross-application for enforcement of its order. 40
The issue before the court on this second appeal was whether the Board had made
findings sufficient to support its conclusion that corporate-wide remedies were necessary
to offset coercive effects caused by FSC's unlawful conduct.'" The court found that the
Board had failed to justify its imposition of extraordinary remedies. 42
 It refused to
Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 735, 743, 100 L.R.R.M. 2451, 2455 (5th Cir. 1979). The court
characterized this process as a part of the union's strategy to build up a long history of antiunion
activity on the part of FSC in order to discredit it before the Board. Id. Dozens of charges have been
filed by the union and many of them, but not all, have been dismissed. Id.
" See United Steelworkers, 646 F.2d at 621 n.9, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2576 n.9, for a thorough list of the
numerous cases in which these parties have met.
2°. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158 (a)(1), (5) (1982).
" 244 N.L.R.B. 395, 102 L.R.R.M. 1181 (1979).
3? 713 F.2d at 824, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3627.
31 Id.
3-2
 262 N.L.R.B. 1460, 1460, 106 L.R.R.M. 2573, 2575 (1982).
33
 The text of the notice is appended to the Board's opinion. Id. at 1466, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2576.
34 Id. at 1460, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2576.
35
3' United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 646 F.2d 616, 106 L.R.R.M. 2573 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
37 Id. at 642, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2593. The court desired findings responsive to the five areas of
inquiry which it had set forth in United Steelworkers. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
" 262 N.L.R.B. at 1465-66, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2576.
" 713 F.2d at 824, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3628.
4° Id.
41 Id. at 828-29, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3629.
" Id. at 830, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3630.
December 1984].	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
	
169
enforce the notice and access provisions of the Board's order because the Board pre-
sented no evidence of coercive effects, choosing instead to rely on conclusory statements
and assumptions, and on an "invocation of history with no link to any effect reasonably
expected from the violation in the case."' 3 The court thus enforced the "cease and desist"
and the "make whole" provisions of the Board's order and denied enforcement of the
corporate-wide notification and access provisions."
The Florida Steel court reached its conclusion by analyzing the Board's opinion in
light of the five factors set forth in United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB." The court
found that although the Board referred to each of the five factors set forth in United
Steelworkers, it failed to point to any evidence in the record of the violation at issue that
would support its extraordinary remedial order." According to the court, the Board
relied solely on historical events totally unrelated to the violation at issue.'? In the court's
view, the Board improperly relied on a recitation of prior history instead of providing the
detailed factual analysis of the instant violations which the court had requested on
remand."
In rejecting the Board's total reliance on history to support the extraordinary order,
the court insisted that the Board impose a remedy proportionate to the violation at hand
and its effects.' The court acknowledged that effects of the present unfair labor practice,
if established by evidence or record, may be evaluated in light of the employer's history,
but absent any demonstration of the effects of the violation, mere historical recitations are
not sufficient." In the court's view, history is not a substitute for evidence of effects, and it
cannot exacerbate effects which have not been shown to exist."
The Florida Steel court concluded that the record before it established that the
Board's order contained punitive measures designed to deter future violations of the
Act." As such, the order could not be said to effectuate the remedial policies of the Act. 53
The court, therefore, refused to enforce the corporate-wide notice and access provisions
of the Board's order."
Analysis of the relevant case law reveals that the court's refusal to enforce the Board's
order is well founded. The court in United Steelworkers" noted that the Board's imposition
of remedies is a matter of special administrative competence, subject to very limited
judicial review." Further, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the
administrative expertise of the Board in fashioning remedies derives from its unique
understanding of the complex relationship between labor and management and the
" Id. at 829, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3629.
44 hi. at 836, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3636.
" See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
46
 713 F.2d at 830, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3629.
" Id. at 831-33, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3630-35.
48 See supra note 37.
49
 713 F.2d at 830, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3629 (quoting Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 233,
240 n.20, 107 L.R.R.M. at 3048 n.20 (5th Cir. 1981)).
5° 713 F.2d at 829, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3629.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 835, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3635.
3.3 Id. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
34 Id. at 836, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3636.
" 646 F.2d 616, 106 L.R.R.M. 2573 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
56 Id. at 629, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2590.
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policies incorporated in labor laws. 57 As stated by the Court, the Board's selection of
remedies must stand unless the Board's order can be shown to be inconsistent with the
policies of the Act. 58
The Board's authority has certain bounds; its powers are remedial, not punitive."
The District of Columbia Circuit has noted, however, that application of this limitation on
the Board's power is difficult." This problem of application to specific facts, the court has
observed, is most acute in cases in which the offending party has demonstrated an
unyielding disregard for the Act by repeatedly committing unfair labor practices and
ignoring Board orders to cease and desist from unlawful conduct." The Board's use of
broader and more stringent remedies against a persistent violator than those usually
invoked against a first offender may appear "punitive" in the context of an individual
violation, but may, in certain circumstances, be "remedial," and therefore proper, in the
context of the total conduct of a persistent violator." Such circumstances exist where the
unlawful conduct at hand creates coercive effects which are exacerbated by a history of
recalcitrance."
Consequently, the critical inquiry in a court's review of the propriety of the Board's
imposition of an extraordinary remedy is whether the conduct at hand has produced
harmful effects which are exacerbated by a history of unlawful conduct." Courts have
recognized that the Board possesses unmatched expertise in distilling and identifying the
coercive effects of unlawful conduct," and that the Board may rely upon that expertise to
presume that certain conduct will produce certain effects." Absent findings of reasonably
foreseeable effects, however, the Board's order cannot be justified as a remedial action,
and therefore can only be explained as containing punitive measures intended to deter
future violations of the Act." A court may not enforce such a punitive order."
The court in Florida Steel refused to enforce the Board's order because the Board
presented no evidence of coercive effects." The Board's order relied upon several
assumptions derived from FSC's history of unlawful conduct." Although the Board may
" See NLRB v. Cissel Packing Co., 395 U.S .  575, 612 n.32, 71 L.R.R.M. 2481, 2495 n.32 (1969);
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216, 57 L.R.R.M. 2609, 2621 (1964);
NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 348-49, 31 L.R.R.M. 2237, 2241 (1953); Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194, 8 L.R.R.M. 439, 455 (1941).
s ' Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540, 12 L.R.R.M. 739, 745 (1943).
" See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
al United Steelworkers, 646 F.2d at 630, 106 L.R.R.M, at 2590.
4' Id.
62
	
Containair Systems Corp. v. NLRB, 521 F.2d 1166, 1171, 89 L.R.R.M. 2685, 2688 (2d Cir.
1975) ("the Board has a duty 	 to employ broader and more stringent remedies against a recidivist
than those usually invoked against a first offender . . . ").
63 United Steelworkers, 646 F.2d at 630, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2590.
64 Id. at 638, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2592.
" See Cook Paint & Varnish Co. v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 712, 719, 106 L.R.R.M. 3016, 3021 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 646 F.2d 616, 639, 106 L.R.R.M. 2573, 2592
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
66
	 Steelworkers, 646 F.2d at 639, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2592.
67 Id. at 641, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2592.
" Id. at 630, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2583.
69 713 F.2d at 831, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3631.
14 262 N.L.R.B. 1460, 1465, 106 L.R.R.M. 2573, 2576 (1982) ("we are drawing inferences which
we believe are reasonable in light of [FSC's] propensity to engage in unlawful conduct . . . ").
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rely upon its expertise to formulate such assumptions," and courts should defer to the
Board's expertise, such assumptions must be supported by evidence in the record." The
Board based its assumptions upon conclusory statements which the court found were not
supported by any evidence in the record." The court in Florida Steel was therefore correct
in rejecting the Board's justification for its imposition of an extraordinary remedy.
After Florida Steel, a union seeking any form of access to an employer's work sites
must present evidence that the violation at issue produced harmful effects at the sites to
which access is sought and that access is necessary to cure those effects. Courts have
recognized the difficulty of showing coercive effects, 74 but Florida Steel sets forth and
applies guidelines to assist the charging party. In order to establish the existence of these
effects, the union should therefore present evidence responsive to the five areas of
inquiry which the court has set forth. 73
The decision in Florida Steel re-affirmed that an employer's extensive history of
unlawful conduct cannot by itself justify an extraordinary remedial order. In the case of a
persistent violator, a history of unlawful conduct may be used to enhance the effects, but
the Florida Steel court has clearly established that history is no substitute for evidence. A
showing of coercive effects resulting from an employer's unlawful conduct thus will be
absolutely essential to justify an access remedy.
C. *Determining Bargaining Units in Health Care Settings:
Watonwan Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. NLRB'
The National Labor Relations Board (Board) has the task of determining which
group of jobs will serve as the election constituency and bargaining unit for collective
bargaining purposes.' As a rule, the Board is given wide discretion in making its determi-
nations. 3 The National Labor Relations Act (the Act) has traditionally been interpreted to
require only that the Board delineate an appropriate unit, not the most appropriate unit. 4
71 United Steelworkers, 646 F.2d at 639, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2592.
72 Id.
" For example, in the Board's discussion of the knowledge of the present violation at other FSC
plants, it concentrated on FSC's conduct generally. The Board said nothing specifically directed to
knowledge of the conduct at issue and cited no evidence that employees learned of this violation. 262
N.L.R.B. 1460, 1462-63, 106 L.R.R.M. 2573, 2575 (1982).
7' See United Steelworkers, 646 F.2d at 639, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2592.
" See supra note 37.
* By Kimberly M. Collins, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 711 F.2d 848, 113 L.R.R.M. 3481 (8th Cir. 1983).
2 R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 66 (1982) [hereinafter cited as GORMAN).
• GORMAN, supra note 2, at 67. Section 159(b) of the National Labor Relations Act provides few
restrictions on the Board's exercise of this power. The statute provides: "The Board shall determine
in each case whether in order to assure employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights
guaranteed by this Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the
employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof." 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982).
4 GORMAN, supra note 2, at 66. See Watonwan, 711 F.2d at 848, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3482 (longstand-
ing principle that the Board need only certify "an appropriate" bargaining unit, rather than "the most
appropriate" one) (emphasis in original). Section 157(a) of the Act provides in pertinent part:
"Representatives designated for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of employees in
a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive bargaining representatives of all
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining...." 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
Watonwan Memorial Hospital did not argue that the traditional interpretation was incorrect gener-
ally but only as applied to health care units. 711 F.2d at 849, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3482.
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In making its determinations, the Board's primary test for appropriateness of a bargain-
ing unit is the "community of interests" test.' Under this test, the Board considers such
factors as wages and working conditions, required skills and duties, and employee interac-
tion and supervision.° As a general rule, the bargaining unit should exclude employees
having a substantial conflict of economic interest.' In examining the Board's decision,
courts have overturned the Board's determination of an appropriate bargaining unit only
if it is arbitrary and capricious.'
Prior to 1974, nonprofit health care institutions were exempted from coverage under
the Act.9
 The 1974 Amendments to the Act, however, brought these institutions and their
employees under the jurisdiction of the Act.'° Congress, while desiring to give all health
care employees the benefits and protections provided by the Act, also recognized the
special needs of the health care industry." In the legislative history of the 1974 Amend-
ments, Congress admonished the Board to prevent "the proliferation of bargaining units
in the health care industry."" This admonition was included because Congress believed
that a proliferation of bargaining units increased the likelihood of strikes that would
possibly disrupt patient care.' 3
In recent years, health care employers have challenged the Board's bargaining unit
determinations, arguing that the legislative history of the amendments requires the Board
to find the largest appropriate unit." The circuit courts have split in their responses to
such challenges. Several of the circuits, such as the Second, Third, Sixth, and Seventh
Circuits have instructed the Board to balance the community of interests factors with the
congressional mandate and the public interest to avoid a proliferation of bargaining
units.' 5 The weight to be given to the proliferation factor by the Board in reaching its
5 GORMAN, supra note 2, at 67. See also infra note 19 and accompanying text.
• Id. at 69.
7 Id.
" See May Dept Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376, 380, 17 L.R.R.M. 643, 647 (1945) (held
judicial review is to "guarantee against arbitrary action by the Board," not to review and weigh the
evidence presented to the Board). See also Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB, 653 F.2d
450, 454, 107 L.R.R.M. 2955, 2956 (10th Cir. 1981).
• The 1974 Amendments to the Act excluded nonprofit hospitals from coverage under the Act.
S. REP. No. 93.766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3946, 3948.
1° GORMAN, supra note 2, at 25. Section 152(2) was amended in 1974 to eliminate the statutory
exclusion for nonprofit medical institutions. Id. See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1982).
" S. REP. No. 93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3946,
3948.
17 Id. al 3950.
' 3 Id. at 3948. See also NLRB v. HMO Int'l/Cal. Medical Group Health Plan, 678 F.2d 806, 808,
110 L.R.R.M. 2745, 2746 (9th Cir. 1982).
74 See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 15-18.
' 5 See Husband, Determining Appropriate Bargaining Units in Health Care Institutions — The Cap
Widens, 32 LAB. L.J. 780, 782 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Husband]. See also NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc.,
705 F.2d 1461, 1470-71, 113 L.R.R.M. 2336, 2342 (7th Cir, 1983) (court will uphold the Board's
application of community of interests test if the Board's result does not lead to proliferation); NLRB
v. Mercy Hospital Ass'n, 606 F.2d 22, 27, 102 L.R.R.M. 2259, 2262 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 971 (sole use of community of interests test insufficient to meet congressional mandate); NLRB
v. Sweetwater Hospital Ass'n, 604 F.2d 454, 458, 102 L.R.R.M. 2246, 2248 (6th Cir. 1979) (Board
justified in weighing policy against disrupting existing bargaining relationships more heavily than
policy against undue proliferation of bargaining units where Board's decision has not resulted in
proliferation); St. Vincent's Hospital v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 588, 592, 97 L.R.R.M. 2119, 2122 (3d Cir.
1977) (legislative history of the amendments directed the Board to apply a non-traditional standard).
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bargaining unit determination, however, was left unclear by these courts."' In contrast,
the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have directed the Board to substitute a "disparity of
interests" test for the community of interests test when determining bargaining units in
the health care industry.' 7 The disparity of interests test focuses on the conflicting
interests of different employee groups that would prohibit or inhibit the representation
of employee interests.' This test requires the Board to start with the largest possible unit
and then eliminate only those groups of employees whose presence in the bargaining unit
would be detrimental to fair representation of employee interests. Consequently, under
the disparity of interests test, the Board would choose the largest unit that could be
deemed appropriate. 19
During the Survey year, in Watonwan Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. NLRB," the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit addressed the issue of what standard must
be applied in health care bargaining unit determinations. In its opinion, the court
considered Watonwan Hospital's (Hospital) argument that the concern of Congress
regarding the proliferation of bargaining units in hospitals required the Board to apply a
test other than its traditional community of interests test. The Watonwan court also
reviewed the rulings of other circuit courts, and determined that the community of
interests standard was appropriate in health care situations where the Board also demon-
strated some consideration of the proliferation issue. 2 '
The controversy in Watonwan arose when the Board certified the Minnesota Licensed
Practical Nurses Association and Technical Employees Association of Minnesota (Union)
as the exclusive bargaining representative of a bargaining unit consisting of all technical
13 In general, the courts have stated only that the proliferation factor must be considered by the
Board. See supra note 15. Cf. St. Vincent's Hospital v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 588, 592, 97 L.R.R.M. 2119,
2122 (7th Cir. 1977) (proliferation issue such that will require Board to apply a non-traditional
standard).
17 NLRB v. HMO Intl/Cal. Medical Group Health Plan, 678 F.2d 806, 808, 110 L.R.R.M. 2745,
2746 (9th Cir. 1982); Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Ctr. v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 450, 457, 107 L.R.R.M..
2953, 2957 (10th Cir. 1981).
's NLRB v. HMO Intl/Cat Medical Group Health Plan, 678 F,2d 806, 808, 110 L.R.R.M. 2745,
2746 (7th Cir. 1977).
19 Watonwan, 711 F.2d at 848, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3482. In St. Francis Hospital the Board rejected its
earlier decisions on health care bargaining units and adopted a refined version of the disparity of
interests test. St. Francis Hospital, 271 N.L.R.B. No. 160, I, 13-20, 116 L.R.R.M. 1465, 1470-71
(1984). Under the Board's new disparity of interests test, the appropriateness of the health care unit
"is judged in terms of normal criteria but sharper than usual differences (or 'disparities') between the
wages, hours, and working conditions, etc, of the requested employees and those in an overall
professional or nonprofessional unit must be established to grant the unit." Id. at 13-16, 116
L.R.R.M. at 1470. In adopting this test the Board recognized and attempted to accommodate the
Second and Eighth Circuits' criticisms of the Ninth Circuit's "rigid" disparity of interests standard. Id.
at 13.20, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1470-71.
For decisions in which the Board applied a community of interests test see, e.g., Extendicare of
West Virginia, Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. 1232, 83 L.R.R.M. 1243 (1973) (LPN's — licensed practical nurses
— have separate and distinct community of interests such that separate LPN unit is appropriate);
Woodland Park Hosp., 205 N.L.R.B. 888, 84 L.R.R.M. 1075 (1973) (x-ray technicians do not have
separate community of interests from that of other technical employees so that separate unit is not
appropriate).
711 F.2d 848, 113 L.R.R.M. 3481 (8th Cir. 1983).
21 711 F.2d at 848, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3482. The court held that reference to its previous opinions
in which it found that creation of a technical employees unit generally does not lead to undue
proliferation was adequate consideration of the 1974 congressional doctrine. Id.
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employees at Watonwan Hospital. 22
 Thereafter, the Hospital refused to bargain with the
Union, claiming the bargaining unit was not an appropriate one.-' 3
 Following a hearing,
the Board found that by refusing to bargain with the Union, the Hospital had violated
section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.' Consequently, the Board ordered the Hospital to
bargain with the Union."
The Hospital petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
for review of the Board's decision." The Hospital contended that in making the bargain-
ing unit determination, the Board failed to comply with the non-proliferation require-
ments of the 1974 Amendments to the Act. 27
 According to the Hospital's interpretation of
the statute, the only appropriate unit was one which included all nonsupervisory, non-
professional employees." In response, the Board filed a cross-application for enforce-
ment of its order."''
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the Board's finding that the Hospital had violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (I) of the Act by refusing to bargain with the Union, and enforced the
Board's order. 3° In its opinion, the court first rejected the Hospital's argument that the
1974 Amendments to the Act precluded the Board from applying its traditional "com-
munity of interests" lest to resolve bargaining unit questions in health care settings. 3 ' The
court recognized that the Ninth and Tenth Circuits had accepted this argument and
required a "disparity of interests" test." Nevertheless, the Watonwan court declined to
adopt this test, noting that the test always requires the Board to select the largest
22 Id. The unit included licensed practical nurses, surgical technicians, and x-ray and laboratory
technicians. Id.
" Id.
24 Id. Section 8(a) of the Act provides, in pertinent part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer — (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7; ... (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a)." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982).
25
 711 F.2d at 848, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3481. The Board also ordered Watonwan to otherwise desist
from violating the employees' section 7 rights and to "post appropriate notices." Id.
26 Id. The Board's order was reported as 263 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (omitted from publication), 111
L.R.R.M. 1191 (1982).
27
 711 F.2d at 849, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3482. In 1974 Congress amended the Act to extend its
coverage to nonprofit hospitals, which had previously been exempted. At the time of the amend-
ment, however, Congress expressed its concern that patient care not be disrupted by a proliferation
of bargaining units. The House and Senate reports state:
Due consideration shall be given by the Board to preventing proliferation of bargaining
units in the health care industry. In this connection the committee notes with approval
the recent Board decisions in Four Seasons Nursing Center ... and Woodland Park Hospital
... as well as the trend toward broader units enunciated in Extendicare of West Vir-
ginia.
Id. (citations omitted). See S. REP. No. 93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3946, 3950.
se 711 F.2d at 849, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3482. Such a unit would have consisted of technical, service,
maintenance and office clerical employees. The Hospital conceded that if the Board had not erred it
had violated section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Id.
Id. at 848, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3481.
3° Id. at 849, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3483.
3 ' Id. at 849, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3482.
" Id. See NLRB v. HMO Int'l/Cal. Medical Group Health Plan, 678 F.2d 806, 110 L.R.R.M. 2745
(9th Cir. 1982); Presbytarian/St. Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 450, 107 L.R.R.M. 2953
(10th Cir. 1981).
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appropriate unit." The disparity of interests test, the court determined, was not required
by either the language of the 1974 Amendments or their legislative history." The court
stated that it would not eliminate, without clear congressional directive, the long standing
principle that the Board need only certify an appropriate bargaining unit, not the largest
or most appropriate unit. 35
The court did observe, however, that the Board must, when applying the community
of interests test, consider the congressional directive to avoid the proliferation of collec-
tive bargaining units in health care institutions." The court determined that the Board
had given appropriate consideration to the non-proliferation requirement. Consequently,
the court concluded that, in this case, the Board had applied its community of interests
test without error. 37
The court found substantial evidence in the record to support the Board's finding
that the Watonwan technical employees share a close and substantial community of
interests which is separate and distinct from that of other hospital employees." In
addition, the court noted that the Board referred to prior opinions in which it articulated
reasons for concluding that creation of a technical employees unit generally does not
cause undue proliferation of bargaining units. Such references demonstrated to the court
that the Board had adequately considered the directive concerning unit proliferation."
The court determined that the record in Watonwan contained no evidence that the
Board's certification of the union would contribute to an undue proliferation of bargain-
ing units." Finally, the court stated that, although Watonwan Hospital employed few
nonsupervisory employees, the separate unit for technical employees was appropriate.'
The court concluded, therefore, that the Hospital committed an unfair labor practice by
refusing to bargain with the Union."
The Eighth Circuit's decision emphasizes the division of the circuits as to the weight
that should be given the congressional mandate to avoid proliferation of bargaining units
in the health care industry. The previous decisions by the Second, Third, Sixth, and
Seventh Circuits instructed the Board to consider the congressional mandate. These
decisions did not clarify, however, how this approach was to be balanced with the
traditional community of interests analysis." The Watonwan court made clear that al-
though the Board must consider the congressional directive to avoid unit proliferation,
the Board was not required to abandon its traditional community of interests test.
711 F.2d at 849, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3482.
"" Id.
" Id. See also GORMAN, supra note 2, at 66.
3"
 711 F.2d at 848, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3482.
37 Id .
" Id. The court considered the training required for technical employees, as well as the fact that
the salary scales for technical employees exceeded those for nontechnical and nonprofessional
employees. Moreover, the court was mindful that, in contrast to the principal responsibilities of
employees excluded from the unit, the job duties of technical employees generally involve direct
contact with the patients. Id.
" 711 F.2d at 848, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3482. The Board cited Barnert Memorial Hosp. Center, 217
N.L.R.B. 795, 89 L.R.R.M. 1083 (1975) and Newington Children's Hosp., 217 N.L.R.B. 793, 89
L.R.R.M. 1108 (1975). Watonwan, 711 F.2d at 848, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3482.
" 711 F.2d at 849, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3483.
" Id.
" Id.
" See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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Consequently, the Board remains free to select an appropriate bargaining unit, rather
than the most appropriate unit."
The Watonwan decision contrasts sharply with the decisions of the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits." These courts have not only found the traditional community of interests test
inappropriate but have also imposed a judicially created test on the Board." These circuit
decisions seem inappropriate, however, in light of the discretion historically vested in the
Board in making bargaining unit determinations." Section 9(b), which instructs the
Board to determine the appropriate unit, was left unaltered by the 1974 Amendments to
the Act." Had Congress desired to change the traditional level of discretion given the
Board in unit determinations, it could have amended this section of the statute." The
discretion given the Board is an important aspect of national labor policy. Under the Act
the Board must employ its expertise to certify the unit which will "assure to employees the
fullest freedom in exercising rights guaranteed" by the Act. 5° Requiring the application of'
the disparity of interests test would force the Board to choose the largest appropriate
unit." This approach would not always be in the employees' best interest." A large unit
can make it difficult for the union to carry out its duty of fair representation, create
conflicts within the unit, and reduce the benefits of unionization to those workers outside
the majority coalition which dominates the unit." Accordingly, the position adopted by
the Ninth and Tenth Circuits diminishes the Board's ability to protect employee rights.
Had Congress intended to alter the Board's role in determining bargaining units, it
would have amended the statute to reflect this intent," Congress, however, did not so
amend the statute. Instead, Congress limited itself' to commentary admonishing the
Board to avoid unit proliferation and approving of those Board decisions that favored
larger units." Given this limited congressional action, Watonwan provides the best ap-
proach to the issue." The Watonwan court preserved the Board's function and discretio-
nary role in determining bargaining units, while recognizing the important public interest
the congressional admonition serves.
" See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
" Id.
" See NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d at 1469, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2431.
" Id. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
4'1 Although a lack of action by Congress alone may not indicate that it consciously chose not to
alter the statute's language and the Board's discretion, at least one circuit has found the failure to
change section 9(b) significant. See NLRB v. Res-Care„ Inc., 705 F.2d at 1469-70, 113 L.R.R.M. at
2341.
" 29 U.S.C.	 159(b) (1982).
51 Watonwan, 711 F.2d at 849, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3482. It is possible that the Board will find more
than one grouping of employees appropriate. The Board's discretion to choose among those units
permits it to certify the unit which best serves the employees' interest. See GORMAN, supra note 2, at
66-67. The Board recognized the Watonwan court's criticism of the Ninth Circuit's disparity of
interests test when it adopted a refined version of that test. St. Francis Hospital, 271 N.L.R.B. No.
160, 1, 13-20, 116 L.R.R.M. 1465, 1470 (1984).
" NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d at 1469, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2341.
53 Id.
" Id.
" See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
56
 The Board has subsequently adopted the disparity of interests test but refined it to reflect the
concerns of the Second and Eighth Circuits. See supra notes 19 and 51.
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II. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Employer Unfair Labor Practices
1. *Ability of Employer to Take Unilateral Action When an Impasse in
Negotiations Has Occurred: Saunders House v. NLRB'
The National Labor Relations Act (the Act) 2 imposes a duty on employers to engage
in collective bargaining with employees regarding wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment. 3 As a general rule, an employer violates the Act if, during
negotiations, it changes unilaterally some conditions of employment which are the subject
of negotiations. 4 An exception to this rule is that an employer may make unilateral
changes in employment conditions when negotiations have reached an impasse, as long as
the employer has offered such changes in proposals advanced prior to the impasse.'
Neither the National Labor Relations Board (Board) nor the courts, however, have
definitively stated what circumstances constitute an impasse, although both the Board and
the courts have considered the issue.' In Taft Broadcasting Co.,' the Board suggested five
general factors to be considered in determining the existence of an impasse. 8 Later, in
Alsey Refractories Company,' the Board defined "impasse" as a situation in which one party
is "warranted in assuming . . . that the [other party) had abandoned any desire for
continued negotiations, or that further good-faith bargaining . . . would have been
futile."° Although they are conceptually clear, these pronouncements have not provided
4` By Carolyn Dailey, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 719 F.2d 685, 114 L.R.R.M. 2977 (3d Cir. 1983).
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
• 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982), which was section 8(5) of the original National Labor Relations
Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1975), provides that "(i]t shall be an unfair Labor practice for an employer .
. • to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employers, subject to the provisions
of section 9(a)." Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982), added by
the Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), defines collective bargaining as:
"the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and conditions of
employment."
• NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743, 50 L.R.R.M. 2177 (1962).
• Huck Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB, 693 F.2d 1176, 1186, 112 L.R.R.M. 2245, 2252 (5th Cir.
1982); Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478, 64 L.R.R.M. 1386, 1388 (1967) enforced sub.
nom. AFTRA, Kansas City Local v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622, 67 L.R.R.M. 3032 (D.C.Cir. 1968). See
generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 445
(1976).
o For discussion of the problematic development of the definition of an "impasse," see Epstein,
Impasse in Collective Bargaining, 44 TEX. L. REV. 769 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Epstein]; Murphy,
Impasse and the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1977). See also Decker, Pennsyl-
vania's Public Employee Relations Act (Act 195) and Impasse — The Public Employer's Right to Make
Unilateral Changes in Employment Conditions, 86 DICK. L. REV. 1, 4 ( [982).
163 N.L.R.B. 475, 64 L.R.R.M. 1244 (1967), enforced sub nom. AFTRA, Kansas City Local v.
NLRB, 395 F.2d 622, 67 L.R.R.M. 3032 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
8 Id. at 478, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1244. The five factors are: the bargaining history, the good faith of
the parties in negotiations, the length of the negotiations, the importance of the issue or issues as to
which there is disagreement and the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the state of
negotiations. Id.
215 N.L.R.B. 785, 88 L.R.R.M. 1071 (1974).
10 Id. at 787, 88 L.R.R.M. at 1071.
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administrative bodies and courts with concrete guidance for their application. For exam-
ple, courts have debated whether an impasse can exist when there is a deadlock as to only
one of several issues." Consequently, the issue of what constitutes an impasse in negotia-
tions continues to be litigated."
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
Saunders House v. NLRB,' focused on the definition of impasse. Ruling on which factors
should be considered to determine whether the circumstances in Saunders House consti-
tuted an "impasse," the court highlighted the importance of factors developed by the
Board as aids in the judicial determination of whether an impasse exists." Ultimately, the
court held that in determining whether further attempts at negotiations would be futile,
and whether any significant concessions are being made by either side, a court must take
into account all negotiation discussions both on-the-record and off-the-record."
In Saunders House, the employer, a nonprofit Pennsylvania health care corporation,
and the union representing Saunders House employees conducted extensive negotiations
on an initial collective bargaining contract." In early September, 1980, the union first
proposed a $40 per week wage increase with a cost-of-living adjustment, a full union
security provision," and a check-off" for union dues and initiation fees." The employer's
initial contract proposal contained neither a union security clause, nor a check-off provi-
sion, nor a wage provision." Although Saunders House promised that wage proposals
would be forthcoming, at the next meeting it asked to defer discussion of the issue. 2 ' The
parties did not discuss wages at the following four meetings. 22
Finally in late November, 1980, the union representative said that in order to further
the negotiations, the employer had to take some action regarding wages, union security
and a check-off provision." The employer's representative promised to deliver a wage
proposal at the next session, but said that the employer remained opposed to union
security and a check-off provision.'-'' The union responded that it could not proceed with
further negotiations until the employer made concessions on all three issues. 25
In early December, 1980, the employer's representative presented the employer's
" Latrobe Street Co. v. NLRB, 630 F.2d 171, 179, 105 L.R.R.M. 2393, 2398 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 821, 108 L.R.R.M. 2558 (1981).
12 See, e.g., Supak & Sons v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 998 (6th Cir. 1972); Wantagh Auto Sales, Inc., 177
N.L.R.B. 153, 72 L.R.R.M. 1541 (1969).
" 719 F.2d 683, 114 L.R.R.M. 2977 (3d Cir. 1983).
" Id. at 688, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2981.
" Id.
" Id. at 684, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2977.
" "Union security provisions" are agreements in a collective employment agreement compelling
union membership. Such provisions are subject to limitation by the National Labor Relations Act and
state law,
" "Check-off" refers to a provision in a collective employment agreement requiring the em-
ployer to deduct certain sums periodically from the worker's pay and remit the money to the union.
In Saunders the check-off sum would equal union dues and initiation fees.
" Saumiers Howe, 719 F.2d at 685, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2977. At the parties' first meeting on
September 16, 1980, the company's representative had promised the union that the employer would
submit a counterproposal at the next bargaining session. Id. at 684-85, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2977.
Id.
21 Id.
" Id. The parties held meetings on October 8, October 29, November 5 and November 12. /d.
23 Id.
24 Id,
n Id.
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wage proposal which provided for a one year contract with a cost-of-living adjustment
provision." The union, on the other hand, modified its wage increase proposal froin $40
to $20 per week for the first year of the contract — retroactive to September, 1980. In
addition, the union proposed art $18 weekly increase for the next two years with a cost of
living adjustment in the second year of the three year contract. 27
 At their next three
meetings during January and February the positions of the parties on the economic issues
remained unchanged." In early February, 1981, during the twelfth negotiating session,
the representatives for the union and the employer agreed to meet privately."
During the off-the-record meeting which followed two weeks later, the union rep-
resentative indicated that a contract which contained a dues check-off, a modified union
security clause, and a wage increase of 8% in each year of a three year contract would be
acceptable." Several weeks after the meeting, in early March, the employer's representa-
tive impiiedly rejected the off-the-record offer, presenting an alternative proposal for a
contract of less than one year with individual pay raises averaging 6 1/2%." The contract
contained no union security or check-off provisions. 32
 The employer's representative
declared that the contract proposal was the employer's final offer."
In subsequent negotiating sessions and before, a Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service fact-finding board hearing," the union progressively lowered its on-the-record
wage demands from its position asserted in early December, 1980. 35 The union continued
to insist on a check-off provision and altered its position on union security from a demand
for full union security to a proposal for modified union security.36 During the last meeting
in mid-April, 1981, the union representative submitted a written proposal which included
a check-off provision and the modified union security proposal which the union had
previously offered." The union, in addition, modified its on-the-record wage increase
proposals from $18-$20 per week, to a proposed annual 8% wage increase. 38 This
on-the-record wage increase proposal matched the off-the-record offer made by the
union representative two months earlier."
The employer's representative informed the union that the union's proposal rep-
resented no change in position." The employer's representative repeated the employer's
28 Id.
27 Id.
29 Id .
29 Id.
3° Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
" Id. On March 16, 1981, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service set up a fact-finding
board. At the hearing, the union representative proposed 8%, 10% and 16% increases pills a
cost-of-living allowance (COLA). The union asked for a determination of seven issues: union
security, check-off, union activity, grievance procedures, wages, contract duration, and reinstate-
ment of two previously dismissed employees. The fact-finding board issued its nonbinding recom-
mendations on March 20, 1981. It called for a contract termination date of August 3, 1982, modified
union security, a check-off proviso, and an across-the-board 8% wage increase effective September 1,
1981. Id.
a Id. at 685-86, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2978.
36 Id. at 686, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2978.
37 a
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id,
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final offer and stated that unless the union accepted the employer's final offer by April 22,
the employer would implement its proposed wage increase." In his response on April 20,
the union representative argued that the union had in fact changed its position on wages,
union security, and other issues.'" As a result, the union representative objected to any
unilateral wage increase which, he alleged, would constitute an unfair labor practice."
Nevertheless, on April 22, 1981, the employer's representative informed the union that
because the parties remained at an impasse on key issues, the employer would implement
its wage proposal." On the same day, Saunders House raised employee wages an average
of 6 I/2%.45
As a result of the unilateral wage increase, the union filed an unfair labor practice
charge with the Board." After reviewing the charge, the Board issued a complaint
alleging that the employer had violated sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, which require
an employer to bargain in good faith with employees regarding conditions of employ-
ment." After an evidentiary administrative hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ)
found that the employer had violated sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act." Saunders
House excepted to the ruling. In particular, Saunders House disagreed that it had failed
to act in "good-faith" and sought a Board ruling."
Upon review by the Board, the employer argued that it had not violated the Act's
good faith requirement because it had taken unilateral action only after negotiations had
reached an impasse." The employer contended that the union's last wage proposal made
in April was not new and was not a concession because the employer had been aware since
the off-the-record meeting in February that such a proposal was acceptable to the union. 5 '
Because the wage issue was a key one, the employer argued that the deadlock over such
an issue created an impasse which allowed it to take unilateral action.'" The Board
rejected the employer's position and affirmed the ALJ's conclusions.53 The Board held
that an impasse did not exist because the union's April 15th proposal demonstrated
movement in its position." According to the Board, the union's final wage offer, which it
emphasized was now on-the-record and made in conjunction with other proposals, was a
new offer and one showing a significant concession. 55
On appeal, the Third Circuit rejected the reasoning of the Board." The court of
appeals held that an impasse did in fact exist because the union's final wage proposal was
merely a reiteration of the proposal its representative had made in the off-the-record
meeting in mid-February." According to the court, the mere shift over a two month
Id. at 686, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2978-79.
" Id., 114 L.R.R.M. at 2979.
Id.
" Id.
" Id.
" Id.
17 Id .
'8 Id.
49 Id.
'° Id.
51 Id.
52 Id .
59 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 689, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2981.
57 Id. at 688-89, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2981.
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period from a position off-the-record to one on-the-record was not a concession sufficient
to preclude a judicial finding that an impasse existed." Therefore, the court concluded
that, because the parties were at an impasse, the employer's unilateral wage increase did
not constitute an unfair labor practice. 59
In determining that an impasse existed, the court first set forth several factors it
considered important in defining an impasse."' According to the court, an impasse exists
where one party is justified in assuming that further negotiations would be futile." The
court acknowledged the five factors which the Board had in the past deemed important in
determining whether negotiations have reached an impasse: (1) the bargaining history of
the parties; (2) the good faith of the parties in negotiations; (3) the length of the
negotiations; (4) the importance of the issue or issues over which there is disagreement;
and (5) the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the state of negotia-
tions." Both parties, the court noted, argued that each of the five factors supported their
case." In the court's view, the only disputed factors at issue in this case were the
importance of the issues over which there remained disagreement and the contem-
poraneous understanding of the parties as to the state of negotiations in view of the extent
of movement of the parties toward a negotiated settlement,"
Having determined that these were the crucial factors, the court stated, as to the first,
that a deadlock as to one key issue can create an impasse in the negotiations.° In support
of its view, the court cited three appellate court decisions for the proposition that an
impasse may exist when a breakdown occurs in negotiations over either one or several
issues.° Because wages were a critical issue in the Saunders House negotiations, the court
concluded that if it found a deadlock existed on wages, the court would consider that an
impasse in negotiations existed."
As to the second key factor, the court emphasized that the determination of the
existence of an impasse was one particularly suited to the expertise of the Board se
Because the determination of the point after which further bargaining on an issue is futile
Often depends on the mental state of the parties, the court stressed that the Board as a fact
finder is generally better suited than an appellate court to make such determinations,
since the Board deals constantly with the evaluation of bargaining processes. 89
 Conse-
66 Id. at 688, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2981.
" Id. at 689, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2981.
e6 Id.
61 Id. at 686-87, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2979 (citing Alsey Refractories Company, 215 N.L.R.B. 785,
787, 88 L.R.R.M. 1071, 1072 (1974)).
62 719 F.2d at 687, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2979 (citing Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478,
64 L.R.R.M. 1386, 1388 (1967) enforced sub nom. AFTRA, Kansas City Local v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622,
67 L.R.R.M. 3032 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).
63
 719 F.2d at 687, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2979.
84 Id.
65 Id.
68 Id. at 687, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2979-80 (citing NLRB v. Yama Woodcraft, Inc., 580 F.2d 942, 945,
(9th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Tomco Communications Inc., 567 F.2d 871, 97 L.R.R.M. 2660 (9th Cir.
1978); Latrobe Steel Co. v. NLRB, 630 F.2d 171, 179, 105 L.R.R.M. 2393, 2398 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 821, 108 L.R.R.M. 2558 ( 198 1 )).
" 719 F.2d at 687, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2979-80.
68 Id. at 687-88, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2980 (citing Dallas General Drivers, W. & H., Local No. 745 v.
NLRB, 355 F.2d 842, 61 L.R.R.M. 2065 (D.C. Cir. 1966)).
69 719 F.2d 688, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2980.
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quently, the court stated that in reviewing a Board decision, it would uphold the Board's
conclusion if the Board's findings were supported by substantial evidence on the record as
a whole."
Turning to the facts of Saunders, the court approached the impasse question by
analyzing each topic of negotiation individually. The court first pointed out that wages,
union security, and a check-off provision were the three key issues in dispute between the
employer and the union from the start of negotiations." According to the court, the
parties were clearly at an impasse on the check-off and union security provisions." Thus,
the central issue, the court concluded, was whether the parties were at an impasse as to
wages."
Analyzing the parties' bargaining on the wage increase issue, the court noted that
during the off-the-record meeting in February, the union representative said that the
union would accept a three year contract with provisions for 8% wage increases in each of
the three years." After the employer rejected this offer, the union progressively lowered
its on-the-record demands in subsequent negotiations." At the final mid-April negotiat-
ing session, the union proposed a three year contract calling for 8% wage increases each
year." Although this wage offer evidenced significant movement in the union's an-
nounced position, the court found that it was identical to the one the union proposed
off-the-record in February."
The court then considered whether these facts constituted substantial evidence to
support the Board's finding of no impasse." The court repeated the operative rule that a
new proposal on a significant issue must be one that encourages the parties to believe that
further negotiations will not be futile." A concession, on a key issue, the court stated,
precludes a finding of impasse because it indicates there is reason to believe that further
bargaining might produce additional movement in the negotiations." If the new proposal
does not bring the parties any closer than they were previously, even off-the-record, a
new announced position, the court maintained, would not encourage the parties to
continue bargaining in the belief that they could reach an agreement.'"
Applying this rule to the facts of Saunders House, the court concluded that a mere
change from a position off-the-record to one on-the-record was not a concession
sufficient to preclude a finding of impasse." According to the court, there was no real
movement in mid-April because the union had not presented anything it had not pre-
sented earlier." Furthermore, the court emphasized that by notifying the union by letter
that there had been no movement, the employer put the union on notice that unless it
accepted Saunders House's final offer by April 22, the employer would put the proposed
" Id.
" Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
" Id, at 688, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2980-81.
" Id. at 688, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2981.
" Id.
" Id.
" Id.
79 Id.
" Id.
81 Id .
82 Id.
" Id. at 688-89, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2981.
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wage increase into effect. 84 Finally, the court stated that, consistent with the requirement
that a post-impasse unilateral change must have been offered before impasse, the wage
increase subsequently implemented by the employee was not higher than the one offered
at the negotiating sessions." Accordingly, the court held that there was not sufficient
evidence in the record to support the Board's finding that the parties were not at an
impasse and that the employer's unilateral wage increase constituted an unfair labor
practice.$"
The Saunders House decision represents the Third Circuit's attempt to clarify the
ill-defined concept of "impasse."" Although, as the Saunders House court noted, Board
policy lists five general factors considered relevant in determining whether negotiations
have reached an impasse, neither the Board nor the courts have given concrete guidance
for applying these factors. 88
 Saunders House provides insight into the proper application
and weight of the factor which evaluates the understanding of the parties as to the status
of negotiations based upon movement of the parties toward a negotiated settlement."
Under Saunders House, a court evaluating the movement of negotiating parties in
order to determine whether an impasse existed should consider all the circumstances of
negotiation, not merely those on record, to surmise whether either party has made a true
concession instead of a restatement of an earlier offer." If the court can find any
off-the-record union offer which is identical to the union's last announced offer before
the employer's unilateral action, the last offer would not be viewed as a concession under
Saunders House 9i The existence of an impasse in the negotiations, however, would still
depend on whether the subject in question was a central issue in the negotiations." The
major question remaining after Saunders House is the extent to which conversations
between bargaining representatives may qualify as offers to be taken into account by a
court in evaluating a union's final offer."
2. *Agreement to Limit Strikers' Reinstatement Rights:
Hotel Holiday Inn de Isla Verde v. NLRB'
It is well settled that the illegal discharge of economic strikers is an unfair labor
practice2 in violation of sections 8(a)( I) and (3) 3 of the National Labor Relations Act (the
84
	at 689, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2981.
23 Id.
88
 Id.
" See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
33 The five factors were originally listed in Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478, 64
L.R.R.M. 1386, 1388 (1967). See supra notes 54 and 83 and accompanying text.
89 See Saunders House, 719 F.2d 683, 685, 114 L.R.R.M. 2977, 2979. See also Epstein, supra note 6,
at 779.
I") Saunders House, 719 F.2d at 685, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2978.
"' Id. at 689, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2981.
" Id. at 689, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2979-80.
83 See id. at 689, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2980. The court never defines what constitutes an off-the-
record meeting for purposes of determining whether the union later made a concession.
* By Richard K. Stavinski, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE. LAIN REVIEW.
723 F.2d 169, 115 L.R.R.M. 2188 (1st Cir. 1983).
2 NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48, 53, 81 L.R.R.M. 2595, 2597 (1972).
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3) (1982). The sections provide in pertinent part:
(a) Unfair labor practices by employer. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
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Act). In NLRB v. International Van Lines , 4 the Supreme Court held that illegally discharged
economic strikers are entitled to unconditional reinstatement.' Consequently, once a
striker is found to have been illegally discharged he may regain his job immediately, even
though the employer may have hired a "permanent" replacement for the striker.'
In addition, the Supreme Court has held that economic strikers who are not dis-
charged during the strike period have a conditional right to reinstatement upon termina-
tion of the strike! This conditional right to reinstatement continues for a presumably
indefinite post-strike period,' during which time the workers may regain their employ-
ment if they have not obtained "other regular and substantially equivalent employment,"
jobs for which they are qualified have become available, and the employer is unable to
show "legitimate and substantial business justifications" for refusing reinstatement. 9 In
United Aireraj? Corp. ,n) however, the National Labor Relations Board (Board) limited this
principle, holding that a collectively bargained strike settlement agreement could legiti-
mately place a time limitation upon the statutory reinstatement rights of economic
strikers." To date, neither the courts of appeals nor the Supreme Court have addressed
the Board's holding on this issue. 12
employer (I) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title; . . . (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization ... .
Id.
409 U.S. 48, 81 L.R.R.M. 2595 (1972).
5
 Id. at 55, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2597.
Id. at 50-51, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2596.
NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 381, 66 L.R.R.M. 2737, 2739 (1967).
Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, 1368, 68 L.R.R.M. 1252, 1257 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d
99, 71 L.R.R.M. 3054 (7th Cir, 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920, 73 L.R.R.M. 2537 (1970). Laidlaw has
been uniformly accepted by the courts of appeals. See, e.g., Retail Stores Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d
380, 388, 80 L.R.R.M. 3244, 3249 (D.C. Cir. 1972); H. & F. Binch Co. v. NLRB, 456 F.2d 357, 364,
79 L.R.R.M. 2692, 2697 (2d Cir. 1972).
No outer time limit has been placed upon the Laidlaw right to reinstatement. It has been held
that this right can extend beyond one year from the commencement of the strike. NLRB v. Hartman
Luggage Co., 453 F.2d 178, 182, 79 L.R.R.M. 1599, 1601 (6th Cir. 1971). The Board has held that
the economic strikers' rights to reinstatement can continue for longer than one year after termina-
tion of the strike, or for longer than the recall period for laid-off employees in the labor contract.
Brooks Research & Mfg. Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 634, 636, 82 L.R.R.M. 1599, 1601 (1973). Brooks Research
is discussed at 15 B.C. IND. & Comm. L. REV. 1143 (1974).
NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 381, 66 L.R.R.M. 2737, 2739 (1967). The
employer's hiring of permanent replacements for the strikers will suffice as a legitimate business
justification. Id. at 379, 66 L.R.R.M. at 2738.
10 192 N.L.R.B. 382, 77 L.R.R.M. 1785 (1971), enforced in part on other grounds, sub nom, Lodges
743 and 1746, International Association of Machinists v. United Aircraft Corp., 534 F.2d 422, 90
L.R.R.M. 2272 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825, 93 L.R.R.M. 2363 (1976). The Board's
decision is discussed at 13 B.C. INn. & Comm. L. REV. 1445 (1972).
" 192 N.L.R.B. at 388, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1793. On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the
employees could not have knowingly waived their reinstatement rights, since those rights did not
exist until the Laidlaw decision, which was eight years subsequent to the agreement. Lodges 743 and
1746, International Association of Machinists v. United Aircraft Corp., 534 F.2d 422, 451, 90
L.R.R.M. 2272, 2295 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825, 93 L.R.R.M. 2363 (1976).
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 381 n.8, 66 L.R.R.M. 2737, 2739 n.8
(1967) (reserving the question of whether a union may limit by agreement the reinstatement rights of
economic strikers); NLRB v. Murray Products, 584 F.2d 934, 938, 99 L.R.R.M. 3269, 3273 (9th Cir.
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During the Survey year, the validity of a strike settlement agreement which affected
the reinstatement rights of economic strikers who had been illegally discharged came
before the First Circuit in Hotel Holiday Inn de Isla Verde v. NLRB." The situation
presented in Hotel Holiday Inn involved a convergence of the principles enunciated in
International Van Lines regarding the unconditional reinstatement rights of illegally dis-
charged economic strikers, and those announced in United Aircraft Corp. regarding the
effectiveness of collectively bargained strike settlement agreements restricting reinstate-
ment rights. The court in Hotel Holiday Inn held that the rights of illegally discharged
economic strikers to reinstatement only become unconditional after the strikers have
proven that they were in fact illegally dismissed." A strike settlement agreement entered
into before a finding of illegal discharge has been made should be considered with regard
to the effect it might have on the economic strikers' rights to reinstatement, the court
found, because such agreements involve contested and as yet undetermined reinstate-
ment rights." The court did not hold that such agreements were per se valid, but
concluded that it could find no reason why voluntary settlements of disputed claims to
reinstatement should not be given effect.' 6
 Rather, the court held that the Board should
determine, on remand, whether upholding the agreement would conflict with the Board's
duty to prevent unfair labor practices." If the Board intended to reject such agreements
• in all cases, however, the court stated that the Board would need to explain fully its
reasons for establishing such a rule.' 6
The Hotel Holiday Inn case arose from a lawful economic strike by a hotel's union
employees."' During the strike the hotel discharged several striking employees for alleged
picketing misconduct. 2° Subsequently, union and hotel officials reached an agreement
settling the strike. 2" The agreement provided that the hotel would withdraw all picketing
misconduct charges, and reinstate the discharged employees, in return for a waiver by the
employees of any charges they might have against the hoteL 22 In addition, the union
agreed that the discharged employees would report for reinstatement on or before
certain assigned dates 23
 and would forego backpay between the dates of their discharge
and reinstatement." The agreement expressly provided that if the employees failed to
1978) (same); Lodges 743 and 1746, International Association of Machinists v. United Aircratt
Corp., 534 F.2d 422, 457, 90 L.R.R.M. 2272, 2299 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825, 93
L.R.R.M. 2363 (1976) (same).
The Eighth Circuit has, in dictum, accepted the Board's holding in United Aircraft Corp. that
reinstatement rights may be limited by a strike settlement agreement. NLRB v. Vitrionic Div. of Penn
Corp., 630 F.2d 561, 564 n.5, 102 L.R.R.M. 2753, 2755 n.5 (8th Cir. 1979).
13 723 F.2d 169, 115 L.R.R.M. 2188 (1st Cir. 1982).
14 Id. at 172-73, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2190.
' 5 Id., 115 L.R.R.M. at 2190-91.
18 Id.
12 Id. at 173, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2190.
' Id.
19 Hotel Holiday Inn de Isla Verde, 265 N.L.R.B. 1513, 1515 app. (Donnelly, A.L.J.),findings
affirmed by the Board, 265 N.L.R.B. 1513, 112 L.R.R.M. 1191 (1982), remanded, 723 F.2d 169, 115
L.R.R.M. 2188 (1st Cir. 1983).
" 265 N.L.R.B. at 1515 app. (Donnelly, A.L.J.).
" Id. at 1516-17 app. (Donnelly, A.L.j.).
" Id.
23 Id.
24 Hotel Holiday Inn de Isla Verde v. NLRB, 723 F.2d 169, 172, 115 L.R.R.M. 2188, 2190 (1st
Cir. 1983).
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report by the agreed upon dates, they would not be rehired. 25
 When three of the
employees failed to report until after their assigned dates, the hotel refused to reinstate
them."
The three employees brought suit, alleging that by firing and refusing to reinstate
them the hotel had violated section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 27 The Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) determined that the misconduct of two of the three employees was not so flagrant
as to warrant their discharge during the strike." Accordingly, the ALJ held that the hotel
had unlawfully discharged the two employees in violation of section 8(a)(3) of the Act, and
ruled that the employees were entitled to reinstatement." The ALJ found that the third
employee had been legally discharged for picketing misconduct and was not entitled to
reinstatement." The ALJ dismissed the contrary terms of the settlement agreement with
the sweeping statement that "[a] Union and an employer may not restrict an individual's
right to reinstatement by negotiating more stringent terms of reinstatement for them
than those available under existing law." 3 '
The Board affirmed the ALJ's holding without discussion, noting only in a footnote
that since two of the employees were illegally discharged during the strike, the hotel had
violated section 8(a)(1) as well as 8(a)(3) of the Act.32
 Accordingly, the Board held that the
two employees were entitled to unconditional reinstatement under the rule of NLRB v.
International Van Lines, 33
 and that the settlement agreement did not govern their rights to
reinstatement." The Board also upheld the ALJ's determination that the third employee
had been legally discharged and was not entitled to reinstatement. 35
Chairman Van de Water dissented in part from the Board's decision, stating that all
three employees had been legally discharged for violating the terms of the settlement
agreement." He argued that the ALJ had misstated the law with respect to settlement
agreements restricting reinstatement rights." Pointing out that the Board had upheld a
settlement agreement restricting the reinstatement rights of economic strikers in United
Aircraft Corp., the Chairman argued that the settlement agreement in the present case
should also be given effect."
On appeal, the First Circuit held that the Board had not adequately considered the
effect of the settlement agreement on the employees' claims for reinstatement." The
court stated that at the time the settlement agreement was entered into the employees had
" Hotel Holiday Inn de Isla Verde, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1517 app. (Donnelly, A.L.J.).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 1515 app. (Donnelly, A.L.J.).
83 Id. at 1517 app. (Donnelly, A.L.J.).
26 Id.
3° Id.
3 ' Id. at 1518 app. (Donnelly, A.L.J.).
" 265 N.L.R.B. at 1513 n.2, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1191
33 See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
" 265 N.L.R.B. at 1513 n.3, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1191
" Id. at 1513, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1191.
34 Id., 112 L.R.R.M. at 1192 (Van de Water, Chairman, dissenting in part).
37 Id. at 1514, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1192 (Van de Water, Chairman, dissenting in part).
34 Id. (Van de Water, Chairman, dissenting in part) (citing United Aircraft Corp., 192 N.L.R.B.
382, 388, 77 L.R.R.M. 1784, 1793 (1971), enforced in part on other grounds, sub nom, Lodges 743 and
1746, International Association of Machinists v. United Aircraft Corp., 534 F.2d 422, 90 L.R.R.M.
2272 (2d Cir, 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825, 93 L.R.R.M. 2363 (1976)).
34 Hotel Holiday Inn De Isla Verde v. NLRB, 723 F.2d 169, 173, 115 L.R.R.M. 2188, 2190 (1st
Cir. 1983).
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not established any rights to reinstatement." On the contrary, the court found that the
employees' rights to reinstatement were contingent upon the Board subsequently finding
that the hotel had acted illegally in discharging the striking employees.' The court noted
that at the time of the settlement agreement it was uncertain whether the employees
would ultimately prevail on their claim of illegal discharge or whether the hotel would be
found to have acted lawfully in discharging the strikers." Thus, the court opined that the
parties were attempting, through the agreement, to settle a bona fide dispute over the
employees' rights, if any, to reinstatement." Reasoning that a fair and mutual settlement
of contested claims is highly favored in the law, the court stated that the Board should
give specific reasons if it intended to reject this principle in labor cases." The court,
therefore, remanded the case to the Board with instructions to reconsider its ruling that
the settlement agreement did not control the workers' rights to reinstatement." If the
Board did not intend to enforce the settlement agreement, the court warned that the
Board would need to state exactly how upholding the agreement would interfere with the
Board's duty to prevent unfair labor practices."
Circuit Judge Breyer dissented from the court's opinion, but did not dispute the
majority's reasoning." Judge Breyer agreed that the Board should give its reasons if it
meant to adopt the ALj's "overstatement" regarding restrictive settlement agreements."
He stated, however, that remand was not necessary since the Board had adequate reason
to reject the settlement agreement on other grounds."
The First Circuit's decision in Hotel Holiday Inn should have the beneficial result of
encouraging the good faith settlement of strike disputes. By not allowing the Board to
reject outright the settlement agreement, the court succeeded in effecting a difficult, but
necessary, conciliation of the rulings in International Van Lines and United Aircraft Corp.
Furthermore, the court's decision does not unwarrantedly diminish the reinstatement
rights of illegally discharged strikers under International Van Lines, nor does it negate the
policy of United Aircraft Corp. to accept voluntary settlement agreements.
The Board in the instant case evidently was concerned about cutting hack, on the
unconditional right of an illegally discharged striker to reinstatement by allowing the
union to bargain away this right.50
 Although the Board in United Aircraft Corp. allowed
conditional rights of reinstatement to be restricted by a collective bargaining agreement
which limited the duration of those rights, 5 ' the Board in Hotel Holiday Inn may have been
concerned that the reinstatement rights of illegally discharged strikers demanded more
protection. This concern was misplaced, however, because when the agreement was made
the hotel had a legitimate claim that the workers had been legally discharged for strike
4° Id. at 172, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2190.
Id.
" Id. at 172 - 73, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2190- 91.
" Id.
" Id. at 173, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2190 - 91.
" Id.
46 Id.
47
.1d. at 173-74, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2191 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 174, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2191 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
49 Id. at 174-75, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2192 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 68-71 and
accompanying text.
50 See 265 N.L.R.B. at 1513 n.3, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1191.
" United Aircraft Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. at 388, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1793.
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misconduct, and the workers' rights to reinstatement were at best uncertain. 32
 Only as a
result of the litigation did the strikers obtain an unconditional right to reinstatement."
Consequently, to hold, as the Board did, that reinstatement rights which might eventually
be acquired through litigation could not be the subject of bargaining, would provide
overprotection for reinstatement rights which might later be found not to exist. Such
overprotection would be achieved at the expense of enabling the parties to bargain
collectively for mutual concessions in order to reach a desirable settlements'
Accordingly, the First Circuit's holding in Hotel Holiday Inn, that the Board should
enforce the settlement agreement unless the agreement conflicts with the Board's duty to
prevent unfair labor practices, does not erode the reinstatement rights of illegally dis-
charged strikers as articulated in International Van Lines. As the court correctly stated in
the present case, those rights could not be said to have been established at the time of the
strike settlement agreement. A review of the workers' rights at the time the agreement
was entered into is therefore the appropriate inquiry. Moreover, consistent with United
Aircraft Corp., settlement agreements restricting strikers' reinstatement rights would be
subject to close review by the Board to determine that the terms of the agreement did not
abrogate the policies of the Act." If no genuine dispute regarding the legality of the
strikers' discharge existed, or if an agreement placed unduly stringent restrictions on
reinstatement rights, the agreement could be set aside by the Board pursuant to its duty to
prevent unfair labor practices. 56
" Hotel Holiday Inn de Isla Verde v. NLRB, 723 F.2d 169, 172-73, 115 L.R.R.M. 2188, 2190
(1st Cir. 1983).
n Id.
" Holding that employees cannot bargain away possible rights to reinstatement, even if they so
desire, is to ignore the fact that there are two sides to every dispute. Since each side knows that the
other side has a potentially valid claim, both sides are encouraged to compromise. Quite apart from
protecting the employees, the Board's refusal to allow the parties to negotiate with respect to
reinstatement rights cuts both ways and may hinder the union's ability to extract a favorable
settlement. While the Board's position protects an employee who may later be deemed to have been
illegally discharged from limiting his reinstatement rights through agreement, it also prevents an
employee who may have been legally discharged from acquiring a right to reinstatement through
private agreement.
Moreover, the parties themselves are in the best position to know their needs and the attainable
concessions. United Aircraft Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. at 388, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1793. It is, therefore, equally
likely the agreement will favor the union as the employer. Most likely, of course, the agreement will
be mutually beneficial to the parties, even apart from saving each party the costs of litigating their
dispute. The instant case can serve as an example. Through the agreement, the employees converted
potential claims of unconditional reinstatement, which they may well have lost, into employer
concessions of definite reinstatement. See Hotel Holiday Inn de Isla Verde, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1516-17 app.
(Donnelly, A.L.J.). Even the third employee, who was found to have been legally discharged for
flagrant misconduct, would have been entitled to reinstatement had he abided by the agreement and
had the agreement been upheld. See id.
" See United Aircraft Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. at 386-88, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1791-93. The Board in United
Aircraft Corp. made clear that it had the exclusive responsibility to enforce the public policies of the
Act of eliminating obstructions to commerce and preventing unfair labor practices, and that it was
not bound by private agreement in so doing. Id. The Board noted, however, that the settlement of
disputes through collective bargaining was also one of the principle policies of the Act and that it
would be inclined to accept private strike settlement agreements as long as the agreements met Board
standards. Id. With respect to agreements limiting the time period for the exercise of reinstatement
rights, the Board stated that it would uphold such agreements provided they were the results of
good-faith bargaining, not discriminatory, not used by the employer to undermine the union, and
did not contain an unreasonably short time period. Id. at 388, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1793.
5.6 See supra note 55.
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The First Circuit's decision in Hotel Holiday Inn is also in accord with the policy
announced by the Board in United Aircraft Corp. In that case, the Board held that freely
negotiated strike settlement agreements containing terms mutually acceptable to the
parties will be honored, subject to Board approval, even if the agreements restrict
statutory reinstatement rights of the employees." As Chairman Van de Water correctly
noted in his dissent from the Board's order, the ALJ's statement that a strike settlement
agreement is ineffective to limit the available reinstatement rights of employees is clearly
in conflict with the United Aircraft Corp. holding." The Board in United Aircraft Corp.
sanctioned the restriction by agreement of definite and accrued statutory rights to condi-
tional reinstatement." Upholding the Hotel Holiday Inn agreement, however, only re-
quires accepting that a disputed claim to reinstatement can be negotiated. Thus, the Hotel
Holiday Inn court did not need to go as far as the Board did in United Aircraft Corp. to
support the agreement in the present case. By remanding the case to the Board with
instructions to reconsider the effect of the settlement agreement on the workers' claims to
reinstatement, the First Circuit avoided severely restricting the principles of United Air-
craft Corp. favoring the voluntary resolution of strike disputes.
Most importantly, by encouraging strike settlement agreements, Hotel Holiday Inn
serves to promote one of the foremost objectives of the Act — the peaceful resolution of
labor disputes through collective bargaining." This position is entirely consistent with the
view that unions are responsible parties and should honor their contractual obligations
arising from good faith agreements with employers. 6 ' As the court in Hotel Holiday Inn
pointed out, if the Board were to set aside all union commitments in strike settlement
57 See supra note 55.
" 265 N.L.R.B. at 1514, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1192 (Van de Water, Chairman, dissenting in part).
Not only did the ALJ incorrectly state Board law, but his claim that the settlement agreement in the
present case "may not restrict an individual's right to reinstatement [with] more stringent terms of
reinstatement for [the employee] than those available under existing law," 265 N.L.R.B. at 1518 app.
(Donnelly, A.L.J.), misconstrued the facts of the case. Even were this a correct statement of the law, it
does not recognize that the employees in Hotel Holiday Inn did not have a right, but a contested claim,
to reinstatement. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. It is doubtful, therefore, that the
terms negotiated by the union could be called more stringent" than other recourse available to the
employees at the time of the settlement. See 265 N.L.R.B. at 1514, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1192 (Van de
Water, Chairman, dissenting in part).
as
	N.L.R.B. at 388, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1793.
"" 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). The relevant text provides: "lt is hereby declared to be the policy of
the United States to eliminate . . . obstructions to ... commerce . . . by encouraging ... collective
bargaining . for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of ... employment or other
mutual aid or protection." Id. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of
Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 452-54, 40 L.R.R.M. 2113, 2114-15 (1957). The Court recognized that
Congress, through the Labor Act, intended to promote industrial peace by encouraging collective
bargaining. id. The Court also noted that Congress meant for the labor-management agreements to
be valid and binding to encourage a high degree of responsibility by the parties. Id. See also NLRB v.
Lundy Manufacturing Corp., 316 F.2d 921, 925, 53 L.R.R.M. 2106, 2109 (2d Cir. 1963), where the
court stated, "the rights recognized in § 7 may be affected by a valid collective bargaining agreement;
to deny this would be to ignore the whole policy of Congress, set forth in § 1 of 'encouraging . .
collective bargaining' and relying on such agreements for the maintenance of industrial peace."
Accord, United Aircraft Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. at 387, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1791.
" See, e.g., United Aircraft Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. at 387, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1792. The Board in United
Aircraft Corp. noted that the officials of the union were "experienced, competent, and knowledge-
able," and that the union had accepted the benefits of the agreement. See also Collyer Insulated Wire,
192 N.L.R.B. 837, 843, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1937-38 (1971).
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agreements which might limit the reinstatement rights of strikers, employers would have
no incentive to bargain on other reinstatement matters.° 2 Such a result would conflict with
the public policy favoring private, voluntary resolution of conflicts." Consequently, the
court's decision directing the Board to reassess the validity of the settlement agreement
should promote responsible bargaining and a stable acceptance of the agreements
reached.
Accordingly, although the court in Hotel Holiday Inn did not pass on the merits of the
strike settlement agreement, but merely remanded the case to the Board for reconsidera-
tion, the language and tenor of the court's opinion evidences a strong presumption in
favor of voluntary resolution of reinstatement disputes." Because the court's position is
supported by prior Board decisions," the policy of the Act," and public policy," future
strike settlement agreements affecting the reinstatement rights of strikers should find
judicial acceptance.
In addition, the Board is not likely to reject on remand the presumptive validity
attributed to strike settlement agreements by United Aircraft Corp., for two reasons. First,
as Judge Breyer noted in dissent, the Board's lack of consideration of the agreement may
have been due to the poorly focused arguments of the parties before the Board." Second,
it is doubtful the Board will establish a broad policy rule on remand since the agreement
can be invalidated on much narrower grounds." The agreement, in fact, did not provide
for the posting of notice of unfair labor practices, or for backpay, nor were the employees
involved in the negotiations." All of these reasons have in the past proven important
factors in setting aside settlement agreements.71
" 723 F.2d at 173, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2190.
63 See,e.g., Insurance Concepts, Inc. v. Western Life Insurance Co., 639 F.2d 1108, 1111-12 (5th
Cir. 1981)(public policy favors voluntary settlement of disputed insurance claims); Pearson v. Ecolog-
ical Science Corp., 522 F.2d 171, 176 (5th Cir. 1975)(private settlement of securities fraud claim is to
be strongly encouraged); Howard v. Commissioner, 447 F.2d 152, 158 (5th Cir. 1971)(out of court
settlement of tax liability contested in good faith is favored).
" See 723 F.2d at 172-73. 115 L.R.R.M. at 2190-91; see also supra notes 39-63 and accompanying
text.
n United Aircraft Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. at 388, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1790-93.
" See supra note 60.
67
 See supra note 63.
" 723 F.2d at 174, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2192 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Judge Breyer noted that the
hotel's brief apparently conceded that if the employees were found to have been illegally discharged,
the settlement agreement would not alter the situation. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Such a position, of
course, completely negated the bargained for terms, but it may explain why the Board did not give
due consideration to the agreement after finding that the two workers had been illegally discharged.
69 See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
" 723 F.2d at 175, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2192 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
APD Transport Corp., 253 N.L.R.B. 468, 469, 105 L.R.R.M. 1675, 1676 (1980) enforcement
denied on other grounds, sub nom, National Book Consolidators v. NLRB, 672 F.2d 323, 109 L.R.R.M.
3035 (3d Cir. 1982)(settlement agreement rejected partly because it did not provide for posting of
notice of employer's unfair labor practices); Finnishline Industries, Inc., 181 N.L.R.B. 756, 758-59,
74 L.R.R.M. 1654, 1655 (1970), modified in other respects, 451 F.2d 1280, 79 L.R.R.M. 2007, (9th Cir.
1971)(union-employer agreement which did not provide for employee back pay set aside); APD
Transport Corp., 253 N.L.R.B. at 470, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1676-77 (settlement agreement which employ-
ees had no hand in negotiating set aside).
In addition, Judge Breyer suggested that the settlement agreement in the present case was
explicitly non-binding. 723 F.2d at 174, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2192 (Breyer, J., dissenting). If that was the
case, then, of course, the employees could not be held accountable for their non-compliance with the
agreement.
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In sum, the court's opinion in Hotel Holiday Inn indicates, without directly holding,
that strike settlement agreements should still he considered acceptable mediums for
bargaining regarding strikers' reinstatement rights. 72
 The practitioner should look to the
Board's thorough discussion of settlement agreements in United Aircraft Corp. for guid-
ance with respect to the appropriate Board standards." Attention should also be paid to
the United Aircraft Corp. Board's caution that settlement agreements which operate to
restrict reinstatement rights will be closely examined." The Board is not hound by any
private adjustment or allocation of rights in preventing unfair labor practices.'" Nonethe-
less, if a strike settlement agreement contains terms which may prove to limit the
reinstatement rights of allegedly illegally discharged economic strikers, the agreement
should be upheld provided it meets Board standards and does not offend the policies of
the Act.'"
3. *Allocation of Burden of Proof in Dual Motive Discharge Cases:
NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp.'
Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) 2
 makes it unlawful for an
employer to discharge an employee because of that employee's union activity. 3 An em-
ployer, however, retains the right to discharge employees for any legitimate business
reason so long as the discharge was not motivated by a desire to discourage union activity.'
When charges are filed against an employer for a discharge that allegedly violates section
8(a)(3) of the Act, the determinative question is the motivation of the employer. 5
 In such
cases, the burden of showing an unlawful motive falls on the General Counsel." Difficulty
in these cases arises when there is a dual motive for the discharge. 7 In dual motive cases,
the General Counsel is able to meet the burden of proving that antiunion animus, a desire
to discourage union activity, was one of the motivating factors for the discharge. In
rebuttal, however, the employer asserts an additional motive that is a legitimate business
reason for discharging the employee' Prior to 1980, uncertainty existed among the
n See 723 F.2d at 172-73, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2190-91.
73
 See supra note 55.
74 See supra note 55.
75 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982). In Laher Spring & Electric Car Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. 464, 77
L.R.R.M. 1800 (1971), decided the same day as United Aircraft Corp., the Board rejected the
reinstatement provisions of a strike settlement agreement where it found the employer had used the
agreement in a discriminatory fashion, Id. at 466, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1802. See also supra note 71.
" 723 F.2d at 172-73, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2190-91. See also supra note 55.
* By Ronald T. Gerwatowski, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
103 S. Ct. 2469, 113 L.R.R.M. 2857 (1983).
2 29 U.S.G. § 158(a)(3) (1982), which states in pertinent part: "(a) It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer — ... (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organiza-
tion." Id.
3 See C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, 208 (1983) [hereinafter cited as C. MORRIS].
▪See id. at 209.
5 See id. at 208.
6 See id. at 208-09.
• Id. at 209.
Id.
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circuit courts as to the amount of antiunion animus that was necessary to establish a
section 8(a)(3) violation in dual motive cases. 9 Several circuit courts found a violation of
section 8(a)(3) only where the dominant motive for the discharge was antiunion animus,'°
while other circuit courts held that the General Counsel had only to show that the
employer was motivated in part by antiunion animus to establish a violation of the Act."
In 1980, the National Labor Relations Board (Board) attempted to resolve the
conflict in the circuit courts in Wright Line, Inc.' In Wright Line, the Board adopted a new
two-part test." Under this test, the General Counsel was first required to make a prima
facie showing that antiunion animus was a motivating factor in the employer's decision to
discharge the employee." Once the General Counsel had made such a showing, the
burden then shifted to the employer to show that the employee would have been
discharged even in the absence of protected union activity.' 5 The new Wright Line stan-
dard was adopted by many circuit courts." Other circuit courts rejected the standard,
however," reasoning that it misallocated the burden of persuasion that section 10(c) of
the Act had expressly placed on the General Counsel." As a result, these latter courts not
only required the General Counsel to prove antiunion animus, but also required the
General Counsel to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee would
not have been fired had it not been for the union activity." Consequently, uncertainty
remained in section 8(a)(3) dual motive cases, despite the Board's attempt in Wright Line to
establish a uniform standard. 2°
9 See id. at 189-90.
f° See, e.g. , Stephenson v. NLRB, 614 F.2d 1210, 1213, 103 L.R.R.M. 2238, 2239 (9th Cir. 1980);
Coletti's Furniture, Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 1292, 1293; 94 L.R.R.M. 3071, 3071 (1st Cir. 1977).
" See, e.g., Edgwood Nursing Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 363, 368, 99 L.R.R.M. 2036, 2040
(3d Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Gogin, 575 F.2d 596, 601, 98 L.R.R.M. 2250, 2253 (7th Cir. 1978).
" 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 105 L.R.R.M. 1169 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899, 108 L.R.R.M. 2513 (1st
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989, 109 L.R.R.M. 2779 (1982).
13 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1174-75.
" Id. at 1089, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1175.
11 Id.
16
 See, e.g., NLRB v. Senftner Volkswagon Corp., 681 F.2d 557, 560, 110 L.R.R.M. 3190, 3191
(8th Cir. 1982); Peavey Co. v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 460, 461, 107 L.R.R.M. 2359, 2360 (7th Cir. 1981);
NLRB v. Nevis Industries, 647 F.2d 905, 909, 107 L.R.R.M. 2890, 2893 (9th Cir. 1981).
" See, e.g., NLRB v. New York University Medical Center, 702 F.2d 284, 294, 112 L.R.R.M.
2633, 2640 (2d Cir. 1983); Behring International, Inc. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 83, 88, 109 L.R.R.M. 3265,
3268 (3d Cir. 1982).
18 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982). See Behring International, Inc. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 83, 88, 109
L.R.R.M. 3265, 3268 (3d Cir. 1982).
Section 10(c) provides in pertinent part:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion
that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such
unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and
cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist
from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including
reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of
this subchapter . . . If upon a preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall
not be of the opinion that the person named in the complaint has engaged in or is
engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact
and shall issue an order dismissing the said complaint . . .
29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982).
" See Behring International, 675 F.2d at 89, 109 L.R.R.M. at 3269.
2° For commentaries on the circuit court responses to the Wright Line standard, see, e.g. , Jackson
& Heller, The Irrelevance of the Wright Line Debate: Returning to the Realism of Erie Resistor in Unfair
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During the Survey year, the Supreme Court of the United States resolved the conflict
regarding the Wright Line standard in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp." In
Transportation Management, the Court held that the Board's Wright Line standard was a
reasonable allocation of the burden of proof." According to the Court, the Board's
standard extended an affirmative defense to the employer without changing the elements
of the unfair labor practice that the General Counsel must show in meeting the burden of
proof under section 10(c) of the Act." The Supreme Court in Transportation Management
thus settled a long-running conflict in the circuit courts over the proper allocation of the
burden of proof in section 8(a)(3) discharge cases, and established the Wright Line rule as
the proper allocation of the burden of proof to be uniformly applied throughout the
circuits."
Transportation Management involved an employee of a bus company, Sam Santillo, who
met with officials of the Teamsters Union on March 19, 1979 to discuss the possibility of
organizing the bus drivers of the company." Over the next four days, Santillo spoke with
many of his fellow employees about joining the union and began distributing union
authorization cards." Santillo's supervisor, Patterson, heard about Santillo's union ac-
tivities, 27 and on March 23, 1979, Patterson made some comments to other employees
about Santillo, promising to get even with Santillo for his union activities." Later that day,
Patterson inquired about Santillo's activities and told one employee that he took Santillo's
activities personally." Patterson also told the employee that he would remember Santillo's
union activities the next time Santillo asked for a favor. 30 On March 26, Santillo was
discharged.' According to Patterson, Santillo was being discharged for taking unau-
thorized breaks and leaving his keys in the bus." Subsequently, Santillo filed a complaint
with the Board, alleging violations of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act."
In response to Santillo's charges, the General Counsel issued a complaint with the
National Labor Relations Board that was heard by an administrative law judge (ALj). 34
The ALJ found that the employer was clearly motivated by antiunion animus in discharg-
ing Santillo, and rejected the asserted business reasons offered by the employer." Accord-
ing to the ALj, the supervisor had not learned about Santillo's practice of leaving keys in
the bus until after the supervisor had decided to fire Santillo." in addition; the practice of
Labor Practice Cases, 77 Nw. U. L. Rev. 737, 746 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Jackson & Heller]; Kelly,
Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc., The Right Answer to the Wrong Question: A Review of Its
Impact to Date, 14 PAC. L. Rev. 869, 903 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Kelly]; Lewis & Fisher, Wright
Line ---An End to the Kaleidoscope in Dual Motive Cases?, 48 TENN. L. Rev. 879, 897 (1981)[hereinafter
cited as Lewis & Fisher].
2 ' 103 S. Ct. 2469, 113 L.R.R.M. 2857 (1983).
22 Id. at 2475, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2861.
23 Id. at 2474-75, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2861.
24 See id. at 2475, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2862.
" Id. at 2471, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2858.
" Id.
27 Id.
" Id.
" Id,
3° Id.
3 ' Id.
" Id.
33 Id.
34 See id.
35 id.
' Id., 113 L.R.R.M. at 2858-59.
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leaving keys in the vehicles was common among many of the bus drivers." Regarding the
unauthorized breaks, the ALJ found that Santillo had never been warned about the
activity, and the employer had tolerated the breaks among its other employees unless such
practices interfered with the bus drivers' duties." The AL] found no indication that
Santillo would have been discharged had he not engaged in union activities."
The Board affirmed the Ails decision, but clarified the conclusions of law by
expressly applying the Wright Line analysis." According to the Board, the employer had
failed to meet its burden of showing that the employee would have been discharged
regardless of the employee's union activities." The Board subsequently sought enforce-
ment of its decision in the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit." The court of appeals,
however, refused to enforce the Board's decision," and remanded the case for considera-
tion of whether the General Counsel had met its burden of showing by a preponderance
of the evidence that Santillo would not have been discharged if he had not engaged in
protected activities." In reaching its decision, the court of appeals rejected the Board's
Wright Line standard, stating that the Board had improperly placed a higher burden of
proof on the employer than was permissible under the Act." Section 10(c) of the Act, the
court stated, expressly places the burden on the General Counsel to show an unfair labor
practice by a preponderance of the evidence." The court reasoned that the Board went
beyond its statutory authority by requiring the employer to meet the burden of overcom-
ing the General Counsel's prima facie case." On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals, holding that the Wright Line standard was a permissible allocation of the
burden of proof."
In its opinion, the Supreme Court reviewed the previous Board decisions establishing
the elements of a section 8(a)(3) violation where it was alleged that an employer has
discharged an employee because of that employee's union activities." According to the
Court, the Board in these cases construed the Act fairly in requiring the General Counsel
to show that the discharge was motivated in some way by a desire to discourage union
activity." At t he same time, the Court acknowledged other decisions which held that an
employer could avoid the consequences of a violation by asserting legitimate reasons for
the discharge.' Referring to the conflict that had developed in the circuit courts over the
proper approach to be applied in dual motive cases, the Court discussed the Board's
attempt in Wright Line to establish a standard that would be acceptable to the circuit
courts.' The Court concluded that the second half of the Wright Line analysis, which had
37 Id., 113 L.R.R.M. at 2859.
36 Id. at 2471 -72, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2859.
" See id. at 2472, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2859.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 See id.
43 Id.
" Id.
" NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp,, 674 F.2d 130, 131, 109 L.R.R.M. 3291, 3292
(1st Cir. 1982).
46 See id., 109 L.R.R.M. at 3292.
47 See id.
48 See Transportation Management, 103 S. Ct. at 2475, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2861.
" Id. at 2472, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2859.
no See id. at 2473, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2859-60.
61 Id., 113 L.R.R.M. at 2860.
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the effect of shifting the burden to the employer, was merely a requirement for the
employer to make out an affirmative defense to the General Counsel's showing of
antiunion animus. 53
In its review of the First Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court analyzed the court's
conclusion that the Board had erred when it shifted the burden of proof to the em-
ployer." The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals' assertion that section 10(c)
of the Act requires the General Counsel to carry the burden of proving an unfair labor
practice. 55 The Court disagreed, however, with the circuit court's conclusion that section
10(c) forbids the Board from requiring that the employer prove that the discharge would
have occurred even in the absence of union activity." According to the Court, the Board's
decision to recognize an affirmative defense, although not necessarily required by the Act,
was a permissible construction and "entitled to deference."" The Court further reasoned
that the Board's Wright Line standard is "clearly reasonable" in making the wrongdoer
bear the risk that the legal and illegal motives cannot be separated." Reasoning that it is
fair to shift the burden of persuasion to the employer where the employer created the risk
through his own wrongdoing, 59 the Court concluded that the court of appeals had erred
when it refused to enforce the Board's decision."
Finding that the Board's Wright Line standard was a permissible allocation of the
burden of proof, the Supreme Court then considered whether the Board's finding on the
facts of the case before it was supported by the record." According to the Court, the
Board was justified in its conclusion that the employee would not have been fired had it
not been for his union activities." The Court noted that the record revealed that the two
transgressions cited by the employer were in fact commonplace among the employees,
and that no other employee had ever been disciplined for such activities." In addition, the
Court found that the employer had departed from its usual procedures of employee
discipline and had failed to warn the employee that he would be fired for the actions in
question." Finally, the Court agreed that the employer "was obviously upset with" the
employee for his union activity." Accordingly, the Court concluded that there was
substantial evidence to support the Board's finding, and reversed the court of appeals
decision . ss
The Supreme Court's decision in Transportation Management is a much needed clar-
ification of the proper standard to be applied in dual motive discharge cases. As a result,
the debate over the allocation of the burden of proof in such section 8(a)(3) cases should
subside and the Wright Line standard should finally be applied uniformly throughout the
See id.
54 Id. at 2474, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2860.
55 Id.
" Id.
57 Id. at 2475, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2861.
56 Id.
56 Id.
°° Id. at 2476, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2862.
°' Id. at 2475-76, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2862.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 2476, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2862.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
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circuits. By deferring to the Board's construction of the Act, the Court affirmed a
workable standard that strikes a balance between the employees' right to engage in
concerted activity and the employer's right to discharge employees for legitimate business
reasons." As one circuit court that has approved the Wright Line standard has stated, the
rule is consistent with the legislative history of the Act, which suggests that an employer
show cause for the discharge of any employee, 69
 and which recognizes that the employer
has better access to the evidence required to prove motivation. 69
Despite general approval of the Wright Line standard,'" some commentators still
perceive underlying problems with the Board's approach." At least three commentators
have suggested that the Board's Wright Line approach contains a more fundamental
problem than the debate over allocation of burdens of proof has revealed." According to
this view, the Board should have been more concerned with the fundamental policy of the
Act, which requires a balancing of interests of employees in their right to engage in
concerted activity against the interests of the employer in operating its business." At least
two of the commentators have suggested that the Board would better serve the policy
objectives of the Act by focusing first on the injury to the rights of the employees caused
by the employer's conduct." These commentators suggest that if the conduct of the
employer is "inherently destructive" of union activity, then a violation should be found
without further inquiry." It, however, the impact on the employees' union activity is
"comparatively slight," then, according to these commentators, the Board should balance
the asserted business interest against the specific interest of the employees." It is fair to
assume that the Board will not alter its standard in the near future, but the general
criticisms of the policy implications of the Wright Line standard may indicate that the
debate over the effectiveness of the rule has not been entirely settled by the .Supreme
Court's decision in Transportation Management.
Notwithstanding the policy questions surrounding the Board's Wright Line standard,
the Supreme Court has at least resolved the issue of proper allocation of the burdens of
proof in dual motive cases. In cases where an employer has both unlawful and legitimate
motives for discharging an employee, the level of proof required to establish a violation of
section 8(a)(3) is clear. Transportation Management establishes that General Counsel in such
cases bears the initial burden of proving that an employer was motivated in some way by
antiunion animus. The burden then shifts to the employer to assert an affirmative
defense." That affirmative defense allows an employer to avoid a violation by proving by
a preponderance of the evidence that the employee would have been discharged even if
that employee had not engaged in union activity." This standard, affirmed by the
Supreme Court, finally brings needed clarification and uniformity to an area of labor law
that has been uncertain for too long.
67
" NLRB v. Nevis Industries, 647 F.2d 905, 909, 107 L.R.R.M. 2890, 2893 (9th Cir. 1981).
" Id.
10 See, e.g., supra note 16 and cases cited therein. See also Lewis & Fisher, supra note 20, at 902
(viewing the Wright Line standard as "a step forward").
See, e.g., Jackson & Heller, supra note 20, at 740; Kelly, supra note 20, at 870.
72 See Jackson & Heller, supra note 20, at 740; Kelly, supra note 20, at 870.
73 See Jackson & Heller, supra note 20, at 740.
" See id. at 773.
n Id. at 774.
" Id.
77 See 103 S. Ct. at 2473, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2860.
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4. *Dual Motive Discharge Cases in the Fourth Circuit: McLean Trucking Co. v. NLRB'
Under section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act' (the Act) it is an unfair
labor practice for an employer to discriminate in hiring or employment practices because
of a person's union activities.' An employer's discharge of an employee violates this
section if it is precipitated by an anti-union discriminatory purpose. 4 Nevertheless, an
employer is free to discharge an employee for a non-discriminatory reason, such as
incompetence, even when that employee is engaged in union activities.° Thus, it is the
employer's motive that determines whether the discharge is an unfair labor practice.°
Where evidence exists of both proper and improper motivation for the firing, a
difficult question of causality arises. Such situations - the "dual motive" cases' - occur
when the discharging employer exhibits an anti-union bias but also has a good cause for
the dismissal. A court, hearing an unfair labor practice claim based on a "dual motive"
dismissal, must judge whether the dismissal was caused by the proper or improper motive
and, consequently, whether it was fair or unfair. In June, 1983, the United States
Supreme Court resolved a conflict in the circuit courts over the proper allocation of the
burden of proof in such dual motive cases.° In NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp. ,°
the Supreme Court held that in determining whether an employer has violated the Act in
dual motive cases, the circuit courts must defer to the National Labor Relatibns Board's
(Board) Wright Line standard.'° As reiterated by the Supreme Court, the Wright Line
standard provides that the General Counsel has the initial burden of showing "by a
preponderance of the evidence only that a discharge is in any way motivated by a desire to
frustrate union activity."" Once this burden is met, the burden shifts to the employer to
show that "without regard to the impermissible motivation, the employer would have
taken the same action for wholly permissible reasons." 12 As the Supreme Court has
* By David P. Curtin, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
719 F.2d 1226, 114 L.R.R.M. 2649 (4th Cir. 1983).
/ 29 U.S.C. § I58(a)(3) (1982).
• Section 8(a)(3) provides, in pertinent part; "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer -
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . . ."
4
 Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 42-43, 33 L.R.R.M. 2417, 2427 (1954); NLRB v.
Consolidated Diesal Electric Co., 469 .F.2c1 1016, 1024, 81 L.R.R.M. 2709, 2715 (4th Cir. 1972),
5 C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, 1 15 (1971).
Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132, 1 L.R.R.M. 732, 737 (1937).
/ NLRB v. Kiawah Island Co., 650 F.2d 485, 490, 107 L.R.R.M. 2599, 2602 (4th Cir. 1981);
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 539 F,2d 1335, 1337, 93 L.R.R.M. 2625, 2627 (4th Cir. 1976);
Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1084, 105 L.R.R.M. 1169, 1170 (1980).
• NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2469, 2475, 113 L.R.R.M. 2857, 2861
(1983). FOr a discussion and analysis of the Supreme Court's Transportation Management decision, see
supra (this Survey) p. 191, 1983- 84 Annum' Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law
- Allocation of Burden of Proof in Dual Motive Discharge Cases: NLRB v. Transportation Management
Corp., 26 B.C. L. REV. 191 (1984) (hereinafter cited as Allocation of Burden of Proof: Transportation
Management].
9 103 S. Ct. 2469, 113 L.R.R.M. 2857 (1983) (see supra p. 191).
" 103 S. Ct. at 2475, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2861. See Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089, 105
L.R.R.M. 1169, 1174-75 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899, 108 L.R.R.M. 2513 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 989, 109 L.R.R.M. 2779 (1982).
" 103 S. Ct. at 2473, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2859.
" Id. at 2473, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2860.
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indicated, this shifting of the burden amounts to an "affirmative defense" upon which the
employer may "escape the consequences of a violation" of the Act."
Prior to the Supreme Court's Transportaion Management decision, however, the Wright
Line standard was not accepted by all of the circuit courts." The Fourth Circuit, although
never expressly rejecting the Wright Line analysis, had adopted a standard different from
Wright Line for the dual motive cases.' 5 The Fourth Circuit's mode of analysis was
established prior to Wright Line in its 1976 decision in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
NLRB .' 6 In that case, the court held that the General Counsel has the burden of showing
not only that the employer was motivated in part by anti-union animus, but also that the
employer had rejected proper motivation and chosen an impermissible one."
During the Survey year, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals again addressed the
problem of dual motive in McLean Trucking Co. v. NLRB a case argued five months prior
to the Supreme Court's Transportation Management decision, but decided shortly thereaf-
ter.'9 In McLean, ample evidence existed of both the employer's anti-union animus" and
the employee's abysmal work record. 21 The court, however, although purporting in a
footnote to accept the Supreme Court's standard, 22 held that the General Counsel of the
Board did not sustain his burden of proof by merely establishing the employer's anti-
union animus." Following the reasoning it had previously articulated in Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co.," the court ruled that the General Counsel had failed to carry the burden of
proof,25 which, in the Fourth Circuit, requires the General Counsel to "articulate, with
support in the record, an affirmative and persuasive reason why the employer rejected
the good cause and chose a bad one. -26 Consequently, after McLean, uncertainty still
exists in the Fourth Circuit regarding the proper standard of proof in dual motive cases,
despite the Supreme Court's expressed attempt in Transportation Management to resolve
the issue.
In McLean, both the Board and the circuit court found ample evidence of the
employer's anti-union animus." Daniels, the employee who had been dismissed by the
McLean Trucking Company, had been very active in union affairs." In addition to
organizational activity, Daniels assisted his fellow employees in filing numerous griev-
ances against the company. 29 Daniels's persistent activities annoyed company officials and
13
 Id.
Id. at 2472 n.3, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2859 n.3. See Allocation of Burden of Proof: Transportation
Management, supra pp. 191-92..
See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 1335, 1337, 93 L.R.R.M. 2625, 2627 (4th
Cir. 1976).
' 6 539 F.2d 1335, 93 L.R.R.M. 2625 (4th Cir. 1976).
" Id. at 1337, 93 L.R.R.M. at 2627.
18
 719 F.2d 1226, 114 L.R.R.M. 2649 (4th Cir. 1983).
79 McLean was argued January 10, 1983 and decided October 6, 1983.
" 719 F.2d at 1228, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2650.
21 Id. at 1229, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2651.
22 Id. at 1228 n.1, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2650 n.1.
u Id. at 1232, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2653-54.
" 539 F.2d 1335, 93 L.R.R.M. 2525 (4th Cir. 1976).
2s
	F.2d at 1227, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2650.
26
 Id. at 1232, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2653.
27 Id. at 1228, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2650.
28 Id.
29 Id.
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caused several of those officials to express a desire to "get rid" of Daniels." Moreover,
there were several other incidents in which company officials displayed hostility to
Daniels's union activities. 3 '
At the same time, however, Daniels had an extremely poor work record." He was late
or absent without an excuse 31 percent of the time over the 36 month period that he
worked for McLean." During that time Daniels had also accumulated a large number of
warnings and reprimands." Ultimately, Daniels was fired by McLean — allegedly for his
poor work performance."
Daniels protested his dismissal. Initially, Daniels submitted his case to an arbitration
board which found that the discharge was merited by poor performance.' Following this
adverse decision, Daniels filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board." The
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Daniels's dismissal violated section 8(a)(3)
even though other evidence indicated that Daniels was fired because he was a "horrend-
ous" employee." This finding was grounded on the collective bargaining agreement
between McLean and its union that provided that a warning notice would not remain in
effect against an employee for more than nine months." The ALJ construed this to mean
that his investigation into McLean's motive for dismissing Daniels was limited to Daniels's
misconduct in the nine months preceding his dismissal." In spite of Daniels's deplorable
past record, his misconduct in the nine months prior to his dismissal was relatively minor"
and the ALJ concluded that it was insufficient grounds for discharge." Accordingly, the
ALJ held that he could find no good cause for Daniels's discharge and the real reason
must have been McLean's anti-union animus."
Although the Board upheld the ALJ's ruling," the Board's affirmation rested on a
different rationale." Unlike the ALJ the Board reviewed Daniels's entire work record:"
" Id. Daniels had become something of an expert on the workers' contract with McLean, id. at
1228 n,2, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2650 n.2, and had himself filed at least 64 grievances with the company in
a five year period. Id. at 1228 n.3, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2650 n.3.
31 Id. The court reported that a terminal manager had told Daniels that "McLean was a big
company and they had ways of getting rid of people like [Daniels] who thought they were lawyers."
Id. at 1228 n.5, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2650 n.5.
32 Id. at 1228 n.5, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2650 n.5. Among other things, McLean managers threatened
to deny Daniel's promotion, refused to accept his grievances, and threatened to issue retaliatory
disciplinary citations. Id.
" Id. at 1229, 114 L.R.R.M at 2651.
34 Id.
3' Id. These warnings included unauthorized absences, unacceptable work habits, failure to
follow instructions, and failure to make a timely report of an injury. Id. at 1229 n.7, 114 L.R.R.M. at
2651 n.7.
Id. at 1231, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2653.
37 See id. at 1230 n.9, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2652 n.9.
" Id. at 1229-30, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2651-52.
39
 Id. at 1230, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2652.
4° Id. at 1230, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2651.
Id. The company was contractually prohibited from dismissing an employee for a "stale"
wrongdoing (over 9 months old). Id.
" Id. Daniels had received four warnings during that time: two were trivial productivity
complaints, one was essentially a parking ticket, and the other involved driving his car in an
unauthorized area to avoid walking in the rain. Id.
Id. at 1230, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2651-52.
" Id., 114 L.R.R.M. at 2652.
' McLean Trucking Co., 261 N.L.R.B. 793, 110 L.R.R.M. 1146 (1982).
46 719 F.2d at 1231, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2652.
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Nevertheless, the Board emphasized that during the original discharge hearings McLean
had justified the dismissal solely on the grounds of Daniels's misconduct in the last nine
months of his employment.° Only when the matter came before the Board did McLean
take the position that the dismissal was motivated by all of Daniels's misconduct." The
Board concluded that this "shifting of defenses" indicated that McLean's justifications
were "clearly afterthoughts" and that Daniels had been unlawfully discharged." Conse-
quently, the Board issued a cease and desist order."
On appeal the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently denied enforcement of
the Board's order." The appeals court held that, although the Board's General Counsel
had established McLean's anti-union animus, he had failed to make out a prima facie case
of discriminatory discharge, as set out in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB , 32 because he
had not produced evidence sufficient to support a finding that Daniels's poor work record
was not the cause of the dismissal. 53 In so holding, the court rejected the analysis of both
the ALJ 54 and the Board. 55 The appeals court stated that the ALJ had erred in consider-
ing Daniels's work performance for only the nine months prior to his discharge 56 and
found that Daniels's prior deficiencies could have contributed to McLean's decision to fire
him," Although such a motivation would have been contractually improper, it would
nevertheless not violate 'the Act because it would not constitute discriminatory intent."
Accordingly, the court reasoned that the A LJ should have given weight to Daniels's entire
work history at McLean."
The court also concluded that the Board should have given greater consideration to
Daniels's work record." The majority asserted that the Board, by concentrating on the
"shifting defense" proposition, had failed to address the evidence that Daniels's dismissal
was caused by his poor work performance rather than by McLean's discriminatory
motive." Consequently, the court concluded that the Board had wrongly held that a
prima facie case had been made for a section 8(a)(3) violation. The court rejected the
"shifting defense" rationale, noting that there was no inconsistency in McLean's position
that would make it suspect." Although the court conceded that McLean had stressed
Daniels's more recent misbehavior at the discharge hearing, where contractual consid-
erations were preeminent, and had pleaded Daniels's entire record before the Board,"
" Id.
" Id., 114 L.R.R.M. at 2653.
46 Id.
5° Id., 114 L.R.R.M. 2652. See McLean, 261 N.L.R.B. 783 n.3, 110 L.R.R.M. 1146 n.3.
261 N.L.R.B. 783, 110 L.R.R.M. 1146.
52
 719 F.2d at 1232, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2654.
53
 539 F.2d 1335, 93 L.R.R.M. 2525 (4th Cir. 1976).
McLean, 719 F.2d at 1232, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2653-54. "Lacking is a supportable reason for the
Board's conclusion that anti-union animus, rather than McLean's utter disenchantment with Daniels
as a worker, prompted the discharge." Id.
Id. at 1230, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2652.
5' Id. at 1231, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2652-53.
" Id. at 1230, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2652.
" Id.	 •-
s9 Id. "In that case anti-union animus did not motivate McLean. Its sole motive would be to rid
itself of a demonstrably poor worker." Id.
€° Id.
" Id. at 1231, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2652.
62 Id.
63
 Id., 114 L.R.R.M. at 2653.
December 1984]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
	 201
the court interpreted this change as a case of "coming clean" before the Board." In
addition, the circuit court found that McLean had maintained throughout the proceed-
ings that Daniels's prior work performance was the reason for his dismissal. 65 The court
concluded that the Board had failed to demonstrate that McLean's decision to dismiss
Daniels was motivated by anti-union animus rather than "utter disenchantment with
Daniels as a worker ...."" Accordingly, the court denied enforcement and remanded the
case to the Board. 67
In dissent, Judge Sprouse asserted that the majority had "misse[d] the impact of
NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp." 68 According to the dissent, once the majority
conceded that the General Counsel had made a prima facie showing that the employee's
protected union activity was a "motivating factor" in the employer's decision to discharge
the employee, the sole issue was whether the employer had proved that the discharge
would have occurred "even in the absence of the protected conduct.""
Applying this standard, Judge Sprouse concluded that the Board was correct in
finding that the employer had violated the Act." According to Judge Sprouse, the
majority, in addition to using the wrong standard to decide the dual motive issue, had
understated the evidence of McLean's anti-union animus." First, Judge Sprouse noted
that one of McLean's managers had threatened to issue warning letters in retaliation for
Daniels's grievance activities." Furthermore, Daniels was discharged on the day following
his election as union steward." Second, Judge Sprouse disagreed with the majority's
opinion that the Board had concentrated too much on McLean's "shifting defense.""
Remarking on the Board's detailed findings of fact, Judge Sprouse indicated that the
majority was wrong to rule that the Board had given insufficient weight to Daniels's work
record." Judge Sprouse also argued that the Board had correctly determined that it had
to consider McLean's motivation for dismissing Daniels based on the company's justifica-
tion at the time of the dismissal." At that time, and until the time of the unfair labor
practice hearing, McLean's sole justification had consisted of Daniels's most recent,
"trivial" work rule violations." Judge Sprouse further contended that the Board had
correctly weighed the trivial misconduct against the large accumulation of evidence of
anti-union animus when it ruled that the General Counsel had made a prima facie
showing that the discriminatory motive contributed to McLean's decision to discharge
Daniels." Accordingly, Judge Sprouse concluded that the Board's order should have
been enforced by the court."
" Id.
" Id. at 1231-32, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2653.
" Id. at 1232, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2653-54.
" Id. at 1233, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2654.
" Id. at 1236, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2656 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
66
 Id. at 1233, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2654-55 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1236, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2657 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
7i Id.
" Id. at 1233, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2654 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1234, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2655.
74 Id.
7' Id. at 1235, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2656.
" id.
" Id.
" Id.
76 Id. at 1236, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2657 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
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The McLean dissent was correct in asserting that the majority failed to apply the
Wright Line standard adopted by the Supreme Court in Transportation Management."
Notwithstanding the majority's cursory acknowledgment of the Transportation Management
decision, it applied a standard significantly different than the Wright Line standard. The
Wright Line standard consists of a two-part "causation test" for dual motive cases: 8 ' (1) the
General‘Counsel must make a prima facie showing that the employee's union activities
were a "motivating factor" in the employer's dismissal decision; and, (2) once this motiva-
tion is established, the burden shifts to the employer to show that the employee would
have been fired-even if he had not engaged in union activities. The Supreme Court
upheld this allocation of the burden of proof, 82
 reasoning that the employer, because of
his wrongdoing, should bear the risk that the proper and improper motives could not be
separated for the purpose of showing causation." Under the McLean analysis, however,
the burden never shifts to the employer. On the contrary, the General Counsel must not
only show that union activity was one of the motivating factors, but also show that the
employer rejected any proper motives and based his decision solely on the improper
one. 84
Although the Supreme Court has apparently resolved the conflict among the circuits
regarding the proper mode of analysis to be applied in dual motive cases, the McLean
decision appears to have perpetuated the confusion in the area, at least in the Fourth
Circuit. The dissent was correct in asserting that the McLean majority missed the impact of
that Supreme Court decision. Perhaps the only explanation for the majority's decision is
that the case was decided before the impact of the Transportation Management decision
could be fully understood, notwithstanding the dissent's criticism." Whatever the reason
for the Fourth Circuit's failure to apply the Wright Line standard, the McLean case should
not be viewed as persuasive precedent in the other circuits. The Supreme Court has
deferred to the Board's adoption of the Wright Line standard in an expressed attempt to
resolve the prior conflict in the circuits. 88
 Given the dates upon which the McLean decision
was argued and decided, that decision should be viewed, at best, as an aberration.
" Id.
" See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1174-75.
"z Transportation Management, 103 S. Ct. at 2475, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2861.
Id.
" See 719 F.2d at 1227, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2650.
B' Because the McLean case was argued in January, 1983, 5 months before the Supreme Court's
Transportation Management decision, it is conceivable that the Fourth Circuit had determined the
outcome of the case before the Supreme Court decided Transportation Management. Perhaps the
majority of the court believed that the outcome of McLean would have been no different, even if the
court had expressly applied the Wright Line standard. See 719 F.2d at 1228 n.1, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2650
n.l.
"" See Allocation of Burden of Proof: Transportation Management, supra p. 193.
It is well-settled that a court must defer to the Board's application and construction of the
general provisions of the Act where the Board's interpretation is "reasonably defensible," even if the
court might prefer a different view. Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497, 101 L.R.R.M. 2222,
2225 (1979). Because the Supreme Court held in Transportation Management that the Board's Wright
Line standard was reasonable and deserved deference, 103 S.Ct at 2475, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2861, the
Fourth Circuit should have applied the Wright Line standard. See also Automobile Salesman's Union
Local 1095 v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 383, 385-86, 113 L.R.R.M. 3175, 3176-77 (D.C. Cir. 1983), discussed
infra (this Survey) p. 243, 1983-84 Annual Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Laws
— Discharge of Supervisor for Union Actiuity: Automobile Salesman's Union Local 1095 v. NLRB, 26
B.C. L. REV. 243 (1984).
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5. *The Fourth Circuit's New Alter Ego Standard: Alkire v. NLRB'
In general, a change in business ownership terminates any labor agreements and
obligations that existed between a union and the predecessor owner.' Under the doctrine
of "alter ego,"3 however, a predecessor's labor contract or duties are not eliminated by a
transfer of business ownership if the transfer is not an "arms length" transaction, 4 but is
"merely a disguised continuance of the old employer." 6 The alter ego doctrine is designed
to eliminate changes in corporate ownership that are essentially technica1, 6 and the
doctrine has been widely applied against employers attempting to avoid a National Labor
Relations Board (Board) order,' or escape from their collective bargaining agreements. 8
Where alter ego status is found the predecessor and successor companies are treated as
the same employer,6 and the Board's remedial powers over the two entities are coexten-
sive.'°
The determination of whether an existing corporation is the alter ego of its predeces-
sor involves the consideration of numerous factors, rather than the application of a
particular rule." Among the factors that the Board considers in determining whether two
entities are alter egos are substantial identity of management, business purpose, opera-
tion, equipment, customers, supervision, and ownership.' Alter ego status is essentially a
* By Robert J. Gilson, Staff Member, Bos .roN COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
I 716 F.2d 1014, 114 L.R.R.M. 2180 (4th Cir. 1983).
• See NLRB v. Burns International Detective Agency, Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 291, 80 L.R.R.M. 2225,
2232 (1972). See also 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 694-97 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited
as THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW]. Under certain circumstances, however, a successor corporation
may be required to bargain with the union. NLRB v, Burns International Detective Agency, Inc., 406
U.S. 272, 281, 80 L.R.R.M. 2225, 2228, or remedy an unfair labor practice committed by its
predecessor. See Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 185, 84 L.R.R.M. 2839, 2845
(1973).
3 This doctrine should be distinguished from the alter ego doctrine used in the corporate
context. See Comment, Bargaining Obligations After Corporate Transformations, 54 N.Y.U,L. REV. 624,
638 n.101 (1979).
• See Fugazy Continental Corp. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1416, 1419, 115 L.R.R.M. 2571, 2573 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
5 Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106, 9 L.R.R.M. 411, 413-14 (1942).
▪See Howard Johnson Co, v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 259 n.5, 86
L.R.R.M. 2449, 2453 n.5 (1974). Technical changes are superficial changes in a business structure
that really do not affect ownership or control.
7 See Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106, 9 L.R.R.M. 411, 413-14 (1942);
NLRB v. Ozark Hardwood Co., 282 F.2d 1, 4, 46 L.R.R.M. 2823, 2825 (8th Cir. 1960); Associated
Transport Co., 194 N.L.R.B. 62, 71-72, 78 L.R.R.M. 1678, 1679 (1971).
▪ See Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, 690 F.2d 489, 508, 111  L.R.R.M.
2787, 2798-99 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 335, 114 L.R.R.M. 2976 (1983); NLRB v. Scott
Printing Corp., 612 F.2d 783, 785, 103 L.R.R.M. 2153, 2155 (3d Cir. 1979).
• See Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106, 9 L.R.R.M. 411, 413-14 (1942);
NLRB v. Al Bryant, Inc., 711 F.2d 543, 553, 113 L.R.R.M. 3690, 3699 (3d. Cir. 1983).
I° See Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106, 9 L.R.R.M. 411, 413-14 (1942);
Crawford Door Sales Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 1144, 1144, 94 L.R.R.M. 1393, 1394 (1976).
" NLRB v. Tricor Products, Inc., 636 F.2d 266, 270, 105 L.R.R.M. 3271, 3273 (10th Cir. 1980);
see also Fugazy Continental Corp. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1416, 1419, 115 L.R.R.M. 2571, 2573 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Crawford Door Sales Co., 266 N.L.R.B. 1144, 1144, 94 L.R..R.M. 1393, 1394 (1976).
12 The Board first cited these factors in Crawford Door Sales Co., 266 N.L.R.B. 1144, 1144, 94
L.R.R.M. 1393, 1394 (1976), and this has become the Board's general standard. See THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW, supra note 2, at 735. For circuit courts that have cited these factors, see, e.g., Fugazy
Continental Corp. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1416, 1419, 115 L.R.R.M. 2571, 2573 (D.C. Cir. 1984); NLRB
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factual question,' 3 and the common element among the cases is the continued ownership
or control of the new entity by the owner of the old entity." In making its factual
determination, the Board will consider whether the motive for the transaction was
designed to avoid contractual obligations or to escape the reach of Board remedies.' 6
Motive, however, is not always controlling.' 6 Aside from the element of continued control,
neither the Board nor courts have established specific factors as necessary criteria for
applying the alter ego doctrine.i 7
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
rejected the Board's existing alter ego multi-factored standard's and established a two .
part test.'9 In Alkire v. NLRB , 2° the Board found that a sole proprietorship and its wholly
owned corporation were both alter egos of a new corporation that had purchased the
assets of the wholly owned corporation.' Accordingly, the Board concluded that the
existing corporation was under a legal obligation to rehire striking employees laid off by
the sole proprietorship, and, because the new corporation had failed to do so, it ordered
back wages to be paid to the employees who were not rehired." On appeal the Fourth
v. Al Bryant, Inc., 711 F.2d 543, 553-54, 113 L.R.R.M. 3690, 3699 (3d Cir. 1983); Carpenters Local
Union No. 1848 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, 690 F.2d 489, 507, 1 I 1 L.R.R.M. 2787, 2798 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 335, 114 L.R.R.M. 2976 (1983); Nelson Electric v. NLRB, 638 F.2d 965. 968,
106 L.R.R.M. 2393, 2394-95 (6th Cir. 1981).
See Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106, 9 L.R.R.M. 411, 413-14 (1942);
NLRB v. Al Bryant, Inc., 711 F.2d 543, 553, 113 L.R.R.M. 3690, 3699 (3d Cir. 1983); Crawford Door
Sales Co., 266 N.L.R.B. 1144, 94 L.R.R.M. 1393 (1976).
" See NLRB v. Bell Company, Inc., 561 F.2d 1264, 1267, 96 L.R.R.M. 2437, 2440 (7th Cir.
1977); NLRB v. Scott Printing Corp., 612 F.2d 783, 786, 103 L.R.R.M. 2153, 2155 (3d Cir. 1979);
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 2, at 735.
15 Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 14, 15 L.R.R.M. 882, 883 (1945); Southport
Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106, 9 L.R.R.M. 411, 413-14 (1942); Fugazy Continental
Corp. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1416, 1419, 115 L.R.R.M. 2571, 2573 (D.C. Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Al Bryant,
Inc., 711 F.2d 543, 553, 113 L.R.R.M. 3690, 3699 (3d Cir. 1983); Penntech Papers, Inc. v. NLRB,
706 F.2d 18, 24, 113 L.R.R.M. 2219, 2223 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 237, 114 L.R.R.M.
2648 (1983); NLRB v. Tricor Products, Inc., 636 F.2d 266, 270, 105 L.R.R.M. 3271, 3273 (10th Cir.
1980).
See Nelson Electric v. NLRB, 638 F.2d 965, 968, 106 L.R.R.M. 2393, 2394-95 (6th Cir. 1981);
NLRB v. Tricor Products, Inc., 636 F.2d 266, 269-70, 105 L.R.R.M. 3271, 3273 (10th Cir. 1980);
Crawford Door Sales Co., 266 N.L.R.B. 1144, 94 L.R.R.M. 1393 (1976); see also Note, The Successor-
ship Doctrine: In Search of a New Focus, 17 WILLAMETTE L.J. 405, 419 (1981). The lack of motive,
however, can be a justification for not finding alter ego status. See Blazer Industries, Inc., 236
N.L.R.B. 103, 110 app. (1978) (Corbley, A.L.J.); Cagle's, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 603, 605, 89 L.R.R.M.
1337, 1340 (1975).
 -
" The factors most often cited are the ones set out in Crawford Door, see supra note 12 and
accompanying text. A case need not involve all these factors, however, for the doctrine to apply. See
NLRB v. Scott Printing Corp., 612 F.2d 783, 786, 103 L.R.R.M. 2153, 2155 (3d Cir. 1979)(a nominal
change in ownership is not dispositive). Thus, the Board and courts review cases in light of their
relevant facts, and different cases will highlight different factors. See, e.g., Fugazy Continental Corp.
v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1416, 1419, 115 L.R.R.M. 2571, 2573 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Nelson Electric v. NLRB,
638 F.2d 965, 968, 106 L.R.R.M. 2393, 2394-95 (9th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Tricor Products, Inc., 636
F.2d 266, 270, 105 L.R.R.M. 3271, 3273 (10th Cir. 1980).
18 See Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014, 1018 n.4, 114 L.R.k.M, 2180, 2183 n.4 (4th Cir. 1983).
" Id. at 1020, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2184. See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
20 716 F.2d 1014, 114 L.R.R.M. 2180 (4th Cir. 1983).
Alkire, 259 N.L.R.B. 1323, 1325, 109 L.R.R.M. 1107, 1110 (1982).
Id. at 1325-26, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1110-11.
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Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order." The Fourth Circuit held that when a
change in business ownership occurs, alter ego status can only be imposed on the new
business if (1) the same entity controls both the old and new business, and (2) the transfer
of business ownership resulted in a foreseeable economic benefit to the predecessor
employer by the elimination of its labor obligations." In establishing this new standard,
the Fourth Circuit departed from the "well-established" alter ego standard," and created
a standard unique to the Fourth Circuit"
In Alkire, the respondent operated, as an individual proprietorship, a trucking
business hauling coal, rock, and other materials in the Backhannon area of West Vir-
ginia." Prior to 1975, the bulk of Alkire's business was hauling for nonunion companies.'
After 1975, however, Alkire began hauling coal for the Badger Coal Corporation, a union
company. As a result, Alkire's drivers became union members covered by the terms of
Badger's contract with the United Mine Workers (UMW)."
In December of 1977, the UMW engaged in an industry wide strike that lasted until
late March of 1978. 3° During this strike Alkire dissolved his proprietorship and fired all
his employees.' Approximately two weeks after the dissolution of the proprietorship,
Upshur Enterprises, Inc. (Upshur), a corporation formed and wholly owned by Alkire, 32
began operating the same hauling business. 33
While the UMW strike was still in effect, Alkire negotiated a sale of Upshur's assets to
a former employee, Dennett Houdyeshell." Houdyeshell formed Mountaineer Corpora-
tion for the purpose of taking over the hauling business, and in March 1978 Alkire and
Houdyeshell executed a contract of sale. 33 The purchase price was to be paid with the
proceeds of a Small Business Administration loan, which was approved in January 1978,
to be effective in July 1978. 36 In the interim, Mountaineer leased the business from
23
 Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014, 1022, 114 L.R.R.M. 2180, 2186 (4th Cir. 1983).
21 Id. at 1020, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2184.
" See Fugazy Continental Corp. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1416, 1419, 115 L.R.R.M. 2571, 2573 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); TILE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 2, at 735; see alto supra note 12 and accompany-
ing text.
" See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
2? Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014, 1016, 114 L.R.R.M. 2180. 2181 (4th Cir. 1983).
28 Alkire, 259 N.L.R.B. at 1323, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1108 (1982).
a Id.
" Id.
3 ' Id. The Board subsequently found that this dissolution was lawful. Id. See infra note 47.
32 In the fall of 1977, Alkire's employees filed a grievance that they were not receiving union
scale wages. Alkire, 259 N.L.R.B. at 1323, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1108. On September 15, 1977 the
grievance was adjusted in favor of the employees. Id. On the same day, Alkire formed Upshur. Id.
33 Id. Because of the UMW strike, Upshur's operation consisted of caretaking and record
keeping functions. Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014, 1016, 114 L.R.R.M. 2180, 2181 (4th Cir. 1983).
Alkire, 259 N.L.R.B. at 1323, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1108.
Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d at 1016, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2181. The Administrative Law Judge's
Endings, adopted by the Board, state that the parties entered the agreement on March 27, 1978,
Alkire, 259 N.L.R.B. at 1323, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1108. The Fourth Circuit found that the agreement
was dated March 6, 1978 and concluded that "there is no support in the record that the agreement
was signed on a date other than that which appears on its face." Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d at 1016
n.1, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2181 n.l.
'	 " Because of the unfair labor practice charges filed against Mountaineer, the Small Business
Administration cancelled its loan. Id. at 1017, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2182. This resulted in the termination
of the sale agreement between Alkire and Houdyeshell, and in July, 1978 Alkire sold his trucking
business assets to another party. Id.
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Alkire." Under the terms of the lease Mountaineer paid all net profits from the hauling
business as rent on the trucking equipment.38 In return, Alkire remained responsible for
taxes, licenses, and loan payments on the equipment.39 In addition, Alkire received four
hundred dollars per week for services as a consultant to Mountaineer. 40
At the end of the UMW strike, Mountaineer began hauling union coal, principally
for the same customers for whom Alkire had hauled.'" As business picked up, Moun-
taineer notified prospective employees, including former Alkire employees, that the
company was taking job applications. 42 Subsequently, Mountaineer rehired some of
Alkire's former employees but refused to hire others." Based on these circumstances, the
former employees of Alkire who were not rehired filed unfair labor practice charges
alleging that Alkire, Upshur, and Mountaineer were alter egos, and that they had violated
section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act44 by requiring striking employees to file new employment
applications and by failing to rehire certain employees.*
The Board applied its "well settled" alter ego standard 48 and concluded that, al-
though Alkire had lawfully terminated his proprietorship,* he continued to control both
Upshur and Mountaineer and the three entities were really one integrated business so
that Upshur and Mountaineer were alter egos of Alkire." Mountaineer, therefore, was
under a duty to reinstate Alkire's employees and its failure to do so constituted unfair
labor practices in violation of section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. 49 Consequently, the Board
ordered back wages to be paid to the former Alkire employees who were not rehired, and
held Alkire, Upshur, and Mountaineer jointly liable."
37 Id. at 1017, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2181.
38 Id. Included in the operating expenses of Mountaineer was a $400 per week salary to
Houdyeshell. See Alkire, 259 N.L.R.B. at 1324, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1109.
Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d at 1017, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2181.
" Id.
41 Id.
41 Id.
" Id.
" 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and (3) (1982).
45 Alkire, 259 N.L.R.B. at 1323, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1108. Under Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act it
is an unfair labor practice to interfere with the exercise of employees rights to organize and to strike.
29 U.S.G. § 158(a)(1) and (3). In NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 66 L.R.R.M. 2737
(1967), the Supreme Court held that if, after conclusion of a strike, the employer refuses to reinstate
striking employees, the effect is to discourage employees from exercising their statutory rights under
the Act. Id. at 378, 66 L.R.R.M. at 758. Accordingly, unless the employer who refuses to reinstate
strikers can show that his action was due to a "legitimate and substantial business justification," he is
guilty of an unfair labor practice. NLRB v. Great Dan Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 34, 65 L.R.R.M. 2465,
2469 (1967). See Alkire, 259 N.L.R.B. at 1326 n.15, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1110 n.15. If, however,
Mountaineer was not the alter ego of Alkire, then Mountaineer had no duty to recall or reinstate
Alkire's former employees. See Alkire, 716 F.2d at 1017 n.3, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2182 n.3.
" Atkin', 259 N.L.R.B. at 1324, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1109. This is the Board's Crawford Door
standard, see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
Alkire, 259 N.L.R.B. at 1323, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1109. An employer has a right to go out of
business, even if the liquidation is motivated by vindictiveness toward a union. Textile Workers
Union of America v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268, 58 L.R.R.M. 2657, 2660 (1965).
" Alkire, 259 N.L.R.B. at 1325, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1110.
49 Id. at 1325-26, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1110-11. For an explanation of a section 8(a)(1) and (3)
violation in this context see supra note 45. The Board found that the burden had shifted to
Mountaineer to prove that it had legitimate business justification for failing to reinstate the former
employees; Mountaineer failed to meet this burden. Id. at 1326, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1111.
59 Id, at 1327, 109 L.R.R.M. at 1111.
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Alkire and Upshur appealed the Board's finding that they were alter egos of Moun-
taineer to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals." The Fourth Circuit found that the
Board had "misapplied the standard for imposing alter ego status." 52 The appeals court,
therefore, denied enforcement of the Board's order and established a new standard for
imposing alter ego status."
The Fourth Circuit began its review by discussing the balance that must be struck in
weighing an employer's right to terminate and sell a business and an employee's right to
be protected from a sudden change in the employment relationship." Although the court
recognized that the existence of an alter ego relationship between two companies is
essentially a factual question," it concluded that most other courts of appeals failed to set
out minimum criteria for applying the doctrine." The court, therefore, focused on what
it considered to be the unsettled question of whether the element of motive or intent
should be a prerequisite for finding alter ego status." In considering this issue, the court
reviewed prior appeals court decisions and found that, although intent or motive was not
always expressly held to be a criterion of alter ego status, the element of intentional
evasiveness was generally present." The court reasoned that this element of intent usually
manifested itself in the question of whether the predecessor owner obtained a benefit
from transferring the business. 59 The court, therefore, held that motive should be a
necessary factor in determining whether an alter ego relationship exists.
In support of this conclusion the court drew an analogy between the alter ego
doctrine and the partial closing situation." Citing the Supreme Court's leading case in the
area of partial closing, Textile Workers v. Darlington Manufacturing Co., 61 the appeals court
stated that a "similar analysis is appropriate in determining whether alter ego status
should be imposed."" In Darlington Manufacturing the Supreme Court had held that in
determining whether a partial closing was an unfair labor practice the purpose and effect
of the closing relative to the labor situation of the remaining business must be consid-
ered.63 The Fourth Circuit concluded that this criterion objectified the element of motive
and it incorporated the Darlington Manufacturing criterion into a new two part test."
Under the Fourth Circuit's test, the initial question is whether the predecessor retains
substantial control over the new entity." If the clement of control is established, the
Alkire, 716 F.2d at 1016, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2181.
52 Id.
" Id. at 1020, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2184.
64 Id. at 1017-18, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2182-83. See also John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S.
543, 549, 55 L.R.R.M. 2769, 2772 (1964).
" Alkire, 716 F.2d at 1018, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2183.
w Id. at 1019, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2183.
" Id. at 1018, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2183.
se
	
at 1019, 114 L.R.RM. at 2183-84.
56 Id.
50 Id. at 1019-20, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2184. A partial closing involves a situation where a large
enterprise controlling various divisions or plants closes down a part of its operations for the purpose
of chilling unionism at its remaining operations. See Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington
Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 275, 58 L.R.R.M. 2657, 2662 (1965). The Supreme Court has held that it is
an unfair labor practice for an employer to effect such a partial closing where the employer may
reasonably have foreseen that the partial closing would have such a chilling effect, Id.
61 380 U.S. 263, 58 L.R.R.M. 2657 (1965).
" Alkire, 716 F.2d at 1020, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2184.
63 Darlington Mfg., 380 U.S. at 275, 58 L.R.R.M. at 2662.
6 ' See Alkire, 716 F.2d at 1020, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2184.
as
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second inquiry considers whether the change in ownership "resulted in an expected or
reasonably foreseeable benefit to the old employer related to the elimination of its labor
obligations."66
 Applying this test to the facts of Alkire the court held that the Board had
made no findings concerning Alkire's benefit with respect to his labor obligations in
transferring the hauling operations.°7
 Noting that the normal procedure would be to
remand the case, the court concluded that the complete lack of evidence in the record
upon which such a finding could be based rendered remand for a factual finding
unnecessary." The court, therefore, remanded with instructions to dismiss any charges of
unfair labor practices against Alkire or Upshur based on actions occurring after the sale
of Upshur's assets to Mountaineer."
Judge Sprouse filed a dissenting opinion in which he argued that intent had not been
a requirement for imposing alter ego status in previous cases and consequently should not
be a requirement in the instant case." According to the dissent, although the predecessor
employer's motive should be a relevant factor, it should not be determinative of alter ego
status!' Instead, Judge Sprouse opined that the "guiding rationale" in alter ego cases
should be whether the successor employer is "merely a disguised continuance of the old
employer."" Applying this analysis, Judge Sprouse concluded that the Board's finding of
alter ego status was supported by substantial evidence, and therefore the Board's order
should have been enforced."
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Alkire v. NLRB represents a substantial departure
from the opinions of prior courts of appeals that have reviewed the alter ego doctrine. 14
In place of a flexible, multi-factor standard," the Fourth Circuit has established a rigid
two part test." The first part of the Fourth Circuit's test — the element of control by the
predecessor employer — has generally been recognized as a necessary prerequisite for
finding alter ego status." The second part of the test — the element of intent to evade
labor obligations — however, is unique to the Fourth Circuit in that it makes intent a
required criterion." While conceding that the question of intent is unsettled in other
circuits," the majority opinion in Alkire held that intent should be a prerequisite for
imposing alter ego status. The court, however, failed.to
 adequately analyze the need for
such a requirement. 8° Instead, the court merely argued that intent, or at least the element
of economic benefit to the predecessor employer, had been present in most alter ego
cases. 6 ' From this limited discussion the court concluded that intent should be a control-
" Id.
67 Id. at 1021, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2185.
" Id. at 1021-22, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2185-86.
89
 Id. at 1022, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2186.
" Id. (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
" Id. (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
72 Id. (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
73 Id. at 1023, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2186 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
74 See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
76 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
76 Alkire, 716 F.2d at 1022, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2184. See also supra notes 65-66 and accompanying
text.
" See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
7 ' See infra notes 83.88 and accompanying text.
" Alkire, 716 F.2d at 1018, 119 L.R.R.M. at 2183.
a° Although the court drew an analogy to the partial closing situation as support for its holding
that intent is a necessary element, it failed to examine the benefits and/or disadvantages of its
decision. See id. at 1018.22, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2183-85.
Id. at 1019, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2183-89.
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ling factor." Although motive or intent has often been a relevant inquiry in applying the
alter ego doctrine," because alter ego is primarily a factual question," the relevance of
intent or motive depends upon the specific circumstances of a case. 85
 Thus, although
some courts have focused on the factor of intent, they have not established intent as a
necessary requirement for finding alter ego status." Indeed, as Judge Sprouse's dissent
points out, the Supreme Court has indicated that alter ego status is not limited to
employers who purposefully attempt to evade the effects of labor laws." The Fourth
Circuit's decision in Alkire v. NLRB, therefore, represents a unique departure from the
"well-established" doctrine of alter ego."
The principal issue in imposing alter ego status had been whether the new employer
was "merely a disguised continuance of the old employer." 88 Such an inquiry requires the
consideration of numerous factors. 8° Establishing a rigid test fails to deal with the myriad
of potential situations within which transfers of business ownership can occur. Moreover,
as one of the ultimate goals of labor law is to provide an equitable balance between the
property rights of employers and the legitimate expectations of employees," a rigid two
part test unnecessarily restricts the Board's scope of inquiry. Although the Fourth Cir-
cuit's attempt to objectify the element of intent, by looking at the benefit flowing from the
change in business ownership, is a useful consideration," other courts should not adopt it
as a necessary factor for finding alter ego status. Instead, the element of intent, like a
number of other factors, should be weighed in light of the particular circumstances of
each case.
6. *Mid- Contract Work Transfers Without Union Approval:
Milwaukee Spring Division of Illinois Coil Spring Co.'
Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) requires employers to
bargain in good faith with employee representatives.' Section 8(d) of the Act limits the
82 Id.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
8' See Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106, 9 L.R.R.M. 411, 413-14 (1942);
NLRB v. Al Bryant, Inc., 711 F.2d 543, 553, 113 L.R.R.M. 3690, 3699 (3d Cir. 1983); Carpenters
Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 486, 508, 111 L.R.R.M. 2787, 2798-99 (5th
Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Tricor Products, Inc., 636 F.2d 266, 270, 105 L.R.R.M. 3271, 3273 (10th Cir.
1980).
Be See Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106, 9 L.R.R.M. 411, 413-14 (1942);
Fugazy Continental Corp. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1416, 1419, 115 L.R.R.M. 2571, 2573 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
NLRB v. Scott Printing Corp., 612 F.2d 783, 787, 103 L.R.R.M. 2153, 2156 (3d Cir. 1979); NLRB v.
Bell Company, Inc., 561 F.2d 1264, 1267, 96 L.R.R.M. 2437, 2440 (7th Cir. 1977).
Alkire, 716 F.2d at 1022, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2186 (Sprouse, J., dissenting), (quoting Howard
Johnson Co. v. Detroit Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 259 n.5, 86 L.R.R.M. 2449, 2453 n.5 (1974)).
88 See Fugazy Continental Corp. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1416, 1419, 115 L.R.R.M. 2571, 2573 (D.C.
Cir. 1984). See also supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
99 See Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106, 9 L.R.R.M. 411, 413-14 (1942);
Fugazy Continental Corp. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1416, 1419, 115 L.R.R.M. 2571, 2573 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Alkire v, NLRB, 716 F.2d at 1022, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2186 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
" See supra notes 11.13 and accompanying text.
B 1
 See John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549, 55 L.R.R.M. 2769, 2772 (1964).
92 See Alkire, 716 F.2d at 1022, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2186 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
* By Lloyd E. Selbst, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
268 N.L.R.B. 601, 115 L.R.R.M. 1065 (1984), ret/g Milwaukee Spring Div. of Illinios Coil, 265
N.L.R.B. 206 (1982) (Milwaukee Spring I).
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982). The same duty to bargain in good faith is imposed on labor
unions by section 8(b)(3) of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1982).
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mandatory subjects of bargaining to "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment." 3
 The parties are not required, however, to reach agreement on these
subjects.' If the parties reach an impasse, the employer may unilaterally implement his
decision.'' Once an employer and the union have agreed to a collective bargaining
agreement, however, section 8(d) provides that the union need not discuss nor agree to
midterm modifications of terms in the collective bargaining agreement.° Furthermore,
section 8(d) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer unilaterally to modify a
mandatory term of a collective bargaining agreement while the agreement remains in
effect.'
Several times in recent years, the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) has
considered whether an employer's decision to relocate work out of a bargaining unit
without the union's consent while the collective bargaining agreement is in effect violates
sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the Act in the absence of a work-preservation clause in the
agreement." Until recently, the Board had consistently ruled that such transfers of work
— and subsequent lay-offs of workers at the original facility — were violations of section
8(a)(5) and 8(d) although the circuit courts have generally refused to enforce the Board
orders." The Seventh Circuit rejected the Board's holding in University of Chicago v.
• 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). This subsection provides, in pertinent part: "For the purposes of
this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and
the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment . .."
• Section 8(d) provides that the obligation to bargain "does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
s American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965).
s Section 8(d) provides that the duties imposed by that section "shall not be construed as
requiring either party to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms arid conditions contained
in a contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to become effective before such terms and
conditions can be reopened under the provisions of the contract." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
Section 8(d)(4) requires that the parties maintain "all the terms and conditions of the existing
contract." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(4) (1982). The Supreme Court, however, has held that "a 'modification'
is a prohibited unfair labor practice only when it changes a term that is a mandatory rather than a
permissive subject of bargaining." Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., Local Union No. 1 v.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chem. Div., 404 U.S. 157, 185, 78 L.R.R.M. 2974, 2984 (1971). If an
employer unilaterally changes a term which is a permissive subject of bargaining, employees may
bring a breach of contract action under section 301 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). Id. at 181 n.20,
188, 78 L.R.R.M. at 2983 n.20, 2986.
" See cases cited infra notes 9-10. The Board has also considered whether such action constitutes
a violation of section 8(a)(3). See, e.g., Milwaukee Spring I, 265 N.L.R.B. at 208-09, rev'd upon
reconsideration, Milwaukee Spring Div. of Illinois Coil Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 601, 604, 115 L.R.R.M. 1065,
1069 (1984) (Milwaukee Spring II). Section 8(a)(3) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an
employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . ..." 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(3) (1982). Although generally, anti-union animus must be shown to establish a violation of
section 8(a)(3), American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311, 58 L.R.R.M. 2672, 2676 (1965),
anti-union animus is not required to establish a violation when the employer's conduct is shown to be
"inherently destructive" of employee rights, NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34, 65
L.R.R.M. 2465, 2469 (1967). This comment will focus primarily on the Board's section 8(a)(5) and
8(d) analysis, however, since the Board's findings of violations of section 8(a)(3) in the area of
mid-term work relocation appear to derive from the finding of section 8(a)(5) and 8(d) violations. See
Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N. L.R.B. at 604, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1069.
o See, e.g., Milwaukee spring I, 265 N.L.R.B. at 206 (1982); Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co.,
235 N.L.R.B. 720, 98 L.R.R.M. 1571 (1978), enforced, 602 F.2d 1302, 102 L.R.R.M. 2498 (9th Cir.
1979); Boeing Co., 230 N.L.R.B. 696, 96 L.R.R.M. 1355 (1977), enforcement denied, 581 F.2d 793, 99
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NLRB ,'° ruling that unless a term in the collective bargaining agreement specifically states
that the employer cannot transfer work to a different facility during the life of the
agreement, a mid-contract transfer does modify the agreement and therefore does not
require union approval." The court did, however, condition an employer's ability to
transfer work in two respects.' First, the court held that, as with other changes in work
conditions not specifically addressed in the collective bargaining agreement, the employer
must bargain in good faith to impasse before instituting the change under the rule
announced by the Supreme Court in Fibreboard Paper Products v. NLRB Second, the
court ruled that, as with other employer decisions, the decision to transfer work could not
be motivated by anti-union animus under the Supreme Court decision in Textile Workers
Union of America v. Darlington Manufacturing Co. 14
The only other circuit to consider the issue, the Ninth Circuit, has reached inconsis-
tent results.' 5 When the Board turned a deaf ear to the Seventh Circuit's University of
Chicago holding in deciding Boeing Co. 16 two years later, the Ninth Circuit denied en-
forcement of the order relying on University of Chicago.' In Los Angeles Marine Hardware
Co. v. NLRB,' ° however, the Ninth Circuit enforced a Board order finding a violation of
section 8(a)(5) and 8(d) when an employer laid off several employees and relocated
bargaining unit work during the term of the collective bargaining agreement.' 9 Sig-
nificantly, the court found an unfair labor practice even though the employer had
bargained in good faith over the decision to remove work and was motivated solely by
economic considerations."' Thus, the Ninth Circuit's decision was directly in conflict with
the Seventh Circuit's decision in University of Chicago' and with its own earlier decision in
Boeing Co."
L.R.R.M. 2847 (9th Cir. 1978); University of Chicago, 210 N.L.R.B. 190, 86 L.R.R.M. 1073 (1974),
enforcement denied, 514 F.2d 942, 89 L.R.R.M. 2113 (7th Cir. 1975).
'° 514 F.2d 942, 89 L.R.R.M. 2113 (7th Cir. 1975).
" Id. at 9948-49, 89 L.R.R.M. at 2116-18.
' 2 Id. at 949, 89 L.R.R.M. at 2117.
13 Id. (citing Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 57 L.R.R.M. 2609
(1964)).
' 4 Id. (citing Textile Workers of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 58 L.R.R.M. 2657
(1965)).
See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
" 230 N.L.R.B. 696, 96 L.R.R.M. 1355 (1977).
' T 581 F.2d 793, 796-97, 99 L.R.R.M. 2847, 2850-51 (9th Cir. 1978).
1° 602 F.2d 1302, 102 L.R.R.M. 2498 (9th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 1306-07, 102 L.R.R.M. at 2500-01. The court also upheld the Board's finding that the
lay-off of 23 employees due to the transfer of work constituted a violation of section 8(a)(3),
reasoning that the lay-off was "inherently destructive" of employee rights. Id, at 1307, 102 L.R.R.M.
at 2501. See supra note 8.
" Id. at 1306, 102 L.R.R.M. at 2500. See also the extensive findings of the Administrative Law
Judge on these issues, adopted by the Board, 235 N.L.R.B. at 732-33.
" See supra text accompanying notes 11-15. Curiously, the court did not even mention University
of Chicago, 210 N.L.R.B. 190, 86 L.R.R.M. 1073 (1974).
" See supra text accompanying notes 17-18. The Ninth Circuit's position on this issue is further
complicated by its subsequent decision in Brown Co. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 1078, 109 L.R.R.M. 2663
(9th Cir. 1981), rev'g and remanding without opinion 243 N.L.R.B. 769, 101 L.R.R.M. 1608 (1979). In
Brown, the Board found that the employer transferred work and laid oft' employees during the term
of the collective bargaining agreement to avoid paying union wages in violation of section 8(a)(3). Id.
at 772, 101 L.R.R.M. at 1611. The Board did not reach the section 8(a)(5) issue. Id. The Board based
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During the Survey year, in Milwaukee Spring Division of Illinois Coil Spring Co. (Mil-
waukee Spring 14 23 the Board adopted the Seventh Circuit's reading of section 8(d) and
abandoned its former position by holding that a mid-contract transfer of work out of a
bargaining unit does not violate section 8(d) unless a collective bargaining agreement
specifically forbids an employer from transferring work to a different facility." In revers-
ing its position, the Board also adopted the Seventh Circuit's two limitations on the
employer's freedom to transfer work to another facility during the term of a contract."
The Board's change of position may have the long-term effect of weakening the bargain-
ing power of many unions and consequently, of undermining the purpose of section 8(d).
In Milwaukee Spring II, the employer, Illinios Coil Spring Company, decided without
the union's consent, to transfer its assembly operation from its unionized Milwaukee,
Wisconsin facility to its nonunionized McHenry, Illinois facility during the term of a
collective bargaining agreement." As a result of that decision, a number of workers at the
Milwaukee site were laid off." The union brought an action before the Board charging
that the Illinois Coil Spring Company had engaged in an unfair labor practice by
transferring work without union approval." Applying its traditional analysis to a mid-
contract transfer, the Board originally held that the transfer and lay-off violated sections
8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the Act." Illinois Coil petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit to set aside the Board's decision. 33 Before the court acted, however, the Board
requested the court to remand the case to it for additional consideration. 3 ' After a
rehearing, the Board reversed its previous ruling and found that the employer had not
violated sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the Act. 32
In its new decision, the Board noted that only modifications by an employer of "terms
and conditions contained in" a collective bargaining agreement are subject to union
consent.under section 8(d) of the Act. 33
 The Board held, therefore, that if the condition of
employment which the employer wished to change was not an express term in the
contract, the employer was subject only to the general obligation under the Act of
bargaining in good faith to impasse before instituting the proposed change." The em-
ployer need not secure the union's consent."
In the Board's view, the sole issue in the instant case was whether an agreement by
Illinois Coil Spring not to move its assembly operations elsewhere during the life of the
its finding of the section 8(a)(3) violation on the Los Angeles Marine theory that the employer's actions
were inherently destructive of employee rights. Id.,see supra note 20. The court denied enforcement
of the Board order and remanded the case to the Board for a determination of whether the
employer's actions were permitted under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 109
L.R.R.M. at 2663 (brief unofficial opinion).
23 268 N.L.R.B. 601, 115 L.R.R.M. 1065 (1984).
24 Id. at 602, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1068.
" Id. at 604, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1068. See also supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
26 Milwaukee Spring 11, 268 N.L.R.B. at 601, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1065.
at Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
3° Id.
31 Id. at 601, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1066.
33 Id.
33 Id. at 602, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1066.
34
 Id.
35
 Id.
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agreement was "contained in" a clause of the company's contract with the union." The
Board ruled that it was not." Upon examination of the collective bargaining agreement,
the Board found no term expressly forbidding relocation of work during the contract
period without the union's approval." Further, the Board rejected the reasoning of the
Ninth Circuit in Los Angeles Marine" by ruling that no clause in the contract implied such
an agreement by the employer." Specifically, the Board stated that the transfer did not
violate the contract's wages and benefits clauses since the transfer did not disturb the
salary rates and fringe benefits offered at the Milwaukee site." Similarly, in the Board
view, the transfer could not be said to violate the recognition clause." In a recognition
clause, the Board asserted, the employer merely agrees to bargain with the union chosen .
by the employees." The employer does not agree that only members of that union will do
the work covered by the contract." In reaching this conclusion, the Board expressly
adopted the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in University of Chicago and the Ninth Circuit
in Boeing Co. 45 Like the Seventh Circuit, the Board noted that employers and unions were
free to write clauses into their agreements requiring that certain tasks be performed only
by members of the bargaining unit." Indeed, the Board pointed out that many contracts
have such clauses.'" The Board held, therefore, that if an employer and a union chose not
to forbid the relocation of work to another facility for the life of the contract expressly, no
such ban, should be read into the existing clauses of the contract."
The Board acknowledged that its decision, like that of the Seventh Circuit in Univer-
sity of Chicago, was irreconcilable with the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Los Angeles Marine."
The Board asserted, however, that the Ninth Circuit's opinion was a misinterpretation of
the law." Moreover, the Board adopted as consistent with the Act the limitations on an
employer's freedom to transfer work imposed by University of Chicago. 5 ' That is, the Board
ruled that an employer who wished to effect a transfer not specifically barred by the
contract must first bargain in good faith with the union to impasse before effecting the
transfer," and second, refrain from making transfers motivated solely by anti-union
animus. 53
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
'9 602 F.2d 1302, 102 L.R.R.M. 2498 (9th Cir. 1979).
4° Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 602, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1066-67.
" Id.
'2 Id. at 602, 115 L.R.R.M at 1067.
" Id.
44 Id.
" See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
46 Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 602, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1068.
" Id.
48 Id,
as Id. at 604, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1068.
6° Id.
" Id.
" Id.
" Id. The Board also overruled its earlier decision that the employer's actions violated section
8(a)(3) of the Act. Id. The Board reasoned that its earlier finding of the section 8(a)(3) violation
"flowed from" the finding of the section 8(a)(5) violation, and that since it now ruled that no section
8(a)(5) violation had occurred, therefore no violation of section 8(a)(3) had occurred either. Id. See
supra notes 8, 20 and 23 regarding the section 8(a)(3) theory.
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The dissenting opinion in Milwaukee Spring II found the majority's reasoning to be
flawed." According to the dissent, in the absence of an explicit relocation ban in the
contract, the employer should be able to transfer work after bargaining to impasse,
provided not only that the employer was not motivated by anti-union animus but also that
the employer's motive was not to save on labor costs by avoiding paying the wages and
benefits that he agreed to pay in the contract. 55
 If the employer's motive arises from any
other considerations, the dissent asserted, then the employer is free to transfer after
bargaining to impasse. 56
In addition, the dissent argued that an employer should not be allowed to do
indirectly what he could not do directly under a collective bargaining agreement."
According to the dissent, an employer should not, therefore, be permitted under section
8(d) to avoid meeting crucial pay and benefit terms of a collective bargaining contract
simply by shifting work from the unit covered by the contract to a different unit.m The
dissent maintained that the decisions of both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits on mid-term
relocations were reconcilable and supported this view. 59 In addition, the dissent asserted
that although the Seventh Circuit in University of Chicago had permitted the reassignment
of work, the court did so because the employer's sole motive in making the transfer was to
increase the quality of performance, not to reduce the wage rate to employees performing
the work." Similarly, in the dissent's view, the Ninth Circuit had permitted the transfer of
work without union consent in Boeing Co. v. NLRB because the employer's motive was to
increase efficiency in production and not to reduce labor costs. 6 ' In Los Angeles Marine, the
dissent argued, the Ninth Circuit had affirmed Boeing by finding that the transfer of work
violated section 8(d) because the employer made the transfer solely to avoid paying the
high labor costs specified in his contract with the union. 62
The sole issue in the instant case, according to the dissent, was the employer's motive
in relocating. 63 The dissent found that the employer's motive was to reduce labor costs by
moving to a nonunionized facility. 64
 Since, in the dissent's view, reducing labor costs was a
motive that the circuit courts had found impermissible under section 8(d), the Board
should have ruled that the transfer was improper without union consent. 65
54 Id. at 605, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1069 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting). The dissent began by
considering the "threshold issue" of whether the employer's relocation decision was a mandatory
subject of bargaining, noting that section 8(d) prohibits midterm unilateral modifications only with
regard to mandatory subjects of bargaining. Id. See supra note 7. The dissent found that the
relocation decision was a mandatory subject. Id. at 609, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1069. The majority did not
address the preliminary issue, apparently because the parties agreed to consider the relocation
decision a mandato?),
 subject of bargaining. Id. at 601 n.5, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1066 n.5. fora detailed
discussion of when an employer's decision to relocate is a mandatory subject of bargaining, see
O'Keefe & Tuohey, Economically Motivated Relocations of Work and an Employer's Duties under Section 8(d)
of the National Labor Relations Act: a Three-Step Analysis, 11 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 795, 815-25, 839-42
(1983).
55 Id. at 605, 610-11, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1069, 1074-75 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
56 Id. at 611-12, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1075 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
5' Id. at 611, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1074 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
56 Id.
" Id. at 610, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1073-74 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
.60 Id. at 610, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1074 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
4" Id. (discussing Boeing Co. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 793, 99 L.R.R.M. 2847 (9th Cir. 1978)).
62 Id.
" Id. at 611, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1075 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
64 Id. at 611, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1074 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
Id.
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As the dissent correctly pointed out, the majority opinion in Milwaukee Spring II was a
departure from the Board's previous position.66 Nevertheless, the dissent's attempt to
synthesize the rulings of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits into a consistent series of
decisions is not convincing." The Seventh Circuit in University of Chicago did not approve
the transfer merely, as the Milwaukee Spring II dissent asserted, because the employer's
motive in deciding to transfer work was to improve efficiency rather than to reduce
wages.68 The court inquired into the employer's motive only to establish whether the
reason for the relocation was anti-union animus." The Seventh Circuit's view in University
of Chicago, adopted by the Board in Milwaukee Spring , was that a mid-contract relocation
was permissible provided the employer had not acted out of anti-union animus and had
bargained in good faith with the union before relocating." In contrast, the Ninth Circuit's
ruling in Los Angeles Marine held mid-term transfers for any reason invalid in the absence
of union approval." The decisions of the two circuits cannot be harmonized in any way.
The Los Angeles Marine rule, however, seems to be more in line with the statutory goal
of protecting the rights of employees. Relocation amounts to wholesale repudiation of a
collective bargaining agreement. To hold, as the Board did in Milwaukee Spring II, that the
employer cannot unilaterally make changes regarding matters covered specifically in the
contract, but can unilaterally scrap the entire contract at will and move elsewhere, seems
to be an unnecessarily narrow and formalistic reading of section 8(d). Further, this
decision, if upheld by the circuit courts, encourages employers who do not have nontrans-
fer clauses in their contracts to shift work to wherever they can pay lower wages, since the
decision would eliminate the 'union's ability to prevent such action. Thus, the decision
would seem to jeopardize the continued existence of many unionized facilities. Finally,
the Board's decision in Milwaukee Spring II will have the effect. of making nontransferabil-
ity of work a separate subject of negotiation between unions and employers. Accordingly,
unions may in the future have to grant significant concessions to secure nontransferabil-
ity. The Milwaukee Spring II decision, rather than aiding unionized workers, appears
merely to provide employers with a new weapon for compelling "give backs" by unions.
7. *Accord and Satisfaction as Defense to Breach of Contract Suit by Union Against Employer Over
Modification of Benefits to Retired Workers: UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc.'
Neither unions nor management are obligated under federal labor law to bargain
over permissive contractual provisions.i In the 1971 case of Allied Chemical and Alkali
al Id. at 610, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1073-74 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
" See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
as
	of Chicago v. NLRB, 514 F.2d 942, 949, 89 L.R.R.M. 2113, 2117 (7th Cir. 1975).
70
 Id.; see also Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. 601, 604, 115 L.R.R.M. 1065, 1068 (1984).
71 Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d 1302, 1307, 102 L.R.R.M. 2498, 2501
(9th Cir. 1979).
* By Walter L. Maroney, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 International. Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America (UAW) and Local 134 UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 114 L.R.R.M. 2489 (6th Cir.
1983) [hereinafter cited as UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc. or Yard-Man].
Allied Chemical and Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Class Company, Inc., 404 U.S. 157,
182, 183 n.20, 78 L.R.R.M. 2974, 2983, 2983 n.20 (1971) (employers and union under no obligation).
See also Titmus Optical Co., Inc. v. United Steelworkers of America, 205 N.L.R.B. 159, 84 L.R.R.M.
1559 (1973) (union not obligated to bargain for benefits to retired workers).
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Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, Inc., 3 the United States Supreme Court declared
that benefits for already retired workers are permissive rather than mandatory subjects
for collective bargaining. 4 Accordingly, the Court held, unilateral modification by an
employer of the terms of retirement provisions relating to already retired workers is not
an unfair labor practice within the meaning of section 8(d) of the National Labor
Relations Act (the Act). 5 Employers who agree to retirement benefit provisions as part of a
collective bargaining agreement, however, are bound by the terms of that agreemerit. 6
During the Survey year, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in International Union,
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), and Local
134, UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc. 7 considered two questions arising from the Pittsburgh Plate
Glass doctrine that retirement benefit provisions are permissive elements of collective
bargaining agreements. The court first held that an employer is under no duty to notify
the union of a proposed modification of benefits to retired employees, even when the
union had undertaken to represent the retirees in a breach of contract suit over the
employer's failure to provide such benefits as required under a collective bargaining
agreement. 9 Second, the court held that acceptance by individual retirees of an employ-
er's modification of benefits, which had originally been provided for in a collective
bargaining agreement, could constitute grounds for the affirmative defenses of estoppel
and accord and satisfaction to a union's suit for specific performance under the contract. 9
UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc. was based upon a collective bargaining agreement entered
into in August 1974, which bore a stated expiration date of June 1, 1977 and covered
employees at Yard-Man's Jackson, Michigan plant,' Less than a year after the signing of
the contract, the plant closed." In April, 1977, Yard-Man notified its Jackson retirees that
existing health and life insurance benefits would terminate upon expiration of the
collective bargaining agreement.' The UAW promptly filed grievances and responded to
Yard-Man's refusal to arbitrate with a breach of contract suit filed in federal district
court" pursuant to section 301 of the Act.'! In its first count, the UAW sought to compel
arbitration over the disputed benefits." Alternatively, the union asked for specific per-
formance of Yard-Man's alleged obligation to provide health and life insurance benefits
3 404 U.S. 157, 78 L.R.R.M. 2974 (1971).
Id. at 180-82, 78 L.R.R.M. at 2982. The Court reasoned that retirees are not "employees"
within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. 152(3). Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 172, 78 L.R.R.M. at 2979.
Nor does modification of retirement benefits vitally affect the "terms and conditions of employment"
of active workers. Id. at 182, 78 L.R.R.M. at 2983. Accordingly, neither unions nor management have
a statutory obligation to bargain over benefits for retired workers. Id. at 182, 183 n.20, 78 L.R.R.M. at
2983, 2983 n.20.
Pittsburgh Plate C/a's, 404 U.S. at 183 n.20, 78 L.R.R.M. at 2983 n.20. See generally Note, Pension
Plans .and the Rights of the Retired Worker, 70 CoLum. L. Rev. 909, 916-20 (1971) (retiree pension rights
protected under common law of contract).
6 Nedd v. United Mine Workers of America, 556 F.2d 190, 95 L.R.R.M. 2392 (3d Cir. 1977);
Toensing v. Brown, 528 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1975).
7 716 F.2d 1476, 114 L.R.R.M. 2489 (6th Cir. 1983).
8 Id. at 1486, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2496.
9 Id. at 1485, 114 L.R.R.M, at 2495.
1 ° Id. at 1478, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2489.
" Id.
12 Id.
"3 716 F.2d at 1478, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2489.
" 61 Stat. 136, ch. 120, title III § 301 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 185-187 (1982)).
Yard•Man, 716 F.2d at 1478, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2489.
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beyond the term of the collective bargaining agreement." In its second count, the UAW
sought specific performance of Yard-Man's acknowledged obligation, in the event of
business failure, to purchase annuities to fund a supplemental pension plan." After the
suit had been filed, but without notice to the UAW, Yard-Man distributed lump sum
payments purportedly equal to the present value of the supplemental pension rights
directly to each retiree."
In the district court, the UAW waived its demand for arbitration and the parties filed
cross motions for summary judgment," Relying solely on the language of the collective
bargaining agreement, the district court found for the UAW on both counts." As to the
first count, the district court held that Yard-Man had breached a contractual obligation
through its unilateral cancellation of the retirees' insurance policies." As to the second
count, the court held that, as a matter of law, Yard-Man could not provide a substituted
performance in accord and satisfaction of its contractual obligation to the retirees to
purchase annuities on their behalf." Accordingly, the court ordered specific performance
of Yard-Man's obligations under each count.".The United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit allowed certified appeal by Yard-Man of the district court's specific
performance orders."
The Circuit Court first examined the UAW's contention that the life and health
insurance provisions were intended by the parties to the Yard-Man agreement to create
vested rights in retirees extending beyond the term of the contract." Relying on a body of
"federal common law" precedent established under the aegis of Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 26 the court treated as established doctrine that parties to a collective bargain-
ing agreement may provide for rights surviving the termination of their contractual
relationship." Regarding the duration of the benefit provisions at issue in the Yard-Man
Id.
' 7 Id. at 1478, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2490.
' Id. Prior to closing, Yard-Man offered two pension plans to its employees. The "Yard-Man
Basic Plan," a qualified ERISA plan, was not involved in the litigation. Id. at 1488, 114 L.R.R.M. at
2498 (Holschuh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The "Improved Yard-Man Pension
Plan — Jackson" offered optional benefits beyond the scope of the ERISA-qualified Basic Plan. Id.
(Holschuh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Article XVI II of the collective bargaining
agreement between Yard-Man and UAW obligated Yard-Man, in the event of business failure, "to
fund the balance of the pension benefits payable to employees then in retirement through purchase
of an annuity from a life insurance company."Id. (Holschuh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The company did not dispute this obligation. Id. (Holschuh, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
" 716 F.2d at 1478, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2490.
20 Id.
2 ' Id.
" Id. at 1487, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2496-97.
" Id. at 1478, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2490. The district court, however, required the affected retirees
to repay the lump-sum distribution as a precondition to receiving their bargained-for annuities. Id.
" Id. The district court certified its judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) as a summary judgment
controlled by a question of law over which substantial difference of opinion existed. Id.
25 Id. at 1479-83, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2490-93.
26
 353 U.S. 448, 40 L.R.R.M. 2113 (1957).
27 716 F.2d at 1479, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2490. Relying on the holding of Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,
40 L.R.R.M. 2113 (1957), that federal courts may adopt common law doctrines to construe collective
bargaining agreements, the court expounded five rules for the divination of the existence of vested
rights in collective bargaining agreements. The court suggested that it should first look to the precise
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contract, however, the court found the language of the agreement to be facially ambigu-
ous. 29 The court, therefore, looked to other provisions of the agreement for evidence
indicative of the parties' intent. 29
First, the court noted that specific durational limits on insurance benefits to active
employees were set out in the agreement." The court further noted that retiree savings
and bask pension plans, as well as coverage of spouses and children of deceased employ-
ees, were similarly made explicitly coextensive with the life of the collective bargaining
agreement. 31 In the absence of equivalent limiting language, the court found it "reason-
able to infer" that the parties to the agreement intended to vest lifetime health and
insurance benefits in retired workers. 32
Turning to the annuities purchase and lump-sum distribution question, the court
language of the agreement for clear manifestations of the parties' intent. 716 F.2d at 1479, 114
L.R.R.M. at 2490-91. Second, any intent so discernible should be interpreted as consistently as
possible with the overall agreement. Id. at 1479-80, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2491. Third, the disputed
provision should not be construed so as to render it "nugatory" or "illusory." Id. at 1480, 114
L.R.R.M. at 2491. Fourth, where the language of the agreement is ambiguous, the court may look to
other language in the agreement for guidance. Id. Finally, any interpretation of a disputed provision
must be consistent with basic principles of federal labor law. Id. See generally Allied Chemical and
Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Inc., 404 U.S. 157, 183 n.20, 78 L.R.R.M. 2974, 2983
n.20 (1971), supra note 4; John Wiley & Sons v, Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 545, 55 L.R.R.M. 2769
(1964). See also Upholsterers International Union v. American Pad and Textile Co., 372 F.2d 427, 64
L.R.R.M. 2200 (6th Cir. 1969); International Union, UAW, v. Robertshow Controls Co., 405 F.2d 29,
68 L.R.R.M. 2571 (2d Cir. 1968); International Union, UAW, Local 784 v, Cadillac Malleable Iron
Co., Inc., 113 L.R.R.M. 2525 (W.D. Mich, 1982); Roxbury Carpet Co. and Textile Workers of
America 73-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH)11 8521 (1973) (Summers, Arb.); American Standard, Inc., 57
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 698 (1971) (Warns, Arb.).
2" 716 F.2d at [481, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2491.
" Id. at 1480-81, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2491. The court determined that the relevant contractual
language was limited to Article XVII, Section 4 of the collective bargaining agreement which read in
relevant part: "When the former employee has attained the age of 65 years then: (1) the Company
will provide insurance benefits equal to the active group's benefits . . . for the former employee and
his spouse." Id. at 1480, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2491. The court explicitly rejected Yard-Man's claim that a
general durational clause terminating the collective bargaining agreement on June 1, 1977 demon-
strated the parties' intent that all benefits conferred by the agreement should terminate on that date.
Id. at 1482-83, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2493. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
3° Id. at 1481, 1981 n.3, 1481 n.4, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2492, 2492 n.3, 2492 n.4 (company
contribution to active employee benefit plans terminable after layoff on a seniority based schedule).
31
 Id. at 1482, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2493.
32 Id. at 1481, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2492. The court noted that the collective bargaining agreement
permitted early retirement at age 55. Article XVII, Section 4 of the agreement committed Yard-Man
to assume insurance costs of the early retiree when the retiree reached sixty-five. Id. Such a promise,
the court observed, bound the company for up to ten years, while the collective bargaining agree-
ment itself was to be in force for only three. Id. According to the court, to hold the duration of the
agreement as controlling all promises therein would render the company's obligation under Section
4 "illusory." Id.
The court also suggested that the permissive nature of retirement benefit provisions in the
collective bargaining process argued for their interpretation as creating vested rights beyond the
term of any given contract. Id. at 1482, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2492-93. The court reasoned that retirement
benefits are typically understood as delayed compensation. Id. at 1482, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2493.
Neither the union nor the employer, however, is under a statutory duty to include such provisions in
subsequent contracts. Id. Therefore, the decision by union members to forgo current wages in return
for future benefits implies an expectation that such benefits will be assured beyond the term of the
authorizing contract. Id. See also Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. 157, 78 L.R.R.M. 2974 (1971), see
supra text accompanying notes 2-4.
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identified two issues. First, the court examined the question of whether retirees may,
consistently with federal labor law and principles, settle disputes over benefits directly
with their former employer by means of accord and satisfaction without notice to, or
consent of, the union. 33 Second, the court considered whether such settlements should be
precluded once the union undertakes legal representation of the retirees in litigation
pursuant to section 301 of the Act. 34
Regarding the issue of notice of settlement to the union, the court began by observing
that section .159(a) of the Act requires such notice in the case of settlements between the
employer and active employees.35 The court held, however, that section 159(a) did not
control the instant situation because, under the Pittsburgh Plate. Glass doctrine, retirees are
not "employees" within the purview of federal labor law." Moreover, according to the
court, as permissive contractual elements, retirement benefits are not "terms and condi-
tions of employment" specifically covered by the Act. 37
The court then examined the union's argument that general principles of federal
labor policy mandated judicial imposition of a union notice requirement as a prerequisite
to settlement of disputes between retirees and a former employer." The section 159(a)
notice requirement, the court observed, protects only the union's interest in preserving
the integrity of "terms and conditions of employment . . . of active employees.' Individual
settlement of retiree benefit disputes would not modify or compromise any mandatory
provision of a collective bargaining agreement and so posed no threat to the union
interest recognized by section 159(a). 4° Furthermore, the court reasoned, the retiree has
an individual remedy at law under section 301 of the Act against a former employer who
breaches a contractual obligation.'" This remedy, the court stressed, does not require
recourse to the union for effectuation. 42 Logically, therefore, the settlement of a section
301 suit between a retiree and former employer is a matter for the individual discretion of
the retiree and is beyond the scope of federal labor law. 43 Accordingly, the court refused
" Id. at 1484, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2494.
34 Id.
38 Id. The court observed that 29 U.S.C. 159(a) "permits 'adjustments' between employer and
employee without intervention of the union so long as the agreement is not inconsistent with the
terms of the bargaining agreement and the union has been given the opportunity to be present." Id.
" Id. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. 157, 172, 78 L.R.R.M. 2974, 2979 (1971). See also supra
text accompanying notes 2-4.
37 716 F.2d at 1485, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2495.
38 Id. at 1484-85, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2494-95.
39 Id. at 1484, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2494 (emphasis in original).
" Id. The court reasoned:
[Section 159(a)] requires notification to.the union prior to employer settlements with
active employees out of recognition of the union's status as the active employees' sole
bargaining representative. In the case of retirees who are not employees or members of
the bargaining unit and whose relationship to the employer and union is not directly
controlled by the labor statutes, this primary rationale for notification no longer exists.
4 ' Id. at 1485, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2495. See also Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 181 n.20, 78
L.R.R.M. at 2983 n.20 (1971), see supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
42 716 F.2d at 1485, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2495 ("[F]ormer employees do not need . . . joint common
strength to enforce their vested contractual rights against their former employer.").
43 Id. at 1486, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2496. Indeed, the court went so far as to argue that a retiree's
discretion concerning settlement of a section 301 suit against an employer is a "right" which should
not be compromised absent a showing of compelling federal policy interest. Id.
Id.
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to establish a notice requirement as a matter of substantive federal law for settlement of
benefit disputes between retirees and a former employer. 44
The court then turned to Yard-Man's assertion that such a settlement could serve as a
basis for the affirmative defenses of accord and satisfaction to a section 301 suit by the
union on behalf of retirees.45
 The court stated that it found the argument for a union
notice requirement as a prerequisite to individual settlements "more compelling" where,
as in the Yard-Man litigation, the union had actually undertaken to represent retirees in a
section 301 suit." Since the union was a signatory to the contract in its own right, the court
noted, it had a consequent interest in ensuring employer compliance with all terms of the
collective bargaining contract." Characterizing this interest as "residual," however, the
court deemed it of insufficient weight to counterbalance the interest of retired workers in
direct settlement of disputes with a fcirmer employer." Therefore, the court held, the
district court's decision that Yard-Man was precluded by law from asserting common law
defenses based on individual settlement to the union's suit over the annuity dispute was in
error. 46
 Summary judgment against Yard-Man on this issue was therefore held inappro-
priate,5° and the court remanded the question of Yard-Man's annuity purchase obligation
for consideration of the factual viability of the asserted defenses."
The dissenting opinion took issue with the court's refusal to establish a union notice
requirement for individual settlement of retirement benefit disputes," Disputing the
court's characterization of Yard-Man's lump sum distribution of present value of the
" Id.
as Id. at 1485, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2495.
" Id. at 1486, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2496.
n Id. The court argued: "Clearly the union's efforts in ensuring compliance with all terms of a
collective bargaining contract are a significant consideration for the active employees when choosing
to retain the union as their exclusive bargaining representative." Id. See also Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404
U.S. at 176 n.17, 78 L.R.R.M. at 2981 n.17 (1971), .supra note 3. The union's status as a contract
signatory, of course, assures its standing to sue the company on its own behalf for breach of contract
arising out of a retirement benefits dispute. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1486, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2496.
" Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1486, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2496:
as Id. at 1487, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2497.
" Id.
5 ' Id. Consistent with its reading of Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 40 L.R.R.M. 2113 (1957), supra
notes 26-27, the court adopted as consonant with federal law the principles of Michigan common law
concerning the three necessary elements of the defense of accord and satisfaction: "[Tjhere must be
a disputed claim, a substituted performance agreed upon and accomplished, and valuable considera-
tion." 716 F.2d at 1487, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2497. The court also instructed the lower court to examine
the conduct of the Yard-Man lump-sum distribution offer for evidence of contractual overreaching
by the employer. Id. at 1488, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2497. A finding of overreaching by the company
would, of course, constitute grounds for overturning the putative settlements. Id. at 1488, 114
L.R.R.M. at 2496.
52 Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1488, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2497 (Holschuh, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The dissent was written by District Court Judge John D. Holschuh, sitting on the
circuit court panel by designation. Judge Holschuh concurred with the court's finding that the
parties to the contract had intended to vest lifelong rights to health and life insurance benefits in
employees. He dissented from the court's decision to remand the issue of annuity payments for
fact-finding related to Yard-Man's affirmative defenses. Id. (Holschuh, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The dissent also argued that the affirmative defenses of estoppel and accord and
satisfaction offered by Yard-Man before the circuit court had been insufficiently articulated at trial,
and so should be precluded on appeal. Id. at 1490, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2499-2500 (Holschuh, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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contractual annuities as a "settlement,"" the dissent argued instead that Yard-Man's
conduct and the language of the proposal sent by Yard-Man to the retirees constituted a
unilateral modification of a contract to which principles of accord and satisfaction would
be inapplicable as a matter of common law. 54
Alternatively, the dissent argued that the court's decision to allow employers to raise
defenses based on individual settlements in a section 301 suit by a union contravened
three significant labor policies.' First, federal labor law rests on a policy of equalizing
bargaining strength between employers and employees." To permit an employer to
completely bypass the union in its dealings with retirees would be contrary to the
assumption that the individual worker (or former worker) is overmatched in direct
negotiation with the employer." Second, the dissent identified a federal policy that
favored honoring collective bargaining agreements." The dissent characterized the
union's interest in enforcement of retirement provisions as central to the vitality of this
policy." Finally, the dissent argued by extrapolation that the federal government has,
u Id. at 1492, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2500 (Holschuh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
" Id. at 1493, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2501 (Holschuh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The notice to participating employees, sent after the union had filed its section 301 suit, read in
relevant part: "Effective November 1, 1978, each participant in the Improved Yard-Man Pension
Plan — Jackson will receive a lump-sum payment equal to the present value of all his or her expected
future payments.... There will be no further payments made after the lump-sum distribution." Id.
at 1489, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2498 (Holschuh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent
emphasized the "unilateral" character of this offer:
Yard-Man unilaterally, without any prior notice to the union or retirees, or agreement
of the union or retirees, decided it would not fulfill [its annuity purChase obligation)
because of' the cost to Yard-Man but, instead, would terminate the Improved Plan, and
send lump-sum cash payments, in amounts determined solely by Yard-Man.
Id. (Holschuh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The dissent argued that the unilateral character of this transaction failed to satisfy the basic
criterion of the defense of accord and satisfaction that any substituted performance must be "agreed
upon and accomplished." Id. at 1492, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2501 (Holschuh, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). See supra note 51. Likewise, the dissent argued that the retirees' seemingly coerced
acceptance of Yard-Man's modification offer ought not establish a defense of estoppel against either
the retirees or the union. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1493, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2501-02 (Holschuh, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). These are entirely meritorious arguments concerning the
applicability of the defenses of accord and satisfaction to the facts of the case. But see infra note 67 and
accompanying text for discussion of the inappropriateness of such analysis to an appeal of summary
judgment.
" Id. at 1495-97, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2503-05 (Holschuh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
" Id. at 1495, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2503 (Holschuh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers, Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180, 65 L.R.R.M. 2449, 2450-51 (1967)
("National labor policy has been built on the premise that by pooling their economic strength and
acting through a labor union freely chosen by the majority, the employees of an appropriate unit
have the most effective means of bargaining for improvements in wages, hours, and working
conditions.")).
" Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1496, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2504 (Holschuh, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The dissent reasoned: "[Such a policy] would pit the sophistication and power of
an employer against the unorganized and less sophisticated individual retirees." Id. (Holschuh, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
" Id. at 1495, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2503.
" Id. at 1497, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2505 (Holschuh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The dissent relied for this principle on Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 176 n.17, 114 L.R.R.M. at
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through ER1SA 6° provisions, demonstrated an interest in the provision of retirement
benefits to former workers by employers.^' This interest would be controverted, accord-
ing to the dissent, by the availability of affirmative defenses to charges by the union of
breach of contract arising from modification by an employer of retirement benefits.62 The
dissent, therefore, would have held that an employer who initiates a modification of
retirees' vested benefits without notice to the union or express approval of the retirees
should be precluded as a matter of federal law from raising affirmative defenses to a
section 301 suit by the signatory union based on individual settlements."
The dissent, however, misconstrued the breadth of the court's holding. As to the
annuity dispute, the court held only that actions to enforce permissive provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement do not preclude affirmative defenses based on the com-
mon law of contract. 64
 No cognizable federal policy, in the court's view, demands union
notification of individual settlement of disputes between retirees and an employer con-
cerning vested rights to retirement benefits." Moreover, the court confined its holding to
general questions of law appropriate to an appeal from summary judgment and reserved
to the trial court examination of the factual applicability of the asserted defenses to the
employer's conduct."
The dissent, on the other hand, examined the factual predicates of Yard-Man's
conduct at length to determine that Yard-Man's conduct constituted a unilateral modifica-
tion as opposed to a settlement. 67 Such a precise factual determination, however, is the
province of the trial court. By engaging in so comprehensive an analysis of the Yard-Man
dispute, the dissent would impose a general procedural requirement on disputes between
employers and retirees predicated largely on a unique fact situation." The dissent
2881 n.17 (1971) (union interest in retirement benefits "undeniable") and Cehaich v. International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Workers of America, 710 F.2d 234, 173
L.R.R.M. 3220 (6th Cir. 1983) (procurement of retirement benefit compliance "one of the most
visible means for the union to show that it is meeting the needs of its members"). Yard-Man, 716 F.2d
at 1497, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2503 (Holschuh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
°° The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982).
61 Yard -Man, 716 F.2d at 1497-98, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2505 (Holschuh J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
" Id. at 1498, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2505 (Holschuh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67 Id. (Holschuh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
" Id. at 1487-88, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2496-97.
" Id. at 1487, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2496.
" Id. at 1488, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2497.
" Id. at 1498, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2505 (Holschuh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
" Id. (Holschuh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent would hold that
defenses based on individual settlements should be unavailable to employers "as a matter of federal
substantive law" when the employer initiates a contractual modification of permissive benefits
without notice to the union or approval of either the retirees or the union. Id. (Holschuh, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Arguably, by expressly laying out the elements for
evaluation by the district court of Yard-Man's accord and satisfaction defense, the majority may be
signalling the appropriateness of an ultimate finding by the trial court similar to that of the dissent.
See id. at 1987-88, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2497, supra note 51. Nevertheless, the court observed that "[the
lack ofi clear justification beyond the case at bar . . . strongly cautions against judicial adoption of any
rule." Id. at 1487, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2496. The court's reasoning is particularly persuasive in the
context of an appeal from summary judgment.
At a more basic level, the majority and dissenting in part opinions in Yard-Man are predicated on
differing readings of the Lincoln Mills doctrine that collective bargaining agreements are subject to
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attempts to justify the generality of its proposed holding by reference to general policies
underlying federal labor law." The propositions relied on by the dissent, however, are too
vague and, in the case of the dissent's ERISA analogy, too tenuously related to federal
labor law to support adoption of a blanket disallowance of common law defenses in a
section 301 suit." Nor does the dissent adequately address the status of retirement benefit
provisions as permissive elements of collective bargaining agreements, on which status the
court had based its refusal to recognize a compelling federal or union interest in modifica-
tion. 7 '
The decision of the Sixth Circuit in UAW v. Yard-Man elucidates the current status of
retirement benefit provisions in collective bargaining agreements under federal law.
According to the court, retirement benefit provisions are permissive elements ola collec-
tive bargaining contract." The parties to a negotiation are free, however, to agree to vest
benefits in active or retired workers beyond the durational terms of a given contract." In
case of a dispute, such a provision is to be construed, consistently with established federal
practice under the aegis of Lincoln Milts,' in accordance with traditional canons of
common law contract interpretation, and in a manner consistent with federal labor
policy.' No federal policy, however, requires notice to, or consent of, a union concerning
agreements between employers and retirees modifying vested retirement benefits." Ac-
cordingly, in the wake of Yard-Man, an employer may raise defenses based on individual
settlements with retirees in a section 301 suit by a union to compel specific performance of
contractual obligations to retirees." The substantive merits of such defenses are to be
determined in each case by the trier of fact."
federal common law. See Textile Workers of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 40 L.R.R.M.
2113 (1957); see also .supra notes 26-27. The court appears to read Lincoln Mills as empowering the
federal courts to adopt principles of common law not inconsistent with federal labor policy. See
Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1487, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2497. The dissent, on the other hand, appears to
envision Lincoln Mills more broadly: as licensing the federal courts to fashion common law principles
which best effectuate federal labor policy. Id. at 1498, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2502 (Elolschuh, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). This assumption permits the dissent to advocate adoption of
substantive rules of federal common law, preclusive of traditional common law defenses, as a matter
of federal policy.
" See supra text accompanying notes 55-63.
7° Id.
TI See supra text accompanying notes 38-43. See also Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. 157, 78
L.R.R.M. 2974 (1971), supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
" See supra text accompanying notes 4 Sc 37.
T3 See supra text accompanying note 32.
u See supra note 27.
" See supra text accompanying notes 27 and 44.
16
 See supra text accompanying notes 44-48.
" See supra text accompanying note 49.
7" See supra text accompanying note 51
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B. Union Unfair Labor Practices
1. *A New Board Standard for Superseniority Clauses in Collective
Bargaining Agreements: Local 900, International Union
of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers v. NLRB'
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act' (the Act) protects the rights of
employees to refrain from engaging in union activity. Under sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the Act,3 it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with those rights or to
encourage or discourage union membership. Similarly, under section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2)
of the Act,' unions may not coerce employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights or
cause an employee to encourage or discourage union membership.
In recent years, the National Labor Relations Board (Board) and the courts have
considered whether clauses in collective bargaining agreements granting union officers
superseniority 5 for layoff, recall, and other contractual benefits violate employees' rights
to refrain from union activity. Neither the Board nor the courts established a per se rule
regarding superseniority clauses. Accordingly, the Board has developed a balancing test
under which it weighs the tendency of superseniority clauses to encourage employees to
become active union members to obtain the corresponding benefits against the union's
legitimate interests in assuring the continued on-the-job presence of union officers.°
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit enforced a Board decision announcing a new rule regarding superse-
niority clauses.' In Gulton Electro - Voice, Inc. , 8 the Board had held that superseniority
accorded to officers who do not perform grievance processing or other on-the-job con-
tract administrative functions is not permissible because it unjustifiably discriminates in
favor of certain employees based on union involvement.° The Board also ruled, however,
that superseniority provisions for stewards or other union officers who perform such
functions would be permissible because the continued presence of such officers on the job
is necessary to carry out their union duties."' In Local 900, International Union of Electrical
Radio and Machine Workers v. NLRB (Electrical Workers), the appeals court affirmed the
* By Michael Roy, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
727 F.2d 1184, 115 L.R.R.M. 2760 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
• 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
3 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3) (1982).
• 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A), 158(b)(2) (1982).
• "Superseniority" refers to provisions in collective bargaining agreements granting some em-
ployees seniority over other employees with longer service. See, e.g. , Dairylea Cooperative, Inc., 219
N.L.R.B. 656, 657, 89 L.R.R.M. 1737, 1737 (1975), enforced sub nom. Milk Drivers and Dairy
Employees, Local 338, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB, 531 F.2d 1162, 91
L.R.R.M. 2929 (2d Cir. 1976).
• See infra notes 26-42 and accompanying text; see generally C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW, 234-35, 245 (2d ed. 1983).
• Local 900, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers v. NLRB, 727 F.2d
1184, 115 L.R.R.M. 2760 (D.C. Cir. 1984), enforcing Gulton Electro-Voice, Inc., 266 N.L.R.B. 406,
112 L.R.R.M. 1361 (1983).
" 266 N.L.R.B. 406, 112 L.R.R.M. 1361 (1983), enforced sub nom. Local 900, International Union
of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184, 115 L.R.R.M. 2760 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
" Id. at 406, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1361.
10 Id. at 408, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1364.
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Board's new rule and rejected the union's argument that employees had waived their
section 7 rights by ratifying the contract that included the clause." Gulton, and its
affirmation in Electric Workers, established the rule that only those superseniority clauses
that provide layoff and recall protection for stewards or other union officials who process
grievances or perform on-the-job contract administration will be enforceable.'
In GultonlElectrical Workers, the collective bargaining agreement contained a clause
granting superseniority as to layoff and recall to a number of union officers, including the
Recording Secretary and the Financial Secretary." The duties of the Recording Secretary
included keeping minutes of union meetings, preparing correspondence, and maintain-
ing records." The duties of the Financial Secretary involved receiving and accounting for
union funds, paying bills, furnishing supplies, and transmitting dues to the parent
international union.'5 On various occasions, the grant of superseniority to the Recording
Secretary caused certain other employees to be laid off when they otherwise would not
have been."
The General Counsel to the Board filed unfair labor practice charges against the
union and the employer, claiming that the grant of superseniority to the two officers
unjustifiably discriminated against other employees' exercise of their section 7 rights
under the Act." The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the complaint, conclud-
ing that superseniority for these officers served the lawful purpose of promoting both
effective representation and the collective, bargaining relationship." The Board unani-
mously reversed the ALys decision, concluding that according superseniority to officers
who do not perform grievance processing or other on-the-job contract administration
functions is not permissible because it unjustifiably discriminates against employees who
choose not to become involved with the union." The union sought reversal of the Board's
order in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and the Board
cross-petitioned for enforcement of the order.m
The appeals court began its review by making some general observations concerning
employees' section 7 rights." Section 7, the court noted, protects employees' rights to
engage in or refrain from engaging in concerted activity, preserving an employee's right
to be a " 'good, bad, or indifferent' " union member." Coercion or discriminatory action by
employers or unions based on the exercise of section 7 rights may be an unfair labor
practice under sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) of the Act. 23 The court acknowledged, how-
ever, that discriminatory treatment may be permitted in situations in which it furthers
other substantial statutory or business purposes.'"
The court then traced the development of the Board's decisions regarding superse-
" Electrical Workers, 727 F.2d at 1190, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2765-66.
" Id. at 1190-95, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2766-70.
" Id. at 1186, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2762.
14 Id.
" Id.
" Id.
" Id.
18 Id.
Gulton, 266 N.L.R.B. at 406, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1361.
" Electrical Workers, 727 F.2d 1185, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2761.
21 Id. at 1186, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2762.
Id. (quoting Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40, 33 L.R.R. M. 2417, 2426 (1954)).
" Id.
" Id.
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niority. 55
 In Dairylea Cooperative, Inc,	 the court stated, the Board had considered the
lawfulness of a clause in a collective bargaining agreement that accorded stewards top
seniority with respect to all contractual benefits, such as layoffs, recalls, overtime assign-
ments, vacations, driver routes, shifts, and days off" In that case, the court observed, the
Board had noted that superseniority clauses could have a discriminatory effect against
employees for union related reasons." According to the court, the Board had recognized,
however, that steward superseniority for layoff and recall furthers the effective adminis-
tration of collective bargaining agreements, thereby serving a legitimate statutory pur-
pose and benefiting all unit employees.'=" Consequently, the court noted, the Board had
concluded in Daiiylea that steward superseniority provisions limited to layoff and recall
were presumptively valid but that superseniority provisions as to other job benefits were
presumptively invalid."
Subsequently, the court went on to state, the Board had addressed the broader issue
of superseniority for "functioning union officers." 3' In United Electrical, Radio & Machine
Workers of America, Local 623 (Limpco) 3" the union officer had been the Recording Secre-
tary, who had had no official duties regarding the processing of grievances, although she
had participated informally in such activities. 33 Although the Board had upheld the clause
in Limpco, the court noted that the Board had been sharply divided on the issue. 34
According to the court, two members had concluded that superseniority regarding layoff
and recall for functional union officers was presumptively lawful.'n Member Murphy, in
casting the deciding vote, the court noted, had limited the presumption of legality to
superseniority for "'stewards and officers whose functions relate in general to furthering
the bargaining relationship.' " 36 The court stated that the two dissenting Board members
would have limited valid superseniority clauses to clauses that served to keep union
officials who process grievances on the job."
The court noted that the Third Circuit, in enforcing the Board's Limpco order, had
considered the Board to have required that the union prove that the official involved
"'was officially assigned duties which helped to implement the collective bargaining agree-
ment in a meaningful way.' " 36
 The Third Circuit's limited language in Limpco, the court
found, was one reason for the Board's subsequent decision in American Can Co." In
.25 Id. at 1186-88, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2762 - 64.
2g 219 N.L.R.B. 656, 89 L.R.R.M. 1737 (1975), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy
Employees, Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162, 91 L.R.R.M. 2929 (2d Cir. 1976).
" 727 F.2d at 1187, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2762-63.
" Id. at 1187. 115 L.R.R.M. at 2763.
" Id.
" Id. The court noted that the Second Circuit enforced the Board's order for reasons largely in
accord with those of the Board. Id. at 1187 n.1, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2763 n.1.
Id. at 1187, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2763.
230 N.L.R.B. 406, 95 L.R.R.M. 1343 (1977), enforced sub nom. D'Amico v. NLRB, 582 F.2d
820, 99 L.R.R.M. 2350 (3d Cir. 1978).
" 727 F.2d at 1187, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2763.
34 Id.
as
 Id.
3g
 Id. (quoting Limpco, 230 N.L.R.B. at 408, 95 L.R.R.M. at 13 (Murphy, Member, dissenting)).
31 Id, at 1187
-88, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2763.
" Id. at 1188, 115 L.R.R.M, at 2763 (quoting D'Amico v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 820, 825, 99 L.R.R.M.
2350, 2353 (3d Cir. 1978) (emphasis supplied by the Electrical Workers court)).
" 244 N.L.R.B. 736, 102 L.R.R.M. 1071 (1979), enforced, 658 F.2d 746, 108 L.R.R.M. 192 (10th
Cir. 1981).
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American Can, according to the court, the Board once again had been sharply divided on
the issue of superseniority, with two members finding the clause invalid on its face
because it applied to union officials other than stewards, and two members finding the
clause valid because, in their view, superseniority clauses have only an insignificant impact
on employees' section 7 rights." The court noted that Member Murphy, who again cast
the deciding vote, had found the clause valid on its face, but had nevertheless concluded
that the General Counsel had met his burden of proving that the application of the clause
to the officers involved was not justified because their activities did not further the
bargaining relationship."
The court then concluded its discussion of prior Board decisions concerning super-
seniority by summarizing its view of the Board's general approach to the problem.
According to the court, superseniority clauses limited to layoff and recall of functional
union officers were presumed lawful by the Board, and the General Counsel had the
burden of proving that the clause was unfairly discriminatory. If the General Counsel met
this burden, the union and employer could avoid liability only by demonstrating that the
clause served a legitimate purpose."
The court then turned its attention to the Gullon order." The court reasoned that the
Board had recognized in Gulton that any form of superseniority is inherently at odds with
an employee's section 7 rights." According to the court, the Board had concluded,
however, that superseniority for stewards, if limited to layoff and recall, was nonetheless
presumptively lawful for three reasons: (1) the immediacy of attention that stewards can
offer; (2) the steward's function helps all employees; and (3) the steward's need to
maintain an on-the-job presence." From this rationale, the court stated, the Board's
conclusion followed that it would uphold " 'only those superseniority provisions limited . to
employees, who, as agents of the union, must be on the job to accomplish their duties
directly relating to administering the collective bargaining agreement.' "46
The court found that the Board had explicitly rejected the argument previously
accepted by the Limpco Board, that superseniority was justified for other officers because
it helped to maintain an effective and efficient bargaining relationship." According to the
court, the Board had concluded that the Act precludes tying job rights to union activity to
achieve this legitimate goal." The court noted that the Board had also rejected the
argument that job retention was necessary for officers without on-the-job union duties for
three reasons: (I) a laid-off officer can continue to serve in office; (2) the laying-off of
officers is not overly disruptive; and (3) the replacement of officers due to lay-offs cannot
be inherently disruptive of adequate union representation, since unions often change
officers anyway."
" 727 F.2d at 1188, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2764.
" Id.
" Id.	 si
" Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1189, 115 L.R.R,M. at 2764. Moreover, the court and Board stated that such superse-
niority for stewards furtheri one purpose of the Labor Management Relations Act, namely, "'to
provide additional facilities for the mediation of labor disputes.' "Id. (quoting a portion of the title of
the Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, 136 (1947)).
46 Id. (quoting Galion, 266 N.L.R.B. at 409, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1365).
" Id.
46 Id.
Id. at 1189, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2765.
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Finding that the new standard announced by the Board in Gulton was a reasonable
one, the court affirmed that portion of the Board's order without deciding whether it
would have adopted the same standard." The Board, the court stated, has expert
knowledge in labor relations, had thoroughly addressed the issue, and had reached a
unanimous decision on the issue for the first time since Dai?ylea." Noting that the Board's
action must be upheld if it is reasonable and supported by the record," the court
concluded: "We therefore affirm the Board's new presumption of legality restricted to
layoff-and-recall superseniority for union officials who must be on the job to administer
the collective bargaining agreement." 53
The court then addressed the union's argument that even if the superseniority clause
discriminates against the exercise of an employee's section 7 rights, the employees had
waived their section 7 rights by ratifying the contract that included the superseniority
clause." According to the court, the cases cited in support of the union's argument stand
only for the proposition that union members can waive their economic right to strike."
The court therefore distinguished those cases, finding that the right at stake in Gulton)
Electrical Workers was the right of the employees' to choose their level of involvement in
union affairs. 56 Reasoning that superseniority encourages employees to support the union
actively, and that, under the decision of the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Magnavox Co.,"
the employees' right to be free of coercion in deciding whether or not to support the
union could not be waived, the court rejected the union's waiver defense:"
Finally, the court addressed the union's argument that it was unfair for the Board to
enforce its new rule in the case in which it was first announced." The court listed five
factors to consider in deciding this issue:
(1) whether the particular case is one of first impression, (2) whether the new
rule represents an abrupt departure from well-established practice or merely
attempts to fill avoid in an unsettled area of law, (3) the extent to which the
party against whom the rule is applied relied on the former rule, (4) the
degree of the burden which a retroactive order imposes on a party, and (5)
the statutory interest in applying a new rule despite the reliance of a party on
the old standard."
So Id.
SI Id.
" Id. at 1186, 1189, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2762, 2765.
" Id. The court noted that although superseniority for stewards would most clearly be presump-
tively legal, the Board had expressed its rule in terms of union officers who "'perform steward or
steward-like functions; i.e., grievance processing or other on-the-job contract administration respon-
sibilities.'" Id. at 1189 n.4, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2765 n.4 (quoting Gulton, 266 N.L.R.B. at 406, 112
L.R.R.M. at 1361). Although the Board opinion suggested that tasks other than grievance processing
may justify superseniority, neither it nor the court gave any examples of what these tasks might be.
" Id. at 1190, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2765.
55 Id.
" Id.
" 415 U.S. 322, 325-26, 85 L.R.R.M. 2475 (1974).
" Electrical Workers, 727 F.2d at 1190, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2765-66.
" Id. at 1190, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2766. The court reached the merits of this argument only after
rejecting the Board's contention that the court had no jurisdiction to decide the issue since, the Board
argued, the union had not raised the argument before the Board. Id. at 1190-91, 115 L.R.R.M. at
2766. The court, however, concluded that the union's cross-exceptions to the ALj's decision, its
opposition to the proposed remedy, and the Board's familiarity with the issue of retroactivity were
sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. /d. at 1194, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2769.
6° Id. at 1194, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2769 (quoting Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union v.
NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390, 80 L.R.R.M. 3244, 3251 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
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The court concluded that none of these factors weighed in the union's favor." The case
was not one of first impression, the court stated, since superseniority cases had been
litigated for years." Moreover, according to the court, since Board members had differed
widely on how to treat such cases, the Board's Gulton rule could not be considered an
abrupt departure from well-established practice."
The court also found no evidence that the union had relied on Dairylea, the only
superseniority case decided before the collective bargaining agreement at issue was
entered into in 1975." The court further rejected as unreasonable any reliance which the
union may have placed on the Limpco decision, in which the Board had upheld superse-
niority for recording secretaries." In enforcing the Board's order in Limpco, the court
stated, the Third Circuit had found it "crucial" that the officer participated in grievance
processing, a fact not present in GultonlElectrical Workers." Finally, the court did not
perceive a great hardship in enforcing the Board's order, since the court estimated that
the amount of money involved was minimal." Having approved the Board's new super-
seniority rule and having rejected the waiver and retroactivity defenses, the court en-
forced the Board's order in its entirety."
The Board's Gullon/Electrical Workers rule presents a sensible standard for distinguish-
ing between superseniority clauses which unfairly discriminate against those employees
who do not choose to be union officers and superseniority clauses which are justifiable to
carry out union business. Stewards or other officers who perform grievance processing
and on-the-job contract administration must remain on the job to carry out their duties."
Officers, such as those in Gulton/Electrical Workers whose duties - do not include grievance
processing or on-the-job contract administration may continue to carry out their duties
despite being laid off. 7° Regarding this latter group of officers, superseniority provisions
had a discriminatory effect on other employees who did not actively participate in the
union." The court and the Board were therefore correct in stating that this amounted to
coercion in violation of section 8(b) and (c). 72 The result in GultonlElectrical Workers is fair
to employees who are not union officers, and it should not impede the union's search for
good union officials.
Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Magnavox Co." that employees'
section 7 rights to choose a bargaining representative can not be waived, the court
correctly rejected the waiver defense.'" In Magnavox, the Supreme Court distinguished
" Id. at 1195, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2769-70.
62 Id. at 1195, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2769.
63 Id.
" Id.
" Id. at 1195, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2769-70.
" Id, The court also rejected as unreasonable any reliance on Otis Elevator Co., 231 N.L.R.B.
1128, 96 L.R.R.M. 1108 (1977)(approving superseniority for Recording Secretary because that case
had not been reviewed by a court). Moreover, the court found that the union had not demonstrated
reliance on either Limpco or Otis. 727 F.2d at 1195, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2769-70.
67 Id. at 1195, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2770.
66 Id.
69 Electrical Workers, 727 F.2d at 1189, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2764.
" Id. at 1189, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2765.
71 Id. at 1189, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2764.
Id.
" 415 U.S. 322, 85 L.R.R.M. 2475 (1974).
" Id. at 325-26, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2475.
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earlier cases holding that employees could waive their economic right to strike." Under
Magnavox, therefore, employees may waive their economic right to strike but not their
other, noneconomic section 7 rights. The right at stake in Gulton/Electrical Workers 
— the
right to choose one's level of involvement in union affairs — was of the nonwaivable
variety.
The court was also correct in enforcing the Board's ruling retroactively. In past
superseniority cases the Board had been sharply divided. For example, the Limpco rule,
decided by an aggregate majority, was hardly a settled principle." The GultonlElectrical
Workers rule, therefore, is not an abrupt departure from existing law since unions and
employers could not have reasonably relied on the Limpco decision as being the final word
on the issue. 77
The rule announced in Gulton and enforced in Electrical Workers is important for two
reasons. First, it narrows the scope of allowable superseniority clauses allowed by prior
Board decisions, principally Limpco. After GultonlElectrical Workers, only those superse-
niority clauses restricted to layoff and recall of union officials who must be on the job to
administer the collective bargaining agreement will be presumed lawful." Superseniority
would most clearly be allowed for stewards, who must be on the job to process grievances;
superseniority for other officials who are involved in on-the-job contract administration
would be allowable as well." Second, the Gulton decision was unanimous. This unanimity
is preferable to the sharp division which characterized the Board's earlier decisions in this
area and which lead to uncertainty and inconsistency." The GultonlElectrical Workers
decision should therefore lead to less litigation and more certainty in the area of superse-
niority clauses.
2. *The Limits of an Expansive Reading of the Section 8(b)(4) Publicity Proviso:
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB'
Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act' (the Act) makes it an unfair
labor practice for a union to use certain "coercive" secondary boycott activities to apply
" Id.
" See supra notes 26-42 and accompanying text.
" Electrical Workers, 727 5.2d at 1195, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2769.
" Id. at 1189, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2765.
7* See supra note 53.
8° Compare Limpco, 230 N.L.R.B. at 406, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1343, with American Can, 244 N.L.R.B.
736, 102 L.R.R.M. 1071; see supra notes 26-42 and accompanying text.
* By Robert J. Gilson, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
IOS S. Ct. 2926, 113 L.R.R.M. 2953 (1983).
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1982). This section provides:
(b) Unfair labor practices by labor organization. It shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents . (4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any
individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use,
manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles,
materials, or commodities or to perform any service or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or
restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where
in either case an object thereof is ... (B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using,
selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other
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economic pressure on an employer. 3
 Secondary boycotts involve the exertion of economic
pressure upon a person with whom a union has no dispute in an attempt to persuade that
person — usually another business referred to as a secondary employer — to cease doing
business with a primary employer whose employees are engaged in a labor dispute.'
While Congress attempted to insulate "neutral" employers from secondary boycotts, it
also recognized the necessity of preserving unions' first amendment rights. 3 Conse-
quently, Congress added a proviso to section 8(b)(4).6
 Under the language of the proviso'
communications "other than picketing" that are "truthful" and that do not induce either
an interference with deliveries or a work stoppage at a secondary employer's facility are
exempt from the general prohibition' The proviso, known as the publicity proviso, also
contains limiting language that requires that in order for its exemption to apply, the
"products produced" by the primary employer must be "distributed" by the secondary
employer.5
 In other words, the publicity proviso allows unions to notify the general public
that the products produced by a primary employer, with whom the union has a labor
producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other
person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor
organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization has
been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section
159 of this title; Provided, that nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to
make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing
. . . .
Id.
3 Although Section 8(b)(4)(A), amended to 8(b)(4)(B) has been labeled the "secondary boycott
provision" the term does not appear in the statutory language. Indeed, the provision does not outlaw
all types of secondary boycotts, and some forms of secondary activity remain lawful. See 2 C. MORRIS,
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1133 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW].
• 105 CONG. REc. 17,674 (1959) (glossary of terms to be used in debate over labor legislation),
reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE
ACT. of 1959, at 1386 (1959) [hereinafter cited as 2 LEG. HIST.). See also 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW, supra, note 3, at 1129; Kamer, The 8( b)(4) Publicity Proviso and NLRB v. Servette: A Supreme Court
Mandate Ignored, 16 GA. L. REV. 575 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Kamer); R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON
LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 240 (1976).
• See 105 CONG. REC. at 17, 898-99 (1959), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIST., supra note 4, at 1432;
(statements of Sen. Kennedy); 105 CONG. REC. at 18,133-34 (1959), reprinted in '2 LEG. HIST., supra
note 4, at 1720-21 (statements of Rep. Thompson); 105 CONG. REc. at 6233 (1959), reprinted in 2 LEG.
HIST., supra note 4, at 1038 (statements of Sen. Humphrey); ice also NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S.
46, 55, 55 L.R.R.M. 2957, 2960 (1964).
▪ 29 U.S.C. § 158(6)(4) (1982).
7 The full text of the proviso provides:
Provided , . .. nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit
publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public,
including consumers and members of a labor organization, that a product or products
are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute
and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does not have an
effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the primary
employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any
goods, or not to perform any services at the establishment of the employer engaged in
such distribution . . .
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982).
B See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 103 S. Ct. 2926, 2931, 113 L.R.R.M. 2953, 2955
(1983); 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, SUpTa. note 3, at 1111.
9 29 U.S.C. § 158(6)(4) (1982). See supra note 7.
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dispute, are being distributed by a secondary employer." A continuing problem in
interpreting the publicity proviso, however, has been the scope of this producer-
distributor relationship." Neither the National Labor Relations Board (Board) nor the
courts have yet to define adequately the parameters of this language."
The Board has given a broad construction to the "producer" language of the public-
ity proviso, and has interpreted the proviso to cover nonpicketing secondary boycotts
even where the primary employer is not strictly a manufacturer.' 3 Accordingly, in the
Board's leading case in this area, Lohman Sales Co.," a wholesale distributor was held to be
a producer within the meaning of the proviso." The Board reasoned that "labor is the
prime requisite of one who produces," and that an employer need not manufacture or
physically acid to an article so long as labor in the form of capital, enterprise, or service
was provided.' In NLRB v. Serviette, Inc. ," the United States Supreme Court endorsed the
Board's construction of the proviso's "producer" requirement. In so doing, the Court
overruled a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that
would have limited the proviso's exemption to secondary boycotts involving disputes with
primary employers who physically created goods, that is, traditional manufacturers."
Rejecting the Ninth Circuit's strict construction of the term producer, the Supreme Court
held that "'producer' must be given a broader reach,"" and that the legislative history of
the proviso suggested that it was intended to be as broad in its coverage as the section
8(b)(4) prohibition to which it is an exemption.'" In decisions following Servette, the Board
has given the "producer" language of the publicity proviso an expansive scope. The
Board has determined that radio 21 and television stations,22 construction companies, 23
service companies 24 and wholly owned subsidiaries that do not sell to any arm of the
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B).
" See Kamer, supra note 4, at 578; see also cases cited infra notes 14, 21 - 25.
" This failure is evident from the Supreme Court's remand of Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
NLRB. The Court has not established any firm principles. Rather, it has simply set limits on the
expansive interpretation that the Board has given the proviso. See infra notes 64-73 and accompany-
ing text.
12 See Kamer, supra note 4, at 577; 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 3, at 1111 - 13.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 537 (Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 901,
48 L.R.R.M. 1429 (1961).
" Id. at 907, 48 L.R.R.M. at 1432.pi id .
" 377 U.S. 46, 55 L.R.R.M. 2957 (1964).
18 Id. at 55, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2960.
Id. at 56, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2961.
Id. at 55, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2960.
" Local 662, Radio and Television Engineers (Middle South Broadcasting Co.), 133 N.L.R.B.
1698, 1705, 49 L.R.R.M. 1042, 1096 (1961).
22 American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, Local 55 (Great Western Broadcasting
Corp.), 134 N.L.R.B. 1617, 1621, 49 L.R.R.M. 1391, 1393, rev'd and remanded sub nor,. Great Western
Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 591, 51 L.R.R.M. 2480 (9th Cir. 1962). The Ninth Circuit's
decision was criticized by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 55, 55 L.R.R.M.
2957, 2960 (1964). On remand the Board affirmed its original holding that the proviso applied.
American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, Local 55, 150 N.L.R.B. 467, 473, 58 L.R.R.M,
1019, 1022, enforced sub nom. Grat Western Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 434, 61 L.R.R.M.
2364 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S: 1002, 62 L.R.R.M. 2392 (1966).
" Int'l Brotherhood Electrical Workers, Local 712 (Golden Dawn Foods), 134 N.L.R.B. 812,
816, 49 L.R.R.M. 1220, 1221 (1961); Electrical Workers Local Union No. 73, 134 N.L.R.B. 498, 500,
49 L.R.R.M. 1181, 1182 (1961).
24 United Plant Guard Workers of America (Houston Armored Car Co.), 136 N.L.R.B. 110,
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parent enterprise all qualify as "producers" under the proviso. Under this analysis, retail
stores advertising products on a radio or televison station, or the company hiring a
construction company to build its facilities, or the company receiving services, or the
diversified corporate enterprise are all "distributors" of the producers' products and,
therefore, they are subject to peaceful, nonpicketing secondary boycotts." Carried to its
extreme, this expansive interpretation ignored the producer-distributor language con-
tained within the publicity proviso, and broadly construed the proviso's coverage.'"
During the Survey year, however, the United States Supreme Court indicated that
there is a limit to the expansive interpretation of the publicity proviso.' In Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB," a unanimous Court held that the publicity proviso's exemption
did not encompass peaceful handbilling of an entire shopping mall where the union's
dispute was with a construction company who was building a store for a single tenant of
the mall, and the tenant had no business relationship with the mall's owner other than as a
lessee." In concluding that there is a limit to the expansive interpretation of the publicity
proviso, the Court held that the express producer-distributor language of the proviso
cannot be ignored.3 '
In Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB , 3' DeBartolo Corporation, the owner and
operator of a shopping mall in Tampa, Florida, entered into a lease with H.W. Wilson
Company (Wilson), a retail department store operator. 33 Under the terms of the agree-
ment, DeBartolo leased land upon which Wilson agreed to build and operate a depart-
ment store." The lease between DeBartolo and Wilson, however, differed from the leases
previously used by DeBartolo in that it did not require Wilson to request its construction
111, 49 L.R.R.M. 1713, 1714 (1962)(bandbilling customers of business whose money was transported
by an armored car service company with whom a union had a labor dispute).
25 United Steelworkers of America (Pet, Inc.), 244 N.L.R.B. 94, 101, 102 L.R.R.M. 1046, 1050
(1979)(a union's total consumer boycott of a diversified holding company and its other subsidiaries
was within the proviso's exemption even where the union's dispute was with one subsidiary who did
not sell any of its products to any other arm or the corporate enterprise), rev'd and remanded sub nom.
Pet, Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 545, 106 L.R.R.M. 2477 (8th Cir. 1981).
2' United Steelworkers of America, 144 N.L.R.B. 94, 101, 102 L.R.R.M. 1046, 1050 (1979), rev'd
and remanded sub nom. Pet, Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 545, 106 L.R.R.M. 2477 (8th Cir. 1981); United
Plant Guard Workers of America, 136 N.L.R.B. 110, 111, 49 L.R.R..M. 1713, 1714 (1962); Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 712, 134 N.L.R.B. 812, 816, 49 L.R.R.M. 1220, 1221
(1961); America Federation of Television and Radio Artists, Local 55, 150 N.L.R.B. 467, 473, 58
L.R.R.M. 1019, 1022, enforced sub nom. 356 F.2d 434, 61 L.R.R.M. 2364 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 1002, 62 L.R.R.M. 2392 (1961); Local 662, Radio and Television Engineers, 133 N.L.R.B.
1698, 1706, 49 L.R.R.M. 1042, 1047 (1961)..
" See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 662 F.2d 264, 269, 108 L.R.R.M. 2729, 2732 (9th
Cir, 1981). In affirming a Board dismissal of a complaint the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit stated: "Board and judicial interpretation of the producer-distributor language, based
in large part upon the legislative history of the proviso, clearly indicates that the language is not to be
read literally but instead is to be broadly construed." Id.
28 Edward" DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 103 S. Ct. 2926, 2932, 113 L.R.R.M. 2953, 2956 (1983).
103 S. Ct. 2926, 113 L.R.R.M. 2953 (1983).
3° Id. at 2933, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2957 .
3' Id. at 2932, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2956-57.
Florida Gulf Coast Building Trade Council, 252 N.L.R.B. 702, 105 L.R.R.M. 1273 (1980),
petition denied, 662 F.2d 264, 108 L.R.R.M. 2729 (1981), vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 2926, 113
L.R.R.M. 2953 (1983).
33 Florida Gulf Coast Building Trade Council, 252 N.L.R.B. 702, 703, 105 L.R.R.M. 1273, 1273
(1980).
34 Id.
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contractors to use union labor or otherwise assure that the employees who constructed the
store were compensated at a level at least equal to established area standards.33
Wilson contracted with H.J. High Construction Company (High) to build its store at
the ma11. 38 SUbsequently, Florida Gulf Coast Building Trades Council (the Union) became
involved in a primary labor dispute with High over the payment of alleged substandard
wages and fringe benefits." As part of its dispute *ith High, the Union distributed
handbills at all the entrances to the ma11. 38 The handbills appealed to the public not to
shop at the mall until the mall's owner (DeBartolo) agreed to require that all construction-
at the mall be performed by contractors who paid their employees fair wages." The
handbilling was conducted in a peaceful manner and was not accompanied by any
patrolling or picketing.°
DeBartolo filed an unfair labor practice charge against the Union, alleging that the
Union had violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act by conducting an illegal secondary
boycott. 4 ' The case came before the Board on stipulated facts, and without deciding
whether the handbilling constituted a form of "coercion" or "restraint" proscribed by
section 8(b)(4), the Board dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the handbilling
came within the publicity proviso exemption.'" The Board focused on the question of
whether High was a "producer," and concluded that there was a "symbiotic" relationship
among Wilson, DeBartolo, and the other mall tenants, such that they would all derive
benefit from the product High was producing — the new store `3
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
Board's dismissal of DeBartolo's charge. 44 The Fourth Circuit held that the Board's
interpretation was consistent with both the proviso's legislative history and the Supreme
Court's decision in NLRB v. Seruette, Inc.' The appeals court also reasoned that because
DeBartolo and its other tenants shared the mall with Wilson they could apply pressure on
Wilson and Wilson in turn could apply pressure on High so that the proviso's exemption
should control this dispute.° The Supreme Court granted certiorari to a conflict
among the circuits. 47 The Court vacated and remanded."
The Supreme Court began its analysis by reviewing NLRB v. Servelte, Inc., its only
35 Brief for the NLRB at 3-4, Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB.
3" Florida Gulf Coast Building Trade Council, 252 N.L.R.B. 702, 703, 105 L.R.R.M. 1273, 1274
(1980).
37 id,
2' Id. The handbilling took place for a three week period, until the Union was enjoined by a state
court order issued pursuant to a trespass suit brought by DeBartolo. DeBartolo, 103 S. Ct. at 2931 n.5,
113 L.R.R.M. at 2955 n.5.
39 Id. at 2929, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2954.
"" Id. at 2929-30, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2954.
4 ' Florida Gulf Coast Building Trades Council, 252 N.L.R.B. 702, 704, 105 L.R.R.M. 1273, 1274
(1980).
42 DeBartolo, 103 S. Ct. at 2930, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2955.
43 Florida Gulf Coast Building Trades Council, 252 N.L.R.B. 702, 705, 105 L.R.R.M. 1273, 1275
(1980).
44 See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 662 F.2d 264, 273, 108 L.R.R.M. 2729, 2735 (1981).
" Id. at 269-72, 108 L.R.R.M. at 2732-34.
" Id. at 271, 108 L.R.R.M. at 2734.
17
 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 103 S. Ct. 205 (1982). The conflict involved the Fourth
Circuit's decision in DeBartolo and the Eighth Circuit's decision in Pet, Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 545,.
106 L.R.R.M. 2477 (8th Cir. 1981); see also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
44 DeBartolo, 103 S. Ct. at 2933, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2957.
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previous decision interpreting the publicity proviso.' The Court stated that its focus in
Serviette had been on the proviso's term "producer." 5° In DeBartolo, however, the Court
shifted its focus to the language in the proviso that required the primary employer's
products to be "distributed by" the secondary employer.' Conceding that High, the
primary employer, was a producer for the purposes of the proviso," the Court refused to
adopt the Board's symbiotic relationship test in order to hold that the distribution
requirement had been met. 53 Reasoning that the Board's test shifted the inquiry away
from the relationship between the primary employer and the secondary employer to the
relationship among the secondary employers, the Court rejected this test as completely
ignoring the proviso's explicit distribution language." Because Wilson received services
from High in the form of a building, the cost of which would affect the cost of Wilson's
retail products, the Court assumed that Wilson distributed products produced by High."
The Court, however, found "no justification for treating the products that the cotenants
distributed to the public as products produced by High." 56 The Court, therefore, con-
cluded that because there was no producer-distributor relationship the Union's secondary
boycott against the entire mall did not fall within the publicity proviso exemption."
Although the Court recognized that its holding may give rise to a first amendment
question," because of the Union's right to distribute handbills to the public, the Court
refused to reach this issue until the Board determined whether the handbilling in this case
was a form of "coercion" or "restraint" prohibited by section 8(b)(4) of the Act." The
Court, therefore, vacated and remanded for a determination of the coercion or restraint
issue."
The requirement that products produced by the primary employer must be distrib-
uted by the secondary employer is expressly set out in the publicity proviso and cannot be
ignored." Although the term "producer" has been interpreted broadly,' the Board's
interpretation of the proviso focused almost exclusively on the issue of whether the
primary employer was a producer, and ignored the requirement that the secondary
4° Id. at 2931, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2956; see also Servette, 377 U.S. 46, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2957 (1964); see
supra notes 17.20 and accompanying text.
5° Id. at 2932, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2956.
5'
	
id.
Ss Petitioner, DeBartolo, conceded that High was a producer within the meaning of the Act, and
the Court accepted this assumption. Id.
" Id.
" Id.
55 Id. at 2032-33, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2957. The Petitioner, DeBartolo, conceded that Wilson
distributed products produced by High, and the Court accepted this assumption. Id. at 2932, 113
L.R.R.M. at 2957.
5° Id. at 2933, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2957.
" Id.
5" Id. This Constitutional question arises because this case involves the peaceful distribution of a
written message — arguably a form of pure speech. Id. The Board had argued that the Court should
invoke its prudential policy of construing acts of Congress so as to avoid unnecessary constitutional
questions. Id. The Court rejected this argument, however, reasoning that the policy the Board sought
to invoke only comes into play if the statute can be construed in a manner that is " 'fairly possible'".
Id. In DeBartolo, the court reasoned that the express language of the publicity proviso cannot be
"fairly" construed so as to ignore its distribution requirement. See id.
S9 Id. See also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
B° DeBartolo, 103 S. Ct. at 2933, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2957.
" 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4), see also DeBartolo, 103 S. Ct. at 2932, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2956-57.
u See NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 55, 55 L.R.R.M. 2957, 2960-61 (1964).
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employer must distribute the primary employer's products.° The Supreme Court's deci-
sion in DeBartolo does not directly affect the Board's construction of the term "pro-
ducer."eq Instead, the decision holds that a finding that an employer is a producer is only
one component of the proviso's test. 65
 According to the Court, in order for the proviso's
exemption to apply, the distribution requirement must also be satisfied." The DeBartolo
decision, therefore, rejected the Board's -one step test where a finding that an employer
was a producer was the basis upon which the distribution requirement was satisfied, and
adopted a two part test requiring a separate analysis of the producer and distributor
requirements." Consequently, the Supreme Court's decision in DeBartolo limits the ex-
pansive interpretation of the publicity proviso by refocusing the analysis of the proviso to
treat the distribution requirement as an independent element.
Although the publicity proviso clearly contains a distribution requirement, a test that
treats this requirement as a separate element may cause uncertainty in future interpreta-
tions of section 8(b)(4) of the Act. Prior to DeBartolo, the publicity proviso had been
interpreted to be as broad in its coverage as section 8(b)(4)'s ban of secondary boycotts.°
Thus, any nonpicketing publicity that would have been prohibited as a secondary boycott
was exempt under the publicity proviso.° After DeBartolo, the new two part test for
applying the publicity proviso's exemption could result in decisions construing the pro-
viso more narrowly than the proscription of secondary boycotts. Consequently, peaceful,
nonpicketing secondary boycotts that do not satisfy the distribution requirement of the
proviso could be found to be unfair labor practices under section 8(b)(4) of the Act." Such
a construction, however, would conflict with the Supreme Court's earlier decision in
Servette, where the Court held that the scope of section 8(b)(4) is no broader than the
publicity proviso." In addition, a finding that peaceful, nonpicketing publicity violated
section 8(b)(4) would raise a first amendment issue concerning the free expression rights
of unions."
A section 8(b)(4) violation requires a finding that the union has coerced or restrained
persons from doing business with the secondary employer." Because of the uncertainty
surrounding the scope of the publicity proviso, future Board decisions may shift their
focus away from the proviso and concentrate on the "coerce" and "restrain" requirements
of the section 8(b)(4) prohibition itself. Under this new perspective, two possible results
are foreseeable. First, in future cases where the producer-distributor requirement cannot
be satisfied and, consequently, a union's peaceful, nonpicketing secondary boycott does
" See DeBartolo, 103 S. Ct. at 2932, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2956.
" Id.
65 Id.
66
 Id.
" Id.
Be See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. The Court quoted the Servette language as to the
scope of the proviso with seeming approval in DeBartolo. See DeBartolo, 103 S. Ct. at 2932, 113
L.R.R.M. at 2956.
69
	 supra notes 19-25.
1°
 This would be the result, if on remand the Board finds that the Union's activity in DeBartolo
was coercive or a restraint within the meaning of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B), which prohibits secondary boycotts, contains no analogous producer-distributor re-
quirement that could arguably restrict its scope. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1982). This section is
quoted supra note 2.
71 See supra note 20.
72 See DeBartolo, 103 S. Ct. at 2031, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2955.
n 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(13) (1982). For the full text of the provision see supra note 2.
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not fall within the proviso's exemption, the union's activity may be found to be coercive or
a restraint and thus a violation of section 8(b)(4) of the Act. Because the effect of a section
8(6)(4) violation would be a ban on the union's publicity, such a finding would also require
a conclusion that the union's activity was outside the ambit of first amendment protection.
Second, in future cases where the producer-distributor requirement cannot be met and a
union's peaceful, nonpicketing secondary boycott does not fall within the publicity pro-
viso, the union's activity may not violate section 8(b)(4) of the Act if no coercion or
restraint is found. This second interpretation is more probable, because it avoids constru-
ing the proviso more narrowly than the ban on secondary boycotts, and it also avoids a
difficult constitutional question.
After twenty years of expansive interpretations, the Supreme Court has finally
indicated that there is a limit to the breadth of the publicity proviso. The Court's decision
in Edward]. DeBartolo v. NLRB requires the Board to refocus its analysis of the proviso so
that both the producer and distributor requirements are separately tested and met.
Although future interpretations of the proviso's scope are clouded, the Supreme Court
has denoted that the express language of the proviso will not be "unfairly" construed.
III. CONCERTED ACTIVITY
A. *Individual Employees and Concerted Activity Under Collective Bargaining Agreements:
NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc.'
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act' (the Act) provides that employees shall
have the right to "engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection." 3 Although the Act does not define the term "con-
certed activities," 4 the concept clearly embraces the activities of employees who have
joined together to achieve common goals. 5 Whether the actions of an individual employee
may be protected as concerted activity, however, is not self-evident from the language of
the Act.5 According to the National Labor Relations Board's (Board) "Interboro doctrine,"
an individual's assertion of a right grounded in a collective bargaining agreement is
"concerted activit[y]" and therefore accorded the protection of section 7 of the Act.?
The circuits had been split over whether to apply Interboro as the test for concerted
activity under section 7 of the Act. At least three circuit courts of appeals accepted the
Board's interpretation of "concerted activities" as including an individual's assertion of a
right grounded in a collective bargaining agreements Five others, however, expressly
* By Scott A. Faust, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
104 S, Ct. 1505, 115 L.R.R.M. 3193 (1984).
= 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982).
29 U.S.C. § 157. Section 7 provides that: "Employees shall have the right to 	 form, join, or
assist labor organizations, ... and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." Id.
• NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1505, 1511, 115 L.R.R.M. 3193, 3197 (1984).
• Id.
6 Id.
' Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R. B. 1295, 1298, 61 L.R.R.M. 1537, 1539 (1966), enforced
388 F.2d 495, 67 L.R.R.M. 2083 (2d Cir. 19 67).
• See,e.g., NLRB v. Ben Pekin Corp., 452 F.2d 205, 206, 78 L.R.R.M. 2429, 2430 (7th Cir. 1971);
NLRB v. Selwyn Shoe Manufacturing Corp., 428 F.2d 217, 221, 74 L.R.R.M. 2474, 2477 (8th Cir.
1970); NLRB v. lnterboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495, 500, 67 L.R.R.M. 2083, 2086 (2d Cir.
1967).
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declined to follow the Interboro doctrine. 9 The District of Columbia Circuit had expressed
doubt about the validity of the Interboro doctrine,") and the Fourth Circuit had left the
issue open."
During the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court resolved this conflict by
holding in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc.' that the Board's Interboro doctrine is a
reasonable interpretation of the Act." The Court ruled that the language of section 7 did
not confine itself to situations where two or more employees acted together, or to
situations where a lone employee intended to induce group activity or acted as a represen-
tative of at least one other employee." The Court concluded that as long as the employee
based his action on a reasonable and honest belief and reasonably directed it towards the
enforcement of a collectively bargained right, no justification existed for overturning the
Board's judgment that the employee was engaged in concerted activity." Consequently,
after City Disposal Systems, courts will apply the Interboro doctrine as the test for concerted
activity by an individual employee.
In City Disposal Systems, the collective bargaining agreement between the employer,
City Disposal Systems, Inc., and the union representing City Disposal's truckdrivers
provided that the company would not require employees to operate any vehicle that was
not in safe operating condition." It also provided that the agreement would not be
violated where employees refused to operate such equipment unless such refusal was
unjustified." The underlying action in City Disposal Systems arose from the company's
discharge of one of its employees when he refused to drive a truck that he honestly and
reasonably believed to be unsafe because of faulty brakes,' 8 After the union declined to
process the employee's grievance under the bargaining agreernent, 18 he filed an unfair
labor practice charge with the Board, challenging his discharge."
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that, even though the employee acted
alone in asserting a contractual right, his refusal to operate the truck constituted con-
certed activity protected under section 7." The ALJ concluded that the company had
9 See. e.g., Royal Development Co., Ltd. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 363, 374, 112 L.R.R.M. 2932, 2940
(9th Cir. 1983); Roadway Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 700 F.2d 687, 693-94, 112 L.R.R.M. 3152, 3157
(11th Cir. 1983); Aro, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 717, 101 L.R.R.M. 2153, 2155 (6th Cir. 1979);
NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714, 719, 83 L.R.R.M. 2625, 2628 (5th Cir. 1973)(di-
ctum); NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884-85, 76 L.R.R.M. 2958, 2961 (3d Cir. 1971).
'° See Kohls v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 173, 176-77, 104 L.R.R.M. 3049, 3051 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
" In Roadway Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 751, 91 L.R.R.M. 2239 (4th Cir. 1976), the
Fourth Circuit enforced, without opinion, a decision of the Board applying the Interboro doctrine,
Roadway Express, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 278, 88 L.R.R.M. 1503 (1975), but in Krispy Kreme Doughnut
Corp. v. NLRB. 635 F.2d 304, 308-09, 105 L.R.R.M. 3407, 3410 (4th Cir. 1980), the court indicated
that whether that circuit would follow Interboro remained an open question.
" 104 S. Ct. 1505, 115 L.R.R.M. 3193 (1984).
13 Id. at 1510, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3197.
" Id. Courts that have rejected the Interboro doctrine have found the actions of a lone employee
in these two limited situations to be concerted activity. See infra note 32.
" Id. at 1516, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3200.
" Id. at 1508, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3195.
" Id.
19 Id. The issue of whether the employee was motivated by an honest belief was not before the
Court. Id. at 1508 n.5, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3195 n.5.
19 Id. at 1509, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3195. The union found no objective merit in the grievance and
declined to process it. Id.
" Id.
21
 City Disposal Systems, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 451, 454, 107 L.R.R.M. 1267, 1267 (1981).
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therefore committed an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(1) by discharging the
employee.' The Board adopted the ALJ's findings and conclusions and ordered the
company to reinstate the employee with back pay," On appeal by the employer, however,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied enforcement of the Board's order:" Finding
that the employee's refusal to drive the truck was an action taken solely on his own
behalf," the appeals court concluded that the refusal was not a concerted activity within
the meaning of section 7." The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict
among the circuits and, in a five to four decision, reversed:"
The issue before the Court in City Disposal Systems was whether an individual's
assertion of a right grounded in a collective bargaining agreement constituted concerted
activity within the meaning of section 7. 28
 Because this issue implicated the Board's
expertise in labor relations," the Court narrowed the issue to whether the Board's
application of section 7 to the employee's assertion of a right grounded in the collective
bargaining agreement was reasonable. 3°
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, 3 ' approached this question by first noting
that even the courts of appeals that had rejected the Interboro doctrine recognized the
possibility that an individual employee may be engaged.in
 concerted activity when he acts
alone.31 The disagreement over the Interboro doctrine, the Court reasoned, merely
reflected differing views regarding the nature of the relationship that must exist between
the action of the individual employee and the actions of the group for section 7 to apply. 33
On the basis of this reasoning, the Court said that the resolution of the issue in this case
required a determination of the exact manner in which particular actions of an individual
employee are related to the actions of fellow employees to find that the individual was
engaged in concerted activity. 34
22 Id. Section 8(a)(1) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer — ( I) to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7]."
29 U.S.C. § 158(a).
23 City Disposal Systems, 256 N.L.R.B. at 451, 107 L.R.R.M. at 1267.
" NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 683 F.2d 1005, 1006, 110 L.R.R.M. 3225, 3226 (6th Cir.
1982).
45 Id. at 1007, 110 L.R.R.M. at 3226.
" /d. at 1008, 110 L.R.R.M. at 3226. The court's rejection of Interboro followed its prior decision
in Aro, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 101 L.R.R.M. 2153 (6th Cir. 1979), in which the court held that
for an individual complaint to amount to concerted action, it must not have been made solely on
behalf of an individual employee; it must be made on behalf of other employees or at least be made
with the object of inducing group action and have some arguable basis in the collective bargaining
agreement. Id. at 718, 101 L.R.R.M. at 2156.
27 104 S. Ct. at 1508, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3195.
" Id.
See id. at 1510, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3197; Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 558, 98 L.R.R.M.
2717, 2721 (1978).
a* 104 S. Ct. at 1510, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3197.
31 Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined in the majority opinion. Id. at 1507,
115 L.R.R.M. at 3194.
3' 104 S. Ct. at 1511, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3197. These courts have limited their recognition of this
type of concerted activity to two situations: 1) that in which the lone employee intends to induce
group activity, and 2) that in which the employee acts as a representative of at least one other
employee. See, e.g., Aro, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 717, 101 L.R.R.M. 2153, 2155 (6th Cir. 1979);
NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 76 L.R.R.M. 2958, 2961 (3d Cir. 1971).
33 104 S. Ct. at 1511, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3197.
34 Id.
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The Court found that the employee's invocation of a right based upon a collective
bargaining agreement was an integral part of the process that gave rise to the agree-
ment. 3' According to the Court, this process — beginning with the organization of a
union, continuing into the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement, and extend-
ing through the enforcement of the agreement — is a single collective activity. 36 As a
result, the Court found that a lone employee's invocation of a right grounded in the
collective bargaining agreement was sufficiently related to the collective activity of his
fellow employees, and was therefore a concerted activity. 37
The Court also reviewed the general history of section 7 38 and found that the
Interboro doctrine was entirely consistent with the purposes of the Act. 39 According to the
Court, this history revealed no indication that Congress intended to limit the protection of
section 7 to situations in which an employee's activity combined in any particular way with
that of his fellow employees." More specifically, the Court found no congressional
intention to have the protection of section 7 withdrawn in situations in which a single
employee, acting alone, participated in an integral aspect of a collective process.'"
Finally, the Court pointed out the limits of the Interboro doctrine by stating that even
though activity by an individual employee may be concerted, an employee may not
engage in that activity with impunity." An employee may engage in concerted activity in
such a manner that he loses the protection of section 7. 43
 Furthermore, the Court noted, if
an employer did not wish to tolerate certain methods by which employees invoked their
collectively bargained rights, he would be free to negotiate a provision in the agreement
that would limit the availability of such methods."
" Id.
" Id. As the Supreme Court noted in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46, 41 L.R.R.M, 2089, 2091
(1957), "[c]ollective bargaining is a continuing process. Among other things, it involves day-to-day
adjustments in the contract and other working rules, resolution of new problems not covered by
existing agreements, and the protection of employee rights already secured by contract."
" 104 S. Ct. at 1515, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3199.
38 Id.; R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 299
(1976). According to Professor Gorman, the "concerted activities" language was carried over from
the purpose clause of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the primary aim of which was to overturn common
law concepts of tortious and criminal conspiracy. He contends that no clear evidence exists that
Congress intended to exclude from protection employees who act alone in lodging complaints. Id.
" 104 S. Ct. at 1513, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3199. The Court stated that by,applying section 7 to the
actions of individual employees invoking their rights under a collective bargaining agreement, the
Interboro doctrine preserves the integrity of the entire collective bargaining process.ld,"[Bly invoking
a right grounded in a collective bargaining agreement, the employee makes that right a reality, and
breathes life, not only into the promises contained in the collective bargaining agreement, but also
into the entire process envisioned by Congress as the means by which to achieve industrial peace."Id.
" Id.
" Id.
" Id. at 1514, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3200.
" Id. See, e.g., Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 724, 729, 74 L.R.R.M. 2855,
2859 (5th Cir. 1970) (abusive and insubordinate conduct at grievance meeting); Yellow Freight
System, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 177, 181, 103 L.R.R.M. 1154, 1154 (1980) (manner of assertion of
contract right constituted insubordination).
44
 104 S. Ct. at 1514, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3200. No-strike provisions, for example, are a common
means by which employers and employees agree that the latter will not assert their rights by refusing
to work. id. In general, if an employee violates such a provision, his activity is unprotected even
though it may be concerted. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 271, 284, 37 L.R.R.M.
2587, 2588, 2594 (1956).
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The Court based its acceptance of the Interboro doctrine upon its recognition that a
lone employee's invocation of a collectively bargained right was an integral part of the
collective bargaining process. It also found that the Interboro doctrine was entirely consis-
tent with section 7 and the policies of the Act. The Court, thus, accepted the doctrine as a
reasonable interpretation of the Act. Having found that the employee's action was
concerted activity, the Court remanded the case for a determination of whether the
employee's action was protected activity. 45
Justice O'Connor, writing for the four dissenting justices, 49 rejected the Interboro
doctrine because she considered it to be "an exercise in undelegated legislative power by
the Board."" In the dissent's view, the ability to ground the right the employee asserts in
the collective bargaining agreement was not sufficient to transform the individual's
self-interested action into concerted activity. 48 If concerted activity is read this broadly, the
dissenting opinion reasoned, every contract claim could be the basis for an unfair labor
practice complaint:19 According to the dissent, such an interpretation would be contrary
to established law that unequivocally states that an employer's alleged violation of a
collective agreement cannot, by itself, provide the basis for an unfair labor practice
complaint. 50 The dissent said that by basing the determination of whether an employee's
assertion of a right is concerted activity on the assertion's ultimate grounding in the
collective bargaining agreement," the Interboro doctrine's extension of section 7's con-
certed activity proviso transfers the final authority for resolving all contract disputes to
the Board." The dissenting Justices concluded that "[t]his arrogation of power violates
Congress' decision to the contrary." 53 The dissent therefore would have affirmed the
Court of Appeals decision to reject the Interboro doctrine as an unreasonable interpreta-
tion of the Act."
The Supreme Court's decision in City Disposal Systems resolved the conflict between
the circuits over the applicability of the Interboro doctrine. The law is now settled that an
individual employee's assertion of a right grounded in a collective bargaining agreement
" 104 S. Ct. at 1517, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3202. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
46
 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined in the dissent.
47
 104 S. Ct. at 1516, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3202 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
48 Id.
49 Id.
'° Id. See NLRB v. C & C Plywood, 385 U.S. 421, 427-28, 64 L.R.R.M. 2065, 2068 (1967) (Board
not empowered to resolve contract disputes); Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 509-13, 49
L.R.R.M. 2619, 2621-23 (1962) (Congress did not intend that NLRB would resolve contract dis-
putes). Congress once considered a proposal that would have given the Board "general jurisdiction
over all alleged violations of collective bargaining agreements." NLRB v. C & C Plywood, 385 U.S.
421, 427, 64 L.R.R.M. 2065, 2068 (1967). It realized, however, that "No have conferred upon the
[Board] generalized power to determine the rights of parties under all collective agreements would
have been a step toward governmental regulation of the terms of those agreements." Id. Congress
expressly decided that, "[o]nce [the] parties have made a collective bargaining contract[,] the en-
forcement of that contract should be left to the usual processes of the law and not to the ... Board."
H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1946).
51 Justice O'Connor was particularly disturbed by the Interboro doctrine because it did not
require the individual expressly to refer to the contract provision supporting the claim or even to be
aware of the existence of the agreement. 104 S. Ct. at 1517 n.3, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3203 n.3 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1517, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3203.
° Id. See supra note 50.
54 104 S. Ct. at 1517, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3202 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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is recognized as concerted activity and is, therefore, eligible for protection under section
7. Analysis of the Court's opinion, however, reveals the limits of the decision.
First, the Court's decision limited itself to the situation where the collective bargain-
ing agreement contained a provision granting employees the right to take individual
action in response to certain conduct of their employer which was violative of the
agreement." In this case, employees had an express right to refuse to operate unsafe
vehicles. 5° City Disposal Systems held that, given the existence of such a provision in the
collective bargaining agreement, an employee's assertion of his rights under that provi-
sion was an integral part of the collective process which produced the provision in the first
place:" Because it was part of the collective process, the employee's action was concerted
activity.
This limitation responds to Justice O'Connor's concern about the Board assuming an
improper adjudicative role in contractual disputes." In City Disposal Systems, the Board's
task was not to define the employee's rights under the agreement, but to determine
whether the employer interfered with the employee's right to engage in concerted activity
in violation of the Act." To make this determination, the Board had to ascertain whether
the employee's refusal to drive an unsafe truck, a collectively bargained right, was
concerted activity. If, as was found, the' employee's refusal to drive an unsafe truck, a
collectively bargained right, was concerted activity and was protected under section 7, the
employer's action was not only a violation of the collective bargaining agreement but also
a violation of the Act." The employee enforced the agreement by exercising his right to
refuse to drive the truck; the Board merely enforced the Act. The Board therefore acted
within its statutory power to adjudicate complaints of unfair labor practices. 6 '
A second limitation of the Court's decision arises because all concerted activity is not
necessarily protected under section 7. 6' The Court specifically stated that the only issue it
was deciding was whether the employee's action was concerted, not whether it was
protected." The Court discussed this limitation briefly in its decision." It indicated that if
the agreement in City Disposal Systems had somehow limited the means by which an
individual employee could exercise his right to refuse to drive unsafe vehicles, then a
refusal which exceeded the limitation would not be protected even though it might be
concerted activity.'
These two limitations in the Court's opinion reveal that the availability of the type of
concerted activity at issue in City Disposal Systems is totally controlled by the collective
" Id. Article XXI of the collective bargaining agreement between City Disposal and the
Teamsters Union provided: "[t]he Employer shall not require employees to take out on the streets or
highways any vehicle that is not in safe operating condition or equipped with safety appliances
prescribed by law. It shall not be a violation of the Agreement where employees refuse to operate
such equipment unless such refusal is unjustified." Id. at 1508, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3195.
56 Id.
' 7 Id. ai 1511, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3199.
58 See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 22.
" See supra notes 55 and 59.
"' Section 10(c) of the Act empowers the Board to adjudicate and remedy unfair labor practices.
29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
"' See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
63 109 S. Ct. at 1514, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3200.
" Id.
65 Id.
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bargaining agreement. The Court has not undermined the collective process, as the
dissent argues." Rather, it has given the parties the power to negotiate the terms of the
agreement and the means of enforcing those terms. If an employer does not wish to
tolerate certain methods by which employees invoke their rights, the employer is free to
negotiate a provision that limits the availability of such methods."
The existence of a collective bargaining agreement was thus the essential element of
the Court's decision in City Disposal Systems. The Court's decision, however, neither
addressed nor answered the question of whether an individual may be said to engage in
concerted activity where no collective bargaining agreement is in force."
The Supreme Court's decision in City Disposal Systems establishes the Interboro doctrine
as the test for determining whether an individual's action constitutes concerted activity
within the meaning of section 7 of the Act. According to the Interboro doctrine, an
individual's assertion of a right grounded in a collective bargaining agreement is con-
certed activity. All concerted activity, however, may not necessarily be protected activity
under section 7. Whether an individual employee's action is protected concerted activity is
controlled by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. The parties have the
power to negotiate their rights under the agreement and the means of enforcing these
rights. Once the collective bargaining process establishes rights and enforcement proce-
dures, however, violations of these rights are subject to remedial action by the Board
under the Act.
B. *Discharge of Supervisor for Union Activity:
Automobile Salesmen's Union Locai 1095 v. NLRB`
Section 8(a)( 1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to interfere with the exercise of an employee's union rights.'
Section 7 of the Act gives employees the rights, among others, to organize and engage in
collective bargaining and other concerted activities. 3 Until 1947, the National Labor
Relations Board (the Board) interpreted the term "employee" to include supervisors, thus
86 See id. at 1517, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3203 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 1516, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3200.
" In the absence of such an agreement, an employee's assertion of rights would not be part of a
continuing collective process and, according to the rationale adopted by the Court in City Disposal
Systems, would not be concerted activity. The Board has recently held that, where a group of
employees are not unionized and no collective bargaining agreement exists, an employee's assertion
of a right that can only be presumed to be of interest to other employees is not concerted activity.
Meyers Industries, 268 N.L.R.B. No.73, 115 L.R.R. M. 1025 (1984). For a complete treatment of the
Board's decision in Meyers Industries, see infra (this Survey), p. 247, 1983- 84 Annual Survey of Labor and
Employment Discrimination Law — Return to an Objective Standard of Concerted Activity: Meyers Industries,
26 B.C. L. REV. 247 (1985).
* By Marianne T. McCabe, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAw REVIEW.
' Automobile Salesmen's Union Local 1095, United Food and Commercial Workers Union,
AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 383, 113 L.R.R.M. 3175 (D.C. Cir. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Automo-
bile Salesmen's Union Lo61 1095 v. NLRB].
• 29 U.S.C.	 158(a)(1) (1982).
3 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
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bringing supervisors within the protective scope of section 8(a)(1). 4 The Taft-Hartley
Amendments to the Act, however, narrowed the definition of the term "employee" by
specifically excluding "any individual employed as a supervisor. "5 The purpose behind
this exclusion was to enable employers to insist on the loyalty of their supervisors!' The
effect of the Taft-Hartley Amendments was to allow employers to discharge supervisors
for participation in union activities, without violating section 8(a)(1). 7
The Board has developed certain exceptions to the general exclusion of supervisors
from coverage under the Act. Accordingly, the Board has found violations of section
8(a)(1) of the Act when a supervisor is discharged for testifying against an employer at an
NLRB proceeding," refusing to commit unfair labor practices,9 and failing to prevent
unionization.")
 The Board has stated that the protection afforded to supervisors in these
situations stems not from any statutory protection inuring to supervisors, but rather from
the need to protect employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights."
The Board has also recognized that the discharge of a supervisor for participation in
union activities violates section 8(a)( I) if the discharge was an "integral part" of a plan or
part of a "pattern of conduct" designed to interfere with an employee's section 7 rights. 12
This line of decisions began with Pioneer Drilling Co., Inc. , u where the employer fired two
supervisors as a pretext for terminating the supervisor's pro-union crew. In Pioneer
Drilling, the Board found that the practice in the drilling industry was for the employment
of rank-and-file employees to depend on the continued employment of the supervisor
who had hired them. Reasoning that the supervisor's discharge was a mechanism to
unlawfully discharge the pro-union crew, the Board concluded that the supervisor's
discharge was an unfair labor practice." In decisions subsequent to Pioneer Drilling, the
Board extended that decision's rationale to supervisors who joined in union activity and
who are then discharged along with the rank-and-file employees.' In these decisions, the
" NLRB v. North Arkansas Electric Co-op Inc., 446 F.2d 602, 605, 77 L.R.R.M. 3114, 3116(8th
Cir. 1971). See Brod, The NLRB in Search of a Standard: Is the Discharge of a Supervisor in Connection with
Employees' Union or Other Protected Activities an Unfair Labor Practice?, 14 IND. L. REV. 727, 727 n.3
(1981).
Labor Management Relations Act 2(3) (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. 152(3) (1982).
b Florida Power and Light v. Electrical Workers, 417 U.S. 790, 806-09, 86 L.R.R.M. 2689, 2695
(1974).
T See Beasley v. Food Fair, Inc., 416 U.S. 653, 654-55, 86 L.R.R.M. 2196, 2197 (1974).
See, e.g., Oil City Brass Works, 147 N.L.R.B. 627, 56 L.R.R.M. 1262 (1964), enforced, 357 F.2d
466, 61 L.R.R.M. 2318 (5th Cir. 1966); Better Monkey Grip Company, 115 N.L.R.B. 1170, 38
L.R.R.M. 1025 (1956), enforced, 243 F.2d 836, 40 L.R.R.M. 2027 (5th Cir. 1957).
9 See, e.g., Belcher Towing Company, 238 N.L.R.B. 446, 99 L.R.R.M. 1556 (1978), enforced, 614
F.2d 88, 103 L.R.R.M. 2939 (5th Cir. 1980); Vail Manufacturing Company, 61 N.L.R.B. 181, 16
L.R.R.M. 85 (1945), enforced, 158 F.2d 664, 19 L.R.R.M. 2177 (7th Cir. 1947).
L" See, e.g., Tailedega Cotton Factory, Inc., 106 N. L.R.B. 295, 32 L. R.R.M. 1479 (1953), enforced,
213 F.2d 209, 34 L.R.R.M. 2196 (5th Cir. 1954).
" Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 402, 403, 110 L.R.R.M. 1289, 1290 (1982),
petition for review den. sub nom. Automobile Salesmen's Union Local 1095 v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 383, 386,
113 L.R.R.M. 3175, 3177 (1983).
12 An analysis of these decisions appears in DRW Corporation, Brothers Three Cabinets, 248
N.L.R.B. 828, 103 L.R.R.M. 1506 (1980)(Truesdale, Member, concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
19
 162 N.L.R.B. 918, 64 L.R.R.M. 1126 (1967), enforced in pertinent part, 391 F.2d 961, 67
L.R.R.M. 2956 (10th Cir. 1968).
14 Pioneer Drilling, 162 N.L.R.B. at 923, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1131.
E' See, e.g., Fairview Nursing Home, 202 N.L.R.B. 318, 82 L.R.R.M. 1566 (1973); Krebs and
King Toyota, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 462, 80 L.R.R.M. 1570 (1972).
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Board ruled that the firing of a supervisor was an unfair labor practice if the motivation
behind the employer's conduct was to coerce rank-and-file employees into curtailing
union activities."'
During the Survey year, in Automobile Salesmen's Union Local 1095 v. NLRB,  the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied a petition for review
of a Board decision overruling the "pattern of conduct" line of cases." In doing so, the
court let stand the Board's ruling in Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc." that the discharge of a
supervisor is unlawful only if it directly interferes with the statutory rights of protected
employees.' Consequently, the discharge of a supervisor as part of a "pattern of conduct"
designed to curtail protected union activities will no longer constitute a section 8(a)(1)
violation unless the employer directly interferes with the exercise of employees' section 7
rights.'"
In Automobile Salesmen's Union, several employees of Parker-Robb Chevrolet
(Parker-Robb) were fired after attending an organizational meeting conducted by the
Automobile Salesmen's Union (the Union). Subsequently, Terry Doss, a supervisor at
Parker-Robb and crew chief for some of the discharged workers who had also attended
the meeting, repeatedly demanded an explanation from Parker-Robb's managers for the
discharges." Doss was then told by a management official that he, too, was being dis-
charged." Relying upon the "pattern of conduct" line of cases, the Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) determined that Doss's discharge violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act because it
was part of an overall plan to discourage employees from exercising their statutory right
to unionize." Upon review, the Board reversed the AL .I's decision, overrruling the
"pattern of conduct" line of cases and limiting Pioneer Drilling to its facts."
The Union petitioned the District of Columbia Circuit Court for review of the
Board's decision." The court began its analysis of whether to grant the Union's petition
by noting that its review of the Board's construction of the Act is limited. According to the
court, the Board's interpretation must be enforced unless it has no reasonable basis in law
or is fundamentally inconsistent with the Act's purposes." The court found that the
Board's construction of the Act was not vulnerable to either of these grounds of attack."
The court noted that the Board had found that the "pattern of conduct" line of cases had
produced inconsistent decisions and had effectively brought supervisors under the pro-
tection of the Act." Furthermore, the court observed, the Board had determined that
previous cases holding that the existence of a section 8(a)(1) violation turns on the
1 " See Donelson Packing Co., Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 1043, 90 L.R.R.M. 1549 (1975); VADA of
Oklahoma, Inc., 216 N.L.R.B. 750, 88 L.R.R.M. 1631 (1975).
' 7 Automobile Salesmen's Union Local 1095 v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 383, 113 L.R.R.M. 3175 (1983).
18 262 N.L.R.B. 402, 110 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1982), petition for review den. sub nom. Automobile
Salesmen's Union Local 1095 v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 383, 113 L.R.R.M. 3175 (1983).
19 Automobile Salesmen's Union, 711 F.2d at 388, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3178.
29 Parker-Robb, 262 N.L.R.B. at 404, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1291.
21 Automobile Salesmen's Union, 711 F.2d at 385, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3176.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
n Parker-Robb, 262 N.L.R.B. at 402-03, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1290-91.
23
 Automobile Salesmen's Union, 7] 1 F.2d at 388, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3178.
" Id. at 385-86, 113 L.R.R.M at 3176-77.
29 Id. at 386, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3177.
29 Id. at 387, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3178.
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employer's motivation were incorrect." According to the court, the Board properly
acknowledged that the discharge of a supervisor for union activity would always have an
incidental effect on rank-and-file employees, and that such secondary affects on employee
unionization formed an insufficient basis upon which to warrant an exception to the
general provision excluding supervisors from coverage under the Act.' Consequently,
the court denied the Union's petition for review, stating that the Board's new approach to
supervisor discharge cases constituted a reasonable exercise of the Board's discretion."
The refusal of the Court of Appeals to disturb the Board's decision in Automobile
Salesmen's Union was proper because the Act expressly excludes supervisors from its
protection." The Board's reasoning that supervisors are not covered under the Act
except in those rare circumstances where the discharge of a supervisor also directly
interferes with the statutorily protected rights of employees flows logically from the Act. " 4
As the court noted, its standard of review in cases involving the Board's construction of
the Act is a narrow one." Accordingly, because the Board's decision in Automobile Sales-
men's Union had an arguably reasonable basis in law and was consistent with the Act's
structure and purposes, the court was correct to deny the union's petition for review.
The Board's decision to overrule the "pattern of conduct" line of cases is equally
sound. In Pioneer Drilling,' the discharge of supervisors was in reality a means to fire the
pro-union crew. Because the firing of the supervisors directly operated to deny employees
their section '7 rights, the supervisors' discharge was unlawful. In Automobile Salesmen's
Union, however, the firing of a supervisor for his pro-union conduct did not directly
interfere with the employees' rights but had merely an incidental effect on those rights."
Given such a tenuous connection between the supervisor's discharge and the employees'
exercise of their rights, little basis exists upon which to find that the supervisor is
protected under the Act when the congressional directive is expressly to the contrary.
Following Automobile Salesmen's Union, an employer may discharge a supervisor with-
out violating the Act if the supervisor participates in union activity, unless such discharge
would directly harm an employee's section 7 rights." By abandoning its inquiry into the
employer's motivation in determining the lawfulness of a discharge of a supervisor, the
Board has shifted its focus from what the employer intended his conduct to achieve to
what the actual effect of his conduct was on the employees." This shift in focus should
produce better-reasoned and more consistent decisions because, as several commentators
have noted, assessing the dominant motivation behind an employer's conduct toward his
employees is often difficult, if not impossible.° Although the decision decreases the
protections formerly afforded supervisors in labor-management relations, it keeps intact
the principle that an employer may not commit unfair labor practices simply by channel-
ling them through the supervisor."
3° Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 388, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3178.
33 29 U.S.C.	 152(3) (1982).
34 Parker-Robb, 262 N.L.R.B. at 404, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1289.
3' Automobile Salesmen's Union, 711 F.2d at 385, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3177.
36 162 N.L.R.B. 918, 64 L.R.R.M. 1126 (1967).
" Automobile Salesmen's Union, 711 F.2d at 387, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3178.
38 Id.
39 Parker-Robb, 262 N.L.R.B. at 404, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1291.
'" See, e.g., Brod, The NLRB Changes Its Policy On the Legality of an Employer's Discharge of a Disloyal
Supervisor, 1983 LAB. L. J. la, 16 (1983).
Automobile Salesmen's Union, 711 F.2d at 387, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3178.
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The Board has left open the question of when a supervisor's discharge will be held to
have a direct affect on employees' section 7 rights. The firing of a supervisor for testifying
before a Board hearing or a contractual grievance proceeding," however, should con-
tinue to be an unlawful practice under the Act because the discharge of a supervisor in
these situations would disrupt procedures designed to protect employee rights." More-
over, the firing of a supervisor for refusing to commit an unfair labor practice or for
failing to prevent unionization should also continue to be illegal because of the need to
ensure that even statutorily excluded individuals, such as supervisors, will not be coerced
into violating laws designed to protect employees."
Although the discharge of a supervisory employee for participating in union ac-
tivities could have a substantial "chilling" effect on employee union rights, this situation
will no longer be within the scope of section 8(a) protection.' Such a chilling effect could
result if employees mistakenly assume that a supervisor is afforded equal protection
under the Act." This chilling effect can be eliminated if employees are educated about
their section 7 rights." Then, even if a supervisor is fired for union activities, the
employees will recognize that they, unlike the supervisor, are shielded from such repris-
als. Armed with such information, the employees will not be discouraged from exercising
their rights." By providing such information, union leaders will be able to minimize the
potential impact of Automobile Salesmen's Union on rights of self organization.
C. *Return to an Objective Standard qf Concerted Activity: Meyers Industries, Inc.'
Section 7' of the National Labor Relations Act 3 (the Act) gives employees the right to
self-organization for the purpose of mutual protection. 4 This right has been traditionally
referred to as "concerted action. " 5 Although the legislative history of section 7 does not
contain any definition of "concerted activity," it does reveal that Congress considered the
concept in terms of individuals united in pursuit of a common goal. 6 An employer violates
section 8(a)(1) of the Act' when it discharges without further cause an employee who has
42 See, e.g., Dal-Tex Optical Company, Inc., 131 N.L.R.B. 715, 48 L.R.R.M. 1143 (1961),
enforced, 310 F.2d 58, 51 L.R.R.M. 2608 (5th Cir. 1962).
" Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. at 404, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1291.
44
" Automobile Salemen's Union, 711 F. 2d at 387, 113 L.R.R.M. at 3178.
" See Note, Limiting An Employee's Liability for Firing Supervisor for Union Activity, 59 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 270, 279 (1983).
17 Id.
" See id.
* By Jennifer L. Jorgensen, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 115 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1984).
2 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) states in pertinent part: "Employees shall have the right to self-
organization to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . ." Id.
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982).
• See supra note 2.
• See Meyers Industries, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 115 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1984).
" Id.
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of
this title . . . ." 29 § 158(a)(1) (1982).
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engaged in a protected concerted activity. 8
The National Labor Relations Board (Board) and those courts which have attempted
to interpret "concerted activity" have defined it in different ways over the years. Until
1975, the Board and courts generally analyzed the concept of concerted activity by first
considering whether some kind of group action occurred and then by examining whether
that action was for the purpose of mutual aid or protection of employees.° Concerted
activity was described as "employee interaction in support of a common goal,"'° and a
dear showing of employees' group effort was required for an activity to be deemed
"concerted."" In the 1975 case of Alleluia Cushion Co. , 17.
 however, the Board developed the
theory of "implied concerted activity" to replace the two-tiered approach to the concept.' 3
In that decision, the Board held that an employee who complained on his own to a state
agency about safety conditions had engaged in concerted action within the meaning of
section 7.' 4
 The Alleluia Board based its decision on two premises. First, the Board
reasoned that safe working conditions concerned the entire work force. 18
 Second, the
Board asserted that public policy enunciated in state and federal legislation provided
industrial employees with a right to safe employment conditions."' The Board, therefore,
held that where an employee seeks to enforce statutory provisions designed for the
benefit of all employees, consent of all employees to those actions may be implied and
such activity may be deemed concerted." Thus, after Alleluia an employee needed only to
assert his statutory right to a healthy work environment for his claim of "concerted
• Protection of concerted activities arises exclusively out of section 7. All concerted activity,
however, is not protected by the Act. For example, if such activity is not engaged in "for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." or is unlawful or insubordinate, it is not a
violation of the Act to restrain an employee from engaging in such concerted activity. See Eastex Inc.
v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 568 n.18, 98 L.R.R.M. 2717 (1978). See generally Gregory, Unprotected Activity
and the NLRA, 39 VA. L. REV. 421 (1953).
• See Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 494, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1026 (citing Texas Textile Mills, 58 N.L.R.B.
352, 15 L.R.R.M. 14 (1944); Globe Co., 54 N.L.R.B. 1, 13 L.R.R.M. 107 (1943)).
" Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 494, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1026 (citing Traylor-Pamco, 154 N.L.R.B. 380,
59 L.R.R.M. 1756 (1965) (two workers who refused to eat their lunch with other employees were
acting individually and were not engaging in concerted actions); Root-Carlin, 92 N.L.R.B. 1313, 27
L.R.R.M. 1235 (1951) (conversation among employees about the need for a union was concerted
activity because section 7 protects activity which "in its inception, involves only a speaker and listener,
[because] such activity is an indispensable preliminary step to employee self-organization.")).
" See, e.g., Continental Mfg,, 155 N.L.R.B. 255, 257, 60 L.R.R.M. 1290, 1291 (1965) (one
employee's letter to company owner complaining of workplace conditions that bothered all employ-
ees but which was signed and prepared by only that one employee was not concerted activity since
there was no evidence that the criticisms and suggestions for improvement in the letter reflected the
views or enlisted the support of other employees).
IS
 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 91 L.R.R.M. 1131 (1975).
" Id. at 1000, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1133 ("Where an employee . . . seeks to enforce statutory
provisions relating to occupational safety designed for the benefit of all employees we will find an
implied consent [of other employees] and deem such activity to be concerted.").
14 Id. at 1001, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1133. In Alleluia, an employee was fired after he wrote a letter
complaining about safety conditions in his workplace to the Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA). Even though there was no evidence that the employee had discussed the safety
problems with other employees or had sought their support in remedying the problems, the Board
found his actions to be concerted and protected by section 7. Id.
' 4 Id. at 1000, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1133.
16 Id. ("Recent years have witnessed the recognition of [the] vital interest [of occupational safety]
by Congress through enactment of the Occupational Safety and Health Act [29 U.S.C. 651-678]
and by state and local governments through the passage of similar legislation.").
' 7
 Alleluia at 1000, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1133.
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activity" to be valid and within the protective ambit of section 7 of the Act.i° The Board
would presume that his fellow employees had consented to occupational safety.
During the Survey year, the Board overruled Alleluia, rejected the "implied concerted
action" standard, and returned to the pre -Alleluia "objective" standard of section 7
concerted activity.") In Meyers Industries, Inc. , 2 ° the Board held that an employee's action is
"concerted" only if the activity is employed with or on the authority of the other workers
and is not done solely by and on behalf of the employee himself." Consequently, after
Meyers Industries, individual employees who complain about working conditions alone and
on their own behalf, without the formal consent of fellow employees, lose the protection
of section 7 of the Act and may be legally discharged by their employers.
The dispute in Meyers involved the discharge of an employee for refusing to drive a
truck and trailer and for contacting state authorities on his own to arrange for an
inspection of the unsafe vehicle. Employee Kenneth Prill, who had been in the trucking
business for a number of years, 23 was a driver for Meyers Industries, Inc. (Meyers), a
Michigan-based trucking company." Prili had been assigned a particular truck and trailer
on a semi-permanent basis.' He lodged several .complaints with his employer concerning
malfunctions in the truck's brakes and steering, but Meyers did not respond to the
complaints.' A second employee, Ben Cove, who had driven the truck for a temporary
period and had also experienced difficulties with it, reported the problems to his super-
visor and refused to drive the truck again until it was repaired." Following Cove's
complaint, the employer's mechanic made an unsuccessful attempt to correct the prob-
lems. 37
 Soon thereafter, Prill voluntarily stopped at an Ohio roadside inspection station
where the truck and trailer unit was given a citation for several defects." Prill forwarded
this citation to company officials." Following this incident, Prill was involved in an
accident in Tennessee caused by a malfunction in the truck's brakes. 3° After receiving
telephone instructions from Meyers' president to return home "as best he could" with the
truck,3 ' Prill remained in Tennessee until the company finally agreed to send its mechanic
to Tennessee to examine the equipment3 3 Prill then contacted the Tennessee Public
Id. The Board reasoned that because Congress and the states made manifest the national will
in the area of industrial safety, "the consent and concert of action emanates from the mere assertion
of such statutory rights." Id.
w Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 498, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1029.
20 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 115 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1984).
" Id. at 498, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1029. The Board also held that once an activity is deemed
concerted, an employer violates section 8(a)(1) only if the concerted activity is protected under the
Act, the employer knew of the concerted nature of the employee's actions, and the employer's
adverse response was motivated by the activity. Id. See infra note 72.
22 Id. at 497, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1029 ("Charging party ... Prill drove trucks for a number of years
and was an owner-operator for the four years before his employment by the Respondent.").
" Id. Respondent's facility was located in Tecumseh, Michigan but its trucks traveled through-
out the country. Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
" Id. Cove drove the truck during the first two weeks of June, 1979. Id.
" Id.
" Id. The citation included defects relating to the truck's brakes. Id.
29
 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. The company president also instructed Prill to have a mechanic look at the truck before he
returned to Michigan. Id.
as Id.
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Service Commission to arrange for an official inspection of the vehicle.sa Upon examina-
tion, the unit was cited for several Department of Transportation safety violations. 34
When Frill reported to work in Michigan, company officials asked him why he had not
driven the truck back immediately as instructed. Prill answered that he had believed that
it was unsafe to drive the vehicle. 35 The vice-president of Meyers fired Prill, stating "we
can't have you calling the cops like this all the time.""
Prill filed charges of an unfair labor practice with the National Labor Relations
Board.37 At the administrative hearing, the General Counsel contended that employer
Meyers had violated section 8(a)( 1) by discharging employee Prill because of his safety
complaints and his refusal to drive an unsafe vehicle. 38 The Administrative Law Judge
(ALV" agreed with Frill's allegations," and held that this discharge was unlawful because
his actions were concerted and therefore protected under section 7. 4 ' The AL] relied on
the Alleluia case, reasoning that Prill's activity established a presumption of concertedness,
since his complaints were a matter of concern for all employees." Further, the Ali noted
that by refusing to drive and by contacting state authorities, Frill's actions were the
equivalent of one employee's safety complaint to the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), 43 which had been found to be a concerted action in Alleluia. 44
The ALJ also maintained that employee Gove's similar complaints about the safety of the
truck, in Prill's presence, "clearly" showed that ?rill's complaints were concerted. 45 The
ALJ concluded that Respondent Meyers was free, under Alleluia, to rebut the inference
that Pri11's activity inured to the benefit of all employees , "4" but that Meyers had failed to
do so.'
Reviewing the ALJ's decision, the Board accepted the findings of fact but rejected the
Ails reliance on Alleluia. Instead, the Board overruled Alleluia and held that Meyers had
not violated section 8(a)( I) when it discharged Frill because, according to the Board, Frill
" Id.
" Id. The citation specifically noted that the unit's brakes and hitch were unsafe. A commission
representative instructed Prill that certain repairs would have to be made before the vehicle could be
moved. Upon arrival in Tennessee, the mechanic phoned the president and it was decided to sell the
trailer for scrap, while Prill was ordered to drive the truck back to Michigan. Id.
" Id. at 498, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1030.
" Id.
37 Id. at 493 n.1, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1025 n.l.
3" Id. A motion to amend the complaint to include an additional allegation that Prill's discharge
was unlawful as supported by section 502 of the National Labor Relations Act was denied and the
Board affirmed the ALys ruling. Id.
3" The Administrative Law Judge was Robert A. Giannosi. Id. at 493, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1025.
4° The ALJ concluded that Frill was fired because of his refusal to drive an unsafe truck after
filing a report with the Tennessee Public Service Commission and his earlier safety complaints to
Ohio authorities. Id. at 498, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1030.
91 Id.
42 Id. (citing decision of ALJ, sec. II, B, par. 2). The judge found that Prill's refusal to drive was
mandated by Department of Transportation regulations which require the inspection of a vehicle
involved in an accident. Id. The judge also stated that Frill's actions "enforced . . . national
transportation policy." Id.
" See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
" See 268 N.L.R.B. at 498, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1030 (citing Alleluia, 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 91 L.R.R.M.
1131 (1975)).
" Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 498, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1030.
46 Id.
" Id.
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had acted solely on his own behalf." In Part I of the Board's decision, it examined the
concept of protected concerted activity under section 7 of the Act." First, the Board
looked to legislative history behind the phrase "concerted activity"" and to the specific
language of section 75 ' in determining that the concept is limited to self-organization and
collective action which represents an employee group . 52
 Next, the Board noted that Board
and court decisions prior to Alleluia were consistent with this interpretation," because
those decisions analyzed the concerted activity concept by looking for some kind of group
action before considering whether that interaction was for the purpose of mutual protec-
tion.54 The Meyers Board pointed out that in G.V.R., Inc. 55 it had specifically disavowed
any public policy considerations for extending concerted activity to one employee's
complaints to public agencies."
In the second part of the Meyers analysis, the Board discussed the Alleluia decision"
and criticized that Board for creating a "per se" standard of concerted activity." The
Meyers Board rejected the Alleluia rationale, theorizing that the practical effect of allowing
solitary employees to invoke "concerted action" protection would be "to transform con-
certed activity into a mirror image of itself."59
 According to the Board, this mirror image
reflected two problems inherent in the Alleluia analysis. First, the Meyers Board asserted
that the Alleluia Board was wrong to determine whether an issue ought to concern
employees as a group." The Meyers Board reasoned that the Board's proper function is to
look at the observable evidence to see whether employees had taken group actions'
" Id.
" Id. at 493-95, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1025-27.
5° Id. at 493, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1026. The Board noted that the legislative history of section 7 did
not specifically define "concerted activity," but the Board stated that Congress considered the
concept "in terms of individuals united in pursuit of a common goal." Id. at 493, 115 L.R.R.M. at
1025. The Board also pointed to section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act and section 2 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act to show that there was a common purpose of creating rights in workers to
organize for the betterment of working conditions. See id at 493 n.4, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1025-26 n.4.
" See supra note 2 for text of the relevant provisions of section 7.
52 Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 494, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1026. The Board also emphasized that "the
statute requires that the activities in question be 'concerted' before they can be 'protected."' Id.
" See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 494, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1026. The Board spent a significant portion of
Part I setting forth the facts and analyses of pre-Alleluia decisions which described concerted activity
in terms of employee interaction in support of a common goal. Id. at 493-95, 115 L.R.R.M. at
1025-27.
95 201 N.L.R.B. 147, 82 L.R.R.M. 1139 (1973).
268 N.L.R.B. at 495, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1027. The Board pointed out, however, that even
though it had rejected the judge's finding in G.V.R. that public policy would be frustrated if
employees could not complain to public agencies with the Act's protection, it had held in that case
that where an employee complaining about employment conditions was covered by a federal statute
governing wages, hours, and conditions of employment, the employee would be engaging in con-
certed activity. Id. (citing G.V.R., Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. at 147, 82 L.R.R.M. 1139). The Meyers Board
interpreted G.V.R. as declining to extend the concerted activity concept as a matter of law. Meyers,
268 N.L.R.B. at 495, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1027. The Board admitted that "[t]he distinction is a difficult
one to discern." Id.
" See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
" Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 496, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1028.
59 Id. at 495, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1028.
69
 Id.
91 Id. at 496, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1028.
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Second, the Board suggested that it was incongruent with section 7 to require an em-
ployer to prove that activity was not concerted." Under Alleluia, an employer was re-
quired to submit evidence that other employees disavowed the lone employee's actions. 63
This "clear shift in the burden of proof," said the Board, is not countenanced by
legislative history or by judicial interpretation of section 7,64 The Meyers Board concluded
Part II of its analysis by referring to the refusal of numerous appeals courts to accept the
per se standard of concerted activity."
In Part III of the Meyers decision, the Board distinguished its decision in Interboro
Contractors" from the Alleluia and Meyers cases. In Interboro, the Board held that actions an
individual takes to enforce a provision of a collective bargaining agreement are grievances
within the framework of that agreement and should be considered as implied concerted
activity." The Meyers Board stated that the focal point in Interboro was the collective
bargaining agreement, which is always presumed to be consented to by all employees and
therefore implies concerted action." The Board found no such agreement at issue in
Alleluia and so held that the analysis in Interboro was distinct from that in Alleluia."
In Part IV of the Meyers decision, the Board explicitly overruled Alleluia, declaring
that the concept of concerted activity enunciated in that decision "does not comport with
the principles inherent in Section 7 of the Act."" Instead, the Board returned to an
objective standard, holding that in order for an employee's activity to be "concerted," it is
necessary that the activity is performed "with or on the authority of other employees, and
not solely by and on behalf of the employee himself." 7 ' The Board also reaffirmed
pre-Alleluia holdings which placed a burden on the General Counsel to show that the
elements of a section 8(a)(1) violation existed. 72
62 Id.
Id. (citing Alleluia, 221 N.L.R.B. at 1000, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1131).
44 Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 496, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1028 (citing the Fourth Circuit in Krispy Kreme
Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 304, 310, 105 L.R.R.M. 3407 (4th Cir. 1980)).
'" Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 496 n.18, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1028, 1028 n.18 (citing Krispy l(reme, 635
F.2d at 309, 105 L.R.R.M. 3407; see, e.g., Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 106 L.R.R.M.
2053 (2d Cir. 1980); Dawson Cabinet Co., 566 F.2d 1079, 97 L.R.R.M. 2075 (8th Cir. 1977)).
86 157 N.L.R.B. 1295, 61 L.R.R.M. 1537 (1966), enf'd., 388 F.2d 495, 67 L.R.R.M. 2083 (2d Cir.
1967).
" Id. at 1298, 61 L.R.R.M. at 1540.
a See Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 496, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1028; City Disposal Systems, 256 N.L.R.B.
451, 107 L.R.R.M. 1267 (1981), enf. denied, 683 F.2d 1005, 110 L.R.R.M. 3225 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd
and remanded, 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1983). In City Disposal, a trucker who complained on his own about a
truck's safety, like Meyers' employee Prill, was found to be engaging in concerted activity. The
Supreme Court held specifically, however, that the decision should be read narrowly because a
collective bargaining agreement was being enforced by the employee. The existence of the agree-
ment was what made his activity concerted. City Disposal, 104 S. Ct. at 1505. For a full discussion of the
Supreme Court's decision in City Disposal, see supra p. 257, 1983-84 Annual Survey of Labor and
Employment Discrimination Law — Concerted Activity —Individual Employees and Concerted Activity Under
Collective Bargaining Agreements: N.L.R.B. v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 26 B.C. L. REV 237 (1985).
69 Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 496, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1028.
7° Id.
71 Id. at 496-97, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1028-29.
72 Once an activity is deemed "concerted," said the Meyers Board, a section 8(a)(1) violation
occurs if, in addition, "the employer knew of the concerted nature of the employee's activity, the
concerted activity was protected by the Act, and the adverse employment action at issue [for example,
discharge] was motivated by the employee's protected concerted activity." Id. at 497, 115 L.R.R.M. at
1029. In a footnote, the Board cited several recent cases which set forth this standard. Id. at 497 n.23,
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The Board was careful to limit its holding, however, by recognizing that its definition
of concerted activity was "by no means exhaustive.' The Board emphasized that a
"myriad of factual situations" could arise in this area of the law," and that under its
standard the question of whether an employee engaged in a "concerted activity" was a
factual one."
In the final part of its analysis, the Meyers Board applied the objective standard of
concerted activity that it had adopted to the facts of the Meyers case and found that Frill
had acted solely on his own behalf when he refused to drive the truck, contacted a public
service commission, and contacted Ohio authorities." Without the "artificial presumption
Alleluia created," said the Board, these actions could not support a finding that Frill had
engaged in concerted activity." The Board also rejected the ALJ's determination that
Prill's presence in the office when a second employee complained about the truck
amounted to concerted action." Absent evidence that the two employees had joined
forces to protest the truck's condition, said the Board, individual employee concerns
manifested on an individual basis did not show "concert of action."" The Board con-
cluded that although Pri11's situation "is a sympathetic one , . we are not empowered to
correct all immorality or even illegality arising under the total fabric of Federal and state
Member Zimmerman dissented from the Board's decision to permit employer
Meyers to lawfully discharge employee Frill for his filing of a safety complaint." The
dissent first argued that in overruling Alleluia the Meyers Board had overlooked the two
rationales on which that case had been based." According to the dissent, Alleluia stood
first for the proposition that concert of action is presumed from a matter of "great and
continuing concern" to the workforce and requires an analysis of the specific complaint to
determine whether it goes beyond individual concerns." Under the second Alleluia
rationale, according to the dissent, the Board is permitted to presume concert of action
from an assertion of a statutory right based on legislative declaration of public interest in a
workplace matter." The dissent asserted that the Meyers situation directly involved the
115 L.R.R.M. at 1029 n.23. Among them, the Board cited NLRB v. Condenser Corp. of America,
128 F.2d 67, 75, 10 L.R.R.M. 483 (3d Cir. 1942), for the proposition that "under this standard, an
employee may be discharged by the employer for a good reason, a poor reason, or no reason at all, so
long as the terms of the statute are not violated." Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 497 n.23, 115 L.R.R.M. at
1029 n.23. This procedural holding by the Meyers Board constitutes a further restriction on section
8(a) protection.
" Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 497, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1029.
74 Id.
75 Id.
75 Id. at 497-98, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1029-30. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
" Id. at 498, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1030.
78 Id.
79 Id.
" Id. at 498-99, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1030.
" Id. at 499, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1031. The Board stated that it did "not believe ... that Section 7,
framed as it was to legitimize and protect group action engaged in by employees for their mutual aid
or protection, was intended to encompass the case of individual activity presented here." Id.
" Id. at 499-503, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1031-35 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
83 Id. at 500, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1032 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
5' Id. at 499, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1031-32 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting). See supra notes 12-18
and accompanying text.
83 Id. at 500, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1032 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting). See supra notes 12.18 and
accompanying text.
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second principle of Alleluia and that it would, therefore, be proper and valid to presume
concert of action from the assertion of an employment-related statutory right. 86
The history and spirit of federal labor laws, as well as the policies behind the Act, the
dissent argued, indicate that section 7's "concerted activity" language protects an individ-
ual employee's assertion of a collective right in the workplace." After discussing the
history of the term "concert"88 and the subsequent federal legislation which incorporated
that term,89 the dissent asserted that it is reasonable to construe "concerted activity" as
supplementing an individual employee's rights as well as the rights of employees who
engaged in actual collective activity." This interpretation of congressional intent is sup-
ported, stated the dissent, by the fact that a work-related statutory right is not an
individual right, but is one shared by and created for employees as a group through
legislation." Thus, the dissent concluded that presuming concert in the individual asser-
tion of an employment-related statutory right running to all employees accommodates
the Act's overall policies regarding workplace conditions." Further, the dissent argued,
the shifting of the burden of proving the lack of concerted activity to the employer in
these instances does not make the presumption any less valid." The dissenter, therefore,
maintained that in the Meyers situation it should have been presumed that other drivers
supported Frill's assertion of Department of Transportation safety regulations." Thus,
Member Zimmerman would have held that employer Meyers had violated section 8(a)( l)
of the Act by discharging an employee who was protected by section 7's concerted activity
concept."
Following the Board's decision in Meyers, an individual employee who complains
alone and on his own behalf about safety conditions in his workplace may lose his section 7
" Id. at 500, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1032 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting). See infra notes 99-100
and accompanying text.
" ld. at 500, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1032 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting). The dissenter stated that
the "central purpose of the Act is to avoid or minimize industrial strife which interferes with the
normal flow of commerce." Id. Other sections of the Act, the dissenter asserted, provide for the full
freedom of association by employees as one way of accomplishing the desired harmony between
employers and employees. See id. (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
"8 The Meyers dissent noted that the earliest use of the term "concert" was in opposition to the
application of the doctrine of criminal conspiracy to employees' organizing efforts. Id. at 501, 115
L.R.R.M. at 1032-33 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting). That doctrine made it a crime for two or
more employees to conspire to raise their wages or improve their working conditions. Id. at 501, 115
L.R.R.M. at 1033 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting). Early legislation, stated the dissent, was
directed toward insulating organized labor from the doctrine, and it was in this context that the term
"concert" first appeared. Id. (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
" Id. (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting). The dissent pointed to the use of "concert" in the
Clayton Act of 1914, the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, section 7(a) of the National Industrial
Recovery Act of 1938, and finally, section 7 of the Act. Id. (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
9° Id.
"I Id. The dissent also noted that the Supreme Court "has long acknowledged the Board's
authority to use presumptions in administering the Act." Id. at 502, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1033 (Zimmer-
man, Member, dissenting) (citing Republican Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 16 L.R.R.M.
620 (1945) (where the presumption that a rule prohibiting union solicitation by employees outside of
working hours is an unreasonable impediment to self-organization and hence was held to be
invalid)).
" Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 502, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1034 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
" Id. at 503, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1034 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
" Id. at 503, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1035 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
95 Id. (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
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protection and, therefore, could be legally discharged. To show concerted activity and,
thus, gain section 7 protection, the General Counsel must either submit evidence that the
employee engaged in actual physical group organization before a complaint was filed or
show that the individual employee. asserted a federal statutory right which governs
employment conditions rather than simply a regulatory right." It is submitted that, as the
dissent suggested, this strict, objective standard of concerted activity is inconsistent with
the policies of labor legislation. As the dissenting member noted, federal labor acts
support the premise that employers must recognize that neither party has a right to
engage in practices which jeopardize public health, safety or interest." Further, the
dissent recognized that Congress' policy of eliminating occupational safety problems is
complemented by extending the concept of concerted action to employees' attempts to
ensure enforcement of that policy." As the dissent in Meyers suggested, the assertion of a
work-related statutory right by an individual employee is at the core of the public policy
underlying federal labor legislation. The Meyers Board, however, cited G.V.R., Inc. to
dismiss the value of public policy conceFns when evaluating concerted activity."`' At the
same time, however, the Board agreed with the G.V.R., Inc. Board's holding that an
employee who protests an employer's noncompliance with a statute which governs em-
ployment conditions has engaged in concerted activity for the protection of all employees
similarly situated.'" Nevertheless, the Board refused to extend this rationale to the Meyers
case because it did not view Department of Transportation regulations as federal legisla-
tion under which Prill's safety complaints were protected.
Although the Board in Meyers asserted that its definition of concerted activity is "by
no means exhaustive," the practical results of its decision may contradict that statement.
The Board's holding is rigid in that it leaves open only two protected avenues for an
individual employee who detects safety violations. In the wake of the Meyers decision, an
employee, unless he wishes to risk losing his job, must actually promote group meetings
and collective activity before he lodges a complaint. Alternatively, an employee may
acquire the protection of section 7 if he individually asserts rights derived directly from a
federal statute.'°' Furthermore, the Meyers Board never explicitly states how many em-
ployees it takes to make activity concerted. Instead, the Board merely warned that the
employees need to loin forces." If Prill had spoken up when the second employee
complained about the truck, would this have been enough to show "group action" under
the objective standard?'" The Board avoids this issue by directing future ALJ's consider-
" See G.V.R., supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text and infra notes 99-100 and accompany-
ing text. An example of a federal statute which governs conditions of employment is the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
" Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 500, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1032 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting). The
dissent pointed to section 1(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. I 141(b) to support
this premise.
" Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 500, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1032 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
99 Id. at 495, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1027. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 495, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1027.
"' See supra notes 55-56 and 99-100 and accompanying text. The Meyers Board also makes it
harder still for an employee to assert a section 8(a)(1) violation of illegal discharge against an
employer since it must be shown that the employer's action was "motivated" by concerted activity. See
supra notes 21 and 72.
The Meyers Board's discussion of the concurrent complaints by Prill and Cove does suggest,
however, that two employees are enough to make an action concerted. See supra note 80 and
accompanying text. See also Root Carlin, 92 N.L.R.B. 1313, 27 L.R.R.M. 1235 (1951), where the Board
stated that section 7 protects activity which "in its inception, involves only a speaker and listener ....
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ing the concerted activity issue to look at the entire "factual situation" of each case.
Examination of the facts of the Meyers case, however, does not lead to conclusions
favorable to the Board's position. As the dissent observed, the Board itself admitted that
there is something "outrageous" about an employer who is willing to endanger its
employees by attempting to force the use of a trailer which had "clearly given up its
ghost."'" Also, the Board conceded that a solitary over-the-road trucker would be
hardpressed to enlist the support of co-workers while away from the home terminal. 104
Nevertheless, the Meyers Board relieved the employer of section 8(a)(1) liability because
Prill's activities were not literally concerted. Employee Prill, and those in his position, can
only be protected by actual concerted activity or assertion of statutory rather than
regulatory requirements. Public policy demands for occupational safety which are not
statutorily defined do not by themselves shelter employees like Prill.
After Meyers, an employer may escape liability under the Act for discharging an
employee who complains solely on his own behalf about safety conditions and thus loses
section 7 protection under the concerted activity concept. The objective standard for
concerted activity which was reinstated by the Board, however, is inconsistent with policy
considerations underlying federal and state labor legislation concerning occupational
safety. It is to be hoped that the absence of defined limitations on the standard will open
the door for a more lenient review of the collective group activity necessary for a showing
of concerted action.
IV. PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. *Statute of Limitations Applicable to Labor Relations Actions:
DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters'
It is a well-settled principle of law that when no federal statute of limitations expressly
applicable to a federal cause of action exists, congressional intent requires the court to
apply the closest analogous statute of limitations under state law.= When adoption of a
state statute of limitations would be at odds with the purposes or operation of the federal
substantive law, however, rules of limitation must be drawn from federal substantive law. 3
Rules of limitation borrowed from federal law may be based either on express limitation
periods drawn from a related federal statute, 4
 or on an alternative basis, such as laches. 5
See supra note 10, Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 494, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1026 (citing Root Carlin, 92 N.L.R.B.
1313, 27 L.R.R.M. 1235 (1951)).
1" Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 499, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1031 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
104 Id.
* By Marguerite M. Dorn, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
103 S. Ct. 2281, 113 L.R.R.M. 2737 (1983).
z See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180-82 (1976); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97,
100-01 (1971); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946).
See Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977); Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, 421 U,S. 454, 465 (1975).
Johnson, 421 U.S. at 462.
Id. at 466. lathes is an equitable doctrine which bars a party from enforcing long neglected
rights. The term signifies an undue lapse of time in enforcing a cause of action and negligence in
failing to act more promptly. See BE,Acn's LAW DICTIONARY 787 (5th ed. 1979).
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In 1981, the United States Supreme Court, in United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell,'
had considered what statute of limitations would apply in suits brought by an employee
against an employer.' Specifically, the Court in Mitchell considered which statute of
limitations would apply to an employee's action against an employer, alleging that the
employer had discharged him for invalid reasons and in violation of its collective bargain-
ing agreement.' The Mitchell Court held that a 90-day state statute of limitations for
vacation of an arbitration award applied to the employee's action.' The Mitchell Court
based its holding on the conclusion that the state statute was most closely analogous to the
underlying federal claim."
The Mitchell Court left unanswered, however, two important questions concerning
the applicable statute of limitations in cases similar to Mitchell. First, the Court's holding
applied only to the employee's claim against the employer." Thus, the Court did not
address the issue of which statute of limitations should govern employee claims against a
union.' Second, the Mitchell Court expressly limited its consideration to a choice between
two state statutes of limitations, and did not consider the alternative of applying a federal
limitation period.'
During the Survey year, the Supreme Court, in DelCostello v. International Brotherhood
of Teamsters," addressed the two questions left unanswered by Mitchell.' Specifically, the
Court in DelCostello considered which statute of limitations should apply in an employee's
suit against an employer and a union, where the employee alleged that the employer
breached its collective bargaining agreement by firing the employee and that the union
breached its duty of fair representation by mishandling the employee's grievance pro-
ceeding." In answer to this question, the Court held that the six-month limitation period
fi 451 U.S. 56, 107 L.R.R.M. 2001 (1981).
7 Id. at 64, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2001.
Id. at 58, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2003. Although the employee in Mitchell had also brought an action
for breach of the union's duty of fair representation, the Court did not decide which statute of
limitations should apply to this claim. Id.
9 Id. at 64, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2004.
'° Id.
" Id. at 58, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2002. Only the employer in Mitchell sought certiorari from the
Court. Id. at 60, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2002.
Id.
Id. at 64, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2002. The petition for certiorari presented only the question of
which state statute of limitations should apply to the facts of Mitchell. Further, the parties did not
contend that a federal limitation period should be applied. An amicus brief did suggest that section
10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 160(b) (1982), was the most appropriate
limitation period. The Court, however, did not address that question. Id. at 60 n.2, t07 L.R.R.M. at
2002 n.2. Section 10(b) of the Act reads in relevant part:
(b) Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any such
unfair labor practice, the Board, or any agent or agency designated by the Board for
such purposes, shall have power to issue and cause to be served upon such person a
complaint stating the charges in that respect, and containing a notice of hearing before
the Board or a member thereof, or before a designated agent or agency, at a place
therein fixed, not less than five days after the serving of said complaint: Provided, That
no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six
months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board ...
29 U.S.C. § 160(b).
H 103 S. Ct. 2281, 113 L.R.R.M. 2737 (1983).
15 Id. at 2285, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2738.
DelCostello, 103 S. Ct. at 2285, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2737.
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under section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act), which governs the filing
of unfair labor practices charges, was the most appropriate statute of limitations."
The petitioner, Philip DelCostello, was employed by Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., and
was represented by the Teamsters Local 557. 18 DelCostello was discharged from his duties
and filed a complaint with the union. 19
 The union brought a formal grievance proceeding
under the company's collective bargaining agreement and a hearing was held before a
joint union-management committee." The committee concluded that DelCostello's griev-
ance was without merit.21
DelCostello then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland against the employer and the union. 22 DelCostello alleged that the employer
had discharged him in violation of the company's collective bargaining agreement and
that the union had represented him in the grievance procedure in a "discriminatory,
arbitrary and perfunctory manner." 23 The district court held in favor of DelCostello."
Thereafter, however, the district court, on its own motion, reconsidered its decision in
light of the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Mitchell and granted summary
judgment for the employer and the union." The district court reasoned that the Supreme
Court's decision in Mitchell compelled application of a state statute of limitations which
governed actions to vacate arbitration awards." On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 27 DelCostello then
applied for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court and the petition was
granted,'
The Court consolidated the DelCostello case with a pending unrelated case, Flowers v.
Local 2602 of United Steel Workers of America. 29 In Flowers, petitioners Donald Flowers and
King Jones were employed by the Bethlehem Steel Corporation and were represented by
the Steelworkers Local 2602. 2" Flowers and Jones filed several grievance complaints with
" Id. at 2285, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2738.
is DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 510 F. Supp. 716, 717 (D.C. Md.
1981).
'° Id. at 718. The employer contended that DelCostello's refusal to perform an assignment was a
"voluntary quit." DelCostello contended, however, that he was wrongfully discharged. Id. at 2285
n.3, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2738 n.3.
20 DelCostello, 103 S. Ct. at 2285, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2738.
21 Id.
22
23
 Id. at 2286, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2738.
" DelCostello, 510 F. Supp. at 720. The union and the employer asserted that the action was
governed by a 30-day state statute of limitations. The district court disagreed, however, holding that
the applicable limitation period was set forth in the three-year state statute governing actions on
contracts. Id.
24
 DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 524 F. Supp. 721, 726, 1 I 1 L.R.R.M.
2761, 2762 (D.C. Md. 1981), aff'd, 679 F.2d 879, 111 L.R.R.M. 3062 (4th Cir. 1982), read, 103 S. Ct.
2281, 113 L.R.R.M. 2737 (1983).
a Id. at 726, 111  L.R.R.M. at 2764. DelCostello had contended that the applicable limitation
period was the six-month period set forth in section 10(b) of the Act. Id. at 726, 111  L.R.R.M. at 2763.
27
 DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 679 F.2d 879, 111  L.R.R.M. 3062
(4th Cir. 1982), read, 103 S. Ct. 2281, 113 L.R.R.M. 2737 (1983). The appeals court decision was
rendered without a published opinion.
DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 459 U.S. 1034 (1982).
" 671 F.2d 87, 109 L.R.R.M. 2805 (2d Cir. 1982), read, 103 S. Ct. 2281, 113 L.R.R.M. 2737
(1983).
" Id. at 88, 109 L.R.R.M. at 2806.
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the union asserting that the company had violated its collective bargaining agreement.'
The union subsequently invoked arbitration proceedings, and the arbitrator issued an
award in favor of the employer."
Flowers and Jones filed an action in the United States District Court for the Western
District of New York, naming both the employer and the union as defendants." The
complainants alleged that the employer had violated the collective bargaining agreement
and that the union had ineptly and carelessly handled the arbitration proceeding on their
behalf." The district court dismissed the complaint against both defendants," but on
appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the lower court
decision." The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari and re-
manded the case for further consideration in light of its decision in Milchell." On remand,
the court of appeals, following Mitchell, held that the suit was governed by a state statute
of limitations governing actions to vacate arbitration awards." The United States Su-
preme Court then granted a writ of certiorari in the Flowers case, and consolidated the
case with DelCostello
The Court in DelCostello considered the employees' contentions that the actions were
governed by the six-month limitation period set forth in section 10(b) of the Act, rather
than by a state statute of limitations governing arbitration awards.'" Concluding that
section 10(b) was the limitation period most closely analogous to the underlying federal
claim, and that it applied to the charges against both the employers and the unions," the
Court reversed the appeals courts' decisions and remanded the case for determination of
whether the six-month limitation period under section 10(b) had expired."
" Id.
3' Id.
" DelCostello, 103 S. Ct. at 2286, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2739.
" Id.
as Id.
36
 Flowers v. Local 2602 of United Steel Workers of Ameri6:a, 622 F.2d 573, 105 L.R.R.M. 2304
(2d Cir. 1980) (unpublished decision).
" United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Flowers, 451 U.S. 965, 107 L.R.R.M. 2144
(1981).
" Flowers, 671 F.2d at 91, 109 L.R.R.M. at 2806. The employees contended, however, that
section 10(b) was the applicable limitation period. Id., 109 L.R.R.M. at 2807.
" United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Flowers, 103 S. Ct. 442 (1982).
" DelCostello, 103 S. Ct. at 2285, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2739. The Court also considered whether the
petitioning employees maintained the right to sue their employers in court. Id. at 2290, 113 L.R.R.M.
at 2741. The Court stated that an employee normally is required to exhaust any grievance against an
employer under the collective bargaining agreement and that, subject to very limited judicial review,
the employee will be bound by the result according to the provisions of the agreement. The Court
asserted that under Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 64 L.R.R.M. 2369 (1967), and Hines v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 91 L.R.R.M. 2481 (1976), however, an employee who was
represented at the grievance proceeding by the union in a discriminatory, dishonest or arbitrary
fashion may bring an action in court against both the employer and the union, notwithstanding the
outcome or finality of the grievance proceeding. DelCostello, 103 S. Ct. at 2290, 113 L.R.R. M. at 2741.
See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 183, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2377; Hines, 424 U.S. at 567, 91 L.R.R.M. at 2488. Such a
suit, the Court noted, comprises two causes of action. The suit against the employer for breach of the
collective bargaining agreement rests on section 301 of the Act. The suit against the union is based on
a claim of unfair representation which is implied under the scheme of the Act. The employee will
prevail only if he or she can prove both claims; that is, the employee bears the burden of demonstrat-
ing that he or she was discharged in violation of the contract and that the union breached its duty of
representation. 103 S. Ct. at 2290, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2742.
41 Id. at 2285, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2738.
42 Id. at 2294-95, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2745. The Court reversed the judgment in the Flowers case
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In support of its holding, the DelCostello Court first found that no federal statute of
limitations expressly applied to the facts of DelCostello." The Court acknowledged that,
generally, in such circumstances congressional intent requires that courts adopt a suitable
rule of timeliness from the most analogous state law." Nevertheless, the Court asserted
that in some circumstances state statutes of limitations can be inappropriate vehicles for
the enforcement of federal law and that Congress did not intend for courts to apply
mechanically a state rule which is at variance with the purpose of federal substantive law."
The DelCostello Court maintained that, in such circumstances, courts must use appropriate
limitation periods set forth in related federal statutes or established under alternative
theories such as laches."
Applying these principles, the Court considered which state statute of limitations
would be most closely related to the action in the present case." After determining that
the limitation period for vacating arbitration awards would be the closest analogous state
statute, the Court asserted that application of that limitation period to the present case
would be at variance with the underlying federal claim, because such limitation period
failed to provide an employee with a reasonable opportunity to vindicate his or her
rights.^" The Court stated that, while the parties in an action to vacate an arbitration
award are normally represented by counsel, employees involved in disputes connected
with collective bargaining agreements will rarely be represented by counsel independent
of the union." Thus, the Court concluded that the employee in a labor dispute has a
strong need for a longer period than in an arbitration dispute in which to evaluate the
merits of his or her case and institute a suit against an employer and a union. 5°
The DelCostello Court then considered as a possible alternative resorting to the state
statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice actions.s' The Court pointed out that,
because the parties conceded that the suit was filed eleven months after the cause of action accrued.
Id. The Court was unsure whether the limitation period had expired with respect to DelCostello's
cause of action. Consequently, the Court remanded the DelCostello case for determination of that
question .
Id. at 2287, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2739.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 2289, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2740.
" Id. The Court cited several cases in which it had declined to apply the state statutes of
limitations to federal actions. The Court cited Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355
(1977), as an example. In Occidental, the Court held that application of state limitation periods to suits
brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act would unduly hinder the policy of the Act. Id. at 372. Similarly, in McAllister v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958), the Court applied the federal limitation period set forth in the
Jones Act to a seaworthiness action under general admiralty law because the two forms of claim were
found to be closely related. Id. at 225.
DelCostello, 103 S. Ct. at 2291, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2742.
" Id. In concluding that the most closely analogous state statute of limitations would not be
applicable in the present case, the Court also addressed the respondents' contention that the Rules of
Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (RDA), mandated application of state statutes of limitations whenever
a federal law does not contain a limitation period. The Court asserted that the RDA does not
establish a mandatory rule that state law be applied in federal interstices, and maintained that the
numerous cases in which the Court has declined to borrow state law demonstrated the validity of that
position. Id. at 2287 n.13, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2740 n.13.
" DelCostello, 103 S. Ct. at 2291, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2742-43.
" Id.
Id. at 2292, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2743. In his dissenting opinion in Mitchell, Justice Stevens had
contended that the limitations period for legal malpractice was most appropriate to an action
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in a commercial setting, a party who sued his or her lawyer for mishandling an arbitration
could recover his or her entire damages, even if the statute of limitations foreclosed any
recovery against the opposing party to the arbitration." Accordingly, the DelCostello Court
stated, a legal malpractice action protects the interests in finality of the party opposing the
litigation, while permitting the misrepresented party to retain the right to sue his or her
lawyer for malpractice under the longer limitation period and to recover his or her entire
damages." The Court asserted, however, that application of the legal malpractice limita-
tion period in the present case would not result in the employee's recovery of his or her
total damages." A union may be held liable, the Court maintained, only for any increase
in the employer's damages directly caused by the union's misrepresentation of the em-
ployee." Consequently, once the legal malpractice statute of limitations foreclosed the
possibility of recovery against the employer, the employee would be unable to collect the
bulk of the damages, even though an action against the union was not barred."
Having determined that all arguably applicable state statutes of limitations were
inappropriate in the present case, the DelCostello Court considered whether federal law
provided a more appropriate alternative limitation period." The Court concluded that
section 10(b) of the Act was the federal statute of limitations most closely analogous to the
present case." The Court reasoned that the section 10(b) six-month period for filing
unfair labor practices charges was designed to accommodate interests similar to those
involved in unfair representation claims." Observing that the National Labor Relations
Board has consistently held that all breaches of a union's duty of fair representation are
unfair labor practices,' the Court stated that claims of both unfair representation and
unfair labor practices are based on similar allegations. 6 ' Consequently, identical evidence
would support both causes of action."
In addition, the Court noted the similarity in the considerations appropriate to a
choice of limitation period under both unfair representation and unfair labor practices
actions." Under both claims, the appropriate statute of limitations is determined by
weighing the general interest in viable bargaining relationships and in the finality of
private settlements against an individual employee's interest in setting aside an unfair
settlement under a collective bargaining agreement." Thus, the Court concluded that the
brought by an employee against a union. Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 72-75, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2008 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Consequently, the Court in DelCostello addressed the applicability of that limitation
period to the present case, noting that the analogy was to a lawyer who mishandled a commercial
arbitration. DelCostello, 103 S. Ct. at 2292, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2743.
" DelCostello, 103 S. Ct. at 2292, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2743.
59 Id.
" Id.
" Id.
w Id,
" Id.
Id. at 2293, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2743-44.
" Id. at 2293, I I 3 L.R.R.M. at 2744.
60 Id. The Court declined to decide the correctness of the Board's position, asserting that "even
if not all breaches of the duty are unfair labor practices, ... the family resemblance is undeniable:' Id.
6`
	 at 2293-94, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2744.
62 Id. Specifically, the Court asserted that both claims rest on allegations of unfair, arbitrary, or
discriminatory treatment of workers by a union. Id.
" Id. at 2294, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2744.
64
	(citing United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 70- 71, 107 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2006
(1981) (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment)).
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close congruence in policy considerations underlying the choice of limitation periods in
both causes of action provided another reason for applying section 10(b) to the present
situation .65
Accordingly, the Court held that the need for uniformity among procedures govern-
ing the similar claims of unfair labor practices and unfair representation, coupled with
the need to balance the competing interests at stake in claims against an employer and a
union, required the adoption of section 10(b) as the appropriate limitation period." The
Court stressed, however, that its holding should not be construed as a departure from the
prior practice of borrowing state limitation periods for federal causes of action. Asserting
that resort to state law remains the norm, the Court stated that the norm should be
ignored only when a rule from a federal law provides a closer analogy than available state
statutes and the policies at stake make the federal rule a significantly more appropriate
vehicle for interstitial lawmaking. 67
In two separate dissenting opinions, Justices Stevens and O'Connor asserted that
congressional intent mandated application of a state statute of limitations to the facts of
the present case, rather than the limitations period under section 10(b)." In his dissenting
opinion," Justice Stevens stated that the policy of using state statutes of limitations in
actions where the federal law is silent on the question of timeliness is a settled practice
well-grounded in the Rules of Decision Act." Justice Stevens suggested that a cause of
action for legal malpractice was most closely analogous to the present action' and,
therefore, he maintained that worker-union disputes should be governed by such a
limitation period."
Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion" stated that Congress intended the use of a
state limitation period where no applicable federal statute of limitations exists." Relying
on Justice Stevens' argument in his dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor stated that a
malpractice action against an attorney provides the closest analogy to an employee's suit
against a union," and that the statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice actions
should have been applied in the present case to the claim against the union." Further-
more, Justice O'Connor maintained that the Court should have followed its decision in
Mitchell and applied the state statute of limitations governing vacation of arbitration
awards to the present claim against the employer."
With the DelCostello decision, the United States Supreme Court finally resolved the
question of timeliness in the context of an employee's action against a union for breach of
its duty of fair representation and against an employer for breach of its collective
bargaining agreement." By adopting the six-month limitation period of section I 0(b) of
" Id.
66
67 Id.
" Id. at 2294, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2745-46.
" Id. at 2295, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2745 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10
 Id. See supra note 48.
103 S. Ct, at 2295, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2745 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" Id.
" Id. at 2295-96, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2745-46 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
74 Id. at 2296, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2746 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
" Id.
78 Id .
" Id.	 •
78
 Prior to the DelCostello decision, the issue of timeliness was governed by the Court's decision in
Mitchell. Because Mitchell addressed only the claim against the employer, the federal courts were
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the Act as the governing statute of limitations, the Court dispelled confusion among the
federal courts and substantially expanded the rights of an individual union member
covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Rather than the 90-day limitation period
set forth in Mitchell, an employee now has six months to file an action against an employer
or a union."
The DelCostello decision is in complete harmony with Supreme Court precedent. The
adoption of section 10(b) as the governing statute of limitations ensures employees a
reasonable opportunity to enforce their rights to fair representation." At the same time,
application of the section 10(b) limitation period upholds basic labor law policies by
restricting the time in which employees may challenge their employers' actions."
Although all statutes of limitations are necessarily arbitrary, the length of the period
permitted for institution of a suit inevitably reflects the legislature's value judgment as to
the point when the interests favoring protecting valid claims are outweighed by the
interests favoring prohibiting the institution of stale claims." In borrowing a state period
of limitation for application to a federal cause of action, a federal court relies on that
state's wisdom in setting a limit on the prosecution of a closely analogous claim." State
legislatures, however, do not devise limitation periods with national interests in mind, and
the federal courts must insure that the acceptance of state law will not interfere with the
implementation of national policy." The DelCostello Court, therefore, properly refused to
mechanically apply a state statute of limitations which was at variance with the policies of
the federal substantive law supporting an employee's right to pursue claims against a
union and an employer." Congress established in section 10(b) of the Act a limitation
period in accordance with its view of the proper balance between an employee's interest in
setting aside a final determination against him and the continued protection of the
collective bargaining system." Consequently, by adopting section 10(b) as the governing
statute of limitations in this case, the DelCostello Court established a uniform rule for all
federal courts consonant with the national interests of federal labor law."
unsure whether to apply the Mitchell holding to claims against a union. Furthermore, prior to
DelCostello, some circuit courts adopted the majority opinion in Mitchell as controlling, while other
courts applied the statute of limitations governing legal malpractice, adopting the views of Justices
Stewart and Stevens. See generally Note, Union Duty of Fair Representation: The Timeliness Issue in Light of
United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 58 NOTRE DAME LAW. 816 (1983).
" See section 10(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). See also supra note 13.
so See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
01 Id.
" Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975).
" Id.
84 Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977).
as Id.
Ba United Parcel Service v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 68, 107 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2006 (1981) (Stewart,
J., concurring in the judgment). In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart maintained that section
10(b) was designed to strengthen and defend the stability of bargaining relationships, and that the
time limitation under section 10(b) reflected the balance drawn by Congress between the competing
interests at stake. Id. at 68-69, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2006.
" In Mitchell, Justice Stewart also recognized the need for uniformity among procedures
followed for similar claims. Id. at 70, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2006.
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V. PREEMPTION
A. *Preemption of State Regulation: Massachusetts Nurses Association v. Dukakis'
The preemption doctrine provides that, in accordance with the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution,2 the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States supersede
contrary state enactments or adjudications. In determining whether state regulation has been
preempted by congressional action, the focal inquiry for a court is the intent of Congress. 3
When Congress has clearly manifested its intent to preempt an area of law, state regulation is
displaced accordingly. 4
 If, however, congressional purpose is unclear, the courts must delimit
the appropriate scope of preemption .3
In enacting the National Labor Relations Act (the Act), 9 Congress did not intend to
preempt the entire labor relations field! Congress did not clearly specify, however, which
aspects of labor law were still open to state regulation . 6 The task has thus fallen to the courts to
determine, in accordance with the policies expressed in the Act, those labor situations which
Congress intended to be controlled exclusively by federal law. 9
The Supreme Court has developed two lines of analysis for determining whether the Act
preempts state law. The principal line of decisions holds that states may not regulate conduct
which is either "arguably protected" or "arguably prohibited" by the Act.' Accordingly, state
* By Richard K. Stavinski, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 726 F.2d 41, 115 L.R.R.M. 2713 (1st Cir. 1984).
• The Supremacy Clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cI. 2.
3
 New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 540, 100
L.R.R.M. 2876, 2903 (1979) (plurality opinion); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 488, 33
L.R.R.M. 2218, 2219-20 (1953).
▪ Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 74 (1941).
5
 Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., .348 U.S. 468, 480-81, 35 L.R.R.M. 2637, 2642 (1955).
Speaking of the Labor Management Relations Act, the Court stated that the Act " 'leaves much to the
states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much.' " Id. (citing Garner v. Teamsters
Union, 346 U.S. 485, 488, 33 L.R.R.M. 2218, 2219-20 (1953)). "This penumbral area can be
rendered progressively clear only by the course of litigation." Weber, 348 U.S. at 480-81, 35 L.R.R.M.
at 2642.
€ 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). The National Labor Relations Act, enacted in 1935, was substan-
tially amended in 1947 by the Labor Management Relations Act. Id. §§ 141-144, 151-167. Reference
herein to the Act refers to the NatiOnal Labor Relations Act as amended.
T San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 256, 244, 43 L.R.R.M. 2838, 2841
(1959); International Association of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 619, 42 L.R.R.M. 2135,
2136 (1958).
8
 "The statutory implications concerning what has been taken from the States and what has been
left to them are of a Delphic nature, to be translated into concreteness by the process of litigating
elucidation." International Association of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 619, 42 L.R.R.M.
2135, 2136 (1958). "The National Labor Relations Act leaves much to the states, though Congress
has refrained from telling us how much." Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 488, 33
L.R.R.M. 2218, 2219-20 (1953).
" See supra note 8.
' 5
 San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244, 43 L.R.R.M. 2838, 2841
(1959). The "Garmon rule" refers to conduct protected under section 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157
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courts may not hear cases involving such conduct, but must defer to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the National Labor Relations Board (Board)." There are two specific exceptions to this
rule. First, states may regulate conduct which is of only peripheral concern to the Act."
Second, the arguably protected or arguably prohibited rule does not prevent state regulation
of conduct involving interests "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility "' 3
A complementary line of preemption analysis was articulated by the Supreme Court
in Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commis-
sion." The Machinists approach indicates that certain kinds of state regulation, although
concerning conduct which is clearly neither protected nor prohibited by the Act, may
nonetheless be preempted by the Act." This view recognizes that Congress, in enacting
the Act, implicitly intended for some conduct to be free from any governmental regula-
tion, whether federal or state." States may not upset the "balance of power" between
labor and management resulting from the congressional choice to leave a labor area
unregulated.' Instead, states must leave some economic tactics of the parties to the "free
play of economic forces."" Under Machinists, state regulation which shifts the economic
balance of power and frustrates effective implementation of the policies of the Act is
invalid unless other evidence of congressional intent to allow the state regulation exists."
In New York Telephone Co. a. New York State Department of Labor,' however, a plurality
of the Supreme Court found that the Machinists analysis did not apply to state laws of
general applicability — laws implementing broad state policies for the benefit of all
citizens and not directed specifically at labor-management relations." The plurality stated
(1982), or prohibited by section 8 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976). See also Local 107, Bridge
Workers v. Perke, 373 U.S. 701, 53 L.R.R.M. 2327 (1963); Marine Engineers Beneficial Assn. v.
Interlake Steamship, 370 U.S. 173, 50 L.R.R.M. 2347 (1962).
" Garman, 359 U.S. at 244-45, 43 L.R.R.M. at 2841. The Garman court determined that the
possibility of conflict between the dictates of the Act and the requirements imposed by state law was
too great to allow state courts to entertain jurisdiction of claims involving conduct arguably protected
or prohibited by the Act. Id. at 244-45, 43 L.R.R.M. at 2842. Federal, as well as state courts must yield
jurisdiction to the Board. Id.
The Court has held that the proper inquiry in determining whether a state court must relinquish
jurisdiction to the Board is whether the controversy presented to the state court is identical to the
controversy which would be presented to the Board. Belknap v. Hale, 103 S. Ct. 3172, 3183, 113
L.R.R.M. 3057, 3064-65 (1983).
Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243, 43 L.R.R.M. at 2841.
" Id. at 244, 43 L.R.R.M. at 2841.
This exception has been construed to apply only to a limited number of situations. See, e.g.,
Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 96 L.R.R.M. 3314 (1977)(damages for intentional infliction of
emotional distress); Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 61 L.R.R.M. 2345 (1966)(action for
libel); International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 351 U.S. 266, 38
L.R.R.M. 2165 (1956)(injunction against violence)..
" 427 U.S. 132, 92 L.R.R.M. 2881 (1976). For a discussion of the Machinists line of labor law
preemption, see Note, Labor Law Preemption, 18 B.C. L. REV. 494 (1977).
" Machinists, 427 U.S. at 141, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2887-88. See also Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377
U.S. 252, 56 L.R.R.M. 2225 (1964).
" Machinists, 427 U.S. at 148, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2886.
" Id. at 148-49, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2886 (citing Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 56
L.R.R.M. 2225, 2228 (1964)).
" New York Telephone Co. v, New York State Department of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 526, 100
L.R.R.M. 2896, 2898 (1979) (plurality opinion).
19
 Machinists, 427 U.S. at 147-48, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2886-87.
2°
	 U.S. 519, 100 L.R.R.M. 2896 (1979) (plurality opinion).
21
 440 U.S. at 532.33, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2900-01 (plurality opinion). New York Telephone involved a
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that it would be more difficult to infer congressional intent to preempt general state laws
than to infer intent to preempt state laws directly regulating labor conduct." In addition,
the New York Telephone plurality concluded that the New York unemployment compensa-
tion statute at issue involved "interests 'deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility' "
and should not be preempted in the absence of "compelling congressional direction." 23
These two views, however, were rejected by a majority of the Justices," and the case was
decided on other grounds. 25
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in
Massachusetts Nurses Association v. Dukakis," considered the issue of whether a Massachu-
setts hospital cost containment statute" was preempted by the National Labor Relations
Act. The court held that the statute, which limited the overall amount that hospitals could
receive annually in payment for their services, did not impermissibly alter the balance of
bargaining power between the hospital and its employees and therefore was not preemp-
ted by the Act under Machinists." The court reasoned that the statute only affected the
bargaining relationship indirectly, and was not an attempt to influence the substantive
New York statute which provided unemployment compensation for strikers. Id. The plurality found
that the unemployment statute was not designed to regulate the bargaining relationship but to
promote the public purpose of providing for employment security. Id. For further discussion of New
York Telephone see Cox, Recent Developments in Federal Labor Law Preemption, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 227
(1980); Note Labor Law Preemption of State Unemployment Compensation Law Paying Benefits to Strikers Not
Mandated by Federal Labor Law, 55 Tut.. L. REV. 268 (1980); 1978 - 79 Annual Survey of Labor Law —
Unemployment Benefits to Strikers: New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department of
Labor, 21 B.C. L. REV. 94 (1979).
22
 New York Telephone, 440 U.S. at 533, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2901 (plurality opinion).
23 Id. at 539-40, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2903 (quoting San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236, 244, 43 L.R.R.M. 2838, 2841 (1959)).
24 Three Justices joined in the Court's plurality opinion. Id. at 522, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2846
(plurality opinion). Justice Brennan, concurring separately, did not believe that the New York statute
was a law of general applicability, and was equivocal on the question of whether laws of general
applicability should be accorded greater deference. Id. at 546 & n.*, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2905 & n.*
(Brennan, J,, concurring in the judgment). Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, concluded
that it was not relevant that the New York law was one of general applicability. Id. at 550, 100
L.R.R.M. at 2907 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). The three dissenters also found it
immaterial whether the statute was a law of general applicability. Id. at 557-58, 100 L.R.R.M. at
2909-10 (Powell, J,, dissenting).
Justice Brennan stated that he found "more substance" in the plurality's claim that the New York
unemployment statute regulated "interests deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility." Id. at
546 n.*, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2905 n.* (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Blackmun,
concurring with Justice Marshall, and the three dissenting Justices stated that they would keep the
"deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility" exception to state law preemption limited to a
narrow range of state tort laws involving violence, libel, or intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Id. at 550-5L 100 L.R.R.M. at 2907 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 559-60, 100
L.R.R.M. at 2910 (Powell, J., dissenting).
" Six Justices agreed that the New York statute should be upheld on the grounds that Congress,
in enacting the National Labor Relations Act and the Social Security Act, had intended to allow state
unemployment statutes such as New York's. Id. at 544, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2903 (plurality opinion); id. at
546-47, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2905 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 549, 100 L.R.R.M. at
2907 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
" 726 F.2d 41, 115 L.R.R.M. 2713 (1st Cir. 1984).
27 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6A, II 31-73 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980 & Supp. 1984). See infra notes
32-35 and accompanying text.
" 726 F.2d at 42-43, 115 L.R.R.M. 2713-14. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6A, §§ 31-73 (Michie/Law.
Co-op. 1980 & Supp. 1984). See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
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aspects of the bargaining process." In addition, the court indicated that the Massachusetts
statute was a law of general applicability not directed at labor-management issues but
concerned with hospital costs — "an 'interest ... deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility.' " 3° Consequently, the court stated that the statute was valid because there
was no evidence of " 'compelling congressional direction' " to preclude the hospital cost
regulation at issue.' The court, therefore, found the statute valid under both Machinists
and the plurality decision of New York Telephone.
The result in Dukakis is in accord with the preemption analysis articulated by the
Supreme Court in Machinists. Since the Massachusetts statute does not significantly affect
the balance of bargaining power between labor and management, it follows under
Machinists that the statute should not be preempted. To the extent that the First Circuit
adopts the rationale of the New York Telephone plurality, however, the Dukakis decision
evidences a narrow view of the scope of the Act's preemption. By extending the "deeply
rooted in local feeling and responsibility" exception to include hospital cost regulation,
the court significantly expands the category of general state laws which may be deemed
presumptively valid and preempted only upon a showing of "compelling congressional
direction." Because a majority of the justices in New York Telephone rejected the analysis of
that Court's plurality opinion, however, the state of the Act's preemption law regarding
state laws of general applicability and the "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibil-
ity" exception should still be considered unsettled.
The controversy in Dukakis arose from the passage by the Massachusetts Legislature
of a statute aimed at curtailing rising hospital costs by establishing a prospective hospital
cost reimbursement system." Under the statute, a hospital's total yearly reasonable costs
are projected in advance using a formula approved by the Massachusetts Rate Setting
Commission. 33 The resulting figure represents the maximum amount the hospital is
allowed to collect for its services for the entire year.34 The statute contained no provision
allowing employee wage increases to be "passed through" and charged to patients. 33
The Massachusetts Nurses Association (MNA or the Association) brought suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, contending that the Massa-
chusetts statute was preempted by the Act." Specifically, the MNA alleged that by
w 726 F.2d at 43-44, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2714-15.
3° Id. at 44, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2715 (quoting San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236, 244, 43 L.R.R.M. 2838, 2841 (1959)). The court does not specifically use the phrase "law of
general applicability" but the label is applicable to the court's description of the Massachusetts statute.
The court's description of the Massachusetts statute directly parallels the characterization of a law of
general applicability used by Justice Stevens in New York Telephone. See supra note 21 and accompany-
ing text. The First Circuit says of the Massachusetts statute: "[it] is oriented toward neither labor-
management issues in general nor wages in particular. The subject of hospital cost containment, for
the benefit of all citizens, lies within 'the historic police powers of the States ... it is an 'interest .. .
deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility.' " Dukakis, 726 F.2d at 44, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2715
(quoting San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 2313, 244, 43 L.R.R.M. 2838, 2841
(1959)).
3 ' Dukakis, 726 F.2d at 44, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2715 (quoting San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244, 43 L.R.R.M. 2838, 2841 (1959)).
" MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 6A §§ 31-73 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980 & Supp. 1984).
" MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 6A §§ 32, 34A (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980 & Supp. 1984).
34 Id.
" See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6A §§ 31-73 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980-& Supp. 1984), Massachusetts
Nurses Association v. Dukakis, 570 F. Supp. 628, 635,114 L.R.R.M. 2456, 2461 (D. Mass. 1983), aff 'd,
726 F.2d 41, 115 L.R.R.M. 2713 (1st Cir. 1984).
38 Dukakis, 570 F. Supp. at 635, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2461.
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restricting the amount that hospitals could receive for their services, the statute impermis-
sibly interfered with the Association's collective bargaining efforts and, therefore, should
be preempted by federal labor law. 37 The MNA argued that the statute placed the
Association at a disadvantage in attempting to negotiate wage increases from the hospi-
tals. 38 The hospitals, the MNA charged, could contend that they were unable to pay wage
increases due to the cost restrictions in the statute and the failure of the statute to allow
for wage increases to be passed on to the patients. 39 In addition, the MNA noted, hospitals
were reducing their nursing staffs because of the economic effects of the statute.°
The district court judge found no intent of Congress to preclude the Massachusetts
statute.° The statute, the judge held, did not affect the relative bargaining power of labor
and management in a way that interfered with the purposes of the Act. 43 Rather, the
judge concluded, the statute was "neutral and permit[ted] the 'free play of economic
forces in the collective bargaining process.' "43 Accordingly, the district court found the
Massachusetts statute to be a permissible expression of state policy and not preempted by
federal labor law."
The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the Massachusetts statute was not an obstacle
to accomplishing the purposes of Congress in enacting the Act. 45 The court reasoned that
previous Supreme Court cases in which preemption had been found involved state
statutes which reached directly into the labor-management relationship.° In the Dukakis
case, however, the state statute only affected the bargaining process indirectly and was not
an attempt by the state to influence or dictate specific terms of the collective bargaining
agreement 4 7 The court acknowledged that by restricting the hospital's annual gross
income, the Massachusetts statute limited the money available for collective bargaining.°
Nevertheless, the court pointed out that a myriad of state regulatory provisions, such as
price controls or health and safety requirements, have similar effects of abating the
overall income of a business. 49 Although such regulations may decrease the funds avail-
able to a business, they do not, the court determined, interfere with the rights of labor or
management under the Act or detract from the practices and procedures of collective
" Id. at 638, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2464.
38 Id.
" Id. at 635, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2461.
4° Id.
Id. at 639-40, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2465.
42 Id.
" Id. at 640, 114 L.R,R.M. at 2465 (quoting New York Telephone Co. v. New York State
Department of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 526, 100 L.R.R.M. 2896, 2898 (1979)).
A' Dukakis, 570 F. Supp. at 640, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2465.
" Massachusetts Nurses Association v. Dukakis, 726 F.2d 41, 42, 115 L.R.R.M. 2713, 2713-14
(1st Cir. 1984).
" Id. at 43, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2714 (citing Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 427 U.S. 132, 92 L.R.R.M. 2881 (1976); Teamsters
Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 56 L.R.R.M. 2225 (1964); International Brotherhood of Teamsters
v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 43 L.R.R.M. 2374 (1959)).
47 Dukakis, 726 F.2d at 43-44, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2714-15 (citing Amalgamated Transit Union,
Division 819 v. Byrne, 568 F.2d 1025, 96 L.R.R.M. 2440 (3d Cir. 1977)(en banc); id. at 1035, 96
L.R.R.M. at 2449 (Aldisert, J., dissenting); id. at 1042, 96 L.R.R.M. at 2454 (Adams, J., dissenting)).
' Dukakis, 726 F.2d at 45, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2715.
" Id.
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bargaining." Thus, the court concluded, the Massachusetts hospital cost containment
statute was a valid state regulation and was not preempted by the Act."
The First Circuit also indicated that the Massachusetts statute was one of general
applicability, passed pursuant to the state's police powers, and directed at health care and
not labor relations." Hospital cost containment, the court stated, was an "'interest .. .
deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility,' " and, therefore, the state's action
should only be preempted upon a showing of " 'compelling congressional direction' " to
preclude the state regulation. 53 The court reviewed congressional hospital cost legislation
similar to the legislation enacted by Massachusetts which, the court determined, contem-
plated state passage of legislation containing hospital cost provisions such as the provi
sions contained in the Massachusetts statute. 54 Consequently, the court concluded that
Congress meant to encourage, and not to preempt, legislation such as the Massachusetts
statute. 55
Although the result in Dukakis is well in accord with established law, the Dukakis
court's opinion suggests a narrowing of the scope of the Act's preemption of state law.
The plaintiff in Dukakis could not contend that the arguably protected or arguably
prohibited line of the Act's preemption cases required preemption of the Massachusetts
statute because the Act clearly does not protect or prohibit state health cost regulation.
Therefore, the only available argument for preemption of the Massachusetts statute was
that, contrary to the principles of Machinists, the statute intruded upon an area of labor
relations which Congress intended to be unregulated. Under Machinists, the inquiry is
whether the state regulation at issue alters the balance of bargaining power between labor
and management in a way that obstructs the processes of the Act." State laws violating this
standard are preempted by the Act, unless Congress has otherwise evidenced an intent to
allow the state regulation."
As the First Circuit correctly held, the Massachusetts statute is valid under the
Machinists standard. The Massachusetts statute does not impose a direct or significant shift
in the balance of collective bargaining power between the parties, and is not concerned
with the substantive aspects of the bargaining process." The statute does not intrude into
the labor-management relationship but merely limits "the universe in which [the] collec-
tive bargaining takes place." 59 Furthermore, the court's ruling is supported by other court
decisions which have upheld state action far more intrusive of the bargaining processes
than is the Massachusetts statute."
5° Id.
51 Id .
52 Id. at 44, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2715. See also supra note 30.
53 Id. (quoting San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244, 43 L.R.R.M.
2838, 2841 (1959)).
" Dukakis, 726 F.2d at 44-45, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2715.
33 Id.
56 Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Com-
mission, 427 U.S. 132, 146-48, 92 L.R.R.M. 2881, 2886-87 (1976).
n See New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 100
L.R.R.M. 2896 (1979) (plurality opinion); id. at 549, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2906 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring).
" Dukakis, 726 F.2d at 43-44, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2714-15.
" Id. at 45, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2715.
66 See New York Telephone Co, v. New York State Department of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 100
L.R.R.M. 2896 (1979). The state statute in New York Telephone directly affected the labor-
management relationship by providing unemployment benefits to strikers. Id. at 523-24, 100
270	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 26:121
Because the Massachusetts statute appears to be valid under Machinists, there seems
to be no reason in Dukakis for adopting a more restrictive view of the scope of the Act's
preemption than the facts of the case necessitate. The court, however, in determining that
the Massachusetts statute was not susceptible to preemption, indicated that it viewed the
statute as a law of general applicability, and stated that the statute's objective of hospital
cost containment was an " 'interest ... deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility.' ""
The court concluded, therefore, that the statute should not be preempted without
evidence of " 'compelling congressional direction' " to proscribe the state action. 62 .This
portion of the First Circuit's opinion thus suggests an approach to labor law preemption
analysis similar to that used in the Supreme Court's New York Telephone plurality opinion."
The First Circuit's reliance on the generality of the Massachusetts statute is, however,
misplaced. State laws which intrude upon the scope of the Act's regulation may be laws
which are directed specifically at labor-management affairs or laws which carry a general
public purpose beyond the area of labor relations." Consequently, there is no compelling
reason to distinguish laws of general applicability from other laws for purposes of labor
law preemption. The issue of the generality of a law misses the point. As one commen-
tator has pointed out, although a general law may be less likely to interfere with the
policies of the Act, whether a law is general or specific the pertinent inquiry for purposes
of labor law preemption is the same." In every case, courts should look to the impact
which the state law has on the collective bargaining relationship, and ascertain whether
the state is attempting to reconcile or influence labor-management relationships in a way
which would upset the balance struck by Congress." Accordingly, the particular aspect of
a state law which affects the labor area should be the focal point of analysis and the
broader general purpose of the law should not provide increased protection from
preemption.
Similarly, the First Circuit's extension of the "deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility" exception to include hospital cost legislation accords undue deference to
state regulation which may affect labor relations. Requiring "compelling congressional
direction" for preemption is a substantial deviation from the general standard for
L.R.R.M. at 2897. Moreover, employers were required to finance the unemployment compensation
system, and hence, the strike against them. Id.
In Amalgamated Transit Union, Division 819 v. Byrne, 568 F.2d 1025, 1029, 96 L.R.R.M. 2440,
2443 (3d Cir. 1977)(en banc), the Third Circuit held that federal labor law policy did not operate to
preempt action by New Jersey's Governor threatening to withdraw state subsidies from any private
transportation companies which agreed to include unlimited cost of living increases in their collective
bargaining agreements with their union. The First Circuit, in Dukakis, stated that it considered Byrne
authority for its holding. Dukakis, 726 F.2d at 44, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2715.
" Dukakis, 726 F.2d at 44, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2715 (quoting San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244, 43 L.R.R.M. 2838, 2841 (1959)).
62 Dukakis, 72fi F.2d at 44, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2715 (quoting San Diego Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236, 244, 43 L.R.R.M. 2838, 2841 (1959)).
63 See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
64 11]t is well settled that the general applicability of a state cause of action is not sufficient to
exempt it from pre-emption. [1]t [has not] mattered whether the States have acted through laws of
broad general application rather than laws specifically directed towards the governance of industrial
relations.'" New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 558,
100 L.R.R.M, 2896, 2910 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Farmer v. United Brotherhood of
Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 300, 94 L.R.R.M. 2759, 2763 (1977)).
a See Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV, 1337, 1356 (1972).
6° Id, Accord, New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department of Labor, 440 U.S. 519,
558, 100 L.R.R.M. 2896, 2910 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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preemption established in Machinists, and the exception should be sparingly extended.
The Machinists rationale presumes that some areas of labor relations are to be free from
any governmental regulation and that state laws will be invalid if they alter the economic
balance of power between labor and management." A requirement of "compelling
congressional direction" makes a finding of preemption significantly more difficult, and
would protect some state laws which would otherwise be preempted under Machinists."
For these reasons, a majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court have been unwilling to
extend the "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility" exception on the grounds
that to do so would be inconsistent with the principles of Machinists and other precedents
delimiting the scope of the exception. 69
 These Justices would keep the "deeply rooted in
local feeling and responsibility" exception limited to a narrow range of state laws regulat-
ing tortious conduct involving violence, libel, or intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress." The reasoning of these Justices should be followed. If the exception were ex-
tended to include health care cost regulation, it is likely that most other exercises of a
state's police power also would fall within the exception. Such an extension of the "deeply
rooted in local feeling and responsibility" exception would, therefore, significantly nar-
row the boundaries of federal labor law preemption. The extension could allow some
state regulation which substantially intrudes upon labor relations to escape federal
preemption because a "compelling congressional direction" to preempt cannot be shown.
In sum, the result reached by the First Circuit in Dukakis is in accordance with the
principles of labor law preemption set forth by the Supreme Court in Machinists. Inas-
much as the Massachusetts statute at issue did not significantly alter the balance of
bargaining power between the hospital and its employees or intrude into the labor-
management relationship, the statute was not subject to preemption under Machinists.
The First Circuit's analysis of labor preemption law, however, was more restrictive than
was necessary to decide the case. The court's treatment of the Massachusetts statute as a
general state law and its extension of the "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibil-
ity" exception to include hospital cost legislation indicates a more deferential regard for
general state regulations and a more limited view of the reach of federal labor laW
preemption.
B. *State Action Under Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act:
Kolinske v. Lubbers'
Labor organizations have the right to determine their own rules regarding member-
ship.' Title 29, section 158 of the United States Code expressly grants labor organizations
the right to make agreements requiring, as a condition of employment, that all employees
67 Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Com-
mission, 427 U.S. 132, 145.48, 92 L.R.R.M. 2881, 2886-87 (1976).
tiE' New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 549, 100
L.R.R.M. 2896, 2906 (1979) (Blackmun, j., concurring in the judgment).
69 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
n See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
* By Terry Barchenko, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW 'REVIEW.
' 712 F.2d 471, 113 L.R.R.M. 2957 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1982) in relevant part provides that this paragraph "shall not impair
the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention
of its membership therein; . . ." Id.
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become members of the organization. 3
 Consequently, labor organizations may in practice
control access to employment through their membership restrictions. Because the union's
power to control membership is authorized by statute, the question arises whether
eligibility requirements imposed by a labor organization constitute state action and are
potentially violative of the first amendment.' If no state action is involved, eligibility
requirements imposed by a labor organization are only private conduct that is not subject
to constitutional scrutiny.° Conversely, if eligibility requirements bear the imprimatur of
the state, the union must establish a compelling reason for imposing requirements which
indirectly restrict the right of freedom of association.°
Several cases have addressed the question of whether a union shop clause negotiated
pursuant to the Railway Labor Act (RLA) constituted state action. In Railway Employes'
Department v. Hanson,' the Supreme Court held that a union shop clause constituted state
action. In Hanson, the Supreme Court considered a provision in a labor contract requiring
all employees, as a condition of their continued employment, to become union members
and to maintain that membership.° The Court upheld the constitutionality of such a
provision on the basis of federal preemption, reasoning that section 2(11) of the RLA
expressly superseded state laws prohibiting the union shop. Accordingly, although the
Court upheld the union shop provision, it reached the constitutional claims presented
because the private agreement was made pursuant to federal law thereby providing the
required governmental action.° The Court's finding of state action in Hanson, therefore,
rested upon federal preemption of a contrary state law.
In two later cases, 1° the Court was confronted with challenges by union members to
the use of union dues for political purposes which some of the dissenting union members
opposed. Both cases arose under the RLA, making the Hanson analysis controlling in
disposing of the constitutional claims presented. The Court in these cases focused on the
• 29 U.S.C. § 157 declares in relevant part that: "employees ... shall have the right to refrain
from any or all activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section
158(a)(3) of this title." Id.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) provides: "... [T]hat nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of
the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization .
.. to require as a condition of employment membership therein . . . ." Id.
▪Kolinske, 712 F.2d at 471, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2957.
5 Id. at 474, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2960.
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 25 (1976) (where the Court stated that governmental
action which may affect the first amendment's protection of the freedom to associate is subject to
close scrutiny).
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court further stated that interference with the right of political associa-
tion "may be sustained if the state demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs
narrowly tailored means to avoid unnecessary abridgment of First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 25.
See also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) ("[A] sufficiently important govern-
ment interest ... can justify incidental limitation on First Amendment freedoms. . . .").
• 351 U.S. 225, 38 L.R.R.M. 2099 (1956).
5 Id. at 227, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2100.
o Id at 232, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2101. Although the Supreme Court noted that the right to work is
frequently considered within the concept of liberty within the meaning of the due process clauses,
the Court focused on the power of Congress under the commerce clause to decide whether the
interests of workers are better served by one type of union agreement or another. Id. at 239-35, 38
L.R.R.M. at 2102.
'° Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 53 L.R.R.M. 2128
(1963); International Association of Machinists v. Street, 567 U.S. 740, 48 L.R.R.M. 2345 (1961).
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language of section 2(11) of the RLA and interpreted the provision to deny unions the
statutory power to use funds collected from union members to support ideological or
political activities that the members oppose."
During the Survey year the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, in Kolinske
v. Lubbers,' addressed the issue of whether an agency shop clause" provision negotiated
by a labor organization with an employer constituted state action. Because a union is a
private organization, the threshold question was whether the alleged infringement of a
union member's first amendment right to freedom of association was "fairly attributable
to the state.' The Kolinske court held, in a unanimous decision, that the agency shop
clause, and attendant restrictions attached to strike benefits funded in part by those
agency fees, did not constitute state action."
The decision in Kolinske is of particular interest because there is currently a split
among the circuits that have been confronted with the question of state action under a
union shop clause. it seems likely, however, that such a provision will not be deemed to
constitute state action because a union shop clause is neither compelled by federal law nor
exercised as a state created right or privilege.
The Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board (Board) investigated
the charges brought by Kolinske, the dissenting union member, and found that the
union's eligibility requirements" for strike benefits were lawful and nondiscriminatory."
The General Counsel of the Board affirmed the findings of the Regional Director and the
charges were dismissed.' Kolinske then initiated suit in federal district court against the
UAW and the General Counsel of the Board' 9 alleging that both parties had violated his
" Allen, 373 U.S. at 118, 53 L.R.R.M. at 2131-32; Street, 567 U.S. at 768-69, 48 L.R.R.M. at
2372-73. The Court's decisions in Hanson and Street controlled the decision of that reached by the
Court in the next case to come before it. In Abrood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209,
224-26, 95 L.R.R.M. 2411, 2416-17 (1977), the Court upheld the right of the union to assess
nonmember fees for the purpose of collective bargaining, but held that the union could not
constitutionally use agency fees for political purposes unrelated to its duties as collective bargaining
representative. Id. at 235- 36, 95 L.R.R.M. at 2421.
712 F.2d 471, 113 L.R.R.M. 2959 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Under an agency shop clause union membership is optional, but nonunion employees, as a
condition of employment, must pay to the union each month an agency fee equal to the monthly
membership dues established by the union for its members. Id. at 472, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2958.
14 712 F.2d at 474, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2960 (citing Rendall-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982),
quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982)). The Court stated:
the ultimate issue in determining whether a person is subject to suit under 1983 is the
same question posed in cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment: is the alleged
infringement of federal rights 'fairly attributable to the state' . ...If the action of the
[private entity] is not state action, our inquiry ends.
712 F.2d at 474, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2960.
712 F.2d at 480, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2965.
' 6 Eligibility for strike benefits was determined by guidelines established by the union. Id. at 473,
113 L.R.R.M. at 2959. Conditions of eligibility included registration, nondelinquency in dues or
agency fees, active employment prior to the strike, and participation in strike activity. Id. Non-
member agency fee payers like Kolinske were eligible to receive strike benefits provided the condi-
tions for receiving such payments were satisfied. Id.
' 7
 712 F.2d at 474, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2960.
'" Id.
'° Id. The district court determined that it was without jurisdiction to review the Director's
decision not to issue a complaint. Kolinske v. Lubbers, 516 F. Supp. 1171, 1180-81, 107 L.R.R.M.
2977, 2984-85 (D.D.C. 1981). The court, however, denied the union's motion to dismiss the allega-
tions against it. 516 F. Supp. at 1181, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2985.
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rights under section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) 2° as well as under the
first and fifth amendments to the Constitution."' In addition, Kolinske alleged that the
union had also breached the duty of fair representation it owed him by forcing nonmem-
bers to participate in strike activities in order to receive strike benefits. 22
 The district court
held that the UAW's use of agency fees constituted state action and that the union's denial
of strike benefits constituted a breach of its duty of fair representation. 23 On cross-
motions for summary judgment the district court determined that the union's refusal to
pay strike benefits not only constituted a breach of its duty of fair representation, but in
addition violated Kolinske's first amendment rights."' The union appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia."
In reversing the district court's finding of state action, the circuit court rejected the
lower court's determination that the state action question was controlled by the Supreme
Court's holdings in Railway Employes' Department v. Hanson and its progeny. 36
 The court in
Kolinske distinguished prior cases under the RLA from the present case, which arose
under the National Labor Relations Act." The Kolinske, court considered the federal
preemption of a contrary state law to be the critical factor in the finding of state action in
Hanson .28
 In the court's view, section 8(a)(3) of the Act, on the other hand, merely
authorized the use of agency shop fees and did not expressly preempt state law to create
direct involvement of the federal government in the enforcement of the agency shop
clause as was the case with the union shop clause in Hanson. 19 The court, therefore,
concluded that prior Supreme Court decisions regarding the question of state action
under the RLA were not applicable to the issue in Kolinske." Accordingly, the court
proceeded to analyze the question of whether the UAW's eligibility rules constituted state
action . 3 '
20 29 U.S.C. 157 (1982); Kolinske v. Lubbers, 712 F.2d at 474, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2960 (D.D.C.
1981).
21 712 F.2d at 474, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2960.
' 2 Id. The duty of fair representation arises'out of the exclusive representational status of a
union. The exclusive representation status is granted a union by section 9(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §
159(1) (1982).
Kolinske, 516 F. Supp. at 1080-81, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2484-85.
" Kolinske v. UAW, 530 F. Supp. 728, 733-35, 109 L.R.R.M. 2464, 2467-69 (D.D.C. 1982). The
district court awarded Kolinske damages of $130.00 equaling the amount of strike benefits which he
would have received had he participated in strike activities originally. Id. at 735, 109 L.R.R.M. at
2469.
25
 The UAW appealed this award pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
" See Railway Employes' Department v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 38 L.R.R.M. 2099 (1956). See
supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
Kolinske, 712 F.2d at 475, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2961. Accord, Reid v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
443 F.2d 408, 410, 77 L.R.R.M. 2609, 2611 (10th Cir. 1971).
Kolinske, 712 F.2d at 475-76, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2961 ("Because the federal statute [in Hanson]
did more than merely authorize the use of a union shop clause and allowed a private agreement to
override contrary state law, the Constitutional deprivation alleged by the plaintiff in Hanson was
caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the government.").
29 Id. at 476, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2962.
3°
 The court noted that although the Supreme Court has not decided the issue of state action
under section 8(a)(3) of the Act, the Court has stated on other occasions that union rules governed by
the Act do not involve state action. Id. (citing United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 112
n.16, 110 L.R.R.M. 2609, 2617 n.16 (1982); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200, 20
FEP Cases 1, 4 (1979); American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402, 26
L.R.R.M. 2084, 2092 (1950)). See also Kolinske, 712 F.2d at 477 n.7, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2962 n.7.
21 Kolinske, 712 F.2d at 477, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2962.
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The court noted that in addressing the question of state action previous cases decided
by the Supreme Court relied on a two tier analysis to determine whether private conduct
should be attributed to the state. 32 According to the court, the first part of the analysis
requires an examination of whether the alleged constitutional infringement was caused by
the exercise of some right or privilege created by the state or by a person for whom the
state is responsible. 33 The second part of the test, the court stated, requires a determina-
tion of whether the person responsible for the deprivation may be held to be a state
actor.34 This two part test was employed by the Kolinske court to determine whether the
agency shop clause at issue compelled a finding of state action.35 The court summarily
concluded that the first part of the state action test was not satisfied because the agency
shop clause was neither compelled by federal law nor exercised as a state created right or
privilege. 36 In so doing, the court rejected the district court's finding that congressional
authorization of the agency shop clause constituted state action. The circuit court noted
that it is well settled that a state's mere authorization of private conduct does not warrant a
finding of state action.37 The court therefore held that, although the Act provides a
framework for collective bargaining, the Act is neutral regarding the content of particular
agreements. According to the court, the parties in this case, as parties to a private
contract, were free to accept or reject an agency shop clause without government inter-
ference. 35
After concluding that adoption of the agency shop clause was a decision by two
private parties lacking direct government influence, the court turned to a discussion of
the second part of the analysis to determine whether the alleged constitutional depriva-
tion was caused by a state actor. The court concluded that none of the traditional indicia
for attributing private conduct to the state were present in Kolinske." For example, the
court pointed out that collective bargaining has never been the exclusive province of the
state. Consequently, the UAW and McLaughlin Company could not be held to be
performing exclusive public functions." Similarly, the court noted that the agency shop
clause would not pass the so-called state compulsion test ." since neither state nor federal
law compelled adoption of the agency shop clause at issue in Kolinske.43 Third, the court
32 Id. (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982)).
" Id. (citing e.g., North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 602-03 (1975)
(pre-judgment garnishment); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 73-74 (1972) (pre-judgment attach-
ment)).
" Id. (citing Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937). The court noted, for example, situations which have given
rise to a finding of state action: where the private party performed what was traditionally an
exclusively public function, Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953); where the private party
acted in concert with the state, Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941; the private conduct was compelled by state law,
Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170-71 (1970); or where a nexus exists between the private
party and the state such that conduct should be attributed to the state, Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
Kolinske, 712 F.2d at 477, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2962-63.
36 Id. at 477-78, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2963.
" Id. at 478 (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 354 (1974)).
31' Id. at 477, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2963.
" Id.
4° For a discussion of the "public function" doctrine, see, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461,
468-70 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505-10 (1946).
'I See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170-71 (1970) (the state compulsion test
examines private conduct compelled by express legal sanctions or by state enforced custom).
*2 Kolinske, 712 F.2d at 478, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2963.
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rejected any finding of state action based upon joint conduct between the private party
and the state.'" The court, therefore, concluded that Kolinske demonstrated no direct
governmental involvement in either the parties' adoption or adherence to the agency
shop clause."
In addition, the court rejected any notion that extensive federal regulation of unions
establishes the requisite nexus between the UAW and the government." The court
reasoned that determining whether the requisite nexus is present requires an examina-
tion of whether the action of a private party allegedly resulting in a constitutional
deprivation was based upon the independent judgment of that party." In Kolinske the
court found that the decision of the UAW and McLaughlin Company to adopt the agency
shop clause was based upon the judgment of the parties to the contract and could not be
attributed to the state. 47
 Relying on the forgoing reasoning, the court opined that the
collective bargaining agreement in Kolinske was privately negotiated and privately en-
forced. Consequently, the court dismissed Kolinske's first amendment claim since the
decision to adopt the agency shop clause and attendant strike benefits lacked the requisite
state action."
Having concluded that the requisite state action was not present, the court turned to
Kolinske's second allegatiOn that the union had breached its duty of fair representation."
A union's duty of fair representation has been described as requiring the union to "serve
the interests of all [employees] without hospitality or discrimination toward any, to
exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary
conduct." SD The Kolinske court reversed the district court's holding regarding this issues'
" Id. at 479, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2963. The court noted that state action was found to exist in Lugar
because the state was directly involved in the procedure by which a private creditor protected its
interest in a debtor's property because a court clerk assisted in the pre-judgment attachment of the
debtor's property. Cf. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978) (no state action held
to exist through self-help because no state officials were directly involved).
" Kolinske, 712 F.2d at 478, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2964.
" For example, the court noted that in a pair of cases involving extensive state regulation of the
affairs of two private entities, a nursing home and a private school, the Supreme Court determined
that state action was not present. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1003-12 (1982) (nursing home's
decision regarding a Medicaid patient did not constitute state action even though the nursing home
was extensively regulated and required the physician's certification regarding the necessity of certain
medical treatment before the state would pay for the services); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 832,
841-43 (1982) (extensive regulation of private school offering alternative program for problem
students which received 90 percent of school funds— decision to discharge the employees was held
to be the act of a private party and therefore beyond constitutional protection).
4° Kolinske, 712 F.2d at 480, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2964-65.
47 Id. The court similarly dismissed a further argument advanced by Kolinske that the agency
shop clause is attributable to the state because of the power of the federal government to enforce the
agreement. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18-23 (1948) (state action present where state court
acts to enforce a racially restrictive covenant to prevent a sale between a willing seller and buyer). The
issue in Kolinske, the court reasoned, was not controlled by Shelley. Rather, Kolinske concerned a
private agreement which was neither mandated nor enforced by the government. Kolinske, 712 F.2d
at 480, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2965.
48 Kolin.sk.e, 712 F.2d at 480, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2965.
" Id. at 481, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2965. A union's duty of fair representation arises out of the
exclusive representational status granted a union by section 9(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
" Kolinske, 712 F.2d at 481, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2965 (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177, 64
L.R.R.M. 2369, 2371 (1967)).
" Kolinske v. UAW, 530 F. Supp. at 735, 109 L.R.R.M. at 2468. The district court reasoned that
the union breached its duty of fair representation because it was inherently discriminatory to force
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and found that the union's duty of fair representation arising out of the union's exclusive
representational status does not extend to its eligibility rules for strike benefits. Instead,
the court stated that the duty of fair representation extends only to matters in which the
union represents employees at all — matters relating to rates of pay, wages, hours or
other conditions of employments' — and does not affect an employee's relationship with
the union structure." The court therefore concluded that since the eligibility rules are
solely an internal union matter without substantial impact on a participant's relations with
his employer, the union cannot be held to have breached its duty of fair representation:54
A conflict currently exists among the circuit courts concerning the question of state
action under section 8(a)(3) of the Act." The Tenth Circuit's decision in Reid v. McDonnell
Douglas56 is in accord with the analysis in Kolinske. The Reid case involved an action
brought by nonunion members alleging that the union violated its duty of fair representa-
tion by spending a portion of the dues collected under an agency shop clause for political
candidates and causes opposed by the plaintiff-employee. 57 In Reid, the Tenth CirCuit
held that the finding of state action regarding the application of the RLA in Hanson had
no applicability to the Act." The Tenth Circuit noted that under the Act, in contrast with
the RLA, the federal government is not directly involved in the decision of a union and
employer to agree to a union security clause so as to make that choice state action."
Two other circuits have reached an opposite conclusion regarding the issue of state
action. In Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp." the Ninth Circuit, relying on Hanson, held
agency fees collected by a union to be subject to constitutional scrutiny. 6 ' The Ninth
Circuit offered no analysis of the state action question, however, apparently assuming that
the issue was controlled by Hanson. In Seay, the court failed to distinguish between those
statutory provisions which create a right or privilege under federal law and those that
merely authorize private conduct. The court's analysis leads to the conclusion that the
Ninth Circuit would find state action inherent in any action brought under the Act
because the Act is based upon the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.
Similarly, the First Circuit in Linscott v. Miller Falls Co." found a union shop clause
requiring union membership as a condition of employment to constitute state action."
The provision at issue in Linscott, section 14(b) of the Act," empowered the state to outlaw
nonmembers to participate in strike activities to obtain strike benefits since strike benefits served to
compensate Kolinske for events beyond his control. Id.
Kolinske, 712 F.2d at 481, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2966 (citing Bass v. International Brotherhood of
Boilermakers, 630 F.2d 1058, 1062-63, 105 L.R.R.M. 3258, 3261-62 (5th Cir. 1980)). The Kolinske
court notes that the strike benefits served as a tool for collective bargaining and had no direct or
substantial relationship to Kolinske's dealings with the company. Id.
53 712 F.2d at 481, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2966.
54 Id. at 482, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2966. The court concluded its discussion by warning against
creating constitutional significance for all union activities because of the unique role that unions play
in our economic structure. Id.
" Id. at 480-82 n.9, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2965 n.9.
" See Reid v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 443 F.2d 408, 77 L.R.R.M. 2609 (10th Cir. 1971).
" Id. at 409, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2610-11.
58 Id. at 410, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2611.
se Id. at 410, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2611-12.
" 427 F.2d 996, 74 L.R.R.M. 2600 (9th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 1003-04, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2605-07.
440 F.2d 14, 76 L.R.R.M. 2994 (1st Cir. 1971).
63 Id. at 16-17, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2995-96.
" 29 U.S.C. § 164(6) (1982).
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union shop agreements. While the court acknowledged that Linscott went further than
Hanson, which involved an affirmative preemption of a contrary state law, the Linscott
court did not believe that a sufficient basis existed for distinguishing Hanson. In reaching
this conclusion, the court reasoned that if federal support attaches to the union shop
when two parties agree to it, it is the same support where the state must consent as a
precondition to attachment.' On the merits, the Linscott court upheld the union shop
clause, holding that governmental interest in peaceful labor relations outweighed an
employee's religious objection to forced union membership. 66
Judge Coffin noted in his concurrence that the plaintiff's complaint failed to establish
a violation of her constitutional rights because of the absence of state action. 67
 Judge
Coffin noted that unlike the union shop provision in Hanson, the provision at issue in
Linscott was incapable of overriding any inconsistent state legislation and merely rep-
resented a term in a privately negotiated collective bargaining agreement. 68 As Judge
Coffin noted, every term in a bargaining agreement does not bear the imprimatur of the
state merely because a federal agency is empowered to supervise the formation of the
agreement."
Because of the conflict among the circuit courts, it is unclear, at present, to what
extent Hanson will be invoked to support a finding of state action in an action involving a
union shop clause. Although the Ninth Circuit in Seay reached the opposite conclusion
from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Kolinske, the Seay court failed to analyze
the question, apparently assuming that it was controlled by Hanson. It seems likely,
however, that Hanson will in the future be confined to its facts. That is, the analysis in
Hanson will only be invoked where an express preemption of a contrary state law exists.
Absent a finding of preemption, when confronted with this issue, the Supreme Court is
likely to employ the two tier test enunciated in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. 7° in determining
the question of state action. If the court continues to apply the Lugar test, union shop
provisions similar to the agency shop clause at issue in Kolinske must necessarily fail the
first part of the state action test because such provisions are neither compelled by federal
law nor exercised as a state created right or privilege. Further, as the Kolinske court noted,
it would be unwise to support a finding of governmental action in these circumstances
because such a conclusion would lead to the treatment of unions as local governmental
units in nearly all of their activities.
VI. BANKRUPTCY
A. *Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements Under Chapter II
Bankruptcy Proceedings: NLRB v. Bildisco and Bildisco'
Courts considering whether a business attempting reorganization under the bank-
ruptcy law may reject a collective bargaining agreement are confronted with the seem-
65
	440 F.2d at 16, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2995.
" Id. at 17-18, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2996
- 97.
137 Id. at 19, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2997 (Coffin, J., concurring).
68 Id. at 19-20, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2997-98 (Coffin, J., concurring).
" Id. at 20, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2998 (Coffin, J., concurring).
" 457 U.S. at 936-40; see supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
* By Ann P. Michalik, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 104 S. Ct. 1188, 115 L.R.R.M. 2805 (1984). For a more comprehensive discussion of the
Bildisco decision and an intensive analysis of the bankruptcy and labor statutes, see Gregory, Labor
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ingly incompatible congressional policies expressed in the National Labor Relations Act
(the Act) 2 and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the Code). 3 The purpose of the Act is
to eliminate the strife between labor and management, that can obstruct the free flow of
commerce, by encouraging collective bargaining and reducing disparity in bargaining
power.' Under section 8(d) of the Act,' neither party to a collective bargaining agreement
may modify or terminate an agreement in effect unless that party follows a delineated set
of procedures.' When an employer alters a collective bargaining agreement without
adhering to the provisions of section 8(d), a union may file a charge with the National
Labor Relations Board (Board) claiming an "unfair labor practice" pursuant to section
8(a)(5) of the Act.T
The prohibition in the Act against unilateral alteration of a collective bargaining
agreement may, however, conflict with provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that permit a
debtor to reject an executory contract as part of a reorganization effort.' Under chapter
11 of the Code,9 a commercial business may file a petition for reorganization in bank-
ruptcy court." The filing of a petition under chapter 11 allows a debtor, who then
becomes a "debtor-in-possession,"" time to develop a plan to repay its creditors and
reduce or extend its debts so that the business may once again become financially viable."
Contract Rejection in Bankruptcy: The Supreme Court's Attack on Labor in NLRB v. Bildisco, 25 B.C. L.
REV. 539 (1984).
• 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
3 11 U.S.C. §§ 1 -330 (1982).
• See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
• 29 U.S.C. § 158(d), commonly known as section 8(d), provides in pertinent part:
That where there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering employees in an
industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no
party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring
such termination or modification —
(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed
termination or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof, or in the
event such contract contains no expiration date, sixty days prior to the time it is
proposed to make such termination or modification;
(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of negotiating a
new contract or a contract containing the proposed modifications;
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thirty days after
such notice of the existence of a dispute, and simultaneously therewith notifies any
State or Territorial agency established to mediate and conciliate disputes within the
State or Territory where the dispute occurred, provided no agreement has been
reached by that time; and
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the
terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice
is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later.
Id.
• See id.
29 U.S.C.	 158(a)(5) (1982), also known as section 8(a)(5), provides in part: "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer — ... to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees... ." Id. See .NLRB v. Bildisco and Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188, 1202, 115 L.R.R.M.
2805, 2817 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
• Note, The Bankruptcy Law's Effect on Collective Bargaining Agreements, 81 Comm. L. REV. 391,
391 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Bankruptcy Law's Effect].
9 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982).
1° 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303 (1982).
" 11 U.S.C. § 1101 (1982).
'2 Note, The Bankruptcy Law's Effect, supra note 8, at 392.
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To facilitate a workable reorganization, section 365(a) of the Code" permits the debtor-
in-possession to petition the bankruptcy court for the rejection of disadvantageous
executory contracts." Although the Code does not define the term "executory contract,"
it is generally understood to include contracts under which performance remains due on
both sides," including• collective bargaining agreements." Rejection of an agreement
constitutes a breach of contract relating back to the date immediately prior to the filing of
the bankruptcy petition." The breach releases the debtor from future obligations under
the contract and allows the other party to claim damages.'" Consequently, claims for lost
future earnings resulting from rejection of an employment contract are rionpriority
claims that are assessed at the fair market value, rather than at the bargained contract
rate, for services rendered during the reorganization period.' 9
The Code does not provide the courts with a standard for determining the propriety
of rejecting an executory contract. 2D When dealing with executory contracts of a commer-
cial nature, courts often have employed the "business judgment test.' When faced with
the question of the applicable standard for the rejection of collective bargaining agree-
ments, however, courts have attempted, with some difficulty, to reconcile the conflict
between the Act and the Code by applying more exacting standards for review of the
decision to reject." For example, in Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products,
Inc.," the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that the bankruptcy court, when
deciding whether to allow rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, must balance the
equities on both sides.'" The court stated that it is not sufficient simply to find that
' 3 I I	 § 365(a) (1982) provides: "(a) Except as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title
and in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject to the courts approval, may
assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor." Id. From the concept that
a trustee in bankruptcy could reject a burdensome executory contract, there evolved the view that the
contract may be rejected simply because a more beneficial arrangement was available. 2 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, § 365.03 ( 15th ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER].
hl 1	 § 365(a). See also, COLLIER, supra note 13, § 365.03.
COLLIER, supra note 13, § 365.03 at 365-12.
" Bordewieck and Countryman, The Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements by Chapter 11
Debtors, 57 AM. BANKR. Li., 293, 294 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Bordewieck and Countryman].
17 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1) (1982) provides:
(g) Except as provided in subsections (h)(2) and (i)(2) of this section, the rejection of an
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a breach of such
contract or lease —
(1) if such contract or lease has not been assumed under this section or under a
plan confirmed under chapter 9, 11, or 13 of this title, immediately before the date of
the filing of the petition.
Id.
" Note, The Bankruptcy Law's Effect, supra note 8, at 393 n.18.
19 Id. at 393-94. On the other hand, if a debtor assumes the contract, a subsequent rejection
would give rise to a claim for damages that could be entitled to first priority as an administrative cost.
Id. at 394.
° See COLLIER, supra note 13, § 365.03 at 365-14. See also 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982).
2 ' See, e.g., Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. Co., 318
U.S. 523, 550 (1943). Under the business judgment test, a contract may be rejected, even though it is
beneficial and not burdensome, if it can be replaced by a more profitable agreement. See COLLIER,
supra note 13, § 365.03 at 365-14.
22
	 SUPTa note 13, § 365.03 at 365-16.
23
 519 F.2d 698, 89 L.R.R.M. 3133 (2d Cir. 1975).
24 Id. at 707, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3139 (citing In re Overseas National Airways, 238 F. Supp. 359,
361-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1965)).
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rejection improves the financial condition of the debtor:23 A short time later, however, in
Brotherhood of Railway, Airline, and Steamship Clerks v. REA Express, Inc.," the same court,
enunciating a stricter standard, found that the bankruptcy court should authorize rejec-
tion only if the collective bargaining agreement is so onerous and burdensome that,
absent rejection, reorganization will fail." The difficulty the Second Circuit experienced
in establishing a standard attests to the problem courts faced in reconciling the provisions
of the Act and the Code.
During the Survey year, the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Bildisco and Bildisco," estab-
lished a standard for review of petitions to reject collective bargaining agreements in
chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. 29
 The Court held that the bankruptcy court should
approve the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, which is subject to the Act, if
the debtor demonstrates that the agreement burdens the debtor's financial condition and
that a balancing of the equities favors rejection of the labor agreement. 30 The Court also
stated that prior to approval of a petition to modify or reject a collective bargaining
agreement, the bankruptcy court must find that reasonable efforts at negotiating a
voluntary settlement have been unsuccessfully made and are not likely to be fruitful in the
near future. 3 ' In addition, the Court held that the Board may not find a debtor-in-
possession guilty of an unfair labor practice for unilaterally modifying or terminating all
or part of a collective bargaining agreement prior to formal approval of rejection by the
court. 32 As a result of the Bildisco decision, bankruptcy courts will evaluate petitions to
reject collective bargaining agreements using a standard that, while higher than the
business judgment rule, is less exacting than the test established by the Second Circuit in
REA Express."
In Bildisco, a general partnership, Bildisco and Bildisco, filed a voluntary petition in
bankruptcy under chapter 11. 34
 The bankruptcy court authorized Bildisco to operate the
business as a debtor-in-possession. 35
 At the time the bankruptcy petition was filed, a
collective bargaining agreement existed between the business and a union that rep-
resented 40 to 45 percent of the employees. 36
 The agreement stipulated that it was
binding on the parties and their successors even if bankruptcy should occur." Shortly
after filing for bankruptcy, however, Bildisco, which had already failed to meet other
' 5 Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 707, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3139.
26 523 F.2d 164, 90 L.R.R.M. 2579 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017, 90 L.R.R.M. 3176
(1975).
IS at 169, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2582. In REA Express, the court, addressing a rejection of a collective
bargaining agreement under the Railway Labor Act, implied it was adopting the standard set forth in
Kevin Steel. Id. Courts have subsequently distinguished the two standards, however. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Bildisco and Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188, 1196, 115 L.R.R.M. 2805, 2812 (1984).
28 104 S. Ct. 1188, 115 L.R.R.M. 2805 (1984). Rehnquist, J. delivered the opinion of the Court,
joined by all members in Parts I and II, and by Burger, C.J., and Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor, J J.,
in Part III.
29 Id. at 1196, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2812.
'" Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1191-92, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2808.
33 Id. at 1196, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2812.
34 Id. at 1192, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2809.
3' Id.
36 Id. The agreement was negotiated by Local 408 of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. Id.
37 Id.
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obligations under the labor agreement, refused to pay wage increases provided for in the
contract." In response, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board."
The Board found that Bildisco had violated the Act by unilaterally altering the terms of
the collective bargaining agreement and by refusing to negotiate with the union." Subse-
quently, the Board petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to enforce its
order requiring Bildisco to fulfill the employer's obligations under the labor contract.'
Several months after the union filed the charge with the Board, Bildisco petitioned
the bankruptcy court for permission to reject its collective bargaining agreement." After
a hearing on the petition, the bankruptcy court granted the rejection." The district court
upheld the decision and the union appealed.'"
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit consolidated the union's appeal with the
Board's petition for an enforcement order." The appeals court first determined that a
collective bargaining agreement is an executory contract subject to rejection in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding." Next, the court stated that section 8(d) of the Act did not conflict
with the authority under the Bankruptcy Code to seek rejection because the debtor-in-
possession was a "new entity" not bound by the prior agreement." Adopting the more
lenient standard set forth by the Second Circuit in Kevin Steel, however, the court held
that in order to obtain a rejection the debtor-in-possession must show that the collective
bargaining agreement was burdensome and that equity favored rejection of the agree-
ment." Addressing the Board's argument that unilateral rejection of a collective bargain-
ing agreement prior to approval by the bankruptcy court constituted an unfair labor
practice, the court rejected the Board's reasoning that the debtor-in-possession was the
38 Id.
39 Id.
Id. at 1192-93, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2809. The Board found Bildisco in violation of section 8(a)(5)
and section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Id. See supra note 7 for pertinent part of section 8(a)(5). Section 8(a)(1)
provides in part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer —(1) to interfere with, restrain,
or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in section 157.. .." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)
(1982).
41 Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1193, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2809-10.
" Id. at 1192, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2809.
43 Id. At the hearing, held at Bildisco's request, the only witness was a partner with Bildisco. Id.
The testimony indicated that rejection would save the ailing business $100,000 in the following year.
Id.
Id.
" In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72, 74, 110 L.R.R.M. 2954, 2955 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd sub nom. NLRB v.
Bildisco and Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188, 115 L.R.R.M. 2805 (1984).
46 Id. at 78-79, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2858-59.
47 Id. at 78, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2959. Courts have also disagreed in their characterization of a
debtor-in-possession vis-à-vis the pre-petition debtor. In reaching their various decisions, courts have
analogized the debtor-in-possession to a "new entity," a "successor employer," or an "alter ego" of the
debtor. See Bordewieck and Countryman, supra note 16, at 300-10. Under the new entity theory, the
debtor-in-possession in a chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding represents an entirely new business with
its own rights and duties, and consequently, is not a party to or bound by the contracts of its
predecessor, the pre-petition debtor. Id. at 300-01. Similarly, in the successor employer analogy, the
debtor-in-possession constitutes a completely new employer who does not automatically assume the
obligations of a collective bargaining agreement, made by the debtor, to which it was not a party. Id.
at 304-07. In contrast, courts sometimes viewed the debtor-in-possession as the same employer as the
pre-petition debtor, as its alter ego, and thus subject to all the contractual obligations of the
predecessor. Id. at 309.
48 682 F.2d at 79-80, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2959-60.
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alter-ego of the pre-petition employer.° Instead the appeals court found that the debtor-
in-possession was a new entity and, unless it assumed the contract, it was not a party to its
predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. 5° Consequently, the court reasoned, the
debtor-in-possession may reject the agreement without following the steps prescribed in
section 8(d) of the Act. 5 ' The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict
between the decision of the Second Circuit in REA Express and the Third Circuit's holding
in In re Bildisco on the proper standard for approval of a debtor-in-possession's rejection
of a collective bargaining agreement."
The Supreme Court addressed two issues in NLRB v. Bildisco and Bildisco." First, the
Court determined the conditions under which a bankruptcy court may allow a debtor-
in-possession to reject a collective bargaining contract. 54 Second, the Court considered
whether the Board may find a debtor-in-possession guilty of an unfair labor practice for
unilaterally modifying or terminating a collective bargaining agreement prior to court
approval of a petition to reject. 55
Addressing the first issue, the Court agreed with the holding of the Third Circuit that
unexpired collective bargaining agreements are executory contracts subject to rejection
under section 365(a) of' the Code." Reviewing the statutory language of the Code, the
Court reasoned that Congress' failure to exclude agreements subject to the Act from
section 365(a) showed congressional intent that the section apply to labor contracts. 57
According to the Court, however, the special nature of the collective bargaining agree-
ment warranted the use of a stricter standard than the one applied to other executory
contracts when deciding whether to allow a rejection." Nevertheless, the Court refused to
adopt the stringent standard enunciated by the Second Circuit in REA Express." The
Court opined that the REA Express standard focused simply on whether rejection was
necessary to avoid liquidation of the business, and disregarded the equitable and flexible
nature of' chapter 11 reorganization." Instead, the Supreme Court held that the bank-
ruptcy court may approve rejection of collective bargaining contracts if the debtor-in-
possession can establish that the agreement burdens the debtor's financial condition and
that equity favors rejection." In deference to the duty to bargain embodied in the Act,
however, the Court found that before acting on the petition for rejection, the bankruptcy
court must determine that reasonable efforts to negotiate have been made and that the
parties' inability to reach a solution may hinder the success of the reorganization pro-
cess.' Moreover, the Court stated that the bankruptcy judge should grant the petition
49 Id. at 82, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2962.
" Id. at 82
-83, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2962.
" Id. at 83, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2962.
• Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1194, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2810.
" Id. at 1191, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2808.
" Id. at 1194-97, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2810-13.
55 Id. at 1197-1201, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2813-16.
56 Id. at 1194-95, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2810-11.
" Id. The Court supported this argument by noting that in section 1167, Congress had ex-
pressly limited rejection of collective bargaining agreements under the Railway Labor Act. Id.
" Id. at 1195, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2811.
• Id. at 1196, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2812.
" Id.
" Id.
65 Id. at 1196-97, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2812-13. The Court noted that both the underlying policy of
the Act and section 8(a)(5) generally require employers and unions to reach agreement on the terms
of employment without government interference. Id. at 1196, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2812. According to
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only after finding that rejection would aid in the successful rehabilitation of the debtor. 63
According to the Court, the relevant considerations include not only the effect of affirma-
tion of the labor agreement on the value of creditors' claims, and on the likelihood and
consequences of liquidation for the debtor, but also the effect of rejection on employees."
In weighing these factors, the Court noted, the degree and qualitative difference in the
hardship each party would face must be addressed." The Court emphasized, however,
that the bankruptcy court's primary focus in considering the interests involved must be on
how the equities relate to a successful reorganization under chapter 11."
Having thus established the standard for review of a petition to reject a collective
bargaining agreement in a chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding, the Court, addressing the
second issue, held that the Board cannot find a debtor-in-possession guilty of an unfair
labor practice for unilaterally rejecting or modifying a labor contract before court ap-
proval of the rejection." In its discussion, the Court first decided not to view the
debtor-in-possession as an "alter ego," "new entity," or "successor employer," but rather
to view the debtor-in-possession as the same entity that existed pre-petition, empowered
by the Bankruptcy Code to seek rejection of disadvantageous contracts." After noting
that the main goal of reorganization is to avoid liquidation of the business, the Court
found that the debtor-in-possession's authority to reject burdensome executory contracts
is vital to prevent the business undergoing reorganization from going into liquidation."
In support of its position, the Court found that Congress intended that debtors-in-
possession in reorganization proceedings should have greater leeway in deciding whether
to reject a contract than debtors in the process of liquidation. The Court noted that the
debtor-in-possession in a chapter 11 reorganization has until confirmation of the reorga-
nization plan to decide whether to reject an executory contract, in contrast to the sixty day
limit in a chapter 7 liquidation proceeding." The Court reasoned that this difference
reflected Congress' judgment that a debtor-in-possession attempting to reorganize should
be granted more flexibility in deciding whether to reject a contract than should a trustee
in liquidation."
the Court, the bankruptcy court should step in only if the parties' lack of progress at reaching an
agreement threatens the reorganization process. Id. at 1196-97, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2812. The Court
noted that the parties need not be deemed to have bargained to impasse for the bankruptcy court to
act. Id. at 1197, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2813.
65 Id. at 1197, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2813.
64 Id.
" Id.
" Id.
67 Id.
 at 1191-92, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2808.
" Id. at 1197, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2813. See supra note 47 for explanation of these theories.
" Id.
7° Id. at 1198, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2814. 11 U.S.C. H 365(d)(1) and (2) provide:
(1) In a case under chapter 7 of this title, if the trustee does not assume or reject an
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor within 60 days after the order for
relief, or within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such 60-day period,
fixes, then such contract or lease is deemed rejected. (2) In a case under chapter 9, 11,
or 13 of this title, the trustee may assume or reject an executory contract or unexpired
lease of the debtor at any time before the confirmation of a plan, but the court, on
request of any party to such contract or lease, may order the trustee to determine within
a specified period of time whether to assume or reject such contract or lease.
Id.
Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1198, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2814.
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After recognizing the importance of the ability of a debtor-in-possession to reject a
contract, the Court examined the effect of a reorganization proceeding on the status of
executory contracts and on claims arising under such contracts in order to determine
whether rejection of a collective bargaining agreement constituted an unfair labor prac-
tice within the meaning of section 8(d) of the Act." The Court noted that under section
365(g)(1) of the Code, which provides that rejection of an executory contract relates back
to the date immediately prior to filing a petition in bankruptcy, claims arising from the
rejection must be presented to the bankruptcy court for administration." As a result, the
Court pointed out, a suit against the debtor-in-possession may be brought only through
administration of the claim in bankruptcy, and not under the collective bargaining
agreement." In addition, the Court noted that if the debtor-in-possession chooses to
affirm the contract, the liabilities incurred under it are treated as administrative expenses
and receive high priority." On the other hand, the Court observed, if the contract is
rejected, damages resulting from the breach receive the low priority given to general
unsecured creditors." In the interim, the debtor-in-possession must pay an employee a
reasonable amount for his services which may or may not be the sum specified in the labor
contract."
Based on the foregoing consideration, the Supreme Court concluded that the Board
may not enforce a collective bargaining agreement by filing an unfair labor practice
charge against a debtor-in-possession." The Court reasoned that once a bankruptcy
petition is filed, and until reorganization is confirmed, the labor agreement is no longer
immediately enforceable and may never again be an enforceable contract within the
meaning of section 8(d) of the Act." A contrary decision, according to the Court, would
be inconsistent with the Code's efforts to provide the debtor-in-possession with "flexibility
and breathing space." 8° Consequently, the Court stated, the debtor-in-possession need not
comply with the procedures required by section 8(d) after filing and prior to seeking
permission to reject the agreement.'" The Court noted that in a chapter 11 proceeding,
the rejection results from the operation of law, not from an employer's unilateral action."
Moreover, the Court reasoned that the exigencies of the bankruptcy proceedings also
require subordination of the duty to bargain to impasse found in sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d)
of the Act prior to seeking rejection. The Court cautioned, though, that the Act does
require the debtor-in-possession to bargain in good faith over terms of a new contract
pending or following formal approval of rejection. 83
Although all members of the Court concurred on the first part of the opinion, four
justices dissented from the holding on the second issue.'" The dissent argued that the
72 Id. at 1198-99, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2814.
73 Id. at 1198, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2814.
79 Id. at 1198-99, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2814.
75 Id. at 1199, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2815.
79 Id. at 1199, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2814.
77 Id. at 1199, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2814-15.
78 Id. at 1199, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2815.
TS Id.
8° Id.
xi Id. at 1200, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2816.
82 Id. at 1200, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2815.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1201, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2816 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Brennan was joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun.
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majority ignored important policies embodied in the Act when it held that a debtor-in-
possession does not commit an unfair labor practice by unilaterally modifying or rejecting
a collective bargaining agreement prior to formal authorization by a bankruptcy court. 85
According to the dissent, the majority's conclusion that Congress did not intend section
8(d) of the Act to apply after a bankruptcy petition is filed is erroneous in that it furthers
the goals of the Code at the expense of the Act." Rather than focusing solely on the
Bankruptcy Code, the dissent maintained, the Court should have better accommodated
the competing policies and provisions of the Code and the Act."'
Examining the language of the two statutes and the definitional sections of the Act,
the dissent determined that although enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement is
suspended after the filing of a bankruptcy petition, the contract retains sufficient vitality
to be considered "in effect" under section 8(d) of the Act." The dissent pointed out that
collective bargaining plays a central role in achieving the goals of the Act, and argued that
the need to prevent labor strife resulting from unilateral alteration of a collective bargain-
ing agreement remains as great after the filing of a bankruptcy petition as it was before
filing." Moreover, the dissent stated, deference should be accorded by the Court to the
Board's judgment that section 8(d) should remain applicable.'
Turning to the Bankruptcy Code, the dissent asserted that the Court had found no
express provision in the Code rendering section 8(d) inapplicable."' The dissent con-
tended that violation of a collective bargaining agreement is not necessary to assure a
successful reorganization and in fact is more likely to lead to deleterious labor strife,
which could in turn hinder a successful reorganization." In addition, the dissent main-
tained that application of section 8(d) during the reorganization period would merely
force the debtor-i n-possession to seek early rejection of a collective bargaining agreement,
which could not harm the reorganization process. 93 Noting that collective bargaining
agreements are not like other contracts," the dissent concluded that a debtor-in-
possession commits an unfair labor practice by unilaterally altering the terms of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement because filing in bankruptcy does not render section 8(d)
inapplicable."
The Court in Bildisco decided several questions concerning the interaction of the Act
" Id.
" Id. at 1203-04, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2818 (Brennan, J.; concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"7 Id. at 1204, 115 L.R.R.M, at 2818 (Brennan, j., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
" Id. at 1206, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2820 (Brennan, j., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
" Id. at 1208, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2821 (Brennan, j., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
'° Id. at 1208, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2822 (Brennan, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
" Id. at 1209, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2822 (Brennan, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
" Id.
" Id. at 1210, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2823 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
According to the dissent, the debtor-in-possession will probably be able to negotiate a contract at least
as favorable to it as the one rejected because union members will lose their jobs if reorganization fails.
Id.
" Id. The dissent noted that the collective bargaining agreement is more than a contract: it
represents an effort to establish a "'system of industrial self-government'" to govern unanticipated
disputes. Id. at 1210 - 11 115 L.R.R.M. at 2823 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-80 (1960)). Moreover, the dissent noted, the parties enter into a
labor agreement to determine how to deal with each other, and not to establish a contractual
relationship, which usually already exists between the labor and management. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at
1210-11, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2823 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
95 Id at 1211, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2824.
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and the Bankruptcy Code. First, in accord with lower court decisions," the Court estab-
lished that a collective bargaining agreement is an executory contract subject to rejection
under section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code." Second, the Court made clear that a
debtor-in-possession seeking rejection of an executory contract will henceforth be
deemed the same entity that existed prior to filing in bankruptcy." The decision, there-
fore, puts to rest prior status theories such as the alter ego, new entity, and successor
employer theories which served only to trouble lower courts attempting to define the
relationship between the parties to a rejected agreement. Third, the Court acknowledged
that collective bargaining agreements differ from other types of executory contracts.
Thus, the Court established that the standard for review of a petition to reject a labor
contract is that the debtor-in-possession must show that the collective bargaining agree-
ment burdens the debtor's financial condition and that a balance of the equities favors
rejection." Fourth, in deference to the national labor policy expressed in the Act, the
Court ruled that the debtor-in-possession must attempt to negotiate a mutually agreeable
modification with a union, but not bargain to an impasse, before a petition for rejection
will be granted)0° Finally, the Court determined that the Board cannot find a debtor-in-
possession guilty of an unfair labor practice for breaching a collective bargaining agree-
ment prior to formal action on the petition to reject.
In Bildisco, the Court dealt with a conflict between federal labor and bankruptcy
policies and found that a balance of the equities weighed against labor)°' The standard
adopted was considerably less stringent than the one adopted! in REA Express, which the
unions had supported)" As the dissent noted, the Court placed primary importance on
the Bankruptcy Code and the need for•flexibility in reorganization of a business under a
chapter I1 bankruptcy proceeding)" In its decision, the Court put the interests of
employees on an even par with those of the debtor and the creditors in terms of balancing
the interests of affected parties)" As a result, the import of a valid collective bargaining
agreement was diminished. Representatives of labor understandably found this decision a
blow to the effectiveness and power of unions)"
In response to the Bildisco decision, Congress passed legislation on June 29, 1984,
which overturned the Court's holding regarding unilateral rejections of collective bar-
gaining agreements by debtors-in-possession, but which supported the Court's decision
on the standard of review to be used by bankruptcy judges considering applications to
Bordewieck and Countryman, supra note 16, at 294.
°7 Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1194-95, 115 L.R.R.M. 2810-11.
' See id. See Bordewieck and Countryman, supra note 16, at 300-11 for a discussion of the
weaknesses inherent in the application of the "new entity" and "successor employer" theories which
were used by courts to justify decisions that debtors-in-possession may reject collective bargaining
agreements.
Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1196, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2812.
I' Id. at 1196-97, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2812-13.
101 Id. at 1201, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2816.
1°2 Id. at 1197, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2813. The Court noted that the bankruptcy court must focus on
the ultimate goal of chapter 11 when balancing the equities. Id. This holding is consistent with recent
case law. See Bordewieck and Countryman, supra note 16, at 319-26 (discussing cases in support of
thesis that courts considering rejection of collective bargaining agreements show a strong pro-debtor
bias).
103 Bildisco, 104 S. Ci. at 1196, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2812.
'° Id. at 1204, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2818.
w5 Id. at 1197, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2813.
1" See CONGRESSIONAL Q., 634 (March 17, 1984).
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reject collective bargaining agreements." Under the new law, a debtor-in-possession
cannot "unilaterally terminate or alter any provisions of a collective bargaining agree-
ment" without prior court approval." Furthermore, before filing a petition to reject a
collective bargaining contract, the debtor-in-possession must propose those modifications
necessary to a successful reorganization to an authorized representative of the covered
employees and meet with that representative in a good faith effort to reach a mutually
acceptable change in the labor contract.' A court may approve an application to reject a
collective bargaining agreement only if the required proposal was made to the union
representative, the proposal was refused without cause, and the balance of the equities
clearly favors rejection."°
In this latter provision, Congress essentially adopted the balancing of equities stan-
dard advanced by the Supreme Court in Bildisco."' Under this test, the interests of all
parties affected by the bankruptcy proceeding — the debtor and creditors as well as the
employees — are to be weighed "fairly and equitably." 112 The section also imposes time
lithits for the scheduling of hearings and provides for emergency court orders modifying
contract terms which will be available to debtors-in-possession in need of more rapid
relief. 13
 The legislation thus represents a compromise between supporters of labor and
business interests."'
The primary goal of' both the Supreme Court's decision in Bildisco and the new
legislation is to attain successful reorganization of an ailing business. Although the
legislation gives greater emphasis to negotiation with unions prior to court involvement
and prohibits the debtor-in-possession from modifying the terms of a collective bargain-
ing agreement without court approval, the emphasis is nevertheless on assuring the
continuation of the business. The legislation essentially supports the Court's view of
equity by requiring the balancing of all interests equally. This approach recognizes that
failure to successfully reorganize in bankruptcy means liquidation of the business and the
loss of jobs, which does not benefit either business or labor.
As a result of the Bildisco decision and of the subsequent congressional modification
of it, practitioners who represent unions in conflict with employers in bankruptcy will find
it difficult to retain the benefits gained in previous bargaining agreements whenever the
debtor-in-possession can show that the contract represents an impediment to successful
reorganization. As the dissent inBildisco noted, the debtor-in-possession will most likely be
able to negotiate a more favorable contract than the one he seeks to reject. " 5 Union
members know they will lose their jobs if reorganization fails. Moreover, since employees
probably will lose more benefits from outright rejection then from renegotiated contracts,
they are likely to make concessions to forestall formal rejection. On the other hand, the
debtor-in-possession now must negotiate in good faith with a union prior to seeking
rejection and propose only those modifications financially necessary for a successful
reorganization. A debtor-in-possession, therefore, cannot use bankruptcy under chapter
11 as an excuse to escape from a collective bargaining agreement he simply does not like.
1 " Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Title III, Subtitle J, PUB. L.
No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 390 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. 1113) ("Bank-
ruptcy Amendments").
'" id. at 391.
101 Id. at 390.
1 LO
'" [Current Awareness Alert] BANKR. SERV. L. En. 51, 52 (July, 1984).
12
 Bankruptcy Amendments, supra note 107, at 390.
"3 Id. at 391.
"1 See [Current Awareness Alert] BANKR. SERV. L. ED. 51, 52 (July, 1984).
118 Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1210, 115 L.R.R.M. at 2823.
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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
I. PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. *Counterdiscovery in an EEOC Enforcement Proceeding: In re EEOC'
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) is empo-
wered under section 710 of Title VII of the United States Code" to conduct hearings and
investigations for the purpose of combatting employment discrimination.' Section 710
provides that all hearings and investigations conducted by the Commission are governed
by section 11 of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). 4 The language of section 11 of
the Act provides the agency with the subpoena powers ordinarily afforded similar ad-
ministrative bodies.' The enforcement scheme of Title VII provides the Commission with
investigative authority, often referred to as "demand power," to determine whether a
company is engaging in a discriminatory employment practice.° This power is intended to
simplify the procedures for subpoenaing witnesses or records thereby facilitating en-
forcement of Title VII.'
When a company under investigation refuses to comply with the EEOC's discovery
requests, the Commission is empowered to bring a subpoena enforcement action.° If such
a proceeding is instituted, the question often arises whether the defendant may engage in
counterdiscovery to find grounds for resisting the subpoena. This question illustrates the
inherent tension between the need for speedy and efficient administrative enforcement
mechanisms and the due process rights of defendants in EEOC actions. The text of
section 11 does not address this question and, until recently, the courts have not provided
useful guidance in resolving the tension.
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
considered the question of whether counterdiscovery should be permitted in an EEOC
enforcement action.' In In re EEOC, a company, which was the subject of an EEOC
investigation, sought counterdiscovery because it believed the Commission's discrimina-
tion proceedings had been wrongfully instituted.'" In deciding that counterdiscovery was
not warranted in that case, the Fifth Circuit held that, in light of the legislative history
* By Terry Barchenko, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 709 F.2d 392, 32 FEP Cases 361 (5th Cir. 1983).
• 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (1982). Section 710 of Title VII reads in its entirety: "For the purpose of
all hearings and investigations conducted by the Commission or its duly authorized agents or
agencies section [11 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1982)] shall apply." Id.
Title VII was originally enacted to eliminate, through the use of formal and informal remedial
procedures, discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1963), reprinted in, 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS
2355, 2401.
' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (1982).
3 In re EEOC, 709 F.2d at 396, 32 FEP Cases at 363 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 25 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
3076 (1949)).
• In re EEOC, 709 F.2d at 396, 32 FEP Cases at 363.
7 Id.
Id. at 399-400, 32 FEP Cases at 366-67.
9 Id. at 393, 32 FEP Cases at 361.
Id. at 392, 32 FEP Cases at 361. The facts of the case were recounted in the earlier opinion of
EEOC v. Neches Butane Products Co., 704 F.2d 144, 31 FEP Cases 1099 (5th Cir. 1983).
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relating to the enactment of Title VII, pre-enforcement discovery in a subpoena en-
forcement action was impermissible during the investigative stages of a discrimination suit
absent a substantial demonstration by the employer that the Commission abused its
investigative authority." The decision in In re EEOC resolves the tension between
efficiency and due process inherent in the enforcement powers granted to the EEOC in
favor of efficiency, a result consistent with Title VII's goal of providing effective en-
forcement in employment discrimination actions." The legislative due process interests of
the subjects of EEOC investigations were not completely ignored by the new rule)' In
situations where a target of an EEOC investigation can make a substantial showing that
the EEOC abused its discretion, counterdiscovery will be permitted under the rule
established in In re EEOC. 14
In re EEOC concerned proceedings instituted after a finding by the EEOC that
Neches Butane Products Company ranked low in the hiring of blacks, hispanics, and
women.' The resulting investigation was impeded by the Company's refusal to comply
with the Commission's request for documents." The Commission therefore brought a
subpoena enforcement action in the Eastern District of Texas pursuant to section 710 of
Title VII. 17 To substantiate its claim of abuse by the Commission, the Company requested
various documents concerning the Commission's decision to institute proceedings and
sought to depose the EEOC Commissioner to whom the case had been assigned."
Reasoning that the Company had raised a "substantial question" concerning the Commis-
sion's good faith in bringing the charge, the district court ordered the EEOC to permit
extensive discovery and ordered the Commissioner to submit to an oral deposition as a
condition precedent to enforcement of the subpoena." On appeal the EEOC sought a
writ of mandamus"" directing the district court to vacate its order compelling counterdis-
covery, to vacate its stay order, and to proceed expeditiously to resolve the underlying
subpoena enforcement action.'"
The Fifth Circuit noted that because this case came before it on a petition for a writ of
" 709 F.2d at 399.400, 32 FEP Cases at 367.
" Id. at 395-97, 32 FEP Cases at 363-64.
13 Id. at 399-400, 32 FEP Cases at 366-67.
' 4 Id. at 400, 32 FEP Cases at 367.
L' Neches Butane, 704 F.2d at 145, 31 FEP Cases at 1099.
16 Id. at 146, 31 FEP Cases at 1100.
17 Id.
18 Id.
'" Id. The district court reasoned that the Commission should not be allowed to proceed with its
subpoena enforcement action until the Company was able to take discovery. Id. at 144. The district
court stated that the Company should have a chance to explore the Commission's motives in bringing
the charge. Id.
2° Mandamus is historically a drastic remedy reserved for "extraordinary" cases. In re EEOC,
709 F.2d at 394, 32 FEP Cases at 362 (citing Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402
(1976)); Bankers Life & Casualty CO. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 385 (1953). Federal courts, however,
have demonstrated an increasing willingness to use the writ as a one-time-only device to "settle new
and important problems." Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 111 (1964). The District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals notes that "Schiagenhauf authorizes departure from the final
judgment rule when the appellate court is convinced that resolution of an important, undecided
issue will forestall future error in trial courts, eliminate uncertainty and add importantly to the
efficient administration of justice." Colonial Times, Inc. v. Gasch, 509 F.2d 517, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
see generally 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3934
(1977).
21 In re EEOC, 709 F.2d at 394, 32 FEP Cases at 362.
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mandamus, its review of the district court's order was limited." Stating that the writ is
issued only "when there is 'usurpation of judicial power' or a clear abuse of discretion,""
the court reasoned that the party seeking the writ has the burden of showing that it has an
indisputable right to issuance of the writ." The Fifth Circuit therefore concluded that the
writ of mandamus should issue only if the district court's exercise of its discretion in
issuing the discovery order was inconsistent with the design of section 710. 25
After discussing the propriety of the court's review on a petition for mandamus the
court turned to a discussion of the history and purpose of Title VII and section 11 of the
Act to determine the standard that should govern the exercise of a district court's
discretion when confronted with a counterdiscovery request in an EEOC subpoena
enforcement action. 26 In examining the legislative history of' Title VII, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that section 710 was enacted so that the Commission would 'have the same
investigative authority as that provided the National Labor Relations Board in section 11
of the Act:" The court noted that section 11 is very general and simply grants the agency
the necessary subpoena power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production
of documents to effectuate the goals of the Act. 28
 The court found, however, that the text
of section 11 did not address the inherent tension between speed and administrative
efficiency on the one hand, and due process concerns on the other. 2" According to the
court, the tension between these competing goals was the central issue in the present
" Id. at 395, 32 FEP Cases at 362.
23 Id. (citing Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 1I0 (1964)).
" In re EEOC, 709 F,2d at 395, 32 FEP Cases at 362 (citing Wills v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 96
(1967)).
28 " In re EEOC, 709 F.2d at 395, 32 FEP Cases at 362-63. In stressing the limited opportunity for
issuance of a writ of mandamus, the court adds one caveat by noting that the appropriateness for
issuance of a writ in the instant case "is not to be construed as making mandamus appropriate in
subsequent cases in which the principles ... set forth in this opinion are applied." Id. at 395, 32 FEP
Cases at 363 (citing United States v. Hughes, 413 F.2d 1244, 1249 (5th Cir. 1969)). The court
reasoned that the purpose of exercising its supervisory and advisory functions through issuance of
the writ is to meet "the compelling need to settle a new issue so that it can become only an ordinary
issue," In re EEOC, 709 F.2d at 395, 32 FEP Cases at 363.
28 In re EEOC, 709 F.2d at 395, 32 FEP Cases at 363.
In re EEOC, 709 F.2d at 396, 32 FEP Cases at 363.
28 Id.
" Id. at 396, 32 FEP Cases at 364. The defendant company argued that the liberal discovery
standard in the tax summons cases should apply in the instant case. Id. at 397, 32 FEP Cases at 364.
The Fifth Circuit rejected this suggestion for four reasons, Id. First, the court stated, the "discovery"
in the tax cases is not actual discovery but rather an opportunity to question Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) officials at a subpoena enforcement hearing. Id., 32 FEP Cases at 364-65. Further, the court
noted that tax investigations are initiated at the discretion of the IRS while an EEOC investigation
may be. started only upon a written charge under oath or affirmation thereby affording potential
EEOC defendants some protection that potential IRS defendants may not always have. Id. at 397, 32
FEP Cases at 364. Second, according to the court, the majority of tax cases do not concern the
propriety of deposing the Commissioner of Internal Revenue but rather the availability of lower-
level local agents. Id. at 398, 32 FE? Cases at 365. The court noted that the efficiency of the EEOC
would be severely reduced if its commissioners were subject to deposition in every routine subpoena
enforcement proceeding. Id. Third, the court reasoned that delay is much more critical in an EEOC
discrimination case than in the IRS cases because enforcement must be speedy. Id. The court,
therefore, stated that delay should be tolerated in only the most unusual circumstances. Id. Finally,
the court noted that tax summons enforcement actions were intended to be summary in nature and
to provide for only limited discovery. Id. at 399, 32 FEP Cases at 365 (citing 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEWS 781, 1031).
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action. Observing that the drafters of the Act were aware of the tension created by the
subpoena enforcement power," the court found that the legislative history of the Act
seemed to have resolved the tension in favor of speed and efficiency because effective
administrative action requires that enforcement proceedings be informal and fast. 3 '
Nevertheless, the court was careful to point out that the choice of speed over due
process is not absolute and that at some point a defendant's allegation of illegal purpose
could warrant counterdiscovery prior to the enforcement of an EEOC subpoena. 32 Ac-
cordingly, the court of appeals adopted a two step procedure designed to maintain a
satisfactory balance between these competing demands and stated that the two step
procedure should be applied in all EEOC subpoena enforcement cases in the Fifth
Circuit. 33 Under this two step procedure, the Commission is initially required to submit a
petition for enforcement that meets the informal guidelines set forth by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Powell. 34 These guidelines require that: (1) the petitioner show a
legitimate purpose for the investigation; (2) the petition state that the inquiry may be
relevant to the purpose; (3) the petition state that the agency does not already have the
information sought; and (4) the petition provide evidence that the agency has complied
with the required administrative steps. 36 After the Commission files a petition which
satisfies the Powell criteria, the second procedural step requires the company under
investigation to comply with the subpoena unless it can demonstrate that there is a
significant chance that the EEOC abused its investigative authority and that counterdis-
covery on that question is therefore warranted. 36
In light of the history and purpose of section 710, the court concluded that counter-
discovery may be had only after a substantial demonstration of abuse based on meaning-
ful evidence. 37 The Fifth Circuit had no difficulty in reaching this conclusion because the
court noted that in general, a defendant is not "entitled to engage in counterdiscovery to
find grounds for resisting" a subpoena and that agency personnel should be deposed
"[o]nly in the 'exceptional case."'" According to the Court, the exceptional case is one
where the defendant has presented "meaningful evidence" that the agency is attempting
to abuse its investigative authority." The court found that meaningful evidence does not
require actual proof, but rather the possibility of some wrongful conduct by the Govern-
ment.'
After discussing the two step procedure to be followed in EEOC subpoena enforce-
ment cases in the Fifth Circuit, the court turned to the question of whether the Company
in the case at issue had presented a substantial demonstration of abuse based on meaning-
ful evidence entitling it to counterdiscovery. Upon reviewing the evidence presented,
31' In re EEOC, 709 F.2d at 396. 32 FEP Cases at 364 (citing To Create A National Labor Board:
Hearings before the [Senate] Comm. on Education and Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1934)).
3' Id.
31 In re EEOC, 709 F.2d at 397, 32 FEP Cases at 364.
" Id. at 399, 32 FEP Cases at 366.
" 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964).
" In re EEOC, 709 F.2d at 400, 32 FEP Cases at 366 (citing Powell, 397 U.S. at 57-58).
36 In re EEOC, 709 F.2d at 400, 32 FEP Cases at 367.
37 Id.
" Id. (quoting United States v. Litton Industries, Inc., 462 F.2d 14, 17 (9th Cir. 1972)).
39 In re EEOC, 709 F.2d at 400, 32 FEP Cases at 367 (citing EEOC v. K-Mart Corp., 694 F.2d
1055, 1067, quoting United States v. Will, 671 F.2d 963, 968 (6th Cir. 1982)).
4° In re EEOC, 709 F.2d at 400, 32 FEP Cases at 367 (citing United States v. Kis, 658 F.2d 526,
540 (7th Cir. 1981)).
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the Fifth Circuit found that the district court surpassed the limits imposed upon its
discretion in subpoena enforcement proceedings under Title VII and counterdiscovery
should have been denied.° The court observed that the Company relied exclusively upon
an affidavit by a person whose name remains under seal to urge that the Commissioner
may have been improperly influenced by a possible vindictive or political motive." This
evidence, according to the court, was insufficient to discharge the Company's burden of
demonstrating that the EEOC abused its authority, because evidence was not produced
that implicated the Commissioner's own motive." The affidavit that was submitted merely
showed the motive of the informant, which is not determinative of the Commission's good
faith in issuing a subpoena." Since the central question was whether the Commission itself
was proceeding in good faith, the court concluded that the Company failed to prove that
the Commission abused its investigative authority." The court stated that any "minor
irregularit[y]" 48 which the affidavit raised in this case was not enough to trigger the
Company's right to pre-enforcement discovery." Granting pre-enforcement discovery in
this case, the court reasoned, would contravene the purpose of section 710 of Title VII by
transforming a summary proceeding into a lengthy discovery battle." The court, there-
fore, concluded that absent a substantial demonstration by the Company that the Com-
mission abused its investigative authority, pre-enforcement discovery in a subpoena
enforcement action was impermissible during the investigative stages of a discrimination
suit."
Although In re EEOC represents a case of first impression in the Fifth Circuit, a
" In re EEOC, 709 F.2d at 401, 32 FEP Cases at 368.
" Id. "The affiant states that he heard one Mrs. A. J. Aibarado say that her husband did not
need to proceed with his individual discrimination claim against the Company because he 'had
friends in [the] League of United Latin American Citizens who could get a big-wig commissioner in
Washington to make sure the company paid."' Id.
43 709 F.2d at 401, 32 FEP Cases at 368.
" Id. (citing United States v. Cortese, 614 F.2d 914, 921 (3d Cir. 1980)).
45
	
F.2d at 401, 32 FEP Cases at 368. Further, the court noted that the remaining portions of
the affidavit in which the affiant alleges to have received a telephone call from someone who
identified himself as Commissioner Rodriguez and who asked about the instant case are similarly
insufficient. Id. at 402, 32 FEP Gases at 368, The affiant stated that the call ended abruptly when the
affi ant remarked that one of the employees in question probably did not have a claim. Id. The court
noted that "although this telephone call may have been unusual, it does not provide sufficient
justification for ordering pre-subpoena enforcement discovery." Id. The court considered this call to
constitute a "minor irregularity" which does not comport with the requisite "abuse of process"
necessary to institute pre-subpoena enforcement discovery. Id.
" 709 F.2d at 402, 32 FEP Cases at 368.
" Id. The court was careful to note that it was not stating a general rule regarding when a minor
irregularity becomes important enough to permit a defendant to engage in pre-enforcement discov-
ery. Id.
" 709 F.2d at 402, 32 FEP Cases at 368.
49
	at 402-03, 32 FEP Cases at 368-69. The dissent noted that this case did not merit the
extreme remedy of mandamus because the facts of the case, according to Judge Jolly, comported
with the two part Powell standard used by the majority. Id. at 403, 32 FEP Cases at 369 (Jolly, J.,
dissenting). Judge Jolly stated that there is sufficient evidence to support granting the Company
counterdiscovery. The dissent based this conclusion on the submitted affidavit in which the charging
party boasted that because of his Washington connections he could force the Company to pay on a
charge for which the Company believed it had no liability and that following that boast, a Commis-
sioner of the EEOC made a telephone call inquiring as to the merits of the charge. Id. The dissent
found that these facts constituted "meaningful evidence" that the defendant Company became the
target of an investigation because it would not settle a charge on which it did not think it was liable. Id.
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recent Sixth Circuit decision has similarly held that a mandamus order may be appropri-
ately issued to prevent a district court from'requiring an EEOC Commissioner to submit
to a deposition as a condition precedent to enforcement of an EEOC subpoena." The fact
that both circuits have reached the same conclusion is not surprising since neither the
language of Title VII nor its legislative history requires a district court to allow discovery
in a subpoena enforcement proceeding. The sole inquiry at this initial investigative stage
is whether the information sought by the Commission is material and relevant. Once the
Commission satisfies this initial burden, a company must comply with the subpoena unless
it can demonstrate that the EEOC abused its investigative authority. This procedure
makes it almost impossible for a defendant to engage in counterdiscovery. Although the
burden theoretically shifts to the company to show that the investigation was conducted
for an improper purpose, this procedural opportunity is likely to be ineffectual. In all
likelihood, a defendant will only be able to meet this burden in the most egregious and
apparent cases of abuse. This difficult procedural standard, however, is consistent with
the underlying policy of Title VII. In light of the broad investigatory powers of the
Commission and the purpose and history of section 710, it is reasonable to conclude that
subpoena enforcement proceedings were intended to be expeditious to provide effective
enforcement of Title VII actions. Allowing routine counterdiscovery at the early stages of
the investigation would contravene this clear intention.
B. *Defining Employer and Employee Under Title VII: Armbruster v. Quinn'
An employee is protected by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 2
 (the Act) if his
employer has at least fifteen employees.' Any individual seeking relief under Title VII
must show that he meets this jurisdictional requirement. 4 The statute does little to define
who is an employer or employee, however, and it does not provide the courts with
guidelines for interpreting these terms.'
The legislative history of Title VII suggests that the Act should be interpreted
broadly. 6
 The Act has a broad remedial purpose, "to insure every citizen the opportunity
for the decent self-respect that accompanies a job commensurate with one's abilities."'
5° EEOC v. K-Mart Corp., 694 F.2d 1055, 1060-61 (6th Cir. 1982).
* By Kimberly M. Collins, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
' 711 F.2d 1332, 32 FEY Cases 369 (6th Cir. 1983).
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
3
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). The statute provides in pertinent part: "The term 'employer'
means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for
each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year...." Id.
4 See Hassell v. Harmon Foods, Inc., 454 F.2d 199, 200, 4 FEP Cases 263, 264 (6th Cir. 1972)
(defendant corporation did not have the then required minimum of twenty-five employees, there-
fore, motion to dismiss allowed); Fike v. Gold Kist, 514 F. Supp. 722, 725, 25 FEP Cases 1216, 1218
(N.D. Ala. 1981), aff'd 664 F.2d 295 (11th Cir. 1981).
5
 See supra note 3. The statute defined "employee" as "an individual employed by an employer
...." and excludes only those elected or appointed to public office. 42 U.S.C. 2000e(f) (1982). See
also Cobb v. Sun Papers, 673 F.2d 337, 28 FEP Cases 837, 839 (11th Cir. 1982).
o Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1336, 32 FEP Cases 369, 372 (6th Cir. 1983); Spirides v.
Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831, 20 FEP Cases 241, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting
Co., 560 F.2d 389, 391, 15 FEP Cases 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1977).
▪ H.R. REP. No. 92.238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 92-238],
reprinted in SENATE COMM. LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE 92D CONC.., 2D SESS. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
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The limitation of statutory coverage to employees or prospective employees of companies
with fifteen or more employees was included in the statute for the benefit of small,
family-run businesses that were likely to hire relatives and friends. 8
 Except for this sole
exception, it is apparent that Congress intended broad coverage for the statute."
A continuing problem in interpreting this jurisdictional limitation has been the small
corporate subsidiary with fewer than fifteen employees. Potential plaintiffs attempting to
satisfy this jurisdictional requirement have argued that the subsidiary and parent corpo-
rations should be treated as one employer.' These employees argue that the operations
of the subsidiary and parent are so interrelated that the two corporations should be
considered as a single employer under Title VII." Many circuits have accepted this
argument and have adopted the four-part test for interrelatedness formulated by the
National Labor Relations Board (Board)." Historically, however, the Sixth Circuit has
applied a stricter test. Under this test the plaintiff' must demonstrate that the subsidiary
was a "sham" corporation before the court would treat the parent and subsidiary as one
employer."
Plaintiffs have also attempted to circumvent the fifteen employee limitation in Title
VII by arguing that persons who appear to be independent contractors should be treated
as employees for jurisdictional purposes." This approach was rejected by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in a widely-followed opinion, Spirides v. Reinhardt .'s
The Spirides court and the courts that have followed it, have held that independent
contractors are not employees under the Act." Instead, these courts apply the common
law "right to control" test to determine whether an independent contractor is an em-
ployee.
During the Survey year, in Armbruster v. Quinn, ' "
 the Sixth Circuit again addressed the
question of what should be the proper test to determine whether two corporations have
such substantial identity that they should be deemed a single employer for Title VII
jurisdictional purposes." In its decision, the court adopted the four-part test formulated
THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972 (Comm. Print 1972) [hereinafter cited as
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
I 118 CoNG. REC. 2409 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Fannin), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 7, at 1297. See also 118 CONG. REC. 2391 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Cotton), reprinted in LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 1283 ("In firms employing 25 persons ... when they select an
employee, it is very much like selecting a partner.").
9 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
t ° See, e.g., Hassell, 454 F.2d 199, 199, 4 FEP Cases 263, 264 (6th Cir. 1972); Baker v. Stuart
Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389, 390, 15 FEY Cases 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1977).
" Id. at 390-91, 15 FEP Cases at 396.
" Id. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
' 3
 Hassell v. Harmon Foods, Inc., 454 F.2d 199, 200, 4 FEP Cases 263, 264 (6th Cir. 1972). See
also Armbruster 711 F.2d at 1335-36 Sc n.3, 32 FEP Cases at 372 Sc n.3.
14 See, e.g., Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1339, 32 FEP Cases at 375; Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d
826, 20 FEP Cases 141 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
" Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 20 FEP Cases 141 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
' 1 Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1341 n.7, 32 FEP Cases at 377 n.7.
" Id. The common law "right to control" test examines the extent to which an employer has the
right to control the "means and manner" of the worker's performance. Spirides, 613 F.2d at 831 &
n.26, 20 FE? Cases at 145 & n.26. An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another
to do something for him but who is not subject to the right to control with respect to his physical
conduct in the performance of the undertaking. Id.
" Armbruster, 711 F.2d 1332, 32 FEP Cases 369 (6th Cir. 1983).
" Id. at 1332.35, 32 FEP Gases at 372.
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by the National Labor Relations Board to determine the interrelationship of corpora-
tions." The Sixth Circuit also considered whether a manufacturer's representative may be
an employee for jurisdictional purposes under Title VII." The court determined that the
"economic realities" of the relationship must be examined to determine whether the
individual was susceptible to discriminatory practices by the principal or employer." The
Sixth Circuit, therefore, rejected the "right to control" test for Title VII purposes. 23 In
reaching its conclusions in Armbruster, the Sixth Circuit joined the majority of other circuit
courts in using the Board's tour-part interrelation test to determine whether a subsidiary
and its parent were one employer," but split from the majority view of other circuits on
the test to be used for determining who is an employee."
The dispute in Armbruster arose when, in 1979 appellant Mayes and Armbruster each
were hired and later fired from the position of secretary to T.J. Quinn (Quinn), then
President of the now defunct Syntax Corporation (Syntax)." Mayes and Armbruster
alleged that they were fired for their unwillingness to submit to or tolerate verbal and
physical sexual harassment." The former employees sued Quinn, Syntax, Pure Indus-
tries, Inc., and t he Stackpole Corporation for sexual discrimination under Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act.'
Syntax was a wholly owned subsidiary of Pure Industries, Inc.; Pure, in turn, is
wholly owned by the Stackpole Corporation."-8 At all times during the twenty calendar
weeks preceding the action, Syntax had less than fifteen employees, excluding manufac-
turer's representatives who were working for Syntax, and thus, failed to satisfy the
jurisdictional requirements of Title VII." If Pure was considered the employer of Mayes
and Armbruster, however, then the jurisdictional requirement of fifteen employees
would be satisfied." Both plaintiffs and defendants presented the district court with
affidavits on the issue of whether Syntax and Pure had sufficiently interrelated operations
to be considered as one employer. 32
" Id. at 1337, 32 FEP Cases at 373-74. The four part test considers: (1) interrelated operations,
(2) common management, (3) centralized control of labor relations, and (4) common ownership. Id.
" Id. at 1335, 32 FEP Cases.at 372.
" Id. at 1340, 32 FEP Cases at 376.
Id. at 1341 n.7, 32 FEP Cases at 377 n.7. Under the traditional "right to control" test for
distinguishing between employees and independent contractors an employee is an agent employed
to perform services whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is subject to the right to
control by the person who has hired the agent. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or AGENCY § 2(2) at 12 (1957).
" Id. at 1341 nn.7-8, 32 FEP Cases at 377 nn.7-8. In Spirides v. Reinhardt, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia applied the common law right to control test. 613 F.2d 826, 831, 20 FEP
Cases 141, 145 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The Ninth Circuit adopted the Spirides test in Lutcher v. Musicians
Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880, 883 & n.5, 24 FEP Cases 859, 862 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1980). The economic
realities test was rejected by the Eleventh Circuit in Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 340.41,
28 FEP Cases 837, 840 (11th Cir. 1982).
Id.
26 Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1334, 32 FEP Cases at 370-71.
27 Id.
28 Id. al 1333, 32 FEP Cases at 370. The plaintiffs also made a claim under the fourteenth
amendment which was dismissed by the district court and not an issue in the appeals proceeding. Id.
at 1334, 32 FEP Cases at 371.
26 Id.
" Id. Employers with fifteen or more employees are subject to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
(1982). See supra note 3.
" Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1334, 32 FEP Cases at 371.
" Id.
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The district court held that Syntax and Pure were two separate corporations."
Applying the Sixth Circuit's standard as set forth in Hassell v. Harmon Foods, Inc.,' the
district court found that Syntax was not a -
 sham entity, and consequently refused to
consolidate Syntax with Pure to satisfy the fifteen-employee requirement." In addition,
the district court found that the manufacturer's representatives were independent con-
tractors, not employees, and thus not covered by the Act. 36
 The lower court thus con-
cluded that the minimal jurisdictional requirement of fifteen employees had not been
met, and dismissed plaintiffs' claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." The plaintiffs
appealed the dismissal of this action to the Sixth Circuit."
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis of the jurisdictional question with a commentary
on the standard of review for jurisdiction issues. 39
 The lower court's jurisdictional ruling
was based, the court noted, on briefs supported by affidavits and other discovery mate-
rials." Although a plaintiff in any action must ultimately prove jurisdiction by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, the court stated that the plaintiff need only make a prima facie
case of jurisdiction to avoid a motion to dismiss.'" When confronted by a motion to
dismiss, therefore, the court is required to review the record to ascertain whether the
record raises genuine issues as to the existence of jurisdiction."
Addressing the jurisdictional issues as they arose, the court found two issues were
presented: first, whether Syntax and Pure had such "substantial identity" that they should
be deemed a single employer for jurisdictional purposes; and second, whether Syntax's
manufacturer's representatives fell within the meaning of the term "employee" for Title
VII jurisdiction." The court began its discussion of the single identity issue with a review
and explanation of its prior decision in Hassell v. Harmon. Foods, hie." I n Hassell, the court
observed that the parent was not liable for the subsidiary's debts and that the subsidiary
was independent for tax purposes.' Based on these facts, the Hassell court concluded that
the relationship between the parent and subsidiary in that case was a "normal" one, and
that the subsidiary could not be considered a "sham." 4° Consequently in Hassell the parent
and subsidiary were considered legally separate corporations for Title VII jurisdiction.'"
The Armbruster court stated that the Hassell test was not a rigid test, however, and that the
instant, more complex, case provided an opportunity to refine the Hassell test."
33 Id.
34
 454 F.2d 199, 4 FEP Cases 263 (6th Cir. 1972).
33 Id. The district court opinion is reported at 498 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
39 Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1334, 32 FEP Cases at 371.
37 Id. The district court also dismissed plaintiffs' fourteenth amendment claim since no state
action was alleged. Id.
33 Id. at 1333, 32 FEP Cases at 370. Because the plaintiffs did not appeal the dismissal of the
fourteenth amendment claim this dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Id. at 1334, 32 FEP
Cases at 371.
" Id. at 1335, 32 FEP Cases at 371 -72.
4° Id., 32 FF.P Cases at 371.
41 Id.
" Id., 32 FEP Cases at 371-72.
" Id.
44
 454 F.2d 199, 4 FEP Cases 263 (6th Cir. 1972).
43 Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1335-36, 32 FEP Cases at 372.
46 Id.
" Id.
48 Id. at 1336, 32 FEP Cases at 372.
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Looking to the purpose and legislative history of Title VII for aid in assessing the
propriety of treating parent and subsidiary corporations as a single employer under the
Act," the Armbruster court noted that Title VII is a remedial statute designed to eliminate
employment discrimination." To effectuate this purpose, according to the court, Title
VII should be given a liberal construction." Accordingly, the court determined that the
employer and employee provisions of the Act should be interpreted broadly." The court
also noted that the framers of Title VII had used the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) as a model. 53 According to the court, the similarity in language of the two Acts
suggests that the broad construction of the NLRA should provide guidance in determin-
ing whether two companies should be deemed to have substantial identity and thus be
treated as a single employer." A second source favoring a broad interpretation, the court
found, was the 1972 Amendment to Title VH. 33 The 1972 Amendment broadened the
coverage of Title VII by reducing the statutory minimum of employees from twenty-five
to fifteen.'" This change, the court explained, indicates a congressional desire to have the
entire Act construed broadly."
The court continued with a discussion of the proper elements of a test for inter-
relatedness of corporations. 3° According to the court, the most important requirement is
an indication of interrelationship between the two corporations which justifies the em-
ployee's belief that the affiliated corporation is jointly responsible for the acts of his or her
immediate employer." As an aid to testing the degree of interrelationship, the Sixth
Circuit adopted the four-part test formulated by the Board.°° That test assesses the
following four areas: (1) interrelated operations, (2) management, (3) central control of
labor relations, and (4) common ownership." According to the court the presence or
absence of any one factor is not conclusive; it is not necessary that all four factors be
present before the Title VII single-employer doctrine is applicable." Adopting a "facts
and circumstances" approach that would consider the factors found relevant in the NLRA
context, the court stated that the correct standard was whether the parent corporation
exercises a degree of control which exceeds that normally exercised by a parent corpora-
tion that is distinct from a subsidiary corporation."
Having described the degree of control necessary for single-employer status, the
court analyzed the facts of the case in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs." The court
" Id.
20 Id.
5' Id.
" Id. The statutory definition of employer is broad and general. "An 'employer' is 'a person [or
any agent of such person] engaged in any industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
employees . .' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). A person 'includes one or more industries ... [or] corporations.'
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)." Id. (emphasis and brackets in original).
' 711 F.2d at 1336, 32 FEP Cases at 373.
64 Id.
53 Id.
5" Id. at 1336-37, 32 FEP Cases at 373.
" Id. at 1337, 32 FEP Cases at 373.
5" Id.
59 Id.
6° Id.
6' Id. at 1337, 32 FEP Cases at 373-74.
" Id. at 1337-38, 32 FEP Cases at 374.
63 Id. at 1338, 32 FEP Cases at 374.
64 Id. Because this case was an appeal from a motion for dismissal, the plaintiffs only had to
make a prima facie case for jurisdiction. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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found there was common ownership of the corporations in that Pure is the sole owner of
its subsidiary, Syntax." The court also found evidence of a close interrelation of opera-
tions between Pure and Syntax: the President of Pure was also a director and officer of
Syntax, and authorized all purchases by Syntax that exceeded two hundred dollars.' In
addition, Pure handled Syntax's accounts receivable and payroll, and assisted with sales
shipments and other administrative matters.° Evidence of centralized control of labor
also existed, the court stated." Not only were several employees transferred from Pure to
Syntax, but the court found that Pure's president had approved the hire of plaintiff
Armbruster as a secretary. 69
 Finally, the court found that while there was evidence of
common management it was not as definitive as for the other factors. Nevertheless, the
court determined that the plaintiffs had met their burden of establishing a prima facie
case." The court remanded this issue with instructions that the lower court analyze both
the prima facie showing and whatever rebuttal evidence the defendants could advance
and determine the merits of this claim.'"
The court began its discussion of the second issue — whether a manufacturer's
representative may be considered an employee — by noting that the determination of
employee status under Title VII is a question of federal law." The court found that
Congress intended Title VII to cover the full range of workers who may be subject to the
harms the Act was designed to eliminate." Absent a provision specifically excluding
manufacturer's representatives, the court was unwilling to find that such a label necessar-
ily denied those individuals Title V11 protection.' Instead, the court explained, the
proper test is whether the economic realities underlying the relationship between the
manufacturer's representative and principal were such that the individual would be
susceptible to discriminatory practices forbidden under Title VII." The court also
analogized to the broad interpretation of "employee" under the Fair Labor Standards Act
and the NLRA, 76
 and adopted the method of interpretation employed by the United
States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc." In Hearst Publications the Court
held that the term "employee" in a statute is not a word of art, but rather is to be
interpreted by reference to the purpose of that statute." Accordingly, the Armbruster
" 711 F.2d at 1338, 32 FE!' Cases at 374.
w Id.
" Id.
68 Id.
ss Id. at 1338 -39, 32 FEP Cases at 374 - 75.
" Id. at 1339, 32 FEP Cases at 375. According to the court, the fact that Pure's president was also
president of Syntax for the first seven years that Syntax was owned by Pure and that thereafter he
remained as Syntax's chairman of the Board of Directors suggested common management. There
was also testimony that Pure's president "professed the unity" between Pure and Syntax. hi.
" Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
" Id. at 1340, 32 FEP Cases at 376. The defendants-appellees alleged that the manufacturer's
representatives were independent contractors, noting that the representatives did not work out of
the corporate office, sold other product lines, and were paid only commissions. Id. at 1339, 32 FEP
Cases. at 375. Their work, Syntax alleged, was not under its control. Id.
m Id. at 1340, 32 FEP Cases at 376.
76 Id. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act the term "employee" was construed to include former
employees. Id. (discussing Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1977)).
77 Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1340, 32 HP Cases at 376.
78 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 124, 14 L.R.R.M. 614, 619 (1944).
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court determined that the end purpose of Title VII is to eliminate employment discrimi-
nation and therefore, "employee" is to be given a broad interpretation for Title VII
purposes."
The court recognized that some circuits had limited the term "employee" in Title VII
by excluding independent contractors." Those circuits based such a limitation on the
amendments to the NLRA which exclude independent contractors from coverage under
that Act." The Armbruster court refused to accept this limitation." Rather, the court
explained that the NLRA had been amended to exclude independent contractors before
the enactment of Title VII. 83 The court stated that although Congress used the NLRA as
a model for Title VII, it did not incorporate the exclusionary provision of the NLRA into
Title VII." Therefore, the court stated, an ambiguity in this matter should be resolved in
favor of broad coverage." The court remanded the issue and instructed the lower court
to determine whether the manufacturer's representatives were susceptible to the unlawful
practices Title VII was designed to remedy." If so, the court explained, they must be
included as employees for the purposes of the jurisdiction requirements'
In a concurring opinion, Judge Silver agreed with the majority's resolution of the
single-employer issue, but dissented from the majority's discussion of the manufacturer's
representatives." Judge Silver stated that Congress had not defined employee in Title
VII, nor did the legislative history of the Act specifically suggest a broad interpretation of
that term." Consequently, judge Silver argued, when Congress is silent courts should fall
back on the common law definition of "employee," and leave it up to Congress to correct
the courts if necessary." The common law definition of employee, Judge Silver com-
mented, excludes independent contractors." Because the district court found the man-
ufacturer's representatives to he independent contractors, the district court's conclusion
on this matter should not be disturbed.s3
The decision of the Sixth Circuit in Armbruster brings that circuit's law into harmony
with•the decisions of several other circuits that have given a broad construction to the
term "employer" for Title VII purposes. 33 The earlier decision of the Sixth Circuit, Hassell
v. Harmon Foods , 99 had been construed by the lower courts as allowing two corporations to
be considered as a single employer for Title VII jurisdictional purposes only upon a
showing that the subsidiary relationship was a "sham," or that the parent corporation was
" 711 F.2d at 1340, 32 FEP Cases at 376 (referring to 42 U.S.0 §§ 2000e-2 and 2000e-3 which
outline unlawful employment practices).
8° Id. at 1341 & nn.7-8, 32 FEP Cases at 376-7 & nn.7-8.
8 ' Id.
82 Id.
°' Id.
" Id. at 1341, 32 FEP Cases at 376-77.
"5 Id. at 1341, 32 FEP Cases at 377.
88 Id.
" Id.
Id. at 1342-43, 32 FEP Cases at 377-78 (Silver, J., dissenting in part).
89 Id. at 1343, 32 FEP Cases at 378 (Silver, J., dissenting in part).
90
 Id.
91 Id. at 1342 -43, 32 FEP Cases at 378 (Silver, J., dissenting in part).
92 Id.
See Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1337, 32 FEP Cases at 373. See, e.g.. Quijano v. University Credit
Union, 617 F.2d 129, 22 FEP Cases 1307 (5th Cir. 1980).
" 454 F.2d 199, 4 FEP Cases 263 (6th Cir. 1972).
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liable for the debts of the subsidiary." The Armbruster decision recognizes that a more
liberal construction of the term "employer" is appropriate under Title V11."
There is ample support for the position that Congress intended broad coverage
under the Act." A primary thrust of the 1972 Amendments was expansion of coverage by
both decreasing the requisite number of employees from twenty-five to fifteen and by
eliminating previous exemptions for certain classes of employees." Fifteen was a com-
promise figure; the original proposal was for a minimum of eight employees, but fifteen
was thought to protect the small businessman, particularly a family-owned business." A
company that becomes a subsidiary to a larger corporation which assumes some control
over the subsidiary's business operations is thus no longer part of the group Congress
sought to shield from Title VII liability.'" The Sixth Circuit's decision on the single
employer issue in Armbruster, then, is in accordance with Title VII policy and brings that
circuit into harmony with those that already permitted this liberal construction of "em-
ployer."
In contrast, the decision of the Armbruster court on the issue of whether a manufac-
turer's representative constitutes an employee presents a conflict with other circuits.'°'
Independent contractors, the Armbruster court found, may be covered employees under
Title VII where the economic realities of the relationship between these individuals and
the principal caused the individuals to be susceptible to employment discrimination.'"
This interpretation is in conflict with that of other circuits that have adopted the common
law "right to control" test which would exclude independent contractors from coverage
under Title VII. 103 The Armbruster court relied heavily on NLRB v. Hearst Publications,
Inc. 1 °4 in formulating its minority view of the term employee.'" In Hearst Publications, the
United States Supreme Court, construing the term "employee" under the NLRA found
nothing in the statute or its history to indicate that Congress intended its scope to be
limited by local or state concepts.i"G The term "employee," under the federal law of the
NLRA, was held by the Hearst Court to include independent contractors, as this .interpre-
tation would promote the purpose of the statute.'" Employing the same analysis, the
" See, e.g., Watson v. Gulf and Western Indust., 650 F.2d 990, 993, 26 FEP Cases 1180, 1182
(9th Cir. 1981); Mas Marques v. Digital Equipment Corp., 637 F.2d 24, 27-28, 24 FEP Cases 1286,
1288 (1st Cir. 1980).
913 Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1336, 32 FEP Cases at 372-73.
97 See, e.g., supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
'" The original proposal was to reduce the employee requirement to eight. That proposal, it was
estimated, would have added 6.5 million employees to the coverage of the Act. 118 CONG. REC.
(1972) (remarks of Sen. Fannin), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 1297. The 1972
Amendments included state and local government and federal agencies as employers. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(b) (1982). See H.R. REP. No. 92-238, supra note 7, at 61.
" Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1337 n.4, 32 FEP Cases at 373 n.4.
100 Senator Stennis voiced the concern that small businesses would not have the resources to
meet the obligations of Title VII. 118 CONG. REC. (1972) (remarks of Sen. Stennis), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, Supra note 7, at 1274.
See Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1337, 32 FEP Cases at 373.
'" See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
103 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
k 0' 332 U.S. 11 (1944).
105 Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1340-41, 32 FEP Cases at 376.
'' Hearst Publications, Inc., 332 U.S. 111, 123, 14 L.R.R.M, 614, 619 (1944). The court also noted
that the imprecision of the common law "right to control" test could lead to an undesirable
inconsistency of decisions. Id. at 121-23.
1" Id. at 124-25. The NLRA has since been amended to exclude independent contractors from
coverage. See Section 2(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1982).
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Armbruster court found that t he policy of Title VII, to eliminate employment discrimina-
tion on a national basis, required the term "employee" to be construed very broadly.''
Other circuits considering this issue have reached the opposite result. '° 9 The silence
of Congress on the meaning of this term has encouraged courts to construe the term
"employee" in accordance with common law, agency principles."' These courts have
found that "employee" excludes independent contractors."' The narrow construction
given this term contrasts with the liberal interpretation generally given Title VII. A
possible explanation for this difference is that the courts have carried over the amend-
ment to the NLRA excluding independent contractors from the definition of employee to
Title VII.""
This prevailing, narrower interpretation of "employee" conflicts with the broad
interpretation given the statute generally, and in particular with the broad interpretation
given the term "employer."" 3
 By contrast, the Sixth Circuit's decision is in accord with the
precedent in Hearst Publications for broadly interpreting the term "employee," and recog-
nizes that Congress was or should have been aware of the broad construction "employee"
would he given."' The Armbruster decision has expanded the jurisdictional coverage of
Title V1I. If this circuit's approach is followed employees and independent contractors
previously excluded from Title VII protection will be included within its scope. This
result is consistent with the Title VII purpose of eliminating employment discrimination
in the United States.
C. *Standard of Causation in Actions Brought Under Title VII:
Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in employment
because of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.' The United States Supreme Court
has traditionally afforded Title VII a liberal interpretation. 3 In 1973, in McDonnell Douglas
"s See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
10" See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
"° See, e.g., Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 340-41, 28 FEP Cases 838, 839-41 (11th Cir.
1982); see supra note 23.
" 1
 See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1341, 32 FEY Cases at 376.77.
n3
 See supra notes 6-8, 51-56 and accompanying text.
711 F.2d at 1340, 32 FEP Cases at 376-77.
* By Teresita Rodriguez, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 725 F.2d 910, 33 FEP Cases 1091 (3d Cir. 1983).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982). The pertinent part of the Act reads as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer — (1) to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin....
Id.
3 See, e.g. , McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 5 FEP Cases 965 (1973). In this case
the Court wrote:
The broad, overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is
efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral em-
ployment and personnel decisions. In the implementation of such decisions, it is
abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.
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Corp. v. Green,' the United States Supreme Court set forth the basic allocation of burden
and order of proof required in a private, noncldss action complaint under Title VII
charging employment discrimination. 5 In McDonnell Douglas, the Court stated that the
Title VII plaintiff has the initial burden of making a prima facie case of employment
discrimination. 6
 A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination under McDon-
nell Douglas by showing that he belongs to a minority group and that he applied and was
qualified for a job the employer was trying to fill.' Further, the plaintiff must show that
although qualified, he was rejected and that thereafter the employer continued to seek
applicants with his qualifications."
If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts
to the defendant to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. 9 If the
employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged decision,
McDonnell Douglas provides that the burden of proof then returns to the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the reason given by the employer for the challenged decision was not a
true reason, but was a pretext for discrimination."'
The courts are not in agreement as to the appropriate standard of causation to be
applied under the third tier of the McDonnell Douglas test to establish a violation of Title
VII. For example, in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trial Transportation Co.," the United States
Supreme Court adopted a requirement of "but for" causation to establish a violation. 12 In
that case, the Court stated in a footnote that to prove pretext under the third step of the
McDonnell Douglas analysis, the Title VII plaintiff must show that the challenged decision
would not have occurred but for" the unlawful factor. 15
 The Court did not explain why
Id. at 801, 5 FEP Cases at 968. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 178, 25 FEP
Cases 1521, 1527 (1981). "As Congress itself has indicated, a 'broad approach' to the definition of
equal employment opportunity is essential to overcoming and undoing the effect of discrimina-
tion.. . . We must therefore avoid interpretations of Title VII that deprive victims of discrimination
of a remedy, without clear congressional mandate." Id. See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 431, 3 FEP Cases 175, 178 (1971) (holding that the Act proscribes not only intentional
discrimination, but also facially neutral practices which have discriminatory effect).
• 411 U.S. 792, 5 FEP Cases 965 (1973). In that case, a black laid-off employee contended that he
was denied re-employment because of his involvement in the civil rights movement and because of
his race and brought suit under Title VII. Id. at 796, 5 FEP Cases at 966-67.
• Id. at 802-05, 5 FEP Cases at 969-70.
6 Id. at 802, 5 FEP Cases at 969.
I Id.
s Id.
9 Id.
'° Id. at 804, 5 FEP Cases at 970. The Court formulated the pretext stage in an attempt to insure
that plaintiffs have a "full and fair opportunity" to make the showing of causation necessary to
establish liability. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56, 25 FEP
Cases 113,116 (1981). The Supreme Court has adopted a different approach to the burdens of proof
allocation problems in constitutional discrimination cases. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977); Mt. Healthy City School
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 420 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
" 427 U.S. 273, 12 FEP Cases 1577 (1976).
' 2 Id. at 282 n.10, 12 FEP at 1580-81 n.10. In that case, two white employees, fired for stealing,
alleged they were victims of invidious racial discrimination because a black employee who had been
similarly charged with stealing was retained by the company. Id. at 276, 12 FEP Cases at 1578. The
Supreme Court held that Title VII prohibits racial discrimination by employers and unions against
white persons upon the same' standards as it prohibits racial discrimination against nonwhites. Id. at
280, 12 FEP Cases at 1580.
'a Id. at 282 n.10, 12 FEP Gases at 1580-81 n.10.
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"but for" causation was the appropriate standard in a Title VII claim charging employ-
ment discrimination, nor did the Court explain how that standard should operate in
practice.'4 The First Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted the Supreme Court's "but for"
causation standard in determining Title VII liability.'s At least two circuits, however, have
construed McDonald as permitting adoption of a different standard for proof of pretext.
For example, the Fifth Circuit has adopted a test that would invalidate personnel action
based in "substantial part" on a discriminatory ground. 16 Under that standard, a Tide VII
plaintiff must prove that an unlawful criterion was a significant factor in the employer's
decision." In a similar vein, the Eighth Circuit has adopted a test that prohibits personnel
action where an impermissible criterion was a "motivating factor" in that action.' 6
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in
Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh,* addressed the issue of the appropriate standard of
causation to be used in a Title VII action. Concluding that McDonald controlled its
adoption of a standard of causation,' the Lewis court held that Title VII requires a
showing of "but for" causation in an employment discrimination suit. 2 ' Based on the "hut
for" standard, the court in Lewis affirmed the lower court's decision that racial discrimina-
tion claims were properly dismissed where a black candidate for promotion demonstrated
that she was better qualified than the white employee chosen over her, but did not show
that she would have been promoted but for unlawful discrimination."
The plaintiff in Lewis, Ida Mary Lewis, had been an employee at the bookstore of the
University of Pittsburgh (University) since 1965." In 1976, an opening for the position of
" Id.
Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663, 665, 19 FEP Cases 932, 933 (1st Cir. 1979) (plaintiff must satisfy
but for causation in impermissibly motivated termination cases); Goldman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
607 F.2d 1014, 1019, 21 FEP Cases 96, 99 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980) (no
indication that but For discriminatory action there would have been an opening); Mack v. Cape
Elizabeth School Bd., 553 F.2d 720, 722, 20 FEP Cases 1679, 1680 (1st Cir. 1977) (Title VII plaintiff
must show that but for impermissible factors she would have been re-employed).
" Baldwin v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 648 F.2d 950, 956, 25 FEP Cases 947, 952 (5th Cir.
1981) (ultimate issue is whether racial considerations were significant factors in the challenged
decision); Whiting v. Jackson State University, 616 F.2d 116, 121, 22 FEP Cases 1296, 1298 (5th Cir.
1980) (forbidden taint must be a significant factor in the challenged decision). Several district courts
have applied a significant or substantial factor standard. See Williams v. Boorstin, 451 F. Supp.1117,
1123, 20 FEP Cases 1514, 1519 (D.D.C. 1978) (employer motivated in substantial part by hostile
reaction to terminated employee's leadership abilities); Gerstle v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 358 F.
Supp. 545, 553, 5 FEP Cases 976, 981 (D. Colo. 1973) (violating company rule not a substantial factor
for challenged decision).
See Baldwin v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 648 F.2d 950, 956, 25 FEP Cases 947, 952 (5th Cir.
1981); Whiting v. Jackson State University, 616 F.2d 116, 121, 22 FEP Cases 1296, 1298 (5th Cir.
1980).
1" Marshall v. Kirkland, 602 F.2d 1282, 1289, 20 FEP Cases 1437, 1442 (8th Cir. 1979)
(invidious discriminatory purpose was motivating factor); Satz v. ITT Financial Corp., 619 F.2d 738,
746, 22 FEP Cases 929, 935 (8th Cir. 1980) (whether prohibited criterion was a factor in the
challenged decision).
12 725 F.2d 910, 33 FEP Cases 1091 (3d Cir. 1983).
20 Id. at 915, 33 FEP Cases at 1095.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 920, 33 FEP Cases at 1098.
" Id. at 912, 33 FEP Cases at 1092. In 1967, Lewis was promoted from clerk to the position of
buyer in the trade book department. Id. In 1975, however, the University eliminated one of the
buyer positions in the trade book department in a budgetary move, and as a result Lewis returned to
her position as clerk. Id.
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assistant buyer in the trade book department became available and Lewis applied for the
position. 24
 The position went to Jean Aiello, a white woman who had been employed with
the University bookstore since 1972. 25
 Lewis brought suit in United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania against the University and its bookstore under
section 706 of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act," and under Title 42 of the United
States Code, sections 1981 27 and 1983,28 contending that she was denied a promotion on
the basis of her race." Lewis claimed that she was better qualified for the position of
assistant buyer than Aiello." The University contended that Lewis was not offered the
position because of her poor employment record as a former assistant buyer in the trade
book department. 3 ' A jury, which heard Lewis' claims under sections 1981 and 1983, 32
found that she had not been denied the promotion because of her race. 33 The Title VII
claim was decided in a bench trial before the district court judge. 34
 The judge found that
24 hi.
" Id.
28
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1982).
27 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). That section provides in full:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exaction of every kind, and to no
other.
Id.
" 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). That section provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other persons within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and the
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress... .
Id.
211 Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 912, 33 FEP Cases 1091, 1092 (3d Cir. 1983).
3° Id. According to the district court findings, Lewis graduated from Carnegie Institute of
Technology in 1947 with a bachelor's degree in history and english. Id. In 1950, she received a
master's degree in history from the University of Pittsburgh. Id. Lewis received a master's degree in
Library Science in 1961 from Carnegie. Id. Lewis had started working toward a Ph.D. degree in
history in 1964, but had to abandon her studies because of financial arid personal reasons.Id., 33 FEP
Cases at 1092-93. In contrast, Aiello obtained a high school degree in 1970. /it, 33 FEP Cases at 1093.
After graduating from high school, she attended the University of Pittsburgh for two years until she
had to withdraw for financial reasons. Id. Lewis had previous experience as a buyer, while Aiello had
only worked as a sales clerk in the bookstore. Id.
91 Id.
32 When Title VII employment discrimination and section 1981 civil rights claims are presented
together, a jury trial is available on the legal claims stated under section 1981. Johnson v. Wolff 's
Clothiers, Inc., 663 F.2d 800, 804, 27 FEP Cases 493, 496 (8th Cir. 1981). See also Williams v.
Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 928, 27 FEP Cases 1273, 1280 (9th Cir. 1982); Bibbs v. Jim Lynch
Cadillac, Inc., 653 F.2d 316, 319, 26 FEP Cases 1223, 1224 (8th Cir. 1981).
An individual bringing an action under section 1983 may also have a right to a jury trial. See,e.g.,
Van Ermen v. Schmidt, 374 F. Supp. 1070, 1075 (W.D. Wis. 1974); Burt v. Board of Trustees, 521
F.2d 1201, 1206, 13 FEP Cases 1740, 1743 (4th Cir. 1975).
33 Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 914, 33 FEP Cases 1091, 1094 (3d Cir. 1983).
31 There is no right to a jury trial on a Title VII claim of race discrimination in employment.
Daniels v. Lord & Taylor, 542 F. Supp. 68, 69, 31 FEP Cases 59, 59 (N.D. III. 1982), See also Ellis v.
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Lewis' poor employment record, and not her race, was the reason she had not been
offered the promotion. 35
 On appeal, Lewis contended that the trial judge had erred in
instructing the jury regarding the level of causation required for her to succeed on her
claims under sections 1981 and 1983 and that the judge had decided the Title VII claim
under the same erroneous standard." The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that
Title VII and sections 1981 and 1983 all require a showing of "but for" causation in an
employment discrimination suit. 37
 The court affirmed both the jury and the district
judge's findings according to this standard."
In addressing the causation question, the court of appeals stated that in McDonald the
Supreme Court had conclusively adopted a requirement of "but for" causation to estab-
lish a Title VII violation." According to the court, no decision from either the Supreme
Court or any other court suggested "any deviation from the use of the 'but for' test of
causation."40
 Lewis, on the other hand, relied on the Supreme Court decision of Mt.
Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle' to assert that in establishing employment discrimi-
nation she only had to prove that race was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor in the
University's decision not to offer her the promotion." The court rejected the plaintiff's
argument and found that Mt. Healthy "did not deviate from the requirement of 'but for'
causation; rather, its only effect was to allocate and specify burdens of proof."'"
In addition, the court dismissed Lewis' reliance on several circuit and district court
decisions" as support for her position that she only had to prove that race was a
Phillippine Airlines, 443 F. Supp. 251, 253, 17 FEY Cases 67, 68 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Schofield v.
Stetson, 459 F. Supp. 998, 999, 19 FEP Cases 947, 948 (M.D. Ga. 1978).
" Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 914, 33 FEE' Cases 1091, 1094 (3d Cir. 1983).
36 Id.
" Id. The standards to be applied in evaluating a claim of racial employment discrimination
brought under section 1981 are the same as those applied in actions brought pursuant to Title VII.
See, e.g., Wilson v. Legal Assistance of North Dakota, 669 F.2d 562, 563-64, 27 FEP Cases 1567, 1568
(8th Cir. 1982); Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1223 n.3, 16 FEP Cases 894, 897 n.3 (8th Cir.
1978); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 270, 12 FEP Cases 314, 323 (4th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of International Harvester Co., 502
F.2d 1309, 1316, 8 FEP Cases 577, 582 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976). The same
standards apply to claims brought under section 1983 when the 1983 action provides a parallel
remedy for the transgression of rights conferred by Title VII. See Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 535
F.2d 722, 729, 13 FEP Cases 1296, 1298 (5th Cir. 1980); Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722, 729,
13 HP Cases 1521, 1527 (2d Cir. 1976).
39 Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 912, 33 FEP Cases 1091, 1092 (3d Cir. 1983).
39 Id. at 915, 33 FEP Cases at 1095.
" Id.
" 429 U.S. 274 (1977). In that case, an untenured teacher, who on a radio station show criticized
a policy of his school, claimed that the school's failure to renew his contract was based on the radio
station incident and thus was retaliation for conduct protected under the first and fourteenth
amendments. Id. at 283.
" Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 915-16, 33 FEP Cases 1091, 1095 (3d Cir.
1983). In Ml. Healthy, the Supreme Court formulated a test of causation which placed the initial
burden on the plaintiff in a constitutional discrimination case to show that his constitutionally
protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the challenged decision. 429 U.S. 274, 286
(1977). If the plaintiff met this burden, the burden would then shift to the employer who would have
to prove that it would have reached the same decision even in the absence of the protected conduct.
Id. at 287. See also supra note 10.
" Lewis, 725 F.2d at 916, 33 FEP Cases at 1095.
" Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116, 22 FEP Cases 1296 (5th Cir. 1980); Niederhuber
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"substantial" or "motivating" factor in the University's decision not to promote her." The
court in Lewis did not interpret these cases as departing from the "but for" causation
standard. Rather, the court found that the effect of the "significant factor" standard was
equivalent to the effect of the "but for" test adopted by the Supreme Court.46 Stating that
the "but for" standard was "more analytically measurable"" and that this standard would
be easier for a jury to apply, the Third Circuit rejected the "significant factor" standard
and adopted the "but for" standard."
After deciding that the "but for" standard was the appropriate standard of causation
in a Title VII claim, the court in Lewis turned its attention to the challenged jury
instructions. The issue before the court was whether the district court judge had impro-
perly instructed the jury regarding the level of causation required for Lewis to succeed on
her claim of employment discrimination under sections 1981 and 1983. 49
 Lewis claimed
that by requiring race to be the "determinative factor" in its instructions to the jury, the
district court had committed an error." Instead, Lewis asserted that the district court
judge should have instructed the jury that race needed to be only a "substantial" or
"motivating" factor." The court of appeals rejected this argument." Although the district
court judge did refer to race as a "determinative factor" in his charge to the jury, the
Third Circuit stated that the judge had emphasized that the jury must decide whether the
plaintiff would have been promoted "but for" her race." The court of appeals noted that
by framing the causation element in terms of "but for," the district court judge had been
consistent with the Supreme Court requirement set forth in McDonald . 54 Further, the
v. Camden County Vocational & Technical School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 495 F. Supp. 273 (D.N.J. 1980),
aff'd, 671 F.2d 496 (3d Cir. 1980).
" Lewis, 725 F.2d at 916, 33 FEP Cases at 1096.
46 Id.
47 Id.
4$ Id.
" Id. at 916-17, 33 FEP Cases at 1096-97.
" Id. at 917, 33 FEP Cases at 1096. Part of the instruction to the jury was as follows:
The defendants intended to or purposefully discriminated against plaintiff only if her
race was the determinative factor in their failure to promote the plaintiff. This means that
the defendants refused to promote the plaintiff because she was black, and that but for the fact that
she was black, the plaintiff would have been promoted.
If the defendants failed to promote the plaintiff for any other reason than her
race, then you cannot find that the defendants intentionally and purposefully discrimi-
nated against the defendant [sic] because of her race.
The consideration of race need not be the sole basis for the decision not to award
the position to plaintiff, but it must be the determinative factor in the decision. If you
find that Defendants did not intentionally and purposefully discriminate against the
plaintiff because of her race, by failing to promote her, then you must find for the
defendant.
In summary, you must find for the plaintiff if you find that the plaintiff has proved
by a preponderance of the evidence that, one, she was better qualified for the position
of assistant buyer in the trade book department than Miss Aiello, and, two, that the
determinative factor of the defendant's decision to deny Miss Lewis the promotion was
her race. In other words, but for the fact that Miss Lewis is black, she would have gotten the
promotion... .
Id., 33 FEP Cases at 1096-97 (emphasis in original).
" Id. at 917, 33 FEP Cases at 1096.
" Id. at 920, 33 FEP Cases at 1098.
53 Id. at 917, 33 FEP Cases at 1096.
54 Id.
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court found that in the jury instruction the term "determinative factor" was always
combined with a description of the "but for" test. 55 Reasoning that the jury instructions
were consistent with other cases approving the combined use of the "determinative
factor" and the "but for" test in a jury instruction measuring the degree of causation 56
 the
court concluded that the district court judge had properly instructed the jury on the
correct test to be employed in determining employment discrimination under sections
1981 and 1983. 5'
The dissent in Lewis argued that the majority had erred in holding that the plaintiff
had the burden of showing that "but for" her race the University would have promoted
her.SN According to the dissent, the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the degree of
causation required in a Title VII claim." Further, the dissent noted that despite the
majority's assertion, the courts are not in agreement as to the standard of causation to be
used in a Title VII employment discrimination claim." The dissent also disapproved of
the jury instruction referring to race as the "determining factor."' The dissent noted that .
a plaintiff would be at a disadvantage if she had to prove that race was a "determinative
factor" in the challenged decision." According to the dissent, Congress specifically re-
jected the use of such a restrictive test in determining whether race was a factor in the
challenged decision."
The Lewis decision accentuates the diversity of opinion among the courts concerning
the appropriate standard of causation required in a private, nonclass Title VII complaint
charging employment discrimination. _Despite the majority's assertion that there is no
indication of courts using a standard of causation other than the "but for" standard," the
federal courts are not in agreement regarding the appropriate standard of causation to be
used in a Title VII employment discrimination case. 65 For example, some courts use a test
that would invalidate a personnel decision where a discriminatory factor was a "significant
or substantial factor" in the decision."" Other courts have adopted a test that would
prohibit personnel action where an impermissible criterion was a "motivating factor" in
that action." The Lewis decision adds to the confusion by interpreting a "significant
55 Id. at 918, 33 FEP Cases at 1097.
51' Id., 33 FEP Cases at 1097-98. See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1019, 20 FEP Cases 29,
41 (1st Cir. 1979); Bentley v. Stromberg-Carlson Corp., 638 F.2d 9,11-12, 24 FEP Cases 1255, 1257
(2d Cir. 1981).
w Lewis, 725 F.2d at 920, 33 FEP Cases at 1098.
59 Id., 33 FEP Cases at 1099 (Adams, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 921, 33 FEP Cases at 1099-1100 (Adams, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the
Supreme Court's reference to a "but for" standard in a footnote was "reflective of the fact that the
Supreme Court has yet to address the degree of causation a plaintiff must establish to prevail on a
Title VII disparate treatment claim." Id.
" Id. at 921 -22, 33 FEP Cases at 1100 (Adams, J., dissenting); see supra notes 11-18 and
accompanying text.
61 Id. at 922, 33 FEP Cases at 1100 (Adams, J., dissenting).
92 Id. (Adams, J., dissenting).
" Id., 33 FEP Cases at 1100-01 (citing proposed McClellan Amendment, 110 CONG. Rec.
13,837-38 (1964), which was defeated prior to ratification of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
" Lewis, 725 F.2d at 915, 33 FE? Cases at 1095.
" See Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed -Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy
Perspective, 82 CoLum. L. Rev. 292, 309 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Brodin]; see also supra notes 11-18
and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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factor" test as the equivalent of the "but for" standard of causation." Lewis, therefore,
suggests that the Supreme Court needs to provide further guidance on the issue of what
standard of causation should be used in a Title VII employment discrimination action.
Although in McDonald the Court required that race be a "but for" cause of the challenged
decision, the Court did not explain why such a standard of causation was appropriate."
The Supreme Court, therefore, should clearly explain the justification for the "but for"
standard in a Title VII claim charging employment discrimination. In addition, the
Supreme Court should establish guidelines for the standard's operation."
As it now operates, the "but for" standard is the functional equivalent of the "same
decision" standard developed in Mt. Healthy." Both standards operate to place the
plaintiff in the same position he would have occupied had the impermissible factor not
entered the picture." lithe fact finder determines that the defendant would have arrived
at the same decision in the absence of the impermissible factor, the plaintiff is deemed not
to have suffered any harm." The only difference between the two standards is that under
the Mt. Healthy standard the burden is on the defendant, rather than on the plaintiff, to
show that the impermissible factor did not make a difference in the ultimate result."
In Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the
Supreme Court had adopted a requirement of "but for" causation to establish a Title VII
violation. 75 The Supreme Court, however, has not clearly defined the appropriate stan-
dard of causation and how that standard is to operate in a private, nonclass Title VII
action charging employment discrimination. Until this issue is squarely addressed by the
Supreme Court, lower federal courts will continue to use different standards of causation
and similarly situated Title VII plaintiffs may be treated differently depending on where
they file their case.
II. EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
A. *Deduction of Unemployment Benefits from a Title VII
Back Pay Award: Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc.'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 grants courts wide discretionary powers to
frame remedies to redress wrongs caused by discrimination on the basis of national
origin, race, religion, or sex. 3 Such discretionary power includes, but is not limited to,
" Lewis, 725 F.2d at 916, 33 FEP Cases at 1095.
69 See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10, 12 FEP Cases
1577, 1580-81 n.10 (1976).
7° Such guidelines would perhaps clear up the confusion created by the Lewis court interpreting
the significant factor test as the functional equivalent of the "but for" standard. Lewis, 725 F.2d at
916, 33 FEP Cases at 1096.
" See Brodin, supra note 65, at:293 n.8.
72 Id. at 316 - 17.
72 Id. at 317.
'' See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977).
" Lewis, 725 F.2d at 915, 33 FEP Cases at 1095.
* By Tracy A. Miner, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 721 F.2d 77, 33 FEP Cases 187 (3d Cir. 1983),
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). The statutory text is as follows:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
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ordering reinstatement of a discharged employee with or without back pay.' If a court
does award back pay, the statute provides that interim earnings or amounts that the
employee could have earned with reasonable diligence be deducted from the award . 5 The
statute is silent, however, on the issue of deducting unemployment compensation re-
ceived by the employee from the back pay award!'
In the absence of a statutory mandate concerning the treatment of unemployment
compensation in back pay awards under Title VII, courts have been left to frame their
own rules regarding the deductibility of unemployment benefits. No consensus has been
reached by the circuit courts of appeals that have addressed the issue. Four circuits have
upheld the reduction of back pay awards by the amount of unemployment compensation
received, considering it within the discretion of the district court to make such a reduction
to avoid double recovery by the plaintiff.' Other circuits have adopted the rule that
unemployment benefits should not be deducted from a Title VII back pay award because
no reductions are made in awards under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 9
which influenced Congress in its drafting of Tide VII;" unemployment benefits should
not be deducted from a Title VII back pay award.
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in
Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc. , t0
 adopted a rule prohibiting a deduction for unemployment
compensation from a back pay award under Title VII. In so holding, the Third Circuit
joined the Fourth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits which have all reasoned that Title VII's
policy of ending employment discrimination is best served by precluding the deduction of
unemployment benefits." These decisions represent a trend towards the adoption of a
uniform rule which should eventually unite all circuit courts concerning the treatment of
unemployment compensation in back pay awards under Title VII.
engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may
enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to,
reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the em-
ployer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for
the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate. Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to
the filing of a charge with the Commission. Interim earnings or amounts earnable with
reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to
reduce the back pay otherwise allowable... .
Id.
▪ Id,
Id.
• See id.
▪ Merriweather v. Hercules, Inc., 631 F.2d 1161, 1168, 26 FEP Cases 733, 737 (5th Cir. 1980);
EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local No. 638, 542 F.2d 579, 592, 13 FEP Cases 705, 715 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911, 14 FEP Cases 702 (1977); Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 552 F.2d
850, 855, 11 FEP Cases I, 4 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 434 U.S. 136,
16 FEP Cases 136 (1977); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 721, 2 FEP Cases 121, 127
(7th Cir. 1969).
• 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
o Brown v. A.J. Gerrard Manufacturing Co., 715 F.2d 1549, 1550, 32 FEP Cases 1701, 1702
( I lth Cir. 1983) (en bane) (per curiam); Kauffman v. Sidereal Corp., 695 F.2d 343, 346-47, 32 FEP
Cases 1710, 1713 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 645 F.2d 183, 195-96, 25
FEP Cases 774, 783 (4th Cir. 1981).
'° 721 F.2d 77, 33 FEP Cases 187 (3d Cir. 1983).
" Id. at 82, 33 FEP Cases at 191.
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In Craig, the plaintiff, Valerie Craig, worked in the packaging department of the
defendant corporation.' Craig's supervisor, Harris Hughes, had complete discretion
over hiring and firing decisions in his department.' 3 On July 15, 1978, Harris suggested to
Craig that they have sexual relations." Craig refused.' 5 When Craig persisted in refusing,
Harris indicated that he would get even.' 6 Ten days after the incident involving Harris,
Craig did not report to work because of an illness." When she returned to work the next
day with a doctor's note, she discovered that Harris had fired her. 18 When no action was
taken by the employer after Craig protested her discharge, Craig filed a complaint with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the Commission). Following an ad-
verse ruling by the Commission, Craig brought suit in the federal district court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania under Title VII for sexual harassment.'"
The district court found that Craig had been dismissed in violation of Title VII and
issued an order directing Craig's reinstatement, enjoining Y & Y from making future
reprisals against Craig, and granting Craig back pay." In awarding Craig back pay,
however, the district court reduced the award by the amount of interim earnings and
unemployment compensation that Craig had received after her dismissal. 2 ' The defen-
dant appealed the finding of liability, maintaining that Craig had been discharged for
independent, legitimate reasons, including excessive absenteeism. 22 Craig cross-appealed
on the issue of damages, arguing that the district court erred by deducting the amount of
unemployment compensation that she had received from the gross back pay award."
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's determination of liability,
finding that the district court did not err in concluding that the legitimate reason given
for the dismissal was pretextual and that the corporation was on constructive notice of
Harris' action's." The Third Circuit, however, reversed the district court's damages
award, holding that the district court erred in reducing plaintiff's back pay award by the
amount of unemployment compensation she had received."
Acknowledging that the back pay issue was a question over which reasonable persons
could differ," the court concluded that congressional intent, principles of tort law, and
the policy underlying Title VII dictated that unemployment benefits not be deducted
from Title VII back pay awards." Looking first at congressional intent, the court rea-
soned that if Congress had intended unemployment benefits to be deducted from a back
pay award it would have mandated the exclusion as it had done for interim earnings."
" Id. at 78, 33 FEP Cases at 187.
' 3 Id. at 78, 33 FEP Cases at 188.
14 Id.
" Id.
" Id. at 78-79, 33 FEP Cases at 188.
" Id. at 79, 33 FEP Cases at 188.
Id.
19
 Id.
" Id.
z' Id.
22 Id.
Id.
24
 Id.
25 Id.
" Id.
27 Id. at 82-84, 33 FEP Cases at 191-92.
at 78, 33 FEP Cases at 187.
at 78, 33 FEP Cases at 187-88.
at 80-81, 33 FEP Cases at 189-90.
at 82, 33 FEP Cases at 191.
" Id. at 82, 33 FEP Cases at 191.
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Because Congress had not added such an exclusion, the court concluded that Congress
did not intend for unemployment benefits to be deducted from Title VII awards. 29 The
court also found evidence of congressional intent from the practice under the NLRA."
The National Labor Relations Board (the Board) has consistently refused to deduct
unemployment benefits from back pay awards under the NLRA. 31
 As Title VII was
modeled• on the NLRA, 32 the court reasoned that Congress intended that the practices
under the statutes be analogous.' Presuming that Congress was aware of the practice of
not deductiog unemployment benefits from back pay awards under the NLRA, the court
concluded that Congress must have intended the same practice to govern Title V11. 34
The court also found support for its holding in principles of tort law, reasoning that
unemployment compensation resembled a collateral benefit which is ordinarily not de-
ducted from a plaintiff's recovery in a tort case. 35 According to the court, the rationale for
the collateral source rule in torts" is that permitting a wrongdoer to benefit at the expense
of the victim is inequitable." This rationale, the court found, should also apply in Title
VII cases."
Finally, the court found that precluding the deduction of unemployment benefits
from a Title VII back pay award would further Title VIPs objective of ending employ-
ment discrimination by providing more of a deterrent to violations." Pointing out that the
prospect of back pay awards unreduced by unemployment compensation would add to
the corrective force of Title VII by making its violation more costly," the court rejected
the approach of permitting the district court judge to determine, in his or her discretion,
the issue of deduction of unemployment benefits." The court reasoned that uniform
rules were necessary to further the statutory objectives of Title VII and to avoid conflict-
ing results.'
Chief Judge Seitz dissented from the part of the decision relating to the back pay
award. The purpose of the damages provisions in Title VII, he argued, was to provide
compensation for the tangible economic loss suffered by the victim of an unlawful
employment practice." This make-whole remedy was the deterrent provided by Congress
in Title V11. 44
 Thus, Judge Seitz reasoned, the employer could not be compelled to pay
more damages than were necessary to make the plaintiff economically whole." If the back
29 Id.
" Id. at 82-83, 33 FEP Cases at 191.
31 Id. The Board's practice of refusing to deduct unemployment compensation from back pay
awards under the NLRA was upheld by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S.
361, 364, 27 L.R.R.M. 2230, 2231 (1951).
32 See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419, 10 FEP Cases 1181, 1188 (1975).
Craig, 721 F.2d at 83, 33 FEP Cases at 191.
31 Id.
3' Id.
" Under the collateral source rule, payments that a plaintiff receives for his or her loss from
another source are not credited against the defendant's liability for all damages resulting from its
wrongful or negligent act. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2) (1979).
37 See Kassman v. American University, 546 F.2d 1029, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
88 Craig, 721 F.2d at 83, 33 FEP Cases at 192.
" Id. at 84, 33 FEP Cases at 193.
40 Id.
" Id. at 85, 33 FEP Cases at 193.
" Id.
43 Id. at 85, 33 FEP Cases at 194 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
" Id. at 86, 33 FEP Cases at 194 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
" Id. (Seitz, CT, dissenting).
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pay award is not reduced by the unemployment benefits received, according to Chief
Judge Seitz, the defendant would be required to pay more than was necessary to compen-
sate the plaintiff." This result, the dissent maintained, impermissibly goes beyond the
provisions of Title VII and actively involves the courts in redistributing wealth. 47
In Craig, the Third Circuit joined the Fourth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits in
adopting a rule that unemployment benefits should not be deducted from back pay
awards. 48 Although an even split now exists among the circuits that have addressed the
issue,49 the Craig decision follows the trend of establishing a uniform practice denying a
deduction for unemployment benefits received from a Title VII back pay award. District
courts in the circuits that have not adopted a rule precluding deduction are given
discretion to deny the deduction." Plaintiffs in those jurisdictions, as well as in the
jurisdictions which have not yet addressed the issue, therefore, should be guided by the
reasoning of Craig in awarding damages under Title VII.
There is much to recommend widespread adoption of the rule in Craig. Adoption of
a rule precluding deduction for unemployment benefits would provide greater deter-
rence against violations of Title VII than would otherwise exist if awards were routinely
reduced by the unemployment benefits received." Contrary to the argument of the Craig
dissent, Congress did not mandate that victims of discrimination receive only compensa-
tion which would make them economically whole. 52 Rather, Congress provided only that
interim earnings are to be deducted from back pay awards. 53 No mention was made of
unemployment benefits 5 4 although Congress was certainly aware of the widespread
existence of such benefits. As no congressional mandate exists for either inclusion or
exclusion of such benefits, courts should adopt a rule furthering the policy goals of Title
VII. Denying deductions from back pay awards furthers Title VII's policy of ending
employment discrimination by making violations of Title VII more costly and thereby
providing greater deterrence to unlawful discrimination. 55
In addition to its deterrent effect, a rule prohibiting deductions of unemployment
benefits would avoid the inequity of permitting wrongdoers from profiting from a benefit
funded by society. Payments of unemployment benefits are made by the state out of state
funds derived from taxation, 56 Employment discrimination is a wrong not only to the
individual victim but to society as a whole. Society's largesse in providing benefits to its
unemployed should not, therefore, be used to subsidize those who have violated its
employment discrimination laws."
46 Id. (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
4 ' Id. (Seitz, CJ., dissenting).
48 See cases cited supra note 9.
" See cases cited supra notes 7 and 9.
" See cases cited supra note 9 and accompanying text.
' I See Craig, 721 F.2d at 84, 33 FEP Cases at 192.
51 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). For the text of the statute see supra note 3.
5-1 Id.
" See id.
55 Craig, 721 F.2d at 84, 33 FEP Cases at 192.
56 NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 364, 27 L.R.R.M. 2230, 2231 (1951). Although
unemployment taxes are paid by employers and thus each employer has contributed to the fund,
payments made to employees from this fund are not made to discharge any liability of the employer,
but rather "to carry out a policy of social betterment for the benefit of the entire state." Id. Thus,
although the employer had contributed to the fund, the moneys in the fund are state moneys to use
for the achievement of state policies.
" As the Fourth Circuit reasoned, back pay awards under Tide VII should not be affected by
the unemployment compensation system because that system is designed to serve a wholly indepen-
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No social policy is subverted, on the other hand, by precluding deduction of unem-
ployment benefits from back pay awards. As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, because
the statute imposes a duty on discharged employees to mitigate damages, denying an
offset from back pay awards for unemployment benefits does not discourage discharged
employees from seeking other employment?' Nor does it provide plaintiffs with a
windfall that is abhorrent to.society. 59
 If society determines that a denial of the deduction
does produce unwarranted benefits to the plaintiff, the states can provide for recoupment
of the unemployment benefits." Such a scheme would benefit all of society rather than a
small segment. This result is preferable to granting the benefits, even indirectly, to those
who have been found to have engaged in employment discrimination in violation of Title
VII. Absent such a scheme, as between the violators of Title VII and their victims, it seems
preferable that the victims receive the unemployment benefits.
With the Craig decision, the Third Circuit joined the Fourth, Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits in adopting a rule precluding the reduction of back pay awards under Title VII
by the unemployment benefits received by the plaintiff.'" This holding is consistent with
the practice under the National Labor Relations Act and furthers Title VII's policy of
ending employment discrimination. 62
 The sound reasoning of the Third Circuit in Craig
should provide guidance for district courts in jurisdictions which have not yet adopted a
rule against the deduction.
B. *Exception Four to the Equal Pay Act: Bence v. Detroit Health Corp.'
The Equal Pay Act of 19632
 (the Act) requires that employers pay equal salaries to
men and women employees for equal work.3
 While this legislation represents Congress'
dent social policy. EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 645 F.2d 183, 196, 25 FEP Cases 774, 784 (4th Cir.
1981).
" Kaufman v. Sidereal Corp., 695 F.2d 343, 347, 32 FEP Cases 1710, 1713 (9th Cir. 1983).
" See NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 364-65, 27 L.R.R.M. 2230, 2231 (1951).
2° Kaufman v. Sidereal Corp., 695 F.2d 343, 347, 32 FEP Cases 1710, 1713 (9th Cir. 1983). Such
a statute has been enacted in Pennsylvania. 43 PENN. STAT. (Purdon's) § 1874(b) (1983 Supp.) Under
the Pennsylvania statute, the recipient of a back pay award from which unemployment benefits have
not been deducted becomes liable to pay to the Unemployment Compensation Fund an amount
equal to the amount of unemployment benefits he or she had received during the period covered by
the back pay award. Id.
gi See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
* By Jennifer L. Jorgensen, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 712 F.2d 1024, 32 FEP Cases 434 (6th Cir. 1983).
2
 The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982), amended § 6 of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982). The Equal Pay Act provides in pertinent part:
No employer . shall discriminate, ... between employees on the basis of sex by paying
wages to employees at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of
the opposite sex ... for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal
skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working condi-
tions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit
system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or
(iv) a differential based upon any other factor other than sex . . . .
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982).
3 See id. Generally, courts have not interpreted the "equal work" language as necessarily re-
quiring identical jobs. See 1979-1980 Annual Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination
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attempt to eliminate wage differentials which discriminate against women,' the Act
nevertheless permits differentials if they qualify under one of four statutory exceptions: a
seniority system, a merit system, a system which measures earnings by quality or quantity
of production, or a differential based upon any other factor other than sex.' The first
three exceptions have faced relatively few legal challenges.6
 The fourth exception ("ex-
ception four"), however, which permits wage differentials if "based upon any other factor
other than sex," has been the focus of extensive litigation! The broad language of the
fourth exception has been interpreted to permit wage differentials in a wide variety of
circumstances . 8
Generally, when an employer faced with charges of an Equal Pay Act violation asserts
that its wage plan is legitimately based upon a "factor other than sex," courts will
scrutinize the particular elements of the employer's wage system to determine whether
Law —Title VII and the Equal Pay Act: Gunther v. County of Washington, 22 B.C. L. REV. 184, 185 n.3
(1980) (citing Usery v. Columbia Univ., 568 F.2d 953, 958, 15 FEP Cases 1333, 1336 (2d Cir. 1977);
Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265, 9 FEP Cases 502, 506 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 905 (1970))[hereinafter cited as 22 B.C. L. REV.]. Instead, jobs are "equal" for the purposes of
the Equal Pay Act if "the actual work performed involves skill, effort, and responsibility of a
substantially equal nature." 22 B.C. L. REV. at 185 n.3 (citing Ridgway v. United Hospital Miller Div.,
503 F.2d 923, 926, 16 FEP Cases 345, 347 (8th Cir. 1977); Brennan v. Prince William Hosp. Corp.,
503 F.2d 282, 285, 9 FEP Cases 979, 980 (4th Cir. 1974)). See also Sullivan, The Equal Pay Act of 1963:
Making and Breaking a Prima Fade Case, 31 ARK. L. REV. 545, 559-83 [hereinafter cited as Sullivan].
• See Declaration of Purpose of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat, 56,
reprinted in 1963 U.S. CODE, CONC. & AD, NEWS 59-60. See also Sullivan, supra note 3, at 547. To make
out a prima facie case of a violation of the Equal Pay Act, a plaintiff "must prove that two workers of
the opposite sex in (1) the same 'establishment' are (2) receiving unequal pay (3) `on the basis of sex'
(4) for work which is 'equal.' "Id. For a good discussion of these four elements to plaintiff's prima
facie case, see id. at 547.
• See supra note 2.
Sullivan, supra note 3, at 587, Professor Sullivan contends that the statutory concept of
"system" is the common denominator of the relatively few cases dealing with these issues. Id. He
suggests that to qualify under any of these specific exceptions under 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), differentials
in pay may not be "accidental or sporadic." Id. According to Sullivan, such a "broad interpretation of
'system' • .. makes more important the basic 'seniority,' 'merit,' and 'incentive' notions." Id. at 588.
7
 Id. See also 22 B.C. L. REV., supra note 3, at 185 n. 4 (citing 1 LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI-
NATION, § 31.10 (1979)).
8 See, e.g., Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 9 FEP Cases 919 (1974). Corning
Glass established that if an employer pays different wages to those on different shifts, that practice is
a factor other than sex for purposes of the Equal Pay Act and does not violate the Act as long as the
shift differential was uniform and gender-neutral. Id. at 204, 9 FEP Cases at 922.
See also the administrative interpretation by the Wage and Hour Administration (the Adminis-
tration) which recognizes the legitimacy of night shift differentials shown to be based on a factor
other than sex. 29 C.F.R. § 800.145 (1983). The Administration stated: "Employees employed under
a bona fide training program may, in the furtherance of their training, be assigned from time to time
to do various types of work in the establishment. At such times, the employee in training status may
be performing equal work with nontrainees of the opposite sex whose wages or wage rates may be
unequal to those of the trainee. Under these circumstances, the differential can be shown to be
attributable to a factor other than sex and no violation of the equal pay standard will result." Id. See
Sullivan, supra note 3, at 592-95 (a detailed discussion of the specific training program structure
necessary to qualify for exception four).
"Red circle rates" is a term used to describe higher wage rates due to training programs,
temporary reassignment and part-time employee situations. Johnson, The Equal Pay Act of 1963: A
Practical Analysis, 24 DRAKE L. REV. 570, 594 [hereinafter cited as Johnson]. Red circle rates generally
fall within the scope of exception four and relieve an employer of liability for paying unequal wages
for equal work. Id. at 594.
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exception four should relieve the employer of liability. 9
 For instance, in Hodgson v. Robert
Hall Clothes, Inc.," where the Third Circuit held that an economic benefit to an employer
may be a "factor other than sex" within the meaning of exception four," the court
afforded much weight to the employer's schedules of sales, earnings, and gross profits in
comparing men's and women's clothing departments." In Robert Hall, the court relied on
the legislative history of the Act to hold that Congress did intend exception four to allow
wage differentials based on "reasonable'business judgments.' The Third Circuit found
that the men's department, staffed only by males, produced more profit than the women's
clothing department, staffed by women, because the men's clothing line stocked by the
employer was more expensive and qualitatively better then the store's women's merchan-
dise." The court, therefore, held that the greater economic benefit received by the
employer from the greater gross profits of the men's department justified its practice of
paying higher incentive wages to salesmen than to saleswomen.' 9 The Ninth Circuit has
also scrutinized particular elements of an employer's wage plan under exception four of
the Act in Kouba v. Allstate Insurance.' In that case, the court noted the importance of
examining the "specific relevant considerations" of each employer's situation." This
case-by-case analysis for determining whether an employer's compensation plan demon-
strates a business justification within the scope of exception four has been applied by most
circuit courts which have confronted the issue."
9 Sullivan, supra note 3, at 583. "[T]he Supreme Court's decision in Corning Glass Works v.
Brennan makes clear that the defendant bears the burden of establishing an exception [because]
the facts necessary to establish the exceptions are 'peculiarly within the knowledge of the employer."'
Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. 800.141(a) (1976)). See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196-97,
9 FEP Cases 919, 226 (1974); Schulte v. Wilson Industries, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 324, 31 FEP Cases 1373
(1982). In Schulte, a district court reaffirmed that the employer must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that any differentials in pay to males and females doing equal work were due to factors
other than sex. Id. at 338-39, 31 FEP Cases at 1380.
473 F.2d 589, 595, II FEP Cases 1271 (3d Cir. 19731, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866, 11 FEP Cases
1310 (1973).
-11 Id.
12 Id.
" Id.
" Id. at 590-91, 11 FEP Cases at 1272. The court accepted the employer's contention that the
intimate contact between clerks and customers necessitated the segregated job placements. Id. at
595-97, 11 FEP Cases 1276.
" Id.
" 691 F.2d 873, 30 FEP Cases 57 (9th Cir. 1982). The Ninth Circuit, in Kouba, adopted the
Robert Hall "legitimate business reason" test and asserted that the proper standard for implementing
the Equal Pay Act is that "the employer must use the [business] factor reasonably in light of [its]
stated purpose as well as its other practices. The specific relevant considerations will of course vary
with the situation." 691 F.2d at 876-77, 30 FEP Cases at 60. This "pragmatic" standard, said the
court,"protects against abuse yet accommodates employer discretion." Id. at 876, 30 FEP Cases at 60.
" In Kouba, a female insurance agent challenged Allstate's practice of computing the minimum
salary of a new sales agent on the basis of ability, education, experience, and prior salary. During an
8-13 week training period, an Allstate agent received only the minimum. Afterwards, an agent
received the greater of the minimum and the commissions earned from sales. As a result of this
practice, female agents generally made less than their male counterparts. Plaintiff Kouba argued that
the use of prior salary in computing present salary caused a wage differential which constituted
unlawful sex discrimination. Id. at 874, 30 FEP Cases at 58.
" The Eighth Circuit rejected a defendant employer's alleged training program as justification
for higher pay to males because there was no actual on-the-job training for the higher positions.
Schultz v, American Can Company-Dixie Products, 424 F.2d 356, 9 FEP Cases 524 (8th Cir. 1970).
December 19841
	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 317
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
addressed the issue of whether or not an employer is permitted under exception four to
compensate male and female employees at different compensation rates for sales of
identical products. In Bence v. Detroit Health Corp.,' the Sixth Circuit held that an
employer's wage system, which compensated employees solely on a "per sale" basis and
paid women employees at a lower commission rate than men, violated the Equal Pay Act
even though the total remuneration provided to male and female employees was substan-
tially equal." The court held that the particular employer's compensation system at issue
did not fall under the scope of exception four since the differential pay scale was not
justified by any difference in economic benefit to the employer." Although the Sixth
Circuit in Bence neither expressly accepted nor rejected the "reasonable business justifica-
tion" test for the exception four defense," the court did adopt the approach of other
courts which have ruled on the scope of that exception" by examining the unique
elements of the employer's wage scheme in determining whether to impose liability on the
employer." Consequently, after Bence, an employer in the Sixth Circuit may not pay
employees at different commission rates for the sale of identical products, even if the
employees' total remuneration is equal, absent a showing that the employer's specific wage
system is based on a "factor other than sex."
The plaintiff in Bence was an employee manager of Detroit Health Corporation
(Detroit Health), which operated a chain of health spas. 25 Each spa was divided into a
men's division, operated only by men, and a women's division, operated only by women.
The spa was open to men and women on alternate days.'" The job descriptions for male
and female managers and assistant managers were identical, 27 and they performed their
See also Schultz v. First Victoria National Bank, 420 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1969). The Fifth Circuit
rejected the employer's contention that the alleged training programs came within exception four
because they were "informal, unwritten, and, if not imaginary, consisted of little more than the
recognition of the ability of employees to work their way up through the ranks." Id. at 654 (footnote
omitted). Special problems arise in determining whether factors such as experience, hours of work,
and physical exertion make the work performed unequal and thus not covered by the Equal Pay Act
or whether these variants qualify under exception four. See 22 B.C. L. REV., supra note 3, at 185 n.4
(citing 1 LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, §§ 31.10-.27 (1979)).
'g 712 F.2d 1024, 32 FEP Cases 434 (6th Cir. 1983).
20 Id. at 1027-28, 32 FEP Cases at 436-37.
21 Id. at 1031, 32 FEP Cases at 439. The employer's wage system was not protected by exception
three because the "quantity or quality test" was not met. Id. See also infra note 61.
" Bence, 712 F.2d at 1031, 32 FEP Cases at 439.
23 See supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
24 See generally Bence, 712 F.2d 1024, 32 FEP Cases 435 (1983) (The Sixth Circuit examined the
facts of the case in detail before holding that the employer's wage system violated the Act).
Id. at 1025, 32 FEP Cases at 435.
26 Id. at 1025-26, 32 . FEP Cases at 435.
" Id. at 1026, 32 FEP Cases at 435. The job descriptions stated that the managers were
"completely responsible for the entire job operation." Id. at 1028, 32 FEP Cases at 437. This
description included responsibility for personnel and bookkeeping functions as well as for the duties
of Instructors and Assistant Manager Trainees, such as record-keeping, instruction of spa members,
and supervision of cleaning personnel. Id. The job description also stated that the progress and
compensation of all employees was "controlled by 'PRODUCTION,' which was defined as 'sales
effectiveness.. "Id. The circuit court in Bence noted that "the specific job description for each grade of
employee focused heavily on sales ... [The record contains uncontradicted testimony that employer
routinely fired managers who failed to meet its sales 'goals' . . . ." Id,
•
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jobs under similar working conditions." All managers and assistant managers were paid
by commissions based on gross sales of memberships?' Male managers received 7.5% of
the individual spa's gross sale of memberships to men. 3° Female managers, however, were
paid only 5% of the gross membership sales to women.'" The total remuneration received
by male and female managers was substantially equal, however, because women tended to
make more sales to their female customers than men made to male customers." The
female managers filed suit, asserting that the different commission rates violated the
Au.33 Detroit Health contended that its wage system did not violate the Act because it paid
unequal commission rates to ensure that all employees received substantially equal re-
muneration for equal work performed."
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan initially granted
summary judgment for Detroit Health," finding that it was "easier to sell memberships to
women than to men." 39
 The court held that this circumstance was "a factor other than
sex" within the scope of exception four, which excused Detroit Health's ostensible viola-
tion of the Act. 31 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for
further findings of fact and conclusions of law. The circuit court ruled that the district
court had improperly granted summary judgment in favor of the employer without
resolving the issue of how "easier sales to women" justified Detroit Health's pay differen-
tia1. 38 On remand, the district court concluded that the employer's commission system was
protected by both exceptions three and four of the Equal Pay Act." The court noted that
because the health spa business historically attracted more potential female members than
male members, 49 male managers who exerted the same amount of effort under totally
equal conditions as female managers would sell fewer memberships than women." The
36 Id. at 1026, 32 FEP Cases at 435.
2° Id,
" Id.
." Id. Similarly, male assistant managers received 4.5% of gross sales to men, and female
assistant managers received 3% of the gross sales to women. Id.
32 Id. "Over the course of employer's life, the gross volume of membership sales to women was
50% higher than the gross volume of membership sales to men." Id. (footnote omitted).
33 Id.
31 Id.
a' Id. at 1026, 32 FEP Cases at 436. The lower court decision is unreported.
" Id. at 1026, 32 FEP Cases at 435.
3' Id. at 1026, 32 FEP Cases at 435-36. The district court also found that the commission
differential established a prima facie case of wage discrimination and shifted the burden of justifying
the differential to the employer. Id. At the same time, however, the district court rejected the
employer's equal total remuneration argument, based on its finding that the Equal Pay Act focuses
on equal wage rates, not simply equal wages. Id. at 1026, 32 FEP Cases at 435.
3' Id.
39 Id. at 1027, 32 FEP Cases at 436. The district court determined that the differential qualified
under exception three because earnings were tied to membership sales or under exception four
because the difference in the size of markets for male and female spa customers was "a factor other
than sex" within the meaning of the Equal Pay Act. Id. at 1028, 32 FEP Cases at 437.
40 Id. at 1026-27, 32 FEP Cases at 436. The district court accepted as conclusive the defendant's
evidence that the membership composition would be sixty percent female and forty percent male. Id.
41
 The district court noted that the summary judgment motion referring to "easier sales to
women" by women employees was not intended to be a "qualitative analysis but a quantitative one ...
[because] [t]here are simply more potential female customers in a consistent ratio of 60/40 and, with
the same expenditure of effort, male and female managers will produce sales figures resulting in a
60/40 female/male membership. The net result of this is that . . . female and male managers at the
same location will make . . . the same salary." Id. at 1027, 32 FEP Cases at 436.
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court held that since the net result of the sales would be equal," Detroit Health had
conformed with the commands of the Equal Pay Act by equalizing pay for equal work."
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision." The appeals
court initially identified two issues for review: (1) whether Detroit Health's commission
differential amounted to a violation of the Equal Pay Act, even though the differential
provided equal remuneration, and (2) whether Detroit Health's wage system was pro-
tected by one of the four exceptions to the Act." In addressing these issues, the Sixth
Circuit rejected Detroit Health's claim that its equal total remuneration was proper under
the Act." The court noted that since the Equal Pay Act commands an equal rale of pay for
equal work," inequality of rate of pay, as established in the plaintiff's prima facie case," is
necessarily inconsistent with the Act." Equal remuneration, the court held, could never
be a valid defense to an allegation of a violation of the Act.' Rather, according to the
court, judicial inquiry into rate of pay differentials should be directed toward the nature
of the services for which an employer compensates employees. 5 '
In examining the job descriptions and the actual work performed by spa managers,'
the court determined that the employees' primary function was to sell memberships. 53
According to the court, the evidence did not show that selling memberships was merely
one element of the managers' total service to the employer's clientele. 54 If that had been
the case, stated the court, the equal remuneration argument might have had some merit,
because compensation would have been based on satisfactory performance of a host of
specified duties:55 Instead, the court determined that the commission differential was
based exclusively on membership sales. 59 Thus, the court reasoned, the employees of
Detroit Health were paid at unequal rates for performing identical functions — the
precise result prohibited by the Equal Pay Act."
The court of appeals next examined the district court's holding that Detroit Health
qualified for either exception three or four of the Act,'" After expressing the remedial
purposes of the Equal Pay Act 59 and setting forth the burdens of proof delegated to each
42 Id. See also supra note 41.
" Bence, 712 F.2d at 1027, 32 FEP Cases at 435.
" Id. at 1031, 32 FEP Cases at 439. Both plaintiff and defendant advanced the same arguments
they had presented to the district court. Id. See also text accompanying notes 33-34. The employer
also admitted that there was no difference between the membership sold to either sex. Bence, 712
F.2d at 1051, 32 FEP Cases at 439.
" Id.
Id. at 1027, 32 FEP Cases at 435.
" Id. (emphasis in original).
" Id, The court cited Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. 188, 195, 9 FEP Cases 919 (1974) as evidence
that inequality of pay was an element of plaintiff's prima fade case. Id.
49
so
51 Id.
" See supra note 27.
" Bence, 712 F.2d at 1028, 32 FEP Cases at 437. See supra note 27.
" Bence, 712 F.2d at 1028, 32 FEP Cases at 437.
" Id. at 1028, 32 FEP Cases at 436-37.
5" Id. at 1028, 32 FEP Cases at 437.
" Id.
58 See supra note 39.
" Bence, 712 F.2d at 1029, 32 FEP Cases at 437. The court said, "The Equal Pay Act was
intended as a broad charter of women's rights in the economic field. It sought to ... eliminate the
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party in an Equal Pay Act claim," the court quickly dismissed the district court's conten-
tion that the employer's wage system was protected by exception three." In a longer
discussion, however, the court determined that the employer's commission differential
also did not constitute a "factor other than sex" within the meaning of exception four.°
In examining the exception four question, the court initially examined the legislative
history of the exceptions' and concluded that Congress had intended the broad wording
of exception four to include factors other than traditional job evaluation criteria." The
court then discussed other decisions which had analyzed the exception, in light of the
facts of Bence .63 According to the Sixth Circuit, Detroit Health improperly relied on Robert
Hall for the notion that an economic benefit to an employer may be a factor other than sex
which justifies a pay differential." The court rejected Detroit Health's argument that it
was a legitimate business policy to provide male and female employees with equal total
remuneration under an unequal commission system because the market for women's
memberships was larger than the market for men's memberships." Instead, the court
held that the Bence employer could not avail itself of the Robert Hall economic benefit rule
depressing effects on living standards of reduced wages for female workers .. ."Id. (citing Schultz v.
American Can Company-Dixie Products, 424 F.2d 356, 360, 9 FEP Cases 524 (8th Cir. 1970)).
" Id. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
" Bence, 712 F.2d at 1029, 32 FEP Cases at 437. The court of appeals stated that exception three
is applicable only when two employees are paid the same rate and one receives a higher salary either
because he produces more or because the higher paid employee's work is harder to perform.
According to the court, Detroit Health satisfied neither of these requirements. First, men employees
were paid more and in fact produced less. Second, memberships were not "easier" to sell to women;
sales to women merely happened with more frequency, Id.
" Id. at 1029-30, 32 FEP Cases at 438-39. The court of appeals phrased the issue as being
"whether the phrase 'any other factor other than sex' means literally any other factor, a factor
traditionally used in job evaluation systems, or something else." Id. at 1029, 32 FEP Cases at 438
(emphasis in original).
" Id. at 1029-30, 32 FEP Cases at 438 (quoting H.R.• REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3,
reprinted in STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EqUAL
PAY ACT OF 1963, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1963)).
" Id. at 1029, 32 FEP Cases at 438. The legislative comments discussed the broad, inclusive
language of exception four. Id. at 1029-30, 32 FEP Cases at 438.
" Id. at 1030-31, 32 FEP Cases at 438-39. The court cited the Supreme Court's decision in
County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170-71 n.11 (1981), as suggesting that Congress
added exception four "because of a concern that bona fide job evaluation systems used by American
business would be otherwise disrupted." Id. at 1030, 32 FEP Cases at 439. The Bence court also briefly
cited two lower courts which interpreted that decision as limiting exception four to factors tradition-
ally included in job evaluation schemes. Schultz v. Wilson Industries, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 324, 339
n.16, 51 FEP Cases 373 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co., 523 F. Supp. 148, 161, 27
FEP Cases 938 (F.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 691 F.2d 873, 30 FEP Cases 57 (9th Cir. 1982). According to
the Bence court, the Ninth Circuit in Kouba "rejected this conclusion and adopted the Robert Hall
'legitimate business reason' test for the scope of exception (iv)." Bence, 712 F.2d at 1030, 32 FEP Cases
at 439 (citing 691 F.2d at 867-77).
" 712 F.2d at 1031, 32 FEP Cases at 439. For a discussion of Robert Hall's "economic benefit as a
factor other than sex" theory see supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. The court conceded that
the Third Circuit in Robert Hall had based its decision on the relevant legislative history of exception
four and also conceded that the Robert Hall decision could, if read broadly, "stand for the proposition
that any nonsexual factor based on an employer's legitimate business judgment may be a factor other
than sex within the meaning of exception four." Bence, 712 F.2d at 1031, 32 FEP Cases at 439. The
court concluded that Detroit Health Corp. did not fall under the scope of the Robert Hall rule. Id. at
1031, 32 FEP Cases at 439.
" Id.
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because the situations at issue in the two cases were distinguishable." In Bence, female
managers provided more profit than male managers, while in Robert Hall, the female
employees provided less profit." The court also noted that unlike the men's and women's
clothing sold in Robert Hall, the memberships sold by male and female employees in Bence
were identical as to price and quality." The Sixth Circuit did not rule on whether the
difference in market size for men's and women's memberships alone justified an employ-
er's commission differential!' Instead, the court asserted that this segregation of the sales
force by sex, combined with the lower wage rate, effectively locked female employees into
an inferior position "regardless of their effort or productivity,' in violation of the Act."
Concluding that the employer had not proven that sex provided no part of the basis for its
wage differential," the court held that exception four was inapplicable to the practices at
issue in Bence . 15
In reaching its decision, however, the court explicitly limited its holding to the unique
facts before it." By factually distinguishing Bence from Robert Hall, the court avoided the
necessity of endorsing or rejecting the broad reading of exception four set forth in Robert
Hall." Rather, the court held that Detroit Health had not justified a sex-based wage
differential under exception four, because it had not demonstrated that the wage differ-
ential reflected either a particular economic benefit to the employer or relative difficulty
in individual sales! Accordingly, the court observed, the narrowness and specificity of its
ruling would not serve to prohibit segregation of male and female employees into
separate departments subject to different wage rates, if such an exculpatory showing
could be made by an employer."
One Sixth Circuit judge, Judge Engel, concurred in part and dissented in part with
the court's opinion in Bence . 8°
 Judge Engel agreed that the compensation at issue did not
qualify for exception threes' and that deliberate differentials in commission rates based
on sex could not be justified by an employer's desire to equalize remuneration." To the
extent that the lower court's decision had been based on these factors, Judge Engel
concurred in the reversal." He did not, however, agree entirely with the majority's
conclusion that the employer's wage system was not within the scope of exception four. R4
Arguing that if the different commission rates paid by Detroit Health were based upon
the sex of the club member and not the sex of the employee, Judge Engel maintained that
45 Id.
09
70 Id.
71 Id. The court also did not rule on the propriety of segregating male and female employees
into men's and women's departments. Id. This treatment is similar to the Third Circuit's actions in
Robert Hall. See supra text accompanying note 12.
72 Bence, 712 F.2d at 1031, 32 FEP Cases at 439.
" Id. After Bence, the market-size question is still undetermined under exception four.
" Id.
75 Id.
' Id.
" Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
B° Id. (Engel, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
" Id.
82
 Id. at 1031, 32 FEP Cases at 440 (Engel, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
63 Id.
84 Id. at 1032, 32 FEP Cases at 440 (Engel, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
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this could be a "factor other than sex" pursuant to exception four?' The Equal Pay Act,
Judge Engel noted, concerns the employee's sex, not the sex of the customer." He sug-
gested that the male-female membership ratio of 40-60 was "solid evidence" that the
market for men's memberships was distinctly different from the market for women's
memberships?' He noted that the large disparity in the female/male customer ratio in any
health club business" was bound to evoke various economic responses from the clubs and
affect their businesses in numerous ways." According to Judge Engel, this difference in
the markets for male and female memberships could be regarded as the requisite "factor
other than sex," triggering exception four of the Equal Pay Act. 9 °
Judge Engel cited the testimony of a witness at the trial level which, he asserted, could
have supported a conclusion that the different commissions paid by the Bence employer
violated the Act because they were based on the employee's sex and not the sex of the
customer?' Because of this testimony and the other conflicting considerations, Judge
Engel recommended remanding the case for reconsideration of this evidence by the trial
judge."'
In Bence v. Detroit Health Corp. , the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed, and thereby
strengthened, the case-by-case approach taken by courts in other jurisdictions in inter-
preting exception four of the Equal Pay Act." The Bence court's holding was expressly
limited to the facts of the case at issue, and the court noted that the decision would not
necessarily control any other Equal Pay Act claim where employees were segregated into
separate departments and paid at different wage rates.
Although the case-by-case analysis appears to be a fair way to judge an individual
employer's wage schemes, analyses under that test are not uniform within the federal
circuits. Accordingly, facts which one court accepts as a legitimate business justification
for a sex-based wage differential will not, absent a clear rule, necessarily persuade other
R5 Id.
" Id.
" Id.
"" Judge Engel pointed out that, as stipulated by the majority opinion and the trial judge, health
spas generally, and particularly those operated by defendant Detroit Health Corp., attract about 50%
more female customers than male customers. Id.
" Id. Judge Engel offers no concrete example of the various responses and numerous effects of
this market condition. The dissent found no merit in the majority's distinction between the Robert
Hall and Bence facts and determined that paying a higher commission rate for sales to men could be
"justified by the market generally and by other economic and business considerations." Id.
6'" Id. judge Engel observed that, had pay rates to employees varied uniformly, the Act would
pose no problem to differing rates for male, female, young, old, or handicapped customers. Id. He
discussed the varying rates of commissions according to the type of market in which products were
sold. Id. He asserted that the basis behind employer's paying commissions was an incentive to its sales
staff. Id. According to Judge Engel, the most obvious discrimination in Bence was the exclusive use of
females to attract only female customers and vice-versa for males, But, Judge Engel pointed out, this
discrimination was not challenged in the case. Id.
91
 Id. at 1033, 32 FEP Cases at 441 (Engel, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). The
witness was James P. Hoppin, vice-president of Detroit Health Corp. since 1974. Id. His testimony
related to walk-in customers, the managerial staff's duties, and the calculation of commission rates
based on matching gross profits from sales to men or women, as opposed to individual sales by men or
women. Id. According to his formula, a sale by a woman to a man on a "walk-in" basis would net the
female manager $10, while a sale by a mate employee to a female customer would net $15 to the male
manager. Id.
" Id. at 1034, 32 FEP Cases at 441.
" See supra notes 9-24 and accompanying text.
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courts. The case-by-case method presents a problem when a court reviews exception four
as a matter of first impression. Reliance on court decisions in which differing results are
based on slight variations in factual situations can lead to inconsistencies among circuits
and does little to resolve the interpretational difficulties posed by the broad wording of
exception four.
The Bence decision was an example of such unclear analysis under the case-by-case
method. While the Bence court stated explicitly that it did not rule on whether Robert Hall's
economic benefit test" was appropriate for the scope of exception four, the court's long
discussion and response to Detroit Health's "legitimate business reason" defense suggests
an acceptance of the Robert Hall theory. In distinguishing Bence from Robert Hall, the court
pointed to two factual differences which prohibited Detroit Health from using the
economic benefit rule to come within exception four. The court's distinction implies that
if the wage system in Bence was factually closer to the system in Robert Hall, the Bence
employer would have fallen under the economic benefit rule. It follows that the Sixth
Circuit agreed with the Third Circuit's opinion in Robert Hall and implicitly recognized
that a legitimate business reason for a wage differential may provide an employer with
exception four protection from an Equal Pay Act claim. Because of the Sixth Circuit's
concern with maintaining a case- by- case approach, however, the court refused to ex-
pressly state its acceptance of that rule. Accordingly, Bence's precedential value seems
limited to a,pallid declaration that facts identical to the facts at issue in Robert Hall fall
within exception four, and that the precise situation in Bence could not be justified by the
considerations advanced by the employer, Detroit Health.
Following Bence v. Detroit Health Corp., courts which have not yet examined exception
four may be persuaded to adopt the case-by-case analysis which examines the specific
details of an employer's compensation system. This ad hoc method of decision gives little
guidance to practitioners and is of relatively little precedential value. Future courts would
do well to formulate a more general rule of analysis under exception four. Until a general
rule is introduced, employers will be operating in a legal vacuum regarding what is or is
not an acceptable wage differential practice.
C. *Title VII and Pregnancy Discrimination Against Employees' Spouses:
Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex.'
In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert , 3 the United States Supreme Court ruled that the exclusion
of pregnancy-related disabilities from an employer's disability plan was not per se dis-
crimination under Title VII.' The Court in Gilbert examined. whether General Electric's
(GE's) nonoccupational sickness and accident plan violated Title VII by excluding preg-
" Bence, 712 F.2d at 1031, 32 FEP Cases at 439.
By Susanna C. Burgett, Staff Member, Bos -rost COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
163 S. Ct. 2622, 32 FEP Cases 1 (1983).
Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 17 (1982), provides in
pertinent part: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer — (1) to fail or refuse
to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, sex, or national origin;   " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
429 U.S. 125, 13 FEP Cases 1657 (1976).
hi. at 145-46, 13 FEP Cases at 1666.
324	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 26:121
nancy disabilities from its coverage. 5 The Court first concluded that the terms of the plan
were not discriminatory, since the exclusion of pregnancy from an otherwise comprehen-
sive disability plan was "not a gender-based discrimination at all." Next, inquiring
whether the effect of the plan was discriminatory, the Court determined that because the
plan covered exactly the same catagories of risk for both men and women there was no
discriminatory effect.' Because of this "facially evenhanded inclusion of risks," 8 which,
according to the Court, resulted in a parity of benefits for men and women alike, GE's
plan was found to be nondiscriminatory and hence legal . 9
Responding to Gilbert, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) to
clarify the meaning of Title VII sex discrimination.'° The PDA redefined sex discrimina-
tion to include discrimination "on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions."" By equating pregnancy discrimination with sex discrimination, the PDA
prohibits an otherwise comprehensive disability plan, such as that examined in Gilbert,
from excluding an employee's pregnancy-related conditions.''
During the Survey year, the Supreme Court, in Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock
Co. v. ELOC, 2
 examined the scope of Title VII as amended by the PDA. Specifically, the
Court inquired whether the amended statute prohibits an employer from providing
fewer pregnancy benefits to spouses of male employees than it provides to female
employees under an otherwise comprehensive insurance plan for employees and their
dependents.' 4
 In a seven-to-two decision,' 5 the Newport News Court answered that ques-
Id, at 127-28, 13 FEP Cases at 1658-59.
Id. at 136, 13 FEP Cases at 1662. In reaching this conclusion, the Gilbert Court relied on the
rationale of an earlier case, Geduldig v. Aiello, which held that a similar disability plan excluding
pregnancy did not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amemdment. 429 U.S. at
132-40, 13 FEP Cases at 1660-64 (citing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 487, 8 FEP Cases 97, 102
(1974)). Both the Gilbert and the Geduldig opinions observed that pregnancy, like any physical
condition, may or may not be covered in an insurance policy. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 134, 13 FEP Cases at
1661; Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20, 8 FEP Cases at 1 01-02 n.20. The two opinions viewed the
classification created by the exclusion of pregnancy benefits as between "pregnant women and
nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members of
both sexes." Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 135, 13 FEP Cases at 1661; Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20, 8 FEP
Cases at 101-02 n.20. Because the classifications created in both disability plans were not strictly
gender-based, both cases determined that the exclusion of pregnancy benefits was not gender-based
discrimination. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 134-35, 13 FEP Cases at 1661; Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97 & n.20,
8 FEP Cases at 101-02 & n.20.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138, 13 FEP Cases at 1663.
Id. at 139, 13 FEP Cases at 1663.
" Id. at 139-40, 13 FEP Cases at 1663-64.
'° Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
" The PDA amended the "Definitions" section of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976), to add a
subsection (k) which provides in pertinent part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and
women affected by pregnancy shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons
not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work,  
Id.
See Note, Pregnancy Discrimination, Equal Compensation and the Ghost of Gilbert: Medical Insurance
Coverage for Spouses of Employees, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 696, 697 (1983).
" 103 S. Ct. 2622, 32 FEP Cases 1 (1983).
' 4 Id. at 2624, 32 FEP Cases at 2.
13
 Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
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tion in the affirmative, holding that the limitation on pregnancy benefits for employees'
spouses constituted sex discrimination against male employees in violation on Title VII.' 6
The insurance plan unlawfully discriminated, according to the Court, by providing male
employees with a less inclusive benefit package than the package provided to female
employees!'
Following passage of the PDA in 1978, the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry
Dock Company (Company) amended its health insurance plan to provide its male and
female employees with the same hospitalization coverage for 111 medical conditions.' 8 The
plan's coverage of eligible dependents was identical to its coverage of employees, except
that spouses of male employees received less coverage for pregnancy-related hospital
charges than did female employees."'
After the Company amended its insurance plan, a male employee filed a charge with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that the Company's
refusal to provide full insurance coverage for his wife's pregnancy-related hospitalization
was unlawful sex discrimination." This allegation found support in the EEOC's interpre-
tive guidelines on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which were issued before the
Company's amended plan became effective.'` One such guideline states that "if an
employer's insurance program covers the medical expenses of spouses of female employ-
ees, then it must equally cover the medical expenses of spouses of male employees,
including those arising from pregnancy-related conditions." 22
After the employee filed a charge with the EEOC, the Company brought an action in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of _Virginia, challenging the
EEOC's guidelines and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief." After first deter-
mining that the provisions of the PDA extended only to female employees, and not to
spouses of male employees,' 4
 the district court held that the Company's insurance plan
did not constitute gender-based discrimination under the rationale of the Supreme Court
in Gilbert.' The court, therefore, enjoined enforcement of the EEOC's guidelines on
Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in
which Justice Powell joined.
Newport News, 103 S. Ct. at 2632, 32 FEP Cases at 8.
"Id. at 2631, 32 FEP Cases at 7.
Id. at 2625, 32 FEP Cases at 3.
' 9 Id. The Company's plan provided 100% coverage for reasonable and customary delivery and
anesthesiologist's charges, and up to $500 of hospitalization charges to the spouses of male employ-
ees in connection with an uncomplicated delivery. Id. at 2625 & n.6, 32 FEP Cases at 2-3 & n.6.
Female employees received the full cost of a semi-private room and the cost of other necessary
medical and hospital charges while hospitalized up to 100% of the first $750 and 80% of the excess.
Id. To the extent that hospital charges exceeded $500 for the spouse of a male employee, therefore,
the male employee received less complete insurance coverage than did a female employee. Id. at
2625, 32 FEP Cases at 3.
' 103 S. Ct. at 2626, 32 FEP Cases at 3.
" See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex & Appendix of Questions and Answers on
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1604 & app. question 21 (1983).
.22 Id.
73 Newport News, 103 S. Gt. at 2626, 32 FEP Cases at 3. A month later the United Steelworkers
filed a similar suit on behalf of other individuals. Id.
"Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 510 F. Supp. 66, 70, 25 FEP Cases 5,
7-8 (E.D. Va. 1981), rev'd, 667 F.2d 448, 27 FEP Cases 1219 (4th Cir. 1982), aff'd on rehearing, 682
F.2d 113, 29 FEP Cases 200 (4th Cir.) (en bane), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 2622, 32 FEP Cases 1 (1983).
Id. at 71, 25 FEP Cases at 8. For a discussion of Gilbert, see supra notes 4-9 and accompanying
text.
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pregnancy benefits for employees' spouses? Meanwhile, in a separate suit in the same
court, the EEOC filed a complaint against the Company, alleging that the Company
discriminated against its male employees on the basis of sex in the provision of health
insurance benefits." Following its decision in the Company's suit, however, the district
court dismissed the EEOC's complaint? The suits by the Company and the EEOC were
consolidated on appeal?
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed the district court." Determining that the language and the legislative history of
the PDA indicated that the statute applies to both employees and their spouses, 3 ' the
Fourth Circuit rejected the Company's contention that the rationale of Gilbert was unaf-
fected by the PDA." The PDA, according to the Fourth Circuit, established that any
distinction based on pregnancy is a distinction based on sex. 33
 Consequently, the distinc-
tion in the Company's plan was unlawful under Title V11.34
 On rehearing en banc, the
court reaffirmed the panel opinion." Because the issue had been decided differently by
the Ninth Circuit in EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co.," the Supreme Court granted
certiorari . 37
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Fourth Circuit," holding that the
Company's plan discriminated against male employees in violation of Title VII by provid-
ing them with a health insurance package for dependents that was less comprehensive
than the package provided female employees." The Court first framed the question
raised by Newport News as whether the Company's plan had discriminated against male
employees within the meaning of section 703(a)(1) of Title VII. 40
 Observing that neither
the PDA nor Title VII defined the word "discriminate," the Court inquired whether
Congress, by enacting the PDA, not only overturned the specific holding in Gilbert, but
also rejected the Title VII discrimination test used by the Court in that case.'" After
w Newport News, 510 F. Supp. at 72, 25 FEP Cases at 9.
Newport News, 103 S. Ct. at 2626, 32 FEP Cases at 3.
" Newport News, 510 F. Supp. at 72, 25 FEP Cases at 9.
" Newport News, 103 S. Ct. at 2626, 32 FEP Cases at 4.
3°
 Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448, 451, 27 FEP Cases
1219, 1222 (4th Cir. 1982), affd on rehearing, 682 F.2d 113, 29 FEP Cases 200 (4th Cir.) (en bane),
affd, 103 S. Ct. 2622, 32 FEP Cases 1 (1983).
at Id. at 450-51, 27 FEP Cases at 1220-22.
" Id. at 450-51, 27 FEP Cases at 1221-22.
33
	 at 451, 27 FE? Cases at 1222.
" Id.
35
 Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 113, 114, 29 FEP Cases 200,
200 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2622, 32 FEP Cases 1 (1983).
"Newport News, 103 S. Ct. at 2626, 32 FEP Cases at 4. In Lockheed Missiles, the Ninth Circuit held
that a company's medical benefit plan which covered the medical expenses of its employees' depen-
dents except for pregnancy did not discriminate against male employees in violation of Title VII. 680
F.2d 1243, 1247, 29 FEP Cases 281, 283 (9th Cir. 1982).
" Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 459 U.S. 1069, 103 S. Ct. 487 (1982).
" Newport News, 103 S. Ct. at 2632, 32 FEP Cases at 8.
' Id. at 2631, 32 FEP Cases at 7.
4a Id. at 2627, 32 FEP Cases at 4.
'I Id. One confusing aspect of the Newport News opinion is that the Court does not state what the
Gilbert "test of discrimination" is, although the Court refers to such a test. See id. Additionally, in
Gilbert, the Supreme Court did not label any part of its analysis a "test of discrimination." Although
the Newport News opinion is unclear on this point, it did state that the proper test of discrimination is
the comprehensiveness of a disability plan. Id. The Gilbert opinion, by contrast, focused on the facial
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describing the discrimination tests applied by the majority and dissents in Gilbert," the
Court examined whether the majority's test survived enactment of the PDA. 43 According
to the Court, the PDA's legislative history indicated that Congress rejected the Gilbert
majority's definition of discrimination, and with it both the majority's holding and reason-
ing. 44
In considering the PDA's legislative history, the Newport News Court observed that
congressional discussion of the PDA focused on the needs of female employees. 45
Nonetheless, the majority reasoned, "[t]his does not create a 'negative inference' limiting
the scope of the act to the specific problem that motivated its enactment." 46 The Court
noted that when the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources considered the
specific issue of pregnancy-related coverage for dependents, the Committee stated that
the question should be resolved "on the basis of existing Title VII principles." 47 According
to the Court, "[t]he legislative context makes it clear that Congress was not thereby
referring to the view of Title VII reflected in this Court's Gilbert opinion." 48 The Court
concluded from the legislative history that proponents of the PDA intended to protect all
individuals, not just pregnant employees, from sex discrimination in employment. 45
After examining the PDA's effect on Gilbert, the Court applied Title VII principles to
inclusiveness of risks in a plan. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 139, 13 FEP Cases at 1663 (to comply with Title
VII, a plan must provide only a "facially evenhanded inclusion of risks"). Hence, the Newport News
Court may be referring to this inclusiveness test as the test it is rejecting.
" Newport News, 103 S. Ct. at 2627-28, 32 FEP Cases at 4-5. For a discussion of the Gilbert
majority's reasoning, see supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text. Briefly, the Gilbert dissenters
disagreed with the majority's application of a fourteenth amendment standard of discrimination to a
Title VII problem. 429 U.S. at 153-54 & n.6, 13 FEP Cases at 1669 & n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id.
at 160-61, 32 FEP Cases at 1672 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan concluded that General
Electric's plan discriminated against women because men were covered for all risks including those
unique to men, while women were not covered for all risks to which they were susceptible. Id. at 160,
13 FEP Cases at 1672 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens explained that "by definition, such a
rule [excluding pregnancy benefits] discriminates on account of sex; for it is the capacity to become
pregnant which primarily differentiates the female from the male.' Id. at 161-62, 13 FEP Cases at
1673 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43
 Newport News, 103 S. Ct. at 2627-30, 32 FE? Cases at 4-6.
" Id. at 2628-29 & nn.15-17, 32 FEP Cases at 5-6 & nn.15-1.7. The Court cited numerous
statements in the House and Senate Reports and statements made by proponents of the bill to
support its conclusion. Id. A representative example of these statements is contained in the Senate
Report, which explained that "the bill is merely reestablishing the la ,w as it was understood prior to
Gilbert by the EEOC and the lower courts." S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 7-8 (1977), reprinted
in Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, at 45 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Legis. Hist.].
" Newport News, 103 S. Ct. at 2629, 32 FEP Cases at 6.
"Id. The Court cited McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), as an example of a
similar problem in interpreting the legislative history of a civil rights statute. In McDonald, the Court
interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), which provides that lain persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts .. .
as is enjoyed by white citizens ... ," as protecting both black and white citizens against discrimination.
427 U.S. at 289-96. After examining the statute's legislative history, the McDonald Court determined
that Congress intended to accomplish more than the alleviation of "the particular and immediate
plight of the . . . Negro." 427 U.S. at 296.
" Newport News, 103 S. Ct. at 2629 & n. 20, 32 FEP Cases at 6 & n.20.
43 Id. at 2629-30, 32 FEP Cases at 6.
49 Id, at 2630, 32 FEP Cases at 6.
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analyze the Company's insurance plan." This plan, the Court observed, provided limited
pregnancy-related hospitalization benefits for employees' wives while providing more
complete coverage for employees' spouses for all other medical conditions.'` Because
Congress had rejected Gilbert's reasoning, and because the FDA had established that
treating pregnancy-related conditions less favorably than other medical conditions is
discrimination, the Court concluded that the Company's plan violated Title VII by
affording a less inclusive benefit package to male employees.'
The Court rejected the Company's argument that the PDA applies only to discrimi-
nation against female employees. According to the majority, the FDA equates discrimina-
tion based on a woman's pregnancy with discrimination based on her sex "for all Title VII
purposes."3 The Court reasoned that "since the sex of the spouse is always the opposite
of the sex of the employee, it follows inexorably that discrimination against female
spouses in the provision of fringe benefits is also discrimination against male employ-
ees."54
Writing in a dissent joined by Justice Powell, Justice Rehnquist contended that Gilbert
was binding precedent on Newport News and that the Company therefore did not violate
Title VII." The PDA, according to the dissent, applies only to female employees who are
pregnant, not to pregnant spouses of male employees." The dissent supported this
argument by analyzing the language of Title VII as amended by the PDA,57 and the
legislative history of the PDA. 58
The dissent observed that as amended by the definitional provision of the PDA,"
section 703(a)(1) of Title VII proscribes discrimination "against any individual ... because
of such individual's ... pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; . . . ." 60
According to the dissent, because the word "individual" refers to an employee or appli-
cant for employment, Title VII proscribes only discrimination based on an employee's
pregnancy. 6 ' The dissent buttressed this conclusion by noting that the second clause of
the PDA states that "women affected by pregnancy . . . shall be treated the same . . . as
'Id. at 2630-32, 32 FEP Cases at 6-8. The Court made three threshold observations concerning
Title VII law. First, health insurance and other fringe benefits are "compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment" for Title VII purposes. Id. at 2630, 32 FEP Cases at 6-7. Second, both
male and female employees are protected against discrimination under this statute. Id. at 2630, 32
FEP Cases at 7. Finally, the Newport News Court reaffirmed the test of discrimination enunciated in
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711, 17 FEP Cases 395, 400
(1978), where the Court stated that sex discrimination exists when a person is treated "in a manner
which but for the person's sex would be different." 103 S. Ct. at 2631, 32 FE? Cases at 7.
5 ' Newport News, 103 S. Ct. at 2631, 32 FEP Cases at 7.
55 Id.
" Id.
" Id.
" Id. at 2632, 32 FEP Cases at 8 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
" Id.
" Id. at 2632.33, 32 FEP Cases at 8-9 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 2633-36, 32 FEP Cases at 9-11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
as
	
provision of the PDA states that "[t]he terms 'because of sex or 'on the basis of sex'
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions; • . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982). Although the statute does not read expressly as cited, such
result is obtained by replacing the word "sex" in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) with the amended
definition of the word "sex" as provided by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
B' Newport News, 103 S. Ct. at 2633, 32 FEP Cases at 9 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work."" This admoni-
tion, the dissent asserted, could only apply to female employees because the phrase
"similar in their ability or inability to work" denotes employment."
Examining the legislative history of the PDA, the dissent catalogued the instances
where Congress referred to the PDA's protection of "working women" or "pregnant
workers."" The dissent next quoted at length from the Senate Report, which raised the
issue of pregnancy-related benefits for employees' dependents but declined to state a
position on the matter.' The dissent concluded that this refusal to take a position
demonstrated Congress's intent to restrict the PDA to the problem that motivated the
PDA's enactment — discrimination against pregnant employees." In support of this
conclusion, the dissent recounted an exchange between Senator Williams, a sponsor of
the bill, and Senator Hatch, during which the former stated: "I do not see how one can
read into this any pregnancy other than the pregnancy of an employee."'
The dissent concluded with an attack on the majority's understanding of the relation-
ship between the PDA and the Gilbert decision." While conceding that some statements
made by individual members of Congress indicated disapproval of the reasoning in
Gilbert, the dissent maintained that, based on an examination of the legislative history of
the PDA, Congress as a whole did not."' Therefore, the dissent concluded that Gilbert was
still good law and that pursuant to Gilbert the Company's plan did not violate Title VII. 7°
The ultimate decision of the Court in Newport News that the Company's insurance
plan discriminated on account of sex appears to be a fair one. Under the plan, male
" Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
" Newport News, 103 S. Ct. at 2633, 32 FEP Cases at 9 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 2633-35 & nn.4-6, 32 FEP Cases 9-10 & nn.4-6 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent
made reference to over twenty-five statements of members of Congress or congressional committees
to the effect that the bill would provide true equality for women by ending a major form of
discrimination. See id.
" Id. at 2635, 32 FEP Cases at 10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. No. 331, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6, reprinted in Legis. Hist. , supra note 44, at 42-43). On the issue of the effect of the
PDA on medical coverage for dependents of employees, the Senate Report stated that the question
should "be determined on the basis of existing Title VII principles." S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., at 6, reprinted in Legis. Hist., supra note 44, at 42-43. .
66 Newport News, 103 S. Ct. at 2635, 32 FEP Cases at 10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"7 Id. The full exchange between Senators Hatch and Williams appears to clarify the intended
scope of the PDA:
Mr. Hatch: The phrase "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions," ... appears to be overly broad, and is not limited in terms of employment.
It does not even require that the person so affected be pregnant . . . . Could the
sponsors clarify exactly whom that phrase intends to cover?
Mr. Williams: I do not see how one can read into this any pregnancy other than that
pregnancy that relates to the employee, and if there is any ambiguity, let it be clear here
now that this is very precise. It deals with a woman, a woman who is an employee, an
employee in a work situation where all disabilities are covered under a company plan
that provides income maintenance in the event of medical disability-
Mr. Hatch: So the Senator is satisfied that, though "women affected by pregnancy"-
seems to be ambiguous, what it means is that this act only applies to the particular
woman . . . who is an employee and has become pregnant after her employment?
Mr. Williams: Exactly.
123 CONG. REC. 29, 643-44 (1977).
" Newport News, 103 S. Ct. at 2636-37, 32 FEP Cases at 11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 2637, 32 FEP Cases at 11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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employees received less insurance coverage than did female employees. 7 ' Viewing an
employee and his or her spouse as a unit, every couple should receive exactly the same
coverage of risks, regardless of which spouse is the employee. 72
 Accordingly, any differ-
ence in coverage based on the sex of the individual employed should be deemed discrimi-
nation . 73
Likewise, the test of discrimination used by the Court in Newport News was appropri-
ate. In Newport News, the Court examined the comprehensiveness of the plan's coverage
of risks,'" in Gilbert, the Court had focused on whether all risks common to both sexes
were covered by the plan." Because the sexes are biologically different and hence are not
"similarly situated," a test such as Gilbert's that examines only shared risks appears
logical." The Newport News test, however, is more appropriate as a Title VII test for
discrimination precisely because it takes into account the biological differences between
the sexes. Pregnancy presents women with risks and burdens not shared by men. Facially
neutral employment policies, such as those analyzed in Newport News and Gilbert, per-
petuate this disadvantage because they do not acknowledge and compensate women for
this additional burden. Testing for discrimination in a facially neutral manner by examin-
ing only shared risks likewise fails to correct for this sex-related inequality.
The basic thrust of Gilbert was that inequalities resulting from inherent differences
between the sexes should not give rise to findings of legal discrimination and should not
require additional benefits for persons bearing additional burdens." The problem with
this approach is that it ignores a primary goal of Title VII: to remove the impediments
hindering women from fully participating in the work force. 78 To assure men and women
equal employment opportunities, "the legal system should recognize the particular
difficulties that each sex faces in combining the dual roles of parent and worker."" By
examining only the percentage level of coverage for all risks and ignoring whether risks
are sex-shared, a comprehensiveness test acknowledges the unique role of women as
childbearers. The Newport News Court, in adopting this test, recognized that because men
and women are not necessarily identical, identical treatment is not always synonymous
with legal equality."
Although the above-noted policy considerations justify the result in Newport News, the
Court's analysis raises questions concerning the appropriate use of the legislative history
of a statutory amendment." In Newport News, the Court concluded that, based on evi-
71 Id. at 2631, 32 FEP Cases at 7 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
" See Note, Employment Discrimination —Pregnancy Discrimination Against Male Employees: Extend-
ing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to Employees' Dependents, 61 N.C.L. REV. 733, 743-44 (1983).
73 Id.
74
 Newport News, 103 S. Ct. at 2627, 32 FEP Cases at 4.
" Id. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 139, 13 FEP Cases at 1663.
"See Comment, Differential Treatment of Pregnancy in Employment: The Impact of General Electric
Co. v. Gilbert and Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 717, 725 ( 1978).
" See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 139 n.17, 13 FEP Cases at 166 n.17.
78 Brown v. Porcher, 502 F. Supp. 946, 954 n.14 (D.S.C. 1980), aff'd, 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983); See H. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978) (in
enacting Title VII, Congress mandated equal access to employment and its concomitant benefits for
female and male workers).
7* Note, Sexual Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 690, 715 (1983).
80
 The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 70, 260-61 (1983).
"' For a general discussion of the construction and effect of amendatory acts, see 1A C. SANDS,
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 22.01-22.39 (4th ed. 1972).
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dence found in the PDA's legislative history, Congress had rejected the Gilbert rationale. 82
While the Court appears to have discerned congressional sentiment correctly, the Court
did not adequately explain why Congress's disapproval and rejection gutted the vitality of
Gilbert's rationale. The terms of the PDA deal only with pregnancy discrimination against
female employees, and hence the PDA overruled Gilbert only to that extent." Neverthe-
less, the Newport News Court refused to accept any of Gilbert's rationale as controlling,
apparently a decision based solely on Congress's rejection of the premises of Gilbert.
The opinion in Newport News fails to provide any independent analysis of why Gilbert's
reasoning is wrong and why that reasoning should no longer be followed. While the
PDA's legislative history provides persuasive support for the position that the entire
Gilbert rationale was incorrect, the Court's analysis based solely on this legislative history
suggests that legislative history alone requires disposing of the Gilbert rationale." Al-
though legislative history is a useful and flexible tool in statutory construction, whether it
alone can mandate discarding the Gilbert rationale is questionable.
It is possible that the Newport News Court did not in fact rely exclusively on the PDA's
legislative history, but had an independent basis for rejecting all of Gilbert. As discussed
previously, the goals of Title VII can best be achieved by replacing Gilbert's test of
discrimination with the comprehensiveness test embraced in Newport News. 85 The Newport
News opinion, as written, however, is troubling because it displays an unnecessary reliance
on the PDA's legislative history and a judicial unwillingness to ,deal directly with an
important legal and moral issue. By relying on the PDA's.legislative history, the Court
may have avoided the "political fallout" associated with requiring employers to provide
spouses coverage for pregnancy-related conditions to the same extent as other medical
conditions.86 Although this observation may explain the Court's limited analysis, the
political ramifications of the holding do not justify the opinion's analytical shortcomings.
Lacking an independent analysis of the propriety of Gilbert's reasoning, Newport News
leaves lower courts with little guidance beyond the fact situation presented in Newport
News. Since the Court did not expressly overrule Gilbert, even the simple question of
whether any of Gilbert remains good law remains undecided."
Because of the analytical gaps in Newport News, t he likely impact of the decision is
difficult to predict. Since Gilbert has not been overruled, the decision may be resurrected
in the future, limiting the principles enunciated in Newport News. Additionally, Newport
News acknowledges that general Title VII principles restrict the scope of the Newport News
" Newport News, 103 S. Ct. at 2627, 32 FEP Cases at 4.
" 3 Id. at 2633, 32 FEP Cases at 8 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Newport News majority did not
refute the dissent's argument that the PDA's protection extends only to female employees. Rather,
the Court stated that it relied on the PDA "only to the extent that it unequivocally rejected the Gilbert
decision" and that the Newport News decision rested primarily on general Title VII principles. Id. at
2630 n.21, 32 FEP Cases at 6 n.21.
" The Court did not state expressly that the PDA's legislative history mandated an abandonment
of Gilbert's rationale. The Court did assert, however, that "Congress' rejection of the premises of
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert forecloses any claim that an insurance program excluding pregnancy
coverage for female beneficiaries and providing complete coverage to similarly situated male be-
neficiaries does not discriminate on the basis of sex." 103 S. Ct. at 2632, 32 FEP Cases at 8.
" See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
"" See Mass, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act: Protecting Men From Pregnancy-Based Discrimination, 9
EMPL. REL. L.J. 240, 248 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Mass].
" The Newport News dissent, however, read the majority's opinion as overruling Gilbert. 103 S. Ct.
at 2632, 32 FEP Cases at 8 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Mass, supra note 86, at 248.
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decision. Although the Court asserted that "it is discriminatory to treat pregnancy-related
conditions less favorably than other medical conditions," 55 the Court will likely find
unlawful sex discrimination only where the less favorable treatment of pregnancy results
in a differing impact on female than on male employees. The Court observed, for
example, that a plan limiting maternity benefits for employees' children would not be
discriminatory since this limitation would affect male and female employees equally."
In Newport News, the Supreme Court held that an employer's insurance plan that
covered employees' spouses for all conditions, but limited hospitalization benefits only for
pregnancy-related conditions of spouses, constituted sex discrimination under Title VII.
The Court may be criticized for relying exclusively on the PDA's legislative history to
support its decision to discard Gilbert's rationale. Despite this shortcoming, however, the
Court's abandonment of Gilbert must be welcomed as an important step toward eradicat-
ing sex discrimination in employment.
III. RESOLVING CONFLICTS — TITLE VII VERSUS NLRA
A. *Enforceability of Title VII Conciliation Agreements that Conflict with Collective Bargaining
Contracts: EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc.'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the Act) 2 requires the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (the Commission) to attempt to eliminate discriminatory em-
ployment practices through informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persua-
sion. 3 Any agreement to remedy unlawful practices reached as a result of negotiations
between the Commission and an employer or union charged with discrimination is
usually reflected in a written conciliation agreement, which may include a detailed plan of
affirmative action to provide remedial relief.' This conciliation process takes place after
the Commission has investigated allegations of discriminatory employment practices and
has determined that there is reasonable cause to believe that a charge is true. 5 A typical
conciliation agreement provides relief for the charging party, an agreement to comply
with the law by the respondent employer or labor union, and a waiver by the charging
party of his or her right to sue the respondent, if the respondent performs its obligations
pursuant to the conciliation agreement
Voluntary compliance and cooperation were selected by Congress as the preferred
means for achieving the goal of the Act, which is to assure equality of employment
opportunities by eliMinating those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of
" Newport News, 103 S. Ct. at 2631, 32 FEP Cases at 7.
a' Id. at 2631 n.25, 32 FEP Cases at 7.8 n.25.
* By Renee M. Landers, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLECE LAW REVIEW.
I 719 F.2d 567, 32 FEP Cases 1465 (5th Cir. 1983).
2
 The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1982).
s 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982).
1 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) ¶ 1473.
s 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1982).
1 1 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 11 1473. Relief for the charging party may include an award of
back pay and a grant of retroactive or "constructive" seniority referring back to the date when the
alleged discrimination occurred. See EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 714 F.2d 567, 569-70, 32 FEP
Cases 1465, 1466-67 (5th Cir. 1983).
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race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' A complaining party must attempt to achieve
voluntary compliance before seeking relief for alleged employment discrimination in the
courts.s Conciliation offers several advantages over full-blown legal proceedings. If the
party or parties accused of having discriminated do not acknowledge that any law has
been violated, the agreements and any records of the investigations and negotiations are
. not made public. 9 Likewise, a conciliation agreement that solves the unlawful employment
practice problem spares all parties the expense and delay of litigation." Finally, the
charged parties avoid having a judicial finding of violation of Title VII entered against
them."
Conciliation agreements entered into by employers and labor unions are specifically
enforceable if regular contract rules are satisfied and if the agreement does not conflict
with the parties' individual rights or the purposes of Title VII." Agreements have been
successfully challenged, however, when they have contained provisions that adversely
affect the rights of individuals who were not parties to the agreements." In W.R. Grace
and Co. v. Local Union 759, International Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and
Plastic Workers of America," for example, the Supreme Court held that, absent a judicial
determination, the Commission and an employer cannot, without the union's consent,
agree to alter a collective bargaining agreement in order to eliminate a discriminatory
seniority system mandated by the agreement.' 5
During the Survey year, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had occasion to
apply the Supreme Court's ruling in W.R. Grace to a conciliation agreement which
violated the terms of a collective bargaining contract by awarding retroactive seniority to
the complaining parties. In EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc. ,' 6 the court held that retroactive
seniority cannot properly be granted by a conciliation agreement absent either the union's
consent or an adjudication on the merits of the discrimination claim in which the union
has the opportunity to participate.' 7 The decision in Safeway extends the prohibition in
W.R. Grace to situations where the conciliation agreement does not alter the entire
seniority system established by the collective bargaining contract, but merely affords the
individual charging parties their rightful place within the seniority system."
The action in Safeway was brought by the Commission seeking specific performance
of three conciliation agreements entered into by defendant Safeway Stores, Inc. and the
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Company, 415 U.S. 40, 44, 7 FEP Cases 81, 84 (1974).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982).
8 Id.
I EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE ¶ 1483.
" According io the statutory timetable, the conciliation procedure occurs prior to any judicial
enforcement action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982).
12 Safeway, 714 F.2d. at 574, 32 FEP Cases at 1470. See Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott, 662 F.2d
1207, 27 FEP Cases 799 (5th Cir. 1981) (decision enforcing an oral conciliation agreement reached
pursuant to Title VII).
W.R. Grace and Co. v. Local Union 759, International Union of the United Rubber, Cork,
Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, 103 S. Ct. 2177, 2186; 31 FEP Cases 1409, 1414 (1983);
Safeway, 714 F.2d at 577, 32 FEP Cases at 1472; United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 442, 27
FEP Cases 913, 919 (5th Cir. 1981); Southbridge Plastics Division, W.R. Grace and Co. v. Local 759,
International Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, 565 F.2d
913, 916, 16 FEP Cases 507, 509 (5th Cir. 1978).
" 103 S. Ct. 2177, 31 FEP Cases 1409 (1983).
14 Id. at 2186, 31 FEP Cases at 1414.
16
 714 F.2d 567, 32 FE? Cases 1465 (5th Cir. 1983).
" Id. at 580, 32 FEP Cases at 1475.
18 Id. at 578, 32 FE? Cases at 1472.
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Commission to resolve four charges of employment discrimination based on race and
national origin.' 9
 After investigating all four charges, the Commission found reasonable
cause to believe that the allegations were true.' As required by Title VII, the Commission
then attempted conciliation with Safeway regarding the charges. 2 ' An agreement was
reached in June and August of 1976, and was signed by Safeway, the Commission, and
the charging parties:" Safeway promised to give each of the four individual complaining
parties a seniority date retroactive either to the date he applied for employment or to the
first date another person was hired by Safeway following his application." In addition,
Safeway agreed to pay each employee an amount which reflected what he would have
earned had he been hired or promoted on the earlier date." The Commission and the
charging parties agreed not to sue Safeway on the underlying discrimination charges,
subject to the performance by Safeway of the promises in the agreement."
Several months after entering into the conciliation agreement, Safeway refused to
revise the seniority status of the four charging parties." Instead, Safeway gave the
employees seniority dates corresponding to the date each was hired or promoted accord-
ing to the seniority system established in the collective bargaining agreement. 27 After the
charging parties complained to the Commission, Safeway and the Commission entered
into a two-year addendum agreement whereby the charging parties would retain their
pre-conciliation seniority dates and, in exchange, Safeway would protect them from
economic loss in the event of layoffs due to the use of the less advantageous seniority
dates." Safeway performed the addendum agreement but failed to give the charging
parties their retroactive seniority when the addendum expired. 29
The Commission filed suit against Safeway in the district court for the Northern
District of Texas in February, 1978, alleging that Safeway had breached the conciliation
agreements by failing to assign retroactive seniority dates to the four charging parties."
19
 Id. at 569, 32 FEP Cases at 1466. Two of the complaining parties alleged that they were either
not hired or not promoted to the position of truck driver by Safeway because of their race. Id. Willis
Taylor filed a charge of discrimination on April 10, 1972, alleging that Safeway failed to transfer him
to the position of truck driver because of his race. Id. In a charge filed on August 9, 1975, Billy Faison
alleged that Safeway failed to hire him as a truck driver because of his race. Id. The other two
complainants, Fernando Cantu and Concepcion Rodriguez, charged that they were not hired by
Safeway for positions in its warehouse due to their national origin. Id.
" 714 F.2d at 569, 32 FEP Cases at 1466.
21
 Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982). Teamsters Local 754 was the collective bargaining
representative for Safeway employees in the truck driver and warehouseman job classifications
related to the claims of the charging parties. 714 F.2d at 570, 32 FEP Cases at 1466. Although the
Commission requested that the union take part in the conciliation process, the union did not do so
and was not a party to the conciliation agreements. Id.
22 714 F.2d at 570, 32 FEP Cases at 1466. There were actually three agreements, one relating to
the warehouse position claims and one each regarding the two individuals who sought to be hired or
promoted to truck driver positions. Id. at 570 Sc n.2, 32 FEP Cases at 1466 & n.2.
23 714 F.2d at 569, 32 FEP Cases at 1466.
" Id. at 569-70, 32 FEP Cases at 1466.
25 Id. at 570, 32 FEP Cases at 1466.
" Id. at 570, 32 FEP Cases at 1466-67.
27 Id. at 570, 32 FEP Cases at 1467.
28 Id .
29 Id.
" Id. The Commission filed suit on February 1, 1978. Trial testimony indicated that Safeway did
not perform the conciliation agreements because of threats received from employees and union
members. Id.
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Teamsters Local 745 was joined as a party under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.' While Safeway and the union contended that Safeway's performance of the
two-year addendum fulfilled its obligations to the employees, the Commission claimed
that the purpose of the addendum had been to give Safeway additional time to resolve its
problem with the union and employees while protecting the charging parties from
economic harm. 32 In 1982, the district court ruled for the Commission, ordered specific
enforcement of the conciliation agreement, and awarded back pay to the Commission on
behalf of the charging parties. 33 No judgment was granted with respect to the union." On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed."
After dismissing all the objections Safeway raised against enforcement of the concilia-
tion agreement," the Fifth Circuit considered the union's claims that, because the provi-
sions of the conciliation agreement violated the seniority provisions in the collective
bargaining contract, the conciliation agreement could not be enforced in the absence of
the union's consent or a judicial determination that the underlying charges of discrimina-
tion were true." In opposition, the Commission contended that the lower court's order
enforcing the agreement that provided that the charging parties receive retroactive
seniority was proper because the agreement did not replace the collectively bargained
seniority system, but merely afforded the charging parties their rightful place as specified
in the conciliation agreement."
The appeals court explained that the Commission relied on the proposition, estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co." and reiterated in
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States," that an employee who is the victim of
unlawful employment discrimination may be made whole by an award of retroactive
seniority, even though such relief may violate seniority provisions contained in the
collective bargaining agreement between the employer and a union." The court noted,
31 Id. at 570 n.5, 32 FEP Cases at 1467 n.5.
" Id. at 570, 32 FEP Cases at 1467.
" Id. at 570.71, 32 FEP Cases at 1467.
34 Id. at 571, 32 FEP Cases at 1467.
3' Id. at 577, 32 FEP Cases at 1472.
36 Id. at 571-76, 32 FEP Cases at 1467-72. Before addressing the claims of the union with respect
to the conflict between the terms of the conciliation agreement and the union contract, the court
considered three defenses raised by Safeway against the Commission's action to enforce the terms of
the conciliation agreement. Id. at 571-76, 32 FEP Cases at 1467-72. The court first rejected Safeway's
contention that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over an action to enforce a Commission
conciliation agreement, on the grounds of the primacy of conciliation in the Title VII statutory
scheme. Id. at 571-73, 32 FEP Cases at 1467-69. The court also rejected Safeway's claims that
conciliation agreements were unenforceable in federal court, reasoning that, so long as regular
contract rules are satisfied and enforcement of the agreement does not conflict with the parties'
individual rights or the purposes of Title VII, the agreement into which the parties entered
voluntarily is specifically enforceable. Id. at 573-75, 32 FEP Cases at 1469-70. Lastly, the Court held
that it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to have found that the addendum agreement
between the Commission and Safeway was not intended to excuse Safeway from performing its
promises in the original agreement but to give Safeway time to obtain the union's consent to a grant
of retroactive seniority to the charging parties. Id. at 576, 32 FEP Cases at 1472. For a discussion of
the addendum agreement, see supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
3' 714 F.2d at 576-80, 32 FEP Cases at 1472-75.
" Id. at 577, 32 FEP Cases at 1472.
39 424 U.S. 747, 778, 779 n.41, 12 FEP Cases 549, 558, 561 n.41 (1976).
4° 431 U.S. 324, 347, 14 FEP Cases 1514, 1524 (1977).
" 714 F.2d at 577, 32 FEP Cases at 1472 (citing Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S.
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however, that in the Franks and Teamsters cases on which the Commission relied, the issue
of employment discrimination had been judicially resolved with the participation of the
objecting union in the proceedings.'" This judicial resolution of the discrimination issue
was viewed by the Safeway court as a critical factor distinguishing the Safeway case from the
prior Franks and Teamsters cases." In a situation like the one presented in Safeway,
involving enforcement of an agreement which would infringe on the rights of parties who
did not participate in that agreement and without a finding that discriminatory practices
had occurred, the "presumption" in favor of retroactive seniority could no longer take
precedence, the court concluded, over the rights of the non-consenting parties.'"
In support of its conclusion, the Fifth Circuit put forward two cases illustrating
circumstances in which a court may enforce a settlement or conciliation agreement that
alters the union's collectively bargained seniority system, without union consent.' In
Southbridge Plastics Division, W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, International Union of United
Rubber, Cork, and Linoleum and Plastics Workers of America," the Fifth Circuit refused to
enforce a conciliation agreement between the employer and the Commission that re-
placed certain seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement with a quota
system." According to the Safeway court, the Southbridge decision held that, in the
absence of a showing that the union's seniority system was negotiated and maintained
with a discriminatory purpose, a conciliation agreement reached under Title VII that
would result in the "wholesale destruction" of the seniority system would not be en-
forced.'" The Safeway court emphasized the point made in Southbridge, that an award of
retroactive seniority may be granted to charging parties so long as they have sought
adjudication `!through the traditional Title VII route."'"
The other Fifth Circuit decision on which the court relied in upsetting the Safeway
agreement was United States v. City of Miami 5°
 In that case, the Safeway court noted, it
approved only those provisions of a consent decree between the city and the United States
that did not conflict with a union collective bargaining agreement." The Safeway court
adopted the reasoning of City of Miami that, where a party's contractual interests are
potentially prejudiced by a decree, that party has a right to a judicial determination of the
merits of its objection, notwithstanding the importance of voluntary settlement to Title
VII's goal of eliminating employment discrimination. 51
Finally, the Safeway court reasoned that the United States Supreme Court, in W.R.
747, 778, 779 n.41, 12 FEP Cases 549, 558, 561 n.41(1976); International Brotherhood of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 347, 14 FEP Cases 1514, 1524 (1977)).
42 714 F.2d at 577, 32 FEP Cases at 1472-73.
" Id. at 577, 32 FEP Cases at 1473.
44 Id .
43 Id. at 577-79, 32 FEP Cases at 1473-75.
48
	 F.2d 913, 16 FEP Cases 507 (5th Cir. 1978).
47 Id. at 916, 16 FEP Cases at 509.
48
 714 F.2d at 577-78, 32 FEP Cases at 1473 (citing Southbridge Plastics, 565 F.2d 913, 917, 16
FEP Cases 507, 509-10 (5th Cir. 1978)).
" 714 F.2d at 578, 32 FEP Cases at 1473 (citing Southbridge Plastics, 565 F.2d at 917, 16 FEP
Cases at 509-10).
" United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 27 FEP Cases 913 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane).
51 714 F.2d at 578, 32 FEP Cases at 1473 (citing United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435,
442, 27 FEP Cases 913, 919 (5th Cir. 1981)).
" 714 F.2d at 578, 32 FEP Cases at 1473 (citing United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435,
447, 27 FEP Cases 913, 924 (5th Cir. 1981)).
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Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 53
 had endorsed the conclusions the Fifth Circuit reached in
its Southbridge and City of Miami decisions." In W.R. Grace, the Supreme Court held that
enforcement of the conciliation agreement at issue in Southbridge, which "nullified" collec-
tive bargaining agreement seniority provisions, would not be proper absent either a
judicial determination that unfair employment practices had taken place, or union con-
sent to the conciliation agreement.° The absence of a judicial determination, the Court
reasoned, would undermine the federal labor policy that parties to a collective bargaining
agreement must have reasonable assurance that their contract will be honored."
The Fifth Circuit rejected the Commission's attempts to distinguish Southbridge, City
of Miami, and W.R. Grace on the basis that the conciliation agreements in Safeway did not
involve a "wholesale destruction"of an existing collective bargaining agreement between
an employer and its employees as did the agreements in the other cases.° The court
agreed that the effect of the conciliation agreement on the collective bargaining system in
Safeway may be less pronounced than in the three cited cases, but did not agree that
conflict with the collective bargaining structure affected the result on the issue of the
enforceability of the conciliation agreement." Rights to due process of parties affected by
conciliation agreements, the court concluded, should not depend on the degree of conflict
with the collective bargaining agreement. 59
 According to the court, awarding the charging
parties a starting date other than the date on which they began work displaced others on
the seniority roster, and thus constituted a violation of the collective bargaining contract."
In its opinion, the court recognized that requiring union consent to conciliation
agreements that alter the operation of a collective bargaining contract may interfere with
the Commission's ability to use conciliation effectively to resolve employment discrimina-
tion claims.° This result was required by law, according to the court, because, while Title
VII expresses an important national policy, it does not exist in a vacuum. 62
 National labor
policy, which protects agreements reached in the collective bargaining process, the court
concluded, is a factor that constrains the remedial measures available to employers and
the Commission through the Title VII conciliation process." The court stated that the
process of conciliation was a voluntary one and if parties chose not to agree, then
conciliation could not alter the terms of a collective bargaining agreement." Accordingly,
" 103 S. Ct. 2177, 31 FEP Cases 1409 (1983).
" 714 F.2d at 578, 32 FEP Cases at 1473-74.
ss 103 S. Ct. 2177, 2186, 31 FEP Cases 1409, 1414 (1983).
" Id.
57
 714 F.2d at 578, 32 FEP Cases at 1474.
55 Id. at 578-79, 32 FEP Cases at 1474.
59
 Id. at 578, 32 FEP Cases at 1474.
'° Id. at 579 & n.22, 32 FEP Cases at 1474 & n.22. In the footnote, the court stated that, as a
result of Safeway's assignment of retroactive seniority dates to Rodriguez and Cantu, those men
advanced ahead of approximately 50 other men on the seniority roster. Taylor advanced ahead of 39
other truck drivers and Faison, ahead of 29 truck drivers. Id.
61 Id. at 579, 32 FEP Cases at 1474.
82 Id.
55 Id.
64 Id. at 580, 32 FEP Cases at 1475. The final issue addressed by the court was the union's
contention that it was entitled to attorneys' fees as the prevailing party in the action. Id. The court
rejected this claim based on the rule that a prevailing defendant can recover fees only if the claim
against it was without foundation, unreasonable, frivolous, meritless, or vexatious. Id. No such
improper motivations led to the Commission's prosecution of this claim and the court, therefore,
declined to award attorneys' fees to the union. Id.
338	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 26:121
the court struck down the award of retroactive seniority dates in the conciliation agree-
ment between the Commission and the employer because that remedy violated the
collective bargaining agreement. 65
The Fifth Circuit holding in Safeway" is a logical extension of the Southbridge," City of
Miami," and W.R. Grace" cases. Those cases established the rule that conciliation agree-
ments are unenforceable where the agreements replace collectively bargained seniority
systems with hiring and promotion structures designed to eliminate dikrimination and to
remedy past discrimination where the union had not agreed to the change." Safeway
extended this rule to a situation where the conciliation agreement was designed to remedy
a few specific instances of alleged discrimination by granting retroactive seniority to four
charging parties."
Safeway, like its predecessors, Southbridge, City of Miami, and W.R. Grace, involves an
area where employment discrimination law and labor law intersect, and where the
mechanisms implementing the policies of each may interfere with the achievement of the
goals of the other. 72
 Under the National Labor Relations Act," the terms and conditions
of employment are to be shaped by the employer and employees through collective
negotiation." By contrast, Title VII requires the employer and the Commission to seek to
resolve discrimination claims by conciliation." As a consequence of Safeway and W.R.
Grace, the Commission and employer cannot agree to a remedy that will violate the union
contract when unions refuse to participate in such conciliation settlements.' Title VII
claims where all three affected parties are unable to agree on a resolution of the discrimi-
nation claim will thus need to be resolved through litigation." Employers and unions may
find it wise, in future contract negotiations, to bargain for a contract provision that
provides a mechanism for negotiating Title VII claims raised against the employer, the
union, or both to avoid being placed in the position of having to choose between
performing a Title VII conciliation agreement or following the terms of a union con-
tract."
ea Id. at 580, 32 FEP Cases at 1475
- 76.
" 714 F.2d 567, 32 FEP Cases 1465 (5th Cir. 1983).
67
 565 F.2d 913, 16 FEP Cases 507 (5th Cir. 1978).
88
 664 F.2d 435, 27 FEP Gases 913 (5th Cir. 1981).
" 103 S. Ct. 2177, 31 FEP Cases 1409 (1983).
" See, e.g., id. at 2186, 31 FEP Cases at 1414.
' 714 F.2d at 577, 32 FEP Cases at 1472.
7x
	at 579, 32 FEY Cases at 1474; W.R. Grace and Co. v. Local Union 759, International Union
of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, 103 S. Ct. 2177, 2186, 31
FEP Cases 1409, 1414-15 (1983). See also Gregory, Labor Contract Rejection in Bankruptcy.. The Supreme
Court's Attack on Labor in NLRB v. Bildisco, 25 B.C. L. REV. 539, 606-07 & n. 347 (1984) ("many
aspects of labor and employment law jurisprudence are in conflict").
" 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
" 714 F.2d at 579, 32 FEP Cases at 1476.
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982).
78 714 F.2d at 578, 32 FEP Cases at 1473 - 74.
" See, e.g., W.R. Grace and Co. v. Local Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, and
Plastics Workers of America, 103 S. Ct. 2177, 2186, 31 FEP Cases 1409, 1414 (1983). As a result of
this decision, the Commission and parties claiming that they have suffered employment discrimina-
tion will need to rely less on conciliation and more heavily on other compliance processes to obtain
relief. Charging parties may be forced to choose between accepting relief in the form of monetary
damages and promotion and pursuing litigation with its inherent risks to obtain the benefits of
seniority they could have earned but for the discriminatory acts of the employer.
" Id. at 2186, 31 FEP Cases at 1414- 15. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443
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In theory, the Title VII conciliation process and the collective bargaining process
could complement one another rather than conflict.' 9 Where only the employer is threat-
ened with Title VII liability, as in the Safeway situation, the employer could persuade the
union to enter the conciliation process to help the employer avoid a suit in exchange for
other concessions!' In cases where the union and employer both are potentially liable, it
would be in the joint interests of the union and the employer to work out a plan to share
the burdens imposed by the Commission." This scenario, however, will only be carried
out in practice if employers and unions view the Title VII conciliation process seriously,
and not as a means to delay and frustrate valid discrimination claims.
IV. AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
A. *Displacement of Incumbent Employees in ADEA Suits: Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp.'
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 2
 was passed by Congress in
1967 3
 for the purposes of promoting employment of older persons based on their ability
rather than their age, prohibiting arbitrary discrimination in employment on account of
age, and assisting employers and employees in discovering ways of meeting problems
arising from the impact of age on employment.' The ADEA protects individuals between
the ages of 40 and 70.3
 To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination
under the ADEA, an employee must show that he: 1) was a member of the protected class;
2) was performing in a satisfactory manner; 3) was discharged; and 4) was replaced by a
substantially younger employee with equal or inferior qualifications. 6
The ADEA aims to make whole the victims of discrimination and to restore them to
the positions they would have occupied absent the wrongful conduct of their employer.'
To effectuate the purposes of the statute, the ADEA empowers courts to provide appro-
priate legal or equitable relief, such as judgments compelling employment, reinstatement,
or promotion. 6
 Although the district courts have broad discretion to award or deny such
legal or equitable relief, 9
 there is little authority on the question of whether the court's
U.S. 193, 208-09, 20 FEP Cases I, 7 (1979) (decision upholding an affirmative action plan collectively
bargained by an employer and a union).
" W.R. Grace and Co., 103 S. Ct. at 2186, 31 FEP Cases at 1414-15.
" Id.
" Id.
* By Jennifer A. Parks, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 717 F.2d 114, 32 FEP Cases 1382 (4th Cir. 1983).
2 29	 § 621 (1982).
Id.
• 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982); see also Hodgson v. First Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818,
820, 4 FEP Cases 269, 271 (5th Cir. 1972); Gill v. Union Carbide Corp., 368 F. Supp. 364, 367, 7 FEP
Cases 571, 576 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
• 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1982).
6
 Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 533, 27 FEP Cases 47, 51 (9th Cir. 1981).
• Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Allegheny County, 519 F. Supp. 1328, 1336,
26 FEP Cases 1087, 1094 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Boddorff v. Publicker Indus., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 1107,
1112, 25 FEP Cases 1065, 1071 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
• 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
9
 Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1100, 30 FEP Cases 859, 865 (8th Cir. 1982);
Cline v. Roadway Exp., 689 F.2d 481, 489, 29 FEP Cases 1365, 1372 (4th Cir. 1982); Hedrick v.
Hercules, Inc., 658 F.2d 1088, 1095, 27 FEP Cases 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1981).
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equitable powers under the ADEA extend to reinstatement orders which result in dis-
placement of incumbent employees.
During the Survey year, the Fourth Circuit, in Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp. , 10 exam-
ined the question of the scope of the court's remedial powers under the ADEA and held
that relief in such cases does not generally extend to displacing incumbent employees."
Instead, the court held, the "rightful place" theory should be adopted. Under this theory
the injured employee is given full seniority rights, may bid for the next equivalent vacancy
on the basis of that seniority, and is awarded back pay in the interim to compensate for
lost earnings. 12
Plaintiff Spagnuolo had been Manager of the Builder Department of the Sales
Division of defendant Whirlpool Corporation in Charlotte, North Carolina.' In Novem-
ber, 1977, Whirlpool combined Spagnuolo's position with one held by Daniel Brattain,
and gave the new, combined position to Brattain, demoting Spagnuolo." Spagnuolo
brought suit against Whirlpool under the ADEA, and obtained a jury verdict in his
favor.' 5 The district court awarded him damages and entered a reinstatement order."
The order directed Whirlpool to reinstate Spagnuolo to either his old position, or to a
position of equal stature, compensation, future prospects, and responsibility." The rul-
ings were affirmed by the court of appeals, and certiorari was denied by the Supreme
Court."
Whirlpool decided to wait for an equivalent position to become available for Spag-
nuolo, rather than to reinstate him either to his old position or the newly combined one. 19
By May, 1982, Whirlpool still had not offered Spagnuolo any position, and the district
court ordered Whirlpool to continue to pay Spagnuolo lost wages." In June, 1982,
Whirlpool attempted to satisfy the reinstatement order by offering Spagnuolo a new
position.' The district court did not find the proffered position equivalent to Spagnuolo's
former position, and, reasoning that Whirlpool had been given sufficient time to find
Spagnuolo a suitable position, amended its reinstatement order. 22 In its amended order,
the court directed Whirlpool to either uncouple the newly combined position and give
10 717 . F.2d 114, 32 FEP Cases 1382 (4th Cir. 1983).
" Id. at 121, 32 FEP Cases at 1389.
12 Id. See United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 471 F.2d 582, 594, 5 FEP Cases 308, 318
(4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom. Bro. of R.R. Trainmen v. United States, 411 U.S. 939, 5 FEP
Cases 862 (1973); Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 988, 1 FEP Cases 875, 881 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919, 2 FEP Cases 426 (1970); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc. 279 F. Supp.
505, 520-21, 1 FEP Cases 260, 271-72 (E.D. Va. 1968).
" Spagnuolo, 717 F.2d 114, 116, 32 FEP Cases at 1383.
" Id,
14 Id.
le
 Id.
" Id.
" Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 25 FEP Cases 376 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 860, 26 FEP Cases 1688 (1981).
Spagnuolo, 717 F.2d at 116, 32 FEP Cases at 1384. This option is routinely available to
employers under the ADEA.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 117, 32 FEP Cases at 1384. The position was that of National Account Manager. It
required Spagnuolo to travel 75% of the time, compared to 25% travel time in his old job. It also had
no secretary or subordinates, while Spagnuolo's former position had a full-time secretary and 10-15
subordinates. Id.
22 Spagnuolo, 548 F. Supp. 104, 109-10, 32 FEP Cases 1377, 1380-81 (W.D. N.C. 1982).
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Spagnuolo his old job back, or replace Brattain with Spagnuolo in the combined posi-
tion."
Whirlpool moved to have its option to offer Spagnuolo a comparable position
revived, and simultaneously offered Spagnuolo a position comparable to his old position
in either its Dallas, Texas or Denver, Colorado markets." The district court rejected this
offer as insufficient compliance with its orders and reaffirmed its amended reinstatement
order!Th
Whirlpool appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit."
The circuit court granted Whirlpool's motion for a stay pending appellate review of the
modified reinstatement order, but denied the stay of the order continuing the lost wages
award, 27
 The court of appeals concluded that the positions offered to Spagnuolo were not
equivalent to his former position and therefore failed to satisfy the reinstatement order."
Consequently, Spagnuolo did not have to accept either of the offered positions to comply
with his statutory duty to mitigate damages.'
The circuit court then addressed the portion of the district court's order requiring
Whirlpool to either uncouple the newly combined position and give Spagnuolo his prior
job, or replace Brattain with Spagnuolo in the new position.' The court concluded that
the district court had erred in ordering that the unknowing beneficiary of the original
discrimination be displaced from either all or part of his job." According to the court,
although section 7 of the ADEA authorizes district courts to order employment, promo-
tion, or reinstatement," the legislative history of ADEA provided no guidance to the
limits of district courts' remedial powers." In the absence of specific legislative direction,
the court drew guidance, by analogy, to cases applying the remedial provisions of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 3° The Spagnuolo appeals court reasoned that the
analogy was appropriate because of the similarities between the language of the equitable
relief provisions in the two statutes, and their similar purposes — to put the victim back
into the position he would have occupied but for the discrimination."
33 Id. at 108-10, 32 FEP Cases at 1380-81.
" Spagnuolo, 717 F.2d at 117, 32 FEP Cases at 1384.
" Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 550 F. Supp. 432, 437, 32 FEP Cases at 1377 (W.D. N.C.
1982).
" Spagnuolo, 717 F.2d at 117, 32 FE? Cases at 1384.
" Id.
" Id. at 118, 32 FEP Cases at 1385. The court considered the factors of stature, future
advancement, and amount of compensation in its evaluation of the new position offered to Spag-
nuolo. Regarding the Dallas and Denver offers, the court reasoned that, particularly for an older
worker, the severance of business and personal ties would be quite burdensome and would put
Spagnuolo in an objectively worse position than he was in prior to the discrimination. Id. at 117-18,
32 FEP Cases at 1384-85.
Spagnuolo, 717 F.2d at 119, 32 FEP Cases at 1386.
" Id.
3 ' Id. at 121, 32 FEP Cases at 1389.
32 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). The statute provides, in part: "In any action brought to enforce this
chapter the court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate
to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, including without limitation judgments compelling
employment, reinstatement or promotion...." Id.
33 Spagnuolo, 717 F.2d at 119, 32 FEP Cases at 1386, (citing H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967), reprinted at 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 2213, 2218, 2222).
" Spagnuolo, 717 F.2d at 119, 32 FEP Cases at 1386-87 (citing 42 U.S.C, § 2000e-5(g)).
Spagnuolo, 717 F.2d at 119-20, 32 FE? Cases at 1386, n.3. See alto Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans,
441 U.S. 750, 756, 19 FEP Cases 1167, 1171 (1979).
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The court began the review of Title VII cases by noting that the Supreme Court has
directed the district courts to grant "the most complete relief possible,"" and that the
district courts have, in the first instance, been given broad discretion to fashion equitable
relief, 37 The court recognized, however, that the "rightful place" theory has been adopted
as the appropriate mechanism for injunctive relief under Title VII." In particular, the
court noted that it had applied the rightful place theory in Patterson v. American Tobacco
Co." and Sledge v. J.P. Stevens and Co.," two Title VII cases in which the court held that
innocent white employees could not be "bumped" to provide immediate positions for
individuals who had been subject to discrimination. In these cases the Fourth Circuit had
reasoned that a necessary compromise for the enactment of Title VII was the assurance
that the statute would not be used to displace innocent incumbent workers in favor of
victims of discrimination. 4 '
In Spagnuolo itself, the Fourth Circuit noted several policy reasons that justified its
Patterson and Sledge holdings. First, the practice of "bumping" would result in resistance
from white employees who had reasonable job expectations and who had not themselves
engaged in discrimination. 42 Second, the court recognized that bumping might require
the displacement of other black employees.* Third, wholesale bumping orders could
improperly involve the district court in the operations of the business." Fourth, back pay
awards are available to compensate the aggrieved employees during the delays in
reinstatement often inherent in the rightful place theory of filling vacancies.* Finally,
while the court recognized that this method would result in injured employees temporar-
ily performing less desirable jobs, albeit at high pay, it found that such was the inevitable
result of the congressional process by which Title VII was enacted. 4° Finding that these
policy reasons applied equally well to ADEA, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the
district court's authority to fashion relief to the injured employee under the ADEA should
not extend to ordering the displacement of an incumbent employee.'" Rather, the court
directed the district court to adopt the rightful place theory when applying ADEA.
The court went on to note, however, that the district court's original reinstatement
order was in accordance with the rightful place theory, because it did not require the
bumping of Brattain. 48 The district court had only amended its order because of
Spagnuolo, 717 F.2d at 120, 32 FEP Cases at 1386 (citing Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 (1976)).
37 Spagnuolo, 717 F.2d at 120, 32 FEP Cases at 1386.
38 Id. Under the rightful place theory, a victim of discrimination can bid for jobs on the basis of
seniority as those jobs become available. If he meets the existing ability requirements for the job, he is
entitled to fill it, without regard to the seniority expectations of junior employees. He cannot,
however, "bump" innocent employees out of their current positions, even though those employees
may hold their positions as a result of the employer's discriminatory practices. See Note, Title VII,
Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1260, 1268-69 (1967).
pe 535 F.2d 257, 12 FEP Cases 314 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920, 13 FEP Cases 1808
(1976).
4° 585 F.2d 625, 18 FEP Cases 261 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979).
▪ Patterson, 535 F.2d at 268, 12 FEP Cases at 325.
• Spagnuolo, 717 F.2d at 120-21, 32 FEP Cases at 1387.
" Id.
" Id.
" Id.
" Id.
" Id.
" Id.
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Whirlpool's apparent noncompliance with the original order." The appeals court in-
ferred that Whirlpool was not making a reasonable effort to place Spagnuolo in an
appropriate vacancy, basing its determination on the lower court finding concerning the
size of the corporation and the substantial time that had elapsed before it made any offer
to Spagnuolo. 5°
In light of this finding of unreasonable noncompliance with the district court's
original order, the circuit court directed the district court to adopt an alternative proce-
dure for enforcement of the ADEA. The court instructed the district court to issue such
orders as "both afforded and required Whirlpool to demonstrate" its compliance with the
reinstatement order. 5 ' The appeals court suggested that, in place of bumping Brattain
from his position, the district court should require Whirlpool to disclose information
regarding which positions it considered equivalent to that previously held by Spagnuolo,
and whether anyone had been promoted to those positions since the reinstatement order
took effect. 53
 In addition, the appeals court stated, the district court could inquire as to
what steps Whirlpool had taken to offer Brattain a comparable job in another location, in
an attempt to accomodate both Brattain and Spagnuolo. 53
The court then suggested, a limited exception to the general rule against court-
ordered bumping under the ADEA. Should the district court's inquiry disclose that
Whirlpool had filled a vacancy in a job comparable to Spagnuolo's old position after the
district court's reinstatement order, the circuit court stated that the district court would be
authorized to bump the new incumbent and order that that position be given to Spag-
nuolo." The court reasoned that this bumping was authorized because it displaces an
employee whose promotion or hiring was in violation of the court's rightful place order,
and who is not presumed to be an innocent beneficiary. 55 Should the information reveal
that Whirlpool had attempted in good faith to comply with the reinstatement order,
however, the appeals court held, the district court must simply continue its rightful place
order, with back pay awards continuing to be paid to Spagnuolo. 5"
Spagnuolo is not the first case to analogize to Title VII to define the scope and
operation of the ADEA. Analogies between the ADEA and Title VII have been drawn by
various courts for other issues under the ADEA. 57 As the Spagnuolo court noted, the
Supreme Court has recognized the validity in certain instances of analogies between the
enforcement provisions of the ADEA and Title VII." The Supreme Court has also noted,
however, that there are significant differences in the remedial provisions of Title VII and
the ADEA. 5" The ADEA was based on, and incorporates by reference, the Fair Labor
Standards Act (ELSA)," while the model for Title VII was the National Labor Relations
49 Id. at 121, 32 FEP Cases at 1388.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 121-22, 32 FEP Cases at 1388.
53 Id. at 122, 32 FEP Cases at 1388.
" Id.
55 Id.
" Id.
See Massarsky v. Gen. Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 117, 31 FEP Cases 832, 839 (3d Cir. 1983);
Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003, 1007, 20 FEP Cases 29, 34 (1st Cir. 1979).
Spagnuolo, 717 F.2d at 119, 32 FEP Cases at 1386, n.3 (citing Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441
U.S. 750, 768-69, 19 FEP Cases 1167, 1172 (1979)).
59 Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584, 16 FEP Cases 885, 892 (1977).
" Id. at 582, 16 FEP Cases at 891; 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1982).
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Act." Indeed, in drafting the enforcement provisions of the ADEA, Congress rejected
Title VII procedures in favor of incorporating the FLSA procedures." Accordingly,
Congress provided for "legal or equitable relief" in the ADEA, but did not authorize
"legal" relief in so many words under Title VII. 63 Therefore, the ADEA, like the FLSA,
provides that employers "shall be liable" for amounts deemed unpaid minimum wages or
overtime compensation. Under Title VII, conversely, back pay awards are a matter of
equitable discretion."
The differences between the remedial and procedural provisions of the two laws
support the argument that courts need not rely on Title VII cases in deciding the issue of
displacement of incumbent employees. 63 Instead, the question ought to be asked whether
sufficient differences exist between the victims of age discrimination and those of racial or
sex discrimination to require that older employees be allowed to bump incumbents while
women and minorities are not. In Spagnuolo, the plaintiff was removed from his position
in November 1977. The circuit court's decision now requires him to extend his six year
wait for a position under the rightful place theory. A lengthy wait for a vacancy may well
be more harmful to an older worker who is protected under the ADEA, yet approaching
retirement age. While the victim of discrimination is receiving back pay during this
period, he is not enjoying the intangible benefits of his former position, and .upon
reinstatement, will have less time to enjoy them than the younger incumbent. Examined
in this light, displacement of an incumbent employee may well be a more appropriate
remedy in the context of age discrimination than in cases of racial or sex discrimination.
Further support for such bumping is found by considering that the Spagnuolo court would
allow the plaintiff to bump an employee who was hired after the reinstatement order.
Such a distinction, based • on the assumption that the first incumbent is an innocent
beneficiary while a later one is not, may not even be grounded in the actual knowledge of
the incumbent, and may carry some of the disadvantages of bumping in the first instance,
as outlined in Patterson.
In Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc.," the United States District Court for the Central
District of California has adopted precisely this reasoning. The Criswell court recognized
that displacement of less senior employees was unfortunate and perhaps inevitable in a
shrinking economy." Nonetheless, it noted that it must assume that such a possibility was
within the contemplation of Congress in enacting ADEA.68 Displacement, the Criswell
court concluded, was not a sufficient reason to fail to effectuate ADEA. 69
Spagnuolo extends the analogy between the ADEA and Title VII to the reinstatement
of wronged employees, and does not require that the innocent incumbent be displaced by
such reinstatement. Rather, Spagnuolo requires the use of the rightful place theory in such
a situation. The question remains, however, whether the Fourth Circuit has reached a
proper result given that several years can elapse between the issuance of a court order
" 29 U.S.C: § 150 (1982)
62 Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. at 584, 16 FEP Cases at 892.
63 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421, 10 FEP Cases 1181, 1195 (1975).
" In the Spagnuolo opinion, the Fourth Circuit itself recognized that analogies between the
ADEA and Title VII will not always be appropriate. 717 F.2d at 119 n.3, 32 FEP Gases at 1385 n.3. It
concluded, however, that there were sufficient similarities between the language and the purposes of
the two acts 4.0 apply Title VII principles to ADEA cases. Id.
" 514 F. Supp. 384, 29 FEP Cases 350 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
67 Id. at 394, 29 FEP Cases at 358.
se
69
 Id.
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mandating reinstatement of an older worker and actual reinstatement under the rightful
place theory." This slow process may cause older victims of age discrimination to suffer
harm not suffered by victims of racial and sex discrimination. 7 ' As the reasoning of the
Criswell court demonstrates, that harm may be sufficient to justify displacing incumbent
employees to reinstate wronged older workers.'"
TO See, e.g., Spagnuolo, 717 F.2d at 116-17, 32 FEP Cases at 1384 (where the worker had been
waiting six years to be reinstated at the time the Fourth Circuit's opinion was rendered).
71 See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
72 Criswell, 514 F. Supp. at 384, 29 FEP Cases at 358.
